March 5, 2019 | International, Aerospace
Par Perspectives Med
Sur le stand de Boeing, une maquette de cet appareil, dont le concept sera baptisé Loyal Wingman, dévoilait des lignes conçues pour atténuer la signature radar de l'appareil. Cet avion sans pilote de 11,7 mètres de longueur disposera d'un rayon d'action d'environ 3.700 kilomètres. Ses missions seraient multiples : reconnaissance, renseignement et surveillance.
Il devrait également accompagner les avions de combat en soutien. Ainsi, le patron de la recherche chez Boeing a expliqué que quatre à six de ces avions pourront évoluer aux côtés d'un F/A-18 Super Hornet, l'avion de combat majoritaire des forces aériennes royales australiennes. Dans cette situation, en plus de pouvoir être télécommandé à partir du sol ou en l'air, l'appareil serait boosté par de l'intelligence artificielle pour pouvoir évoluer de façon autonome en sécurité lors des formations de vol serrées.
Boeing expliquait également que pour réduire les coûts, l'avion sera propulsé par un seul réacteur provenant de l'aviation civile.
L'appareil sera développé entièrement par la filiale australienne de Boeing. Pour l'avionneur, ce sera d'ailleurs le plus grand budget consacré à un programme de drone en dehors des États-Unis. Ce développement sera soutenu par un investissement de près de 30 millions de dollars américains de la part du département de la défense du pays. Le premier vol de démonstration est prévu dès 2020, pour aboutir dans la foulée à la production en série d'un Airpower Teaming System directement opérationnel.
February 24, 2023 | International, Aerospace
PrecISR™ radars are currently operated by experienced ISR operators from CAE Aviation in challenging areas of operations for various types of missions and for very demanding end-users
July 9, 2020 | International, Other Defence
By: Joe Gould WASHINGTON ― House appropriators on Tuesday approved a spending bill that would block plans from defense hawks to give the Pentagon a stronger hand in crafting nuclear weapons budgets. The House Appropriations Committee passed their Energy-Water bill, which contained the provision, by a voice vote. The $49.6 billion spending bill contained $13.7 billion for nuclear weapons accounts ― a $1.2 billion increase over fiscal 2020 that's still $1.9 billion less than the president's request. Lead Republicans voiced opposition to the bill, arguing that Democrats had not consulted with Republicans on pandemic emergency funds in the bill and that Democrats included policy riders the White House will seek to cut. The top Republican on the House Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies Subcommittee, Rep. Mike Simpson of Idaho, said the bill “still shortchanges funding for the nuclear weapons program.” “While I acknowledge the increase above last year, we must also acknowledge that the threats we face today are not the same threats we faced in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War,” he said. “We must adequately fund the activities necessary to maintain a safe, reliable and effective stockpile.” The bill would bar funding for the Pentagon-led Nuclear Weapons Council, and would prevent it from assisting with the budget of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous agency under the Energy Department. The Senate Armed Services Committee's version of the annual defense policy bill would allow the council to edit the budget request after the Energy Department crafts it and before the request is submitted to the White House budget office. The move was seen as giving the Pentagon extra sway to boost warhead programs and nuclear weapons laboratories. Its introduction came after Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette clashed with SASC Chairman Jim Inhofe, R-Okla., who backed a budget request for the larger number than Brouillette sought. The Energy-Water spending bill contains language ordering no funds “may be used in furtherance of working through the Nuclear Weapons Council to guide, advise, assist, develop, or execute a budget for the National Nuclear Security Administration.” Separately, the proposed bill would ban the Trump administration's reported plan to resume nuclear weapons testing. The bill would prohibit funding “to conduct, or prepare to conduct, any explosive nuclear weapons test that produces any yield.” “Critically, the bill would prevent the Trump administration from using any funds to carry out its dangerous and short-sighted plan to resume nuclear testing,” House Appropriations Committee Chairwoman Nita Lowey, D-N.Y., said in a statement. The Trump administration was reportedly discussing whether a “rapid test” could aid it in negotiations with Russia and China, as the White House seeks a trilateral nuclear weapons pact. The defense appropriations bill introduced Tuesday would also bar funding for explosive nuclear weapons tests. https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/07/07/house-panel-blocks-pentagon-from-extra-sway-over-nuke-budget/
August 17, 2020 | International, Naval
Mark Pomerleau The Navy's primary cyber outfit released its strategic plan for the next five years, a document that calls for using the service's networks as a warfighting platform. The document, released by 10th Fleet/Fleet Cyber Command in late July, covers the range of responsibility of the command, which is the only fleet with a global footprint in all the military domains, to include cyberspace operations, signals intelligence and recently, the Navy's component to U.S. Space Command. Much has changed since the last strategic plan was published in 2015, namely, the rampant activity of adversaries on a daily basis below the threshold of armed conflict to strategically harm the United States. “The long term competition we face today is between democracies and authoritarian regimes, freedom of navigation, and access to shared world markets. Our long-term strategic competitors are executing strategic cyber activities to alter the international order. This will not let up,” the document read. It added that adversaries learned the military's game but now the military must learn the adversary's game and play it on their terms. “Historically, to undermine a state's power required territorially-focused, overt armed attacks or physical invasion. While that is and will always remain a possibility, technology has provided our adversaries with the ability to achieve their objectives without traditional military force,” the document read. “Currently, our adversaries are engaging us in cyberspace and the costs are cumulative – each intrusion, hack or leak may not be strategically consequential on its own, but the compounding effects are tantamount to what would have been considered an act of war.” The Navy, and military by extension, must be prepared to contest this activity. “I am certain the opening rounds of a 21st century great power conflict, particularly one impacting the maritime domain, will be launched in the electromagnetic, space, or cyber domains. If the Navy is to fight and win, Navy networks must be able to survive those hits and ‘fight hurt,'” Vice Adm. Timothy White, who rarely speaks publicly, said in the forward to the strategy. “Our people must be trained and exercised to fight through those hits. This contest spans the continuum of competition and conflict. We must win this contest during the day-to-day competition of ‘peacetime operations,' where our networks are already in close contact, under constant probing and attack. If we do not, we will be at a severe disadvantage during crisis and lethal combat.” The plan, which continues to nest within the Navy's overarching vision of Distributed Maritime Operations, features a three pronged vision; acting first in full spectrum information warfare, fighting and winning in a fully contested battlespace and promoting modernization and innovation. Moreover, the plan tweaks the five goals outlined in the previous strategic plan 2015-2020. They include: Operating the network as a warfighting platform: Following several high profile network breaches, the Navy must tighten the screws on its IT. Fleet Cyber is responsible for operating, maintaining and defending the network and as part of that, service leaders recognize they must “fight hurt” when networks are strained. They are also working ton establish greater cyber situational awareness across the service and reduce the intrusion attack surface. Conducting fleet cryptologic warfare: Fleet Cyber published its cryptologic cyber warfare vision in 2019. As part of the new strategy, command officials said they will seek to expand and enhance capabilities in distributed signals intelligence as part of its contribution to Distributed Maritime Operations. Delivering warfighting capabilities and effects: Fleet Cyber wants to expand how it delivers effects on the battlefield to include accelerating and synchronizing information warfare capabilities across Maritime Operations Centers, advancing integration of cyber effects into Navy and Marine Corps concepts and creating tactical cyber teams along with a maritime fires cell to provide expertise across the fleet for delivering cyber effects. Accelerate Navy's cyber forces: Fleet Cyber needs to develop a plan to meet increased demand, both for its joint force requirements through U.S. Cyber Command and Navy specific requirements. Leaders are also looking to mature organizational structures and command and control relationships between various cyber entities that control forces across the globe such as Joint Forces Headquarters–DoDIN, Joint Force Headquarters–Cyber and Cyber Operations–Integrated Planning Elements. Moreover, with the additional importance of the space domain, Fleet Cyber will look to exploit the increasing convergence between space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Establish and Mature Navy Space Command: The document states that Fleet Cyber's goal is to “maintain maritime superiority from the sea floor to space with a core emphasis on lethality, readiness and capacity,” and so officials must re-focus to provide the best space integration possible as the service component to Space Command. The strategy also articulates Fleet Cyber's role in enabling Distributed Maritime Operations, which is underpinned by assured command and control, battlespace awareness and integrated fires. All of those require robust networks, information and completion of the kill chain. https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2020/08/13/the-new-strategy-from-navys-cyber-command/