Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - August 8, 2019

On the same subject

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  November 14, 2018 | International, Land

  BAE Systems Leverages Industrial Network As Ramp-Up Of Armored Vehicle Production Approaches

  Loren Thompson In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, production of heavy armored vehicles like tanks and troop carriers almost became a lost art in America. The Army and Marine Corps repeatedly deferred development of new vehicles, leaving industry with little work besides upgrading combat systems developed during the Reagan years. As a result, there are only two integrated manufacturing sites left where new heavy vehicles can be produced -- one for tanks, the other for almost everything else. I wrote about the nation's sole surviving tank plant on November 2. Today's piece is about the plant where almost everything else is produced -- the sprawling BAE Systems manufacturing complex at York, Pennsylvania. BAE Systems is a contributor to my think tank and a consulting client, so I have a fairly detailed understanding of what goes on there. At the moment, York is in the midst of a renaissance, having recently won orders for a new Army troop carrier and a new Marine amphibious vehicle. It is also upgrading the Army's Bradley fighting vehicle and Paladin self-propelled howitzer. The company is investing heavily in new machining systems and other capital equipment to sustain an expected surge in output, and is hiring hundreds of workers who must be trained to a high level of proficiency in specialized skills such as the welding of aluminum armor. This is all good news for the local economy, but to a large degree what BAE Systems is doing at York involves building back capacity that was lost during the Obama years. BAE Systems has been highly successful at booking new business in the armored-vehicle segment of the military market as Army and Marine leaders have become increasingly worried about their reliance on Cold War combat vehicles. An industrial-base study released by the White House in September stated that over 80% of new armored-vehicle production for the two services will occur at York. The study speculated that all the new work might stress the production capabilities of the site. However, that issue was thoroughly analyzed by the Army before it awarded recent contracts for Paladin howitzer upgrades and a new Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle to replace Vietnam-era troop carriers in its armored brigades. The Army found no significant capacity constraints so long as BAE makes suitable investments and hires skilled workers. The findings of the Army's industrial-base analysis are not reflected in the White House report. Here are a few reasons why capacity concerns are overblown. First, although York is the final assembly point for diverse armored vehicles, it is only one part of a nationwide manufacturing network on which BAE Systems relies to produce combat vehicles. The company operates other manufacturing facilities in Alabama, Oklahoma and South Carolina, including one of the nation's largest integrated forges for producing track components. It also works closely with Army depots (as does the tank plant), and has a supplier network containing over a thousand industrial partners. Second, preparation of the White House report predated release of some details concerning how BAE Systems plans to invest in robotic welding, advanced machining technology and other cutting-edge capital equipment. The combination of these investments and programs with schools near manufacturing sites to train the necessary workforce will provide BAE Systems with more production capacity than it requires to address projected levels of demand. Third, the current level of production capacity at York is the inevitable result of uneven demand from U.S. military customers over the last decade. The White House report identifies lack of stable funding as a key factor explaining the fragility of the military supplier base, but fails to explicitly make the connection in explaining why York is facilitized to its current capacity level. BAE Systems is now investing heavily to meet future demand, but it is understandably wary about building capacity much beyond what it expects to need. The latter factor is critical in understanding why there are only two sites left in America capable of integrating heavy armored vehicles. There were many more in the past when high levels of demand were sustained for decades, but industry can't carry capacity indefinitely if no customer is prepared to fund the resulting costs. The reason the workforce assembling Abrams tanks at the Ohio plant dwindled to less than 100 personnel during the Obama years was that nobody was buying tanks. This is not a hard connection to grasp. York has some advantages over the tank plant because it produces a diverse array of vehicles for multiple customers, and the industrial skills required are fungible across its portfolio. But if the Army or Marine Corps were to trim their production objectives for ground vehicles as they have repeatedly over the last decade, it is inevitable that production capacity will adjust to match the reduced level of funding. That's how an efficient industrial base works: supply matches demand. At the moment, the York plant is generating products that satisfy all customer technical standards. There are no outstanding issues -- which is a good thing, because BAE Systems and its legacy enterprises have been the sole providers of Marine amphibious vehicles since World War Two and today manufacture a majority of the combat vehicles in the Army's armored brigades. Company executives do not anticipate problems as they gradually ramp up to two shifts per day at the site. But the point they stressed to me is that York is the central node of an industrial network scattered across the nation, and there is adequate capacity going forward not only to meet expected demand, but also to cope with potential surges. The company estimates that combined demand from the Army and the Marine Corps will be the equivalent of one-and-a-half armored brigades worth of equipment per year, and that should be easily manageable within the limits imposed by planned capacity. They are confident the company can deliver what warfighters need, when they need it. https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2018/11/13/bae-systems-leverages-industrial-network-as-ramp-up-of-armored-vehicle-production-approaches

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  April 24, 2024 | International, Aerospace

  Airbus says it accepts request by Canadian union for conciliation

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  March 20, 2020 | International, Land

  Raytheon: Robotized Factory Speeds Up Army LTAMDS Radar

  The company is using extensive automation and a new generation of high-efficiency gallium nitride materials to accelerate development of the Lower-Tier Air & Missile Defense Sensor, LTAMDS. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.on March 19, 2020 at 7:01 AM WASHINGTON: Last October, the Army gave Raytheon a new kind of contract for a new kind of radar. Originally envisioned as simply an upgrade for the iconic but aging Patriot missile defense system, the Lower-Tier Air & Missile Defense Sensor has evolved into a multi-purpose radar that can share data with multiple kinds of command posts and launchers, not just Patriot, over the Army's new IBCS network. Its components use gallium nitride (GaN), instead of the traditional gallium arsenide (GaS), which means less electrical energy wasted as heat and more pouring out of the radar to detect incoming threats at greater distances. The program also takes a new approach to acquisition, using both the Other Transaction Authority (OTA) and Section 804 Mid-Tier Acquisition processes to shortcut around the cumbersome conventional process known as DoD 5000. Even the manufacturing process uses new forms of automation to speed up the process, helping to meet the Army's ambitious timeline. In this interview, sponsored by Raytheon, the company's Integrated Air & Missile Defense director, Bob Kelley, talks to Breaking Defense about what makes LTAMDS different. Q: What's special about the way the Army and Raytheon are developing LTAMDS? A: I think this is a great example of an Other Transaction Authority and Section 804 type of rapid prototyping program. It's very ambitious to go from a sense-off in the spring/early summer timeframe at White Sands Missile Range in 2019, to fielding radars to US Army soldiers in 2022. It is an ambitious schedule, but thus far we are on or ahead of schedule. I think a lot of that has to do just with the level of collaboration and transparency that you get from these types of acquisition programs. The OTA is a rapid prototyping program. This is not a [standard] 5000-series DOD acquisition program. The Army is looking for an urgent material release in fiscal year '22. And so, you back that up, you've got to deliver radars for testing in '21, and you had contract award in October of '19. Within 4 months of contract award, we had the first main array antenna, the one that goes on the front – there are two smaller ones to the rear. The first large front array is complete. Call it a prototype zero. That will be ready to start running contractor tests on this year. Q: What's your manufacturing process like to build these systems? A: We have our own nationally certified GaN Foundry on our site of our manufacturing facility in Andover, Massachusetts. So we're literally manufacturing the GaN chips about a couple hundred yards away from where we turn those into circuit cards, so that we can make GaN radio frequency elements to go onto the front of a radar antenna. So once those GaN chips are made, they come over to the circuit card assembly line, and from that point on there is very little touch labor. What you have is you have people that are supervising machines that are making these chips. It's not that people can't make great circuit cards, but you're going to be far more efficient and you're going to make a lot more. The machines are calibrated that every single card will be identical. Now, you need the humans there to make sure that it's identically right, not identically wrong, because if the first one's wrong they're all going to be wrong. But we take a lot of steps with a lot of quality control and testing to make sure that those are all done properly. Something else that's new this time around is adding some larger robots to our factory. We literally have a robot taking those circuit cards — that were assembled on a circuit card assembly line by machines — and delivering those circuit cards to another robot, and that robot will put them in place and install them on onto the radar. It allows us to have more identicality throughout the entire manufacturing process, but also to manufacturer these products much faster. A Patriot radar is still a very viable radar on the battlefield today, and we have partners that are purchasing them, but there's a lot of human touch labor on there, because some of the designs are a few decades old. This makes it so that we can create and manufacturer a radar in a much shorter period of time — and that's one of the things that is what's allowing us to go quickly here and meet the Army's ambitious timeline. Q: You mentioned Gallium Nitride – why is your ability to make that for LTAMDS so important? A: From our perspective, it's the power efficiency. So our radar takes power in and then it needs some of that power to power all the internal systems inside the radar: There's a whole bunch of signal processors, there's a cooling system — just like your car, there's all these auxiliary things that have to be operating to make the radar work. Then you're left with an amount of power that you are going to try to turn into radio frequency power, to push out and do things that radars do – detect, identify, classify, discriminate. The ranges and altitudes that you can do that at is a function of the efficiency of your RF transmitters and how much power you're putting in. What you'll see with gallium nitride is the efficiency, the output, the power output efficiency is unparalleled by any technology that's out there today. With the same amount of input power, you can see much further, see much higher and see much clearer. That's important when you want to build a ground-based air defense radar that has to be able to be driven around, that you want to be able to deploy on, say, a C-17 aircraft from the United States to some hotspot in the world. Well, that will limit you on the size that your radar can be. What you want to have is the most efficient radar that you can make, so with that size you can get the most performance and capability out of your radar. And we believe that's what we've done. This is not our first gallium nitride radar we've made. But with the improvements we've made to our gallium nitride over the past five to 10 years, we're calling this next-gen GaN technology. The efficiency on this radar far exceeds the efficiency on any other GaN radars that we produce. The main LTAMDS array is roughly the same size as the array on a Patriot, but provides more than twice the performance of the Patriot that's out there today on the battlefield. Q: What's the importance of the side arrays? Patriot didn't have them. A: The battlefield used to be linear – the good guys were on one side, the bad guys were on the other side – so bad things were going to come at you from generally the way you were facing. Well, the battlefield is nonlinear today. Now I can maneuver these missiles to attack from any direction I want. I know what your capability for sensing is; if I want to stay out of that, go all the way around you and come in from the rear, I can do that to you. You can be attacked by tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, electronic attack in the form of jamming, UAVs, fifth gen fighters. And they can bring them all in the same time and space to overwhelm your sensor capability. It's gotten to the point now, with the evolution of the threat and where the threat is going, that there is a requirement to have 360 degree protection. That's why we ended up with three fixed and staring arrays, so that we are always looking in all directions. Q: It's not just about LTAMDS itself – you also have to make this work with Northrop Grumman's Integrated Air & Missile Defense Battle Command System network, IBCS. A: There's a lot of intersections with IBCS as it gets ready to go into its limited user test, coming up in the next couple of months. This is the first US Army radar that is being designed and manufactured to be a native to the IBCS network. With Patriot and Sentinel, there are these adaptation kits that will adapt those radars and those shooters to the IBCS integrated fire control network. Those kits are not required with this radar: It is being designed and optimized specifically to operate in that network. It was actually part of the requirement: You had to demonstrate that you understood how to do that and make it happen. We get the interface document from the United States government and they say, “This is what you have to interface with.” It's that simple. [Editor's note: IBCS is a Northrop Grumman product, not one of Raytheon's, but the US government owns the necessary data rights and can share the interface control documents with other contractors whose products need to plug in. That's actually a novel approach to contracting and central to the military's pursuit of interoperable open architecture.] This interview transcript was edited for clarity and brevity. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/03/raytheon-robotized-factory-speeds-up-army-ltamds-radar