Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - December 02, 2020

On the same subject

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  July 20, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Solvay et Lockheed promeuvent l'innovation universitaire dans le secteur aéronautique

  La Libre Eco avec Belga Publié le 17-07-20 à 10h59 - Mis à jour le 17-07-20 à 11h00 Le groupe chimique belge Solvay et l'américain Lockheed Martin ont annoncé vendredi la conclusion d'un accord permettant la sélection de projets d'innovation des universités belges dans le secteur aéronautique, une initiative qui fait suite au choix de l'avion de combat F-35 Lightning II américain par le gouvernement belge. Solvay et Lockheed Martin, ainsi que sept entreprises belges (Asco, Coexpair, Feronyl, SABCA, Safran Aeroboosters, Sonaca et Thales Belgium) ont démarré la procédure de sélection dans le cadre de l'+Innovative Growth University Challenge+ ces 1er et 2 juillet. Soutenus par le gouvernement belge, les projets de l'"University Challenge" s'inscrivent dans une stratégie de renforcement des pôles de défense, d'industrie et de technologie de la Belgique, ont précisé Solvay et Lockheed dans un communiqué conjoint. En tout, plus de vingt projets ont été présentés par sept universités belges, reconnues pour leur expertise de haut niveau dans les matériaux avancés, répondant à l'objectif du "Challenge" qui vise à découvrir ou faire émerger la future génération de composites de l'industrie aéronautique belge. Solvay, Lockheed Martin et les sept autres sociétés feront leur sélection finale d'ici la fin août. Les projets concernent cinq domaines suivants: les matériaux composites de nouvelle génération, la diminution des coûts de production gr'ce aux technologies hors autoclave, le collage de métaux et composites, l'intégration des fonctions et simplification des assemblages et les techniques de réparation des composites. Les projets prévoient la participation d'un ou plusieurs membres des neuf entreprises impliquées pour assister le développement de produits de haute technologie pour le secteur aérospatial, souligne le communiqué. Solvay, Lockheed Martin et les sept autres sociétés avaient signé l'an dernier un accord-cadre visant à développer l'+University Challenge+ et stimuler la recherche et développement dans le secteur aéronautique. Cette initiative s'inscrit dans le cadre de l'accord entre les gouvernements américain et belge pour l'achat de 34 avions de combat F-35 de Lockheed Martin en remplacement des F-16 vieillissants. Selon ses promoteurs, les projets de l'"University Challenge" constituent une "opportunité unique" pour soutenir la recherche et l'innovation aéronautique en Belgique. https://www.lalibre.be/economie/entreprises-startup/f-35-solvay-et-lockheed-promeuvent-l-innovation-universitaire-dans-le-secteur-aeronautique-5f1167e7d8ad58621946a3bb

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  February 5, 2021 | International, Naval

  Northrop Grumman and Ultra Demonstrate Unmanned Anti-submarine Warfare Capability

  Northrop Grumman Corporation and UK-based Ultra Maritime equipped a modified, manned Bell 407 (acting as an MQ-8C Fire Scout surrogate) platform with Ultra sonobuoys, receiver and processor to complete an unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability demonstration. This successful demonstration of the UAS ASW mission on October 29 was the first time a vertical takeoff surrogate unmanned aerial system (VTUAS) had been used to conduct a large area multistatic acoustic search. The mission payload and effects were controlled from the ground with the resultant ASW picture disseminated to locations across the globe. “Adding an ASW capability to Fire Scout's existing multi-mission capabilities would further enhance this highly-versatile platform,” said Dan Redman, Fire Scout maritime mission expansion lead, Northrop Grumman. “This ASW capability would offer commanders flexibility to employ not only UAS systems in this particular ASW role, but also utilize the increased availability of crewed aircraft more incisively against an expanded mission set. This would increase the total available effect of the manned/unmanned teamed force mix.” By jointly developing and demonstrating UAS ASW capabilities, initially on an MQ-8C Fire Scout manned surrogate as part of an industry-led initiative, the two companies are combining their world-leading expertise and experience with the aim of bringing unique ASW solutions to global customers. While the U.S. Navy has not yet identified a clear requirement for UAS ASW capability, it has shown interest in the development and continues to support and monitor progress. “Operating prototype hardware in a high-pressure real-world environment can be challenging,” said Thomas Link, president of Ultra Maritime. “Our partnership will bring an innovative and leading ASW capability into operation, combining both manned and unmanned ASW systems that will help defend our warfighters and provide increased capability to our forces.” The MQ-8C Fire Scout can fly missions in excess of 12 hours, providing commanders an unrivaled level of layered multi-source/sensor intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and command and control/comms relay capabilities over land and sea. When operating in a manned-unmanned teaming concept, Fire Scout enables commanders to employ manned assets in a more focused manner, allowing them to exploit hybrid manned/unmanned teaming opportunities. https://www.uasvision.com/2021/02/04/northrop-grumman-and-ultra-demonstrate-unmanned-anti-submarine-warfare-capability/

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  May 25, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  The US needs to rethink its overseas supply chain

  By: Thomas Ayres As Americans respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, we have become acutely aware of the outsized impact of our dependence on China in the supply chain. Pharmaceutical companies learned key chemicals and minerals are exclusively made or mined in China. For instance, reports show China produces 97 percent of the antibiotics, 95 percent of ibuprofen and 91 percent of hydrocortisone consumed in the U.S. market. Hospitals also learned that while China produces 50 percent of the world's face masks, they are of dubious reliability. There is cause for concern with the quantity or quality of ventilators. In sum, we learned as citizens what we in the Department of Defense have known for some time: Our national security supply chain must be free from dependence on China. The DoD's concern for its supply chain is not new. Congress spurred activity over a decade ago by questioning the DoD's supply chain risk management, or SCRM, policies. The National Defense Strategy‘s recognition of a new era of strategic, great power competition further sharpened the DoD's focus, propelling recent efforts to enhance regulations and procedures in addressing supply chain threats. We are transitioning from analog to digital, with the goal of planes, ships, tanks and satellites all seamlessly sharing data — a lethal version of the ride-sharing app on your smartphone. Yet, even as the DoD builds this future, the threat of supply chain disruption and concerns about component quality within the electronic backbone are real. Counterfeit or planted microelectronic parts can be vectors for cybersecurity intrusions. Recently, for instance, the DoD voiced concerns that Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei's 5G solution provided back doors, purposefully or negligently, for data corruption, data extraction, system failure or worse. Similarly, SCRM policies have increasingly addressed the concern of intellectual property theft enabled by subcomponents designed to allow information to flow back to larger architectures. The COVID-19 pandemic is giving new meaning to that threat, and the risk of disruption to both raw and manufactured materials from abroad has become apparent. Our SCRM focus must broaden in response to COVID-19 to better address national production capacity and sustainability. Being able to assure access to the minerals, chemicals, subcomponents and components required to build weapon systems is essential. China supplies 80 percent of the rare earth minerals imported to the U.S., many of which are essential to electronic parts. Since 1933, the Buy American Act has required federal agencies, including the DoD, to purchase items manufactured in the U.S. Additionally, these items must be made from supplies mined or made in the U.S. The act is implemented by regulations requiring analysis of the components — where they are mined or made, and where they are assembled. Companies that falsify “Made in America” designations can be debarred from the federal marketplace. In July 2019, months before the pandemic emerged, President Donald Trump issued an executive order seeking to increase the minimum domestic manufacture thresholds above the current 50 percent floors. The pandemic now shows even more needs to be done. We must increase to President Trump's mandated percentages, and we must also analyze where each of the subcomponents are manufactured. This doesn't mean we need to back away from allied contributions or alliance-based weapon systems like the F-35 fighter jet, which benefits from the industrial cooperation of nine partner nations. But in light of COVID-19, it does mean that when we make risk-based and measured decisions to produce an alliance system, we program in several months' worth of component backlogs to allow continued production during future quarantines. The majority of our weapon systems are made in the U.S. by American companies with greater than 50 percent of component production and assembly done domestically. Yet, what is less clear are the composition of the subcomponents in the components themselves. Not recognizing the risks of the subcomponents equally jeopardizes the new reality of disruptions to our supply chain and risks of data extraction, degradation and spying, about which we have increasingly been concerned. Recently, I sought to buy a grapefruit spoon on the internet and found it exceedingly difficult to learn where the offered spoons were made. The harder it was to find, the more I suspected it was made in China. Perhaps Congress should pass a law making it easier to learn the source of manufacturing. Ensuring my access to an American-made grapefruit spoon is not nearly as vital as assuring our access to critical weapon systems, rare earth materials, and pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. A vital step is knowing the source countries of components and subcomponents. We must have deeper knowledge of the full supply chains of subcomponents, and how and where they are produced. Trust can only come once we know all that is required to understand our supply chains and we seek even greater focus in our new normal. Our security depends on it. Thomas Ayres is general counsel for the U.S. Air Force. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/22/the-us-needs-to-rethink-its-overseas-supply-chain/