July 22, 2024 | International, Aerospace
December 18, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR
The military could save hundreds of billions — by capping pay, scrapping aircraft, slashing benefits, experts say
By: Leo Shane III
WASHINGTON — Analysts from the Congressional Budget Office say the government could trim hundreds of billions from the federal deficit by enacting a host of already discussed military and veterans program reforms.
The problem is that those reforms include some of the most controversial and politically unpopular policies of the last few years, things like limiting military pay raises, ending a host of military equipment purchases, and cutting back on veterans benefits.
The document released last week — CBO's annual “options for reducing the deficit” report — lists more than 120 ideas to reduce federal spending or boost federal revenues over the next 10 years. Authors said the goal is to “reflect a range of possibilities” of moves that lawmakers could make in dealing with government debt and escalating federal programming costs.
Twenty of the proposals would affect the departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs, including a plan to cut the Pentagon budget by 10 percent ($591 billion in reduced budget authority over the next decade). That dramatic cut would “require DOD to decrease the size of its forces, slow the rate at which it modernizes weapon systems, or do both,” which in turn would prompt a host of complaints from military leaders and defense lawmakers.
Still, the size of the savings involved show why the ideas continue to attract debate on Capitol Hill each year, even with the significant disruptions they may bring.
Here is a look at some of the other potential VA and Pentagon moves:
Limit pay raises for troops ($18 billion in savings over 10 years)
The CBO idea would give troops an annual raise of 0.5 percent less than the expected growth in civilian salaries. Service members would still see annual raises, but opponents of the idea argue that those increases wouldn't keep up with the cost of living for military families.
President Barack Obama's Pentagon capped the military raises at this level for three years during his presidency, leading to criticism from advocates that he had created a new gap in military and civilian wages. President Donald Trump suggested a 0.3 percent reduction in the expected raise formula in his first budget, but saw the proposal rejected by Congress.
Narrow eligibility for VA disability benefits ($33 billion over 10 years)
The CBO plan would drop a host of conditions not directly related to military service — illnesses like arteriosclerotic heart disease, hemorrhoids and multiple sclerosis — from the list of claims eligible for disability benefits. More than 750,000 veterans' checks would be affected by the move.
Any such trims in benefits have prompted harsh attacks from veterans groups, who have accused supporters of breaking faith with men and women who were promised lifelong assistance for their military service.
Cancel new F-35 purchases ($16 billion over 10 years), retire the F-22 fleet ($30 billion over 10 years) and delay development of the B-21 bomber until after 2028 ($45 billion over 10 years)
All three ideas would require Air Force officials to continue using aging aircraft, a concern for Pentagon planners who have seen a spike in aviation accidents in recent years.
The CBO report acknowledged that a disadvantage of the idea would be making the military “less flexible against advanced enemy air defense systems” but said the current mix of aircraft types already in use by the services would mitigate some of those concerns.
Stop building Ford-class aircraft carriers ($18 billion over 10 years)
Under this option, the Navy would stop building new aircraft carriers after the USS Enterprise, scheduled to be completed in 2027. A carrier set for the start of construction in 2023 would be scrapped.
The CBO report argues that even with the move, the Navy would still have 11 active carriers until 2036 given its current fleet size. However, defense lawmakers have long argued against any delays in ship building schedules, given the long wait for construction and fielding of new vessels.
End VA's Individual Unemployability program for retirement-age veterans ($48 billion over 10 years)
Trump also suggested this idea in his first VA budget, only to have lawmakers and veterans groups soundly reject it.
The IU program provides extra benefits to veterans unable to work because of disabilities, even if they don't have a 100 percent disabled rating. Supporters have argued that money should stop once Social Security payouts begin. Opponents of the idea could leave as many as 235,000 veterans in dire financial need.
Reduce military housing allowances to 80 percent of rent costs ($15 billion over 10 years)
Under this plan, BAH payments wouldn't change for troops until they move, but it would slowly increase their out-of-pocket costs for housing. The change would also create savings for the VA, since post-9/11 GI Bill housing stipends are tied to the military housing formula.
Similar BAH reform proposals on Capitol Hill have met fierce opposition in recent years. Advocates argue that since military members have little say in their next duty assignment, they shouldn't have to shoulder the costs of unexpected moves and expensive housing costs.
Replace thousands of troops with civilian workers ($17 billion over 10 years)
The CBO idea calls for reducing military end strength by 80,000 over four years and replacing them with 64,000 civilian employees. The work would not be directly related to warfighting, and the health care and ancillary costs of non-military workers would create significant savings compared to service members' benefits.
But Congress has worked to increase the military's end strength in recent years, saying it brings more readiness and flexibility to the overall force. An end-strength cut of that size would represent a major political backtrack for many elected officials.
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July 10, 2020 | International, C4ISR
Moving further into the information age with Joint All-Domain Command and Control
Lt. Gen. David Deptula (ret.) The United States' comparative military advantage has eroded significantly as the technologies that helped sustain its primacy since the Cold War have proliferated to great power and regional competitors such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. They have evolved their capabilities and operational approaches to negate and otherwise avoid traditional American warfighting strengths. The United States is highly unlikely to regain its competitive advantage through like-for-like replacements of its legacy platforms with incremental improvements while remaining beholden to industrial age notions of warfare focused on individual weapon systems focused on inflicting attrition. Instead, future success demands that the U.S. military embrace a new approach. Advancements in computing and information technology hold the potential to radically transform how military forces attain desired effects, where success depends foremost on the speed and integration of information. By harnessing information technologies to promote the rapid and seamless exchange of information across platforms, domains, services, and even coalition partners, commanders can make faster decisions and better integrate actions across domains. In such a manner, we can enable friendly forces to operate inside the adversary's decision-making cycle and impose multiple, simultaneous dilemmas that collectively confound and paralyze an adversary's ability to respond. To put it simply — it comes down to understanding the battlespace to know when and where to position forces to maximize their effectiveness, while minimizing vulnerabilities. Realizing this future vision of combat, however, faces challenges given legacy command and control (C2) systems and processes currently in use that were not designed for the speed and complexity that information age all-domain operations demand. Overcoming these constraints will require not just material changes involving technology, but also a shift in how the role of networks and information systems are perceived relative to weapons and platforms. Recognizing this, military leaders are pursuing joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) as the guiding construct to address these challenges. Undeniably an ambitious undertaking, the success of JADC2 will ultimately depend upon having a champion at the top of the Department of Defense that will guide the modernization of related policy, acquisition, and concepts of operations toward a common goal that all relevant stakeholders can understand and accept as the desired way forward. Progress to date Although U.S. forces can presently conduct multi-domain operations, current practices are far from what will be required when facing advanced adversaries. Each service branch and coalition partner organize, train, and equip their own forces, which joint force commanders then stitch together in a federated “joint and combined” employment construct. This ensures that military personnel and their communications and weapon systems can work together in a synchronized fashion. In other words, the services tend to develop their capabilities in a stand-alone manner focused around their primary operating domain without an overarching construct to ensure joint or allied partner interoperability. This often leads to strategies focused on deconfliction versus collaborative partnership or the interdependence required to achieve force multiplying effects with available resources. As a result, the employment of these capabilities is at best additive, rather than complementary where each one enhances the effectiveness of the whole, while compensating for the vulnerabilities of other assets, optimizing the force's overall capacity for dynamic exploitation of opportunities. The good news is the services agree that data is the principal currency of future warfare and that leveraging data through a network that connects forces across both domains and services to seamlessly collect, process, and share data will provide an asymmetric advantage in future conflicts. The bad news is that the services are pursuing a number of individual, stove-piped efforts aligned with their own distinct requirements. The development of concepts such as Multi-Domain Operations, Multi-Domain Command and Control, Distributed Maritime Operations, and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, as well as their associated capabilities such as the Cooperative Engagement Capability and the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System, have been sporadic and uncoordinated, consisting of dozens of programs being developed independently and lacking a coherent vision to align mission requirements and reconcile gaps or redundancies. To better streamline and synchronize these efforts under the JADC2 banner, the joint staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense created a joint cross-functional team including representatives from the offices of the DOD Chief Information Officer, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment. This body is charged with bringing the services together to develop the JADC2 construct by identifying gaps and requirements, enhancing experimentation collaboration, and recommending resource allocation for both materiel and non-materiel C2 capability improvements, while also being mindful of the distinct capabilities inherent in each service and government security organization. At the same time, the Secretary of Defense has tasked the joint staff to deliver a warfighting concept that outlines how the U.S. military plans to fight in the future — a much needed update to existing joint concepts that are becoming increasingly outdated. By describing the capabilities and attributes necessary to fight effectively in the future operating environment—including for JADC2 — this concept will inform the requirements that are produced by the joint requirements oversight council and pushed out to the services. This top-down guidance is critical to help inform bottom-up technological development and experimentation. Although each of the services has been active developing related technologies, the Air Force has taken the rare step of volunteering to lead JADC2′s development as a joint function. Currently, these efforts center on the Advanced Battle Management System — essentially a “combat cloud” to connect any sensor with any shooter across all domains—that the Air Force is using as its technical engine for enabling JADC2. To help field new capabilities as fast as possible and cultivate broader buy-in, the Air Force is partnering with the other services to conduct small-scale field demonstrations scheduled for every four months. The first experiment was completed in December 2019, which connected Air Force aircraft, Space Force sensors, Navy surface vessels and aircraft, Army air defense and fire units, and a Special Operations Team with incompatible data and communications systems to defeat a simulated cruise missile. These efforts are intended to develop both the architecture and the technologies required to implement JADC2. As currently envisioned, ABMS includes six key “product categories” and 28 specific “product lines” the Air Force intends to develop over time. Underpinning all these efforts is digital engineering, open architecture, and data standards that allow all the disparate elements to ‘snap' together. Obstacles remain Despite encouraging progress and widespread agreement of the necessity for JADC2 across the services and other relevant defense agencies in the DOD, significant obstacles remain before its full potential can be realized. Foremost among these challenges, current organizational structures and service cultures do not align well with JADC2′s emphasis on employing assets in service- and domain-agnostic ways that entail dynamically connecting sensors and shooters across domains and enabling multiple, rapid shifts in supporting/supported relationships. Specifically, JADC2 raises difficult questions regarding who has decision authority and risk acceptance. Although joint force commanders exercise operational control over joint forces and are tasked to maintain conditions for joint force success, the subordinate command structure tends to exacerbate military service and domain stovepipes that are resistant to ceding control over their assets. Similar frictions are likely to extend beyond a single combatant command, particularly in terms of integrating space and cyberspace capabilities, which have their own functional combatant commands. Of course, this assumes U.S. forces eventually reach a level of integration that makes resolving such relevant operational authorities necessary. The current service-based model for systems development and acquisition is not optimal for achieving the level of interdependency that JADC2 envisions. Given the complexity and number of programs likely to be affected by ABMS, the Air Force created the position of chief architect to ensure it acquires the right mix of capabilities in a coherent manner. However, the authority of that position does not extend to the other services, which are likely to focus on their own specific operating requirements as they fund and develop their components of JADC2′s technical architecture. Furthermore, ABMS technical demonstrations focused on connectivity have thus far outpaced development of the operational concepts it is intended to support. Consequently, JADC2 risks over-emphasizing communications and ubiquitous connectivity at the expense of effective battle management. This could have several deleterious implications for future operations. First, it could exacerbate the tendency of senior commanders to centralize control, usurping tactical level decisions. Second, the desire to push as much information as possible forward to the tactical edge could overwhelm warfighters, resulting in operational paralysis or chaos. Third, it could result in unrealistic communications demands, particularly in a conflict with China or Russia or their proxies where the United States' exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum will be fiercely contested. Lastly, given the enormous financial investment JADC2 entails, maintaining stable funding will present a continual challenge due to both the likely downward pressure on the defense budget resulting from the COVID-19 epidemic and because it is challenging to cultivate a constituency on Capitol Hill for ethereal “connections” and “data” compared to more tangible platforms, some of which the Air Force defunded in its latest budget proposal in part to fund further development of ABMS. Furthermore, JADC2 is likely to face ongoing scrutiny because the nature of the program does not lend itself to traditional methods of evaluation, as evidenced by the Government Accountability Office's recent report that was highly critical of ABMS. The path forward Navigating these challenges requires the highest level of direction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and centralized, OSD-level management along the lines of the recently formed joint cross-functional team to champion overall JADC2 development. Using a DOTMILPF-P (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, interoperability, logistics, personnel, facilities, & policy) approach, the primary goal of this group should be to define a “template” to guide modernization policy, acquisition, and concepts of operation. The United States requires the distinct capabilities inherent in its separate military services and other defense agencies. However, they must be bound by a common vision for employing joint and combined forces, as well as an overarching strategy to realize the JADC2 concept. The United States cannot risk boutique solutions that do not integrate in a seamless, mutually reinforcing fashion. To achieve this, the OSD-level group must pursue four critical lines of effort: 1) establish standards and continuity so individual programs integrate within the greater JADC2 enterprise and secure desired outcomes in a timely fashion; 2) support effective programs and help them to maintain momentum and protection from competing bureaucratic interests; 3) engage across the military services and DOD agencies to respond to combatant command warfighting requirements, while also holding participating entities accountable; and 4) ensure industry is fully integrated into appropriate JADC2 development. If properly executed, JADC2 promises to provide commanders with “decision advantage” by allowing them to gather, process, exploit, and share information at the speed and scale required to defeat potential adversaries. At the same time, allowing joint and combined forces to distribute access to relevant information more widely, JADC2 must also enable new, more flexible command and control techniques that empower subordinate elements to effectively act when they become isolated. The ability to leverage capabilities across a network through the seamless and ubiquitous sharing of information could also ease requirements for systems that are currently expected to operate independently. The complexity inherent to this approach of overloading requirements on a given program drives lengthy development cycles, time and cost overruns, and delays in capability. Instead, by leveraging numerous redundant function options through a combat cloud, individual systems could focus on narrower requirements where their capability can be maximized while also minimizing cost and technical risk. Change will not come easy, particularly given how successful the United States has been using the traditional combined arms approach. However, such complacency could be disastrous, given that critical information technology advances are often measured in days, potentially enabling competitors with less dominant industrial combat means to leapfrog past legacy military concepts by investing in newer information technologies and capabilities. The United States' efforts to harness information are not being pursued in a vacuum—America's adversaries are pursuing similar concepts. JADC2 may be ambitious, but it is also imperative to gain a competitive advantage to deter and, if necessary, defeat those potential adversaries. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/07/09/moving-further-into-the-information-age-with-joint-all-domain-command-and-control/
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June 30, 2024 | International, Land
North Korea calls South Korea, US and Japan 'Asian version of NATO'