Canadian ‘Maple Hawk’ tour: Red Arrows to celebrate RCAF centennial - Skies Mag

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  May 23, 2019 | International, Naval

  Is Britain buying a warship? Depends who you ask.

  By: Andrew Chuter LONDON — Senior British defense procurement officials have found themselves on the wrong end of a verbal battering by the parliamentary Defence Committee. Lawmakers on Tuesday kept up growing opposition to an international competition to build up to three logistics ships instead of favoring a local consortium. Led by Defence Procurement Minister Stuart Andrew, ministry officials were forced to fend of repeated questions from the committee as to why they had opted for an international competition instead of awarding a contract to a consortium made up of Babcock International, BAE Systems, Cammell Laird and Rolls-Royce, known as Team UK. The officials cited the requirement to adhere to European Union procurement rules, known as Article 346, as reasoning for their decision to open up bidding to international shipbuilders. The fleet solid support ships could not be defined as warships and therefore could not be counted under rules allowing warships to be exempt from international bidding requirements, explained MoD officials. But according to trade unions and lawmakers, thousands of jobs, sovereign capability and wider economic benefits are all at risk if the MoD opts for a foreign bid for the vessels, known locally as fleet solid support ships. The deputy chief of the Defence Staff, Richard Knighton, warned the committee that stopping the competition, which could be worth up to £1 billion (U.S. $1.3 billion), would mean serious consequences. “The competition is already running. To throw that away, the risk would be very serious. In fact there is the certainty we would deliver the capability late and there would be a capability gap,” said Knighton, who is responsible for financial and military capability at the MoD. International shipyards Fincantieri, Navantia , Japan Marine United Corp., and Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering were invited in 2018 to bid alongside Team UK for up to three large logistics ships earmarked to provide support for the Royal Navy's new aircraft carrier fleet. In recent weeks the list of interested companies shrunk. Andrew said he could confirm Fincantieri's withdrawal but was unable to comment on reports Daewoo had also pulled the plug on its bid. An MoD spokesperson declined to say whether Daewoo was in or out of the competition. “The MoD does not comment on speculation," the spokesperson said. “Any decision to withdraw from the competition is a matter for each tenderer.” ‘Ludicrous' explanations The ministry's Article 346 explanation infuriated some committee members. Mark Francois, a former defense minister, termed the MoD's position as “patently ludicrous.” “You are treating this like a game. If you declare this ship a warship under the national shipbuilding strategy, you have to award it to a U.K. yard. But you are worried you will be over a barrel in terms of the pricing, so in order to prevent that you insist it's not a warship so you can compete it internationally in order bear down on the price you have to pay,” Francois said. Other members of Parliament said the position was indefensible and pointed to the fact that France and other nations had kept contracts in-house for similar ships. “Some have chosen to class it as a warship and some have chosen not to class it as a warship, and we are trying to pretend we had to [define it as not a warship]. That seems to stretch credulity," Defence Committee Chair Julian Lewis said. MoD officials added that by exposing local shipbuilders to international competition, they were trying to make U.K. industry more competitive, and not just for local orders but in the international market, adding that the industry can't solely rely on domestic work. What are the ships for? The logistic ships are part of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, an organization separate from the Royal Navy that is tasked with supplying warships with ammunition, food, fuel and other stores at sea, including in war zones. The ships are registered as merchant vessels and crewed largely by civilian staff, although they do carry defensive weapons like the Phalanx gun. Under the Conservative government's national shipbuilding strategy launched in 2017, the logistics ships were earmarked for international competition. The author of the original report, John Parker, is conducting a review of the strategy, which is due for publication this year. The budget for the Royal Navy and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary for the coming decade has £60 billion earmarked for building surface ships and nuclear submarines. More than half of that is for renewing the submarine nuclear missile fleet. BAE's shipyard in Glasgow is responsible for the construction of the first three of an expected order of eight Type 26 anti-submarine frigates. A competition is underway between three bidders to build five F-31e general-purpose frigates. Babcock recently closed a small shipyard in Appledore, Devon, after finishing an offshore patrol boat order for the Irish Navy, and there are concerns over the future of the company's large shipyard at Rosyth, now that the assembly of the second Royal Navy aircraft carrier, HMS Prince of Wales, is nearly complete at the Scottish yard. The Rosyth shipyard would be the likely venue to assemble the large logistics ships in the event Team UK succeeds with its bid. The Defence Committee hearing was the latest effort to crank up pressure on the MoD to change its mind over whether international companies can bid on the deal for the logistics ships. Recently, an all-party parliamentary shipbuilding group released a report recommending the government "choose to build new Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships in the UK and thus retain the skills needed for the construction of complex warships.” Bids for two fleet solid support ships, with an option on a third if the MoD can find the money, are due in late July 2019. The winning contractor would agree to a firm fixed-price design and build deal by July 2020. The first ship is due in service by 2026. The new defense secretary, Penny Mourdant, has also stepped into the fray, perhaps decisively. In her first speech as defense secretary last week, she signaled that the MoD is reviewing projects such the logistics ship program. Francois, the former defense minister, claimed Mourdant's announcement effectively awarded the contract to Team UK, although that was denied by MoD officials. “The secretary of state did not say that. She was explicitly asked in the questions after the speech whether she could confirm that fleet solid ships order would go to a British shipyard, and she said, ‘No,' ” the defense procurement minister explained. Britain has previously purchased logistics ships overseas. Four fleet oilers were recently delivered from South Korean shipbuilder Daewoo. The ships arrived months late, and the fixed-price deal cost the shipyard a pile of money remedying faults with the oilers. On that occasion there was no British bid for the work, although a domestic shipyard did secure a deal to equip the oilers with sensitive equipment like sensors and weapons. https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/05/22/is-britain-buying-a-warship-depends-who-you-ask

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  January 19, 2023 | International, Aerospace

  DARPA takes big step forward on X-plane that maneuvers with air bursts

  "We’re not actually pushing the vehicle with air, we’re using it to tailor how the air is flowing over the wing,” the former CRANE program manager said.

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  August 14, 2018 | International, C4ISR

  HOW HACKED WATER HEATERS COULD TRIGGER MASS BLACKOUTS

  WHEN THE CYBERSECURITY industry warns about the nightmare of hackers causing blackouts, the scenario they describe typically entails an elite team of hackers breaking into the inner sanctum of a power utility to start flipping switches. But one group of researchers has imagined how an entire power grid could be taken down by hacking a less centralized and protected class of targets: home air conditioners and water heaters. Lots of them. At the Usenix Security conference this week, a group of Princeton University security researchers will present a study that considers a little-examined question in power grid cybersecurity: What if hackers attacked not the supply side of the power grid, but the demand side? In a series of simulations, the researchers imagined what might happen if hackers controlled a botnet composed of thousands of silently hacked consumer internet of things devices, particularly power-hungry ones like air conditioners, water heaters, and space heaters. Then they ran a series of software simulations to see how many of those devices an attacker would need to simultaneously hijack to disrupt the stability of the power grid. Their answers point to a disturbing, if not quite yet practical scenario: In a power network large enough to serve an area of 38 million people—a population roughly equal to Canada or California—the researchers estimate that just a one percent bump in demand might be enough to take down the majority of the grid. That demand increase could be created by a botnet as small as a few tens of thousands of hacked electric water heaters or a couple hundred thousand air conditioners. "Power grids are stable as long as supply is equal to demand," says Saleh Soltan, a researcher in Princeton's Department of Electrical Engineering, who led the study. "If you have a very large botnet of IoT devices, you can really manipulate the demand, changing it abruptly, any time you want." The result of that botnet-induced imbalance, Soltan says, could be cascading blackouts. When demand in one part of the grid rapidly increases, it can overload the current on certain power lines, damaging them or more likely triggering devices called protective relays, which turn off the power when they sense dangerous conditions. Switching off those lines puts more load on the remaining ones, potentially leading to a chain reaction. "Fewer lines need to carry the same flows and they get overloaded, so then the next one will be disconnected and the next one," says Soltan. "In the worst case, most or all of them are disconnected, and you have a blackout in most of your grid." Power utility engineers, of course, expertly forecast fluctuations in electric demand on a daily basis. They plan for everything from heat waves that predictably cause spikes in air conditioner usage to the moment at the end of British soap opera episodes when hundreds of thousands of viewers all switch on their tea kettles. But the Princeton researchers' study suggests that hackers could make those demand spikes not only unpredictable, but maliciously timed. The researchers don't actually point to any vulnerabilities in specific household devices, or suggest how exactly they might be hacked. Instead, they start from the premise that a large number of those devices could somehow be compromised and silently controlled by a hacker. That's arguably a realistic assumption, given the myriad vulnerabilities other security researchers and hackers have found in the internet of things. One talk at the Kaspersky Analyst Summit in 2016 described security flaws in air conditioners that could be used to pull off the sort of grid disturbance that the Princeton researchers describe. And real-world malicious hackers have compromised everything from refrigerators to fish tanks. Given that assumption, the researchers ran simulations in power grid software MATPOWER and Power World to determine what sort of botnet would could disrupt what size grid. They ran most of their simulations on models of the Polish power grid from 2004 and 2008, a rare country-sized electrical system whose architecture is described in publicly available records. They found they could cause a cascading blackout of 86 percent of the power lines in the 2008 Poland grid model with just a one percent increase in demand. That would require the equivalent of 210,000 hacked air conditioners, or 42,000 electric water heaters. The notion of an internet of things botnet large enough to pull off one of those attacks isn't entirely farfetched. The Princeton researchers point to the Mirai botnet of 600,000 hacked IoT devices, including security cameras and home routers. That zombie horde hit DNS provider Dyn with an unprecedented denial of service attack in late 2016, taking down a broad collection of websites. Building a botnet of the same size out of more power-hungry IoT devices is probably impossible today, says Ben Miller, a former cybersecurity engineer at electric utility Constellation Energy and now the director of the threat operations center at industrial security firm Dragos. There simply aren't enough high-power smart devices in homes, he says, especially since the entire botnet would have to be within the geographic area of the target electrical grid, not distributed across the world like the Mirai botnet. But as internet-connected air conditioners, heaters, and the smart thermostats that control them increasingly show up in homes for convenience and efficiency, a demand-based attack like the one the Princeton researchers describes could become more practical than one that targets grid operators. "It's as simple as running a botnet. When a botnet is successful, it can scale by itself. That makes the attack easier," Miller says. "It's really hard to attack all the generation sites on a grid all at once. But with a botnet you could attack all these end user devices at once and have some sort of impact." The Princeton researchers modeled more devious techniques their imaginary IoT botnet might use to mess with power grids, too. They found it was possible to increase demand in one area while decreasing it in another, so that the total load on a system's generators remains constant while the attack overloads certain lines. That could make it even harder for utility operators to figure out the source of the disruption. If a botnet did succeed in taking down a grid, the researchers' models showed it would be even easier to keepit down as operators attempted to bring it back online, triggering smaller scale versions of their attack in the sections or "islands" of the grid that recover first. And smaller scale attacks could force utility operators to pay for expensive backup power supplies, even if they fall short of causing actual blackouts. And the researchers point out that since the source of the demand spikes would be largely hidden from utilities, attackers could simply try them again and again, experimenting until they had the desired effect. The owners of the actual air conditioners and water heaters might notice that their equipment was suddenly behaving strangely. But that still wouldn't immediately be apparent to the target energy utility. "Where do the consumers report it?" asks Princeton's Soltan. "They don't report it to Con Edison, they report it to the manufacturer of the smart device. But the real impact is on the power system that doesn't have any of this data." That disconnect represents the root of the security vulnerability that utility operators need to fix, Soltan argues. Just as utilities carefully model heat waves and British tea times and keep a stock of energy in reserve to cover those demands, they now need to account for the number of potentially hackable high-powered devices on their grids, too. As high-power smart-home gadgets multiply, the consequences of IoT insecurity could someday be more than just a haywire thermostat, but entire portions of a country going dark. https://www.wired.com/story/water-heaters-power-grid-hack-blackout/