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February 18, 2024 | Local, Security

Canada Undefended: Our military readiness is dangerously insufficient. Here’s how to fix it

The recent Defence Department results report provides a clear picture of the overall readiness of the CAF at barely 50 to 60 per cent.

https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canada-undefended-our-military-readiness-is-dangerously-insufficient-heres-how-to-fix-it

On the same subject

  • Canadian test centres and accelerators join NATO DIANA network

    March 16, 2024 | Local, C4ISR

    Canadian test centres and accelerators join NATO DIANA network

    Today, the Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of National Defence; the Honourable Bardish Chagger, Member of Parliament for Waterloo; Andy Fillmore, Member of Parliament for Halifax; and Darren Fisher, Member of Parliament for Dartmouth—Cole Harbour congratulated two Canadian accelerators and 13 test centres that have joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) network.

  • A new Defence Procurement Agency – Would it solve anything?

    November 5, 2019 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    A new Defence Procurement Agency – Would it solve anything?

    By Brian Mersereau Defence Watch Guest Writer During the recent federal election, the issue of considering a new Defence Procurement Agency or DPA surfaced again. The Liberals made such an organization part of their defence platform this time around as part of their plan to improve military procurement. While positive outcomes could result from a new organizational structure, simply installing one will not in and of itself create an efficient procurement model. It most certainly will not address in any substantive manner why taxpayers pay far too much to acquire the defence capabilities Canada needs to protect our sovereign interests in a world that has become increasingly unstable in recent years. It appears that, in many cases, Canada pays more per unit of capability to satisfy its defence needs than most of its allies. Unfortunately, though quite logically, this phenomenon has effectively shrunk the size of our armed forces as the number of platforms we can afford to acquire continues to dwindle due to high costs. While this approach can create short-term jobs, they are ultimately unsustainable since there is no international market for our higher-priced solutions. This is not the direction in which Canada should be headed. Before Canada decides to move ahead with a new procurement agency, it should assemble a “smart persons” panel or forum to thoroughly review the existing system and establish the mandate and objectives of whatever type of organization results from said review. Such a review group must be composed of people from the public and private sector with significant experience, not skewed with staff whose procurement experience primarily consists of exposure to the Canadian “way”. During this review, the panel must examine various issues which are currently perceived to be an impediment to the efficiency of Canada's procurement system. Based on my own years of experience on both the buy and sell sides of the procurement equation, the following areas merit some serious thought: Organizational Structure The fewer individuals, departments and oversight committees with their fingers in the “procurement pie”, the quicker and more coherently things will get done. Even at today's interest rates, time really is money for all involved in the process. Adding more time to a schedule for another management review quite often has a negative impact. While I understand governance and oversight committees have their place, their overinvolvement can produce negative outcomes if mandates are not absolutely clear and if individuals on these committees have limited experience with respect to the issue at hand. Risk Canada's ongoing method for defence procurement is that it will not assume any risk on their side of a contract. If Canada insists the private sector must accept all risk, the private sector will so oblige – but at a significant price and to the detriment of schedules and timelines. As contract prices necessarily increase, so do governments costs to manage the contract. In reality, the most efficient procurement solution for Canada would see some elements of risk managed by the buyer, rather than entirely borne by the seller. More consideration needs to go into balanced risk-sharing formulas. Process Canada has an extremely hands-on procurement process for major systems during the competitive phase, as well as during the implementation of the contract. Even in this digital age, Canada hamstrings its own progress with the sheer degree of detail and bureaucracy it requires; unbelievably, freight trucks are still required to deliver proposals. It seems as though, on occasion, the buyer thinks it knows more about designing and engineering the defence systems Canada needs than the actual designers and engineers for whom it is a primary occupation. Requirements of little or no consequence are painstakingly spelled out in the greatest of detail. Such an approach has a tremendous impact on the amount of time consumed by both the buyer and seller, again driving up costs and extending schedules. Less “hand holding” by the customer must be seriously considered. Sole Source In the procurement world, “sole source” is often viewed as a dirty phrase. Frequently, Canada attempts to run competitions in scenarios where the chances of achieving any meaningful savings or benefits related to competition are low at best. This takes years and drives costs higher at no measurable gain for the buyer. The parameters of when and under what circumstances Canada should move directly to a sole source should be thoroughly reviewed. Significant resources are being wasted managing nearly meaningless processes. Skills Canada's internal skill set for managing large, complex defence procurements does not appear to be adequate. As a result, it turns more and more often to the expertise of external third parties in order to keep up with large private sector firms at the negotiation table from a knowledge and experience standpoint. While there will always be a need for some third-party expertise, project managing many external suppliers in the negotiation phase – each of whom have their own agendas – only further complicates the already convoluted procurement process. Canada would be much better off with an enhanced internal core staff. If Canada takes the time to review the appropriateness of some form of DPA model, it must cast the net wider and review other critical aspects of the procurement process – or else any organizational changes will inevitably succumb to the systematic inertia of the overall process. A failure to do so means Canada will continue struggling mightily to stand-up the level of defence and security necessary to secure its citizens in an increasingly turbulent world. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/a-new-defence-procurement-agency-would-it-solve-anything

  • No timeline set for development of promised defence procurement agency

    January 6, 2020 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    No timeline set for development of promised defence procurement agency

    By Charlie Pinkerton; iPolitics Published on Jan 2, 2020 3:02pm Although Canada's defence minister has been tasked with working toward creating a new defence procurement agency to improve the country's often slow-moving system for purchasing military equipment, there's no clear timeline for when the new body will be put in place. In the mandate letter addressed to him by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and published last month, Harjit Sajjan was told that part of his job in this Parliament will be to “bring forward analyses and options for the creation of Defence Procurement Canada,” which the Liberals promised to advance toward in this mandate while they campaigned in the fall's election. “A lot of work has already started on (Defence Procurement Canada) and the goal of this is to make sure that we get the procurement projects done as quickly as possible to make sure the Canadian Armed Forces has what they need,” Sajjan told iPolitics the day before his mandate letter was released. Sajjan also said the Department of National Defence (DND), Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada and Public Services and Procurement Canada still need to complete “more work” before a timeline for the creation of the new procurement agency would be set. Some of the first steps of the Trudeau government to improve Canada's military procurement system was in transferring the responsibility of military procurements to being managed internally at DND. When the Liberals published its overhauled defence policy in June 2017, DND said that 70 per cent of procured projects were being delivered past their deadlines. “Cumbersome decision making and approval processes have introduced undue delays. Accountability among departments has been diffuse and at times unclear,” says the Liberals' defence policy (it's titled Strong, Secure, Engaged). As a response, the defence policy declared that DND would internally manage the contracts of all projects of under $5 million — an initiative which it said would reduce departmental approval times by 50 per cent for 80 per cent of all contracts. The defence policy is intended to lead how Canada's military operates beyond this decade. At the same time as developing the new agency for military procurement projects, Sajjan has also been tasked with choosing which company the government will choose to pay almost $20 billion to build Canada's next generation fleet of fighter jets. According to the current timeline laid out by the Canadian Armed Forces, the government will receive the final bid proposals from the three companies it deemed in 2018 as being capable of meeting Canada's needs (which includes Saab, Lockheed Martin and Boeing) early in 2020. If it sticks to its timeline, the government will pick which company will be its fighter jet provider by next year and will receive the first next generation jet as early as 2025. Sajjan's mandate letter includes another procurement-related list item; he's also tasked with advancing the renewal of Canada's naval fleet. There are four major navy procurement projects that are nearing their conclusion. Canada is buying new surface combatants, new Arctic and offshore patrol ships, new joint patrol ships and retrofitting its 12 frigates. The combined cost of these projects is expected to cost taxpayers more than $83 billion. Investments in procured projects account for a large portion of the $32 billion jump in annual defence spending that Canada is planning for by 2027. If achieved in that year, Canada's defence spending as it relates to a portion of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) would equal about 1.4 per cent. Canada currently spends just over 1.3 per cent of its GDP on its military two years ago. It has pledged to NATO to work toward spending two per cent of its GDP on its military, which is a common goal amongst allied countries. Over the past few years, U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly called on Canada to increase its military spending to surpass two per cent of GDP. Global News reported less than a month ago that Canada had multibillion-dollar discrepancies in the last two years in how much it planned to spend on its military and how much it actually spent. According to documents obtained by the publication, it had a discrepancy of $2.29 billion in military spending in 2017-2018 and a shortfall of $4.45 billion in spending last year, compared to what it outlined in its defence policy.

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