Avion de chasse sans pilote Market Forecast 2020-2026 Par Tendances mondiales de lindustrie, la croissance future, Vue densemble régional, Taille, Partager, Estimation du revenu, et perspectives

On the same subject

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  June 15, 2023 | International, Aerospace

  Six questions with France’s Air and Space Force chief

  Gen. Mille discussed the French military’s efforts toward an all-Rafale fighter fleet, among other capability goals for the force.

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  February 12, 2020 | International, Land

  Army Seeks New JLTV Competition In 2022

  The service is already slowing production of Oshkosh's Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and now wants to find an alternative manufacturer —which could create logistical or legal headaches. Other Oshkosh programs are also ramping down. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. PENTAGON: As the Army moves billions into new high-tech weapons, truck-maker Oshkosh is feeling the pinch. The 2021 budget request not only decreases spending on three Oshkosh vehicles, the 10-wheel FHTV, the 6-wheel FMTV, and 4×4 JLTV: It also calls for a new competition the following fiscal year for JLTV, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle originally meant to replace the Humvee. That's especially worrying for the Wisconsin company, because JLTV is the youngest program of the three and the most important for the company's long-term future. But then-Army Secretary Mark Esper — now Secretary of Defense — has publicly criticized JLTV as overly specialized for the kind of counterinsurgency conflicts the Pentagon is no longer focused on. While the Army insists it will still buy the planned total of 49,099 trucks, eventually, it keeps slowing down the annual rate and extended the deadline to complete production, which now won't end until 2042. (That leaves the Humvee in service, at least with some units, indefinitely). Why recompete? “We do that to drive the price down,” said Deputy Assistant Army Secretary John Daniels this morning, when my colleague Jen Judson asked about the proposal. But any new competition would be two fiscal years from now and Daniels declined to give any details. The only other information about the plan is buried on page 102 of the fifth volume of the Army's newly released procurement request for 2021, which also includes projections for 2022 and beyond. Under JLTV, the “justification book” says that: “Current contract options may be exercised through 30 November 2023 assuming contractual quantity headspace is still available. Current funding indicates headspace quantity of 16,901 may be achieved in FY 2021, with competitive follow on contract award anticipated in FY 2022. A split procurement will occur between the existing Oshkosh contract and the new competitively awarded contract based on the approved acquisition strategy. The Program Office continues to gather insight from industry partners to better understand their position to ensure strong competition for the follow on contract.” In plain English, this means Oshkosh's current contract to build Joint Light Tactical Vehicles runs though fall 2023. Since production will continue for decades, the Army will have to award a new contract to buy more JLTVs for itself, the other services and allies. But when it comes time to award that follow-on contract, the service doesn't want Oshkosh to be its only option: It wants at least one competitor to drive down costs. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-seeks-new-jltv-competition-in-2022

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  June 12, 2020 | International, Naval

  If the US Navy isn’t careful, its new unmanned tanker drone could face a 3-year delay

  By: David B. Larter   WASHINGTON — The US Navy could face a three-year delay in testing of the MQ-25 Stingray carrier-based tanking drone if it doesn't get its designated test ships through the required modernizations on time, a possibility the Navy said was remote. Two carriers — Carl Vinson and George H.W. Bush — have limited windows to complete the installation of unmanned aircraft control stations, and if operational commitments intervene it could create significant issues for the program, according to Navy officials and a government watchdog report. “Program officials stated that, among other things, the Navy's potential inability to maintain its schedule commitments could require modifications to the contract that would impact the fixed-price terms,” the Government Accountability Office reported. “Specifically, the Navy faces limited flexibility to install MQ-25 control centers on aircraft carriers. “If the Navy misses any of its planned installation windows, the program would have to extend MQ-25 development testing by up to 3 years. According to officials, such a delay could necessitate a delay to initial capability and result in a cost increase.” Navy officials say a three-year delay is “extremely unlikely,” however the Navy has struggled in recent years to balance its modernization schedules with operational commitments, a problem that its “Optimized Fleet Response Plan” deployment rotation scheme was supposed to address. Ultimately, a delay would further push back the Navy's ability to extend its carrier air wing's range through unmanned tanking, critical to keeping the service's powerful strike arm relevant against long-range guided munitions. The Navy believes it can avoid a schedule delay and is working toward keeping the program on track, said Jamie Cosgrove, a spokesperson for Naval Air Systems Command. “The Navy is still planning to achieve [initial operating capability] in 2024,” Cosgrove said. “A three-year extension of development testing and a delay to IOC is extremely unlikely and represents improbable scenarios where both aircraft carriers currently designated to support MQ-25 testing are unavailable due to operational requirements, or the program misses the planned periods to install the MQ-25 test equipment on those two carriers. “Should either of these unlikely scenarios occur, the program will reevaluate the schedule and determine how to best mitigate schedule impacts to deliver the mission-critical MQ-25 to the Fleet ASAP.” Unmanned control The specific alternations needed to operate the MQ-25 Stingray include special control and network equipment, Cosgrove said. The program of record is the Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission Control System and installing it will include setting up a control room known as the Unmanned Aviation Warfare Center on the ship. The equipment in the UAWC will include control stations, network interfaces and routing equipment, commanding and control equipment and network infrastructure, Consgrove said. The Navy awarded Boeing an $805 million contract to build the first four MQ-25 aircraft, with options for three additional aircraft. In April, the Navy announced it had exercised the option to the tune of $84.7 million, bringing the total number of Stingrays under contract to 7. Ultimately the Navy plans to buy 69 additional aircraft as part of the its full production run, according to the GAO report. The Navy's former air boss Vice Adm. Mike Shoemaker told USNI Proceedings in a 2017 interview that the MQ-25 would extend the carrier air wing's range by up to 400 miles. Juggling maintenance The Navy has struggled to maintain its carrier schedules in recent years as the problems have arisen with carriers during their availabilities. For example, last year, the carrier Abraham Lincoln was extended on its deployment because its relief, the carrier Harry S Truman, was stuck in maintenance to repair unforeseen issues. That can throw a monkey wrench into the Navy's overstretched deployment rotation scheme, meaning that other carriers have their deployments extended while still others have their maintenance availabilities truncated to play catch up. But that can lead to even more problems down the road with differed maintenance and worn-out equipment that ultimately adds up to a significant readiness hole that is tough to dig out from. All of this is exacerbated by crushing demands from Combatant Commanders for Navy forces overseas, which ultimately is driving the vicious cycle. That means the Navy will have to manage the risk of impacting the Vinson and Bush's upcoming maintenance availabilities to not set back the MQ-25 development cycle. https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/06/10/if-the-us-navy-isnt-careful-its-new-unmanned-tanker-drone-could-face-a-3-year-delay/