Contracts for August 25, 2021

On the same subject

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  November 7, 2019 | International, Aerospace

  Lockheed Martin Appoints Leader Of Future Vertical Lift Campaign

  WASHINGTON, D.C., Nov. 7, 2019 – Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT) today announced the appointment of Andrew (Andy) Adams to oversee all strategic and operational aspects of its efforts to support Future Vertical Lift (FVL), which will shape the United States military's helicopter fleet of the future. This appointment emphasizes that Lockheed Martin is bringing the full strength of its portfolio to FVL and demonstrates that the corporation is prepared to support accelerated fielding of these capabilities. Led by the U.S. Army, FVL will create the next generation of rotary wing aircraft that are faster, more maneuverable, more lethal, and more technologically advanced. Andy joins the Rotary and Mission Systems business from Aeronautics, where he was vice president and deputy general manager, F-35 Lightning II program. He has a diverse background in the aerospace industry with 31 years of experience within Lockheed Martin, including 29 with Lockheed Martin's Advanced Development Programs (Skunk Works®). Andy brings unique skills to the role based on his deep involvement in the pursuit, capture and execution of highly complex, highly contested capture campaigns. His appointment is effective Nov. 18, 2019. “Lockheed Martin is demonstrating its leap-ahead technologies today that will enable us to provide these critical capabilities to the U.S. Army in record time. For more than a decade, Sikorsky, a Lockheed Martin company, has been investing in game-changing X2 technology to support our customers' FVL missions with increased speed, agility and maneuverability,” said Frank St. John, Executive Vice President, Rotary and Mission Systems. “Coupled with our adaptable mission systems, sensors, weapons, advanced manufacturing, and training and sustainment solutions, Andy will ensure we bring the best of Lockheed Martin to Future Vertical Lift. He will lead the way as we advance industry and supplier partnerships with a stronger, centralized effort to meet our customers' critical missions.” Lockheed Martin's FVL campaign will integrate capture initiatives for the Army's Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA), for which Lockheed Martin is proposing its RAIDER X aircraft, and Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA), the Marine Corps' Attack Utility Replacement Aircraft (AURA), as well as S-97 RAIDER, SB>1 DEFIANT and international efforts. The FVL campaign will bring employees and resources together into a unified organizational structure, increasing efficiencies and preparing Lockheed Martin for rapid development and delivery of game-changing technologies and capabilities. About Lockheed Martin Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, Lockheed Martin is a global security and aerospace company that employs approximately 105,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. https://news.lockheedmartin.com/Lockheed-Martin-Appoints-Leader-of-Future-Vertical-Lift-Campaign

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  May 31, 2021 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Eyeing China, Biden defense budget boosts research and cuts procurement

  U.S. President Joe Biden’s first budget request for the Department of Defense slashes procurement by $8 billion, whacking scores of legacy weapons and systems as a way to deliver a $5.5 billion boost for the development and testing of cutting-edge technologies that could deter China.

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  June 9, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties

  By: Sarah Bidgood Russia recently published a new document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Its release marks the first time that Russia's official policy on deterrence has been made publicly available. As others have observed, this document is an example of declaratory policy aimed primarily at a foreign audience — and should be read with this orientation in mind. Still, it contains information that helps readers better understand how Russia thinks about nuclear weapons, and this certainly makes it worth a close examination. Some of the more useful insights this document offers pertain to Russia's threat assessments and what it sees as likely pathways to nuclear use. A number of these threats line up with American declaratory policy as reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These overlaps are noteworthy, since the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been able to work together to mitigate mutual threats even when their bilateral relationship is in crisis. As such, they can point toward ways to get arms control back on track at a time when it is in deep trouble. One such area of overlap appears in section 19C, which covers the conditions that could allow for nuclear use. This list includes an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions." The similarities between this language and that which appears in the 2018 NPR are considerable. That document identifies “attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian populations and infrastructure and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” as a significant non-nuclear strategic attacks that could warrant the use of nuclear weapons. These parallels suggest that an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear command, control and communications systems could be of interest to both Washington and Moscow. A treaty along these lines would help to shore up crisis stability while rebuilding trust and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. It could also become a multilateral approach involving the five nuclear weapon states, which have been meeting regularly to discuss risk reduction and other topics. This would represent one of the few concrete outcomes of these discussions, which have been met with cautious enthusiasm but have so far failed to bear much fruit. Another example of mutual U.S.-Russia threats appears in section 12E of the Russian document. Here, the “uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture” are described as risks that nuclear deterrence is meant to neutralize. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons seems to remain a focus of U.S. nuclear policy, too, and the 2018 NPR commits to strengthening institutions that support “verifiable, durable progress on non-proliferation.” This ongoing shared interest is an argument for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, especially as it relates to strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. There is a long history of engagement between the two largest nuclear weapon states on nonproliferation, even at times of major discord in their relationship. Successful outcomes of this cooperation include the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty itself, which the United States and the Soviet Union concluded 50 years ago to stop additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite decades of joint work toward this shared goal, the rift between Washington and Moscow has now brought most bilateral efforts in this area to a halt. As some in Iran, Turkey and Germany contemplate the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it's time for the U.S. and Russia to shore up the credibility of the regime they built. Other sections of Russia's document offer additional glimpses into Moscow's perceived threats, although not all find ready analogs in U.S. declaratory policy. Many relate instead to the possibility that an adversary will carry out a conventional attack on Russia. Sections 12 and 14, for instance, reference the risks posed by adversary deployments of medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons. They also mention the deployment of missile defense systems in space; military buildups by would-be adversaries of general-purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in territories neighboring Russia; and the placement of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapons states, among others. There is little here that would surprise most Russia-watchers, but if the U.S. is serious about pursuing “next generation” arms control, it is useful to have a list of potential topics for discussion that go beyond ballistic missile defense. This list might also prove helpful in negotiating asymmetric treaties or in identifying confidence-building measures that cross domains. Overall, this short document does provide greater clarity with respect to Russia's deterrence strategy, but it is ambiguous on many points as well. Olga Oliker, the International Crisis Group's program director for Europe and Central Asia, noted, for instance, it does not settle the debate over whether Russia has an “escalate-to-deescalate” policy, and it is (unsurprisingly) vague about the precise circumstances under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons. Still, despite leaving some questions unanswered, the document offers a valuable window into Russia's strengths and vulnerabilities as they appear from Moscow. While likely not the intended signal this document was meant to send, it nevertheless points to possible opportunities for engagement when other good alternatives are hard to see. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/08/russias-new-nuclear-policy-could-be-a-path-to-arms-control-treaties/