Back to news

July 26, 2019 | International, Aerospace

Boeing drops from next-generation ICBM competition

By:

WASHINGTON — Boeing has announced its withdrawal from the $85 billion Ground Based Strategic Deterrent competition, potentially leaving Northrop Grumman as the only contender vying to replace the Air Force's Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles.

“After numerous attempts to resolve concerns within the procurement process, Boeing has informed the Air Force that it will not bid Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) under the current acquisition approach,” reads a Boeing statement. “We've evaluated these issues extensively, and determined that the current acquisition approach does not provide a level playing field for fair competition.”

Boeing Defense CEO Leanne Caret detailed the company's issues in a July 23 letter to Air Force acquisition executive Will Roper, which was obtained by Defense News and other outlets.

“Throughout the procurement process, Boeing has been transparent with the Air Force about its concerns with the competition,” she wrote. “The final RFP released on July 16 made only modest changes to the draft RFPs that had been previously released. As relevant to the concerns Boeing had raised, the final RFP extended the proposal submission deadline by 60 days, from 90 days after the RFP's issuance to 150 days, and allowed offerors to submit ‘an alternative proposal in addition to their principal proposal,' that could include ‘a single, combined proposal' from both competitors."

But Caret said that those changes did not address Boeing's primary concern: that Northrop Grumman would have an unfair advantage in the competition due to its recent acquisition of solid rocket motor manufacturer Orbital ATK, now known as Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems.

NGIS is one of two U.S. manufacturers of solid rocket motors, alongside Aerojet Rocketdyne, but both Boeing and Northrop had chosen Orbital as its supplier for GBSD prior to the merger.

According to Caret, Northrop only recently — as of July 3 — signed off on an agreement that would firewall Boeing's proprietary information from Northrop's own GBSD team as Boeing negotiates with NGIS for solid rocket motors. Even though an agreement has now been reached, Caret contends that Boeing does not have enough time to negotiate a competitive price for the motors.

Caret said the current acquisition approach gives Northrop “inherently unfair cost, resource and integration advantages related to SRMs,” adding: “As I said in my July 8 letter, we lack confidence in the fairness of any procurement that does not correct this basic imbalance between competitors.”

Even the Air Force's accommodation that would allow Northrop and Boeing to submit a joint bid “is not a workable solution to these issues,” she said.

“Because the final RFP does not address Northrop's inherent advantage as a result of its control of SRMs, Northrop retains the ability to compete on unequal terms against either a Boeing or a joint ‘alternative' proposal — and as a result, would not be incentivized to devote the significant resources required to develop such a proposal,” Caret said.

Additionally, Caret said it is “not realistic” to expect that Boeing and Northrop could develop a competitive joint bid in the five months before proposals are due, given that both companies have been working on their separate proposals for more than two years.

An Air Force spokeswoman declined to comment on the news, as the competition is currently in source selection.

Inside Defense broke the news of Boeing's departure from the competition.

Boeing's decision comes a week after the Air Force released its final request for proposals on July 16. A contract for the engineering, manufacturing and development phase is expected to be awarded by the end of 2020.

Lockheed Martin had previously competed for the contract, but was ousted in August 2017, when the service awarded technology maturation and risk reduction contacts to Boeing and Northrop.

It's unclear how Boeing's departure will affect the ultimate price of the GBSD program.

In April, Gen. Timothy Ray, head of Air Force Global Strike Command, said he was counting on competition between Northrop and Boeing to help offset a near-term bump in cost expected as the Air Force makes investments in current infrastructure that will be reused for the GBSD system. Ultimately, that competition would help drive “billions” of dollars in savings over the lifespan of he weapon, he said.

“Between the acquisition and the deal that we have from a competitive environment, from our ability to drive sustainment, the value proposition that I'm looking at is a two-thirds reduction in the number of times we have to go and open the site. There's a two-thirds reduction in the number of times we have to go and put convoys on the road.”

It would be unusual for the Air Force to move forward with this program with only one competitor, Byron Callan, an analyst with Capital Alpha Partners, noted in an email.

“One option would be for the Air Force to re-write the RFP to address some of Boeing's concerns, which could delay the program,” he wrote. “The RFP had been seen by some analysts as favoring Northrop Grumman because the initial portion was cost-plus, but Boeing's concerns suggest it's worried about a strategic bid by Northrop Grumman.”

During an earnings call on Wednesday, Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg referred to the GBSD program a single time — to say that the company would leverage its development work on GBSD for future programs such as NASA Commercial Crew effort and next-generation space launch.

https://www.defensenews.com/space/2019/07/25/boeing-drops-from-next-generation-icbm-competition/

On the same subject

  • Can Army Futures Command Overcome Decades Of Dysfunction?

    August 28, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Land

    Can Army Futures Command Overcome Decades Of Dysfunction?

    By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. ARMY S&T CONFERENCE: How broken is the procurement system the new Army Futures Command was created to fix? It's not just the billions wasted on cancelled weapons programs. It's also the months wasted because, until now, there has not been one commander who can crack feuding bureaucrats' heads together and make them stop bickering over, literally, inches. “I have not always been an Army Futures Command fan,” retired Lt. Gen. Tom Spoehr told the National Defense Industrial Association conference here. But as he thought about his own decades in Army acquisition, he's come around. How bad could things get? When he was working in the Army resourcing office (staff section G-8), Spoehr recalled, the Army signals school at Fort Gordon wanted a new radio test kit that could fit in a six-inch cargo pocket. The radio procurement programmanager, part of an entirely separate organization, reported back there was nothing on the market under eight inches. The requirements office insisted on sixinches, the acquisition office insisted they had no money to develop something smaller than the existing eight-inchers, and memos shot back and forth for months. At last, Spoehr warned both sides that if they didn't come to some agreement, he'd kill the funding. Suddenly Fort Gordon rewrote the requirement from “fit in a cargo pocket” to “cargo pouch” and the procurement people could go buy an eight-inch kit. That kind of disconnected dithering is what Army Futures Command is intended to prevent. “I had the money, but nobody really had control of all of this,” Spoehr said. As a result, he said, “we probably spent six months trading memos back and forth on the size of the radio frequency test kit.” Multiplying that by thousands of requirements over hundreds of systems, and the wasted time and money gets pretty bad. But what's often worse is when the requirements are unrealistic and no one pushes back. Most notoriously ,Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki demanded easily airlifted Future Combat Systems vehicles that weighed less than 20 tons but had the combat power of a 60-ton M1 Abrams tank. The designs eventually grew to 26 tons, and the performance requirements came down, but by then FCS had lost the confidence of both Congress and Defense Secretary Bob Gates, who canceled it in 2009. It was another casualty of overly ambitious requirements drawn up by staff officers in isolation from the people who'd actually have to build them. Army Futures Command is structured to force those two groups to talk to each other from the start. Full article: https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/can-army-futures-command-overcome-decades-of-dysfunction

  • New head of Strategic Capabilities Office wants to focus on AI

    September 24, 2018 | International, C4ISR

    New head of Strategic Capabilities Office wants to focus on AI

    By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — The Strategic Capabilities Office is under new management, and its new director intends to doubledown on the agency's emphasis on artificial intelligence. In his first interview since taking over the office, Chris Shank, the new SCO director, made it clear he sees artificial intelligence as a sweet spot for his office. Roughly one third of SCO projects deal with autonomous systems, machine learning or AI in some way, Shank said, including long-range fires programs, cyber programs and some assorted with special forces. Shank is the the group's second leader, following Will Roper, the office's founder who is now the Air Force's top civilian acquisitions official. But don't expect major changes in how the office works. “My job is to keep momentum going,” Shank explained. “It's a very high ops tempo group that [Roper was] able to recruit and attract into the office, in terms of working synergistic teams around that. What I am trying to do is take it from a startup organization to a long-term sustainable one.” Although they share some DNA, the SCO's mission is different from that of the Pentagon's technology office, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Where the latter is focused on finding and prototyping the game-changing technologies for future battles, the SCO is trying to understand existing needs and address them in new ways. Getting those projects from tests to prototype to a tool used by the services remains a central challenge, Shank acknowledged, but he said that is one of the office's core function. “Where SCO lives is the valley of death,” Shank said, referencing a term for when technologies infamously tend to fail. The SCO had been reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, but under the Pentagon's recent reorganization, it now reports to Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Mike Griffin. Shank acknowledged the importance of coordination within that office, particularly with AI, which now has a number of different centers of gravity within the Pentagon – a $2 billion push by DARPA, an AI center under Chief Technical Officer Dana Deasy, a directorate under the R&E enterprise, as well as various service-level initiatives. The R&E enterprise has weekly meetings to deconflict investments in AI, Shank said, emphasizing the different business models and goals between the groups. Shank described two programs — each named after pieces of the Iron Man movie mythos — as examples of how SCO can use AI to assist the services in the near-term. Paladium is a broader Navy logistics effort, which involves “smart sustainment” in support of fourth-generation fighter aircraft. A sub project for that is JARVIS, which involves putting a robotics suite out into the field with maintainers that can scan existing parts and quickly re-manufacture them. Shank said the office identified two parts that would require around 2,000 man hours to build out; JARVIS should be able to quickly recreate those, saving both time and the potential errors that come from human-machined pieces. Perhaps those projects aren't as shiny as some of SCO's other programs, such as the Perdix drone-swam, but finding areas where AI can be injected onto existing system and where “the human brain doesn't have to work” as hard will have benefits across the Pentagon, Shank said. The office is primarily focused on the Indo-PACOM and European Command theaters, Shank said. However, he expects to soon provide an update on the Sea Mob/Ghost Fleet initiative, which involves converting existing naval vessels into unmanned systems. He also indicated that there would be unmanned projects in air and land that are unveiled in 2019. One looming cloud for the office: an attempt earlier this year by members of the House Armed Services Committee to kill the SCO by 2020. However, when asked if he was concerned about that proposal, Shank flatly said “no.” He traveled to the Hill shortly after taking office to address that specific issue. In describing the conversation with lawmakers, Shank said, “'I know this wasn't your intent, but this impacted both morale and my ability to recruit talent into the organization,'” he said, “and they [said] ‘that wasn't our intent.'” The SCO is working on a report for Congress on the future of the organization. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/09/21/new-head-of-strategic-capabilities-office-wants-to-focus-on-ai

  • U.S. Army Orders Additional Enhanced CH-47F Block II Chinooks

    October 3, 2022 | International, Aerospace

    U.S. Army Orders Additional Enhanced CH-47F Block II Chinooks

    The separate Lot 3 advance procurement contract is valued at $29 million

All news