On the same subject

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  June 4, 2020 | Local, Aerospace

  RCAF aircraft participate in East Coast intercept exercise

  Posted on June 4, 2020 by Ken Pole Royal Canadian Air Force CF-188 Hornets and U.S. fighters are routinely tasked by North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) to intercept Russian aircraft operating close to Canadian and U.S. airspace. The latest incident occurred in early March when two Tupolev Tu-142 reconnaissance aircraft were met over the Beaufort Sea by RCAF Boeing CF-188s from Cold Lake, Alta., and USAF F-22 Raptors out of Elmendorf AFB in Alaska. They were supported by two larger Boeings, a USAF KC-135 Stratotanker and E-3 Sentry surveillance aircraft. Having waved their metaphorical flags, all returned to their respective bases without incident. More recently, two CF-188s from 433 Tactical Fighter Squadron at RCAF 3 Wing in Bagotville, Que., and Lockheed Martin CP-140 Aurora maritime reconnaissance aircraft out of 14 Wing Greenwood, N.S., were involved in a more unusual intercept exercise off the East Coast. Also participating were the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) frigate Ville de Quebec and the supply ship Asterix, both homeported in Halifax. The unprecedented May 28 to 31 exercise was co-ordinated by U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and also involved the U.S. Strategic, Space and Transportation Commands. Centred around the U.S. Navy Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier strike group and the RCN ships, the exercise was designed to test U.S. homeland defence against a supersonic Rockwell B-1B Lancer heavy bomber representing an enemy intruder. U.S. aircraft included KC-135s for refuelling not only the Canadian fighters but also Boeing F-15 Eagles flown by the U.S. Air National Guard 104th Fighter Wing out of Barnes ANG Base in Westfield, Mass., and Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornets from Carrier Air Wing 1 at Oceana, Va. The CP-140s, from 404, 405 and 415 Squadrons at Greenwood, conducted five overflights during the exercise as well as participating in an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) element. The Ville de Quebec also participated in the ASW element as well as the Lancer intercept before returning to Halifax. The Asterix conducted several “replenishments at sea” exercises with other ships. “This was an excellent advanced readiness opportunity for Canadian and American maritime forces,” RAdm Craig Baines, the RCN's Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic, said in a statement. “The scenarios utilized during these events enable our mutual ability to operate in a multi-threat environment, in which co-ordination and integration are absolutely critical for our success in responding to any crisis in our waters or internationally.” Operational details were scarce, with Canadian and U.S. officers saying only that the exercise took place in an area up to 160 kilometres offshore. However, Terrence O'Shaughnessy, the four-star USAF General who heads both USNORTHCOM and NORAD, said in a statement that the “complex high-end operations . . . allowed us to demonstrate and exercise critical homeland defense capabilities.” https://www.skiesmag.com/news/rcaf-aircraft-participate-east-coast-intercept-exercise

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  December 26, 2019 | Local, Naval

  Industry briefing questions Ottawa's choice of guns, defence systems for new frigates

  Murray Brewster The Department of National Defence has faced some tough, pointed questions about whether it has chosen the right radar, main gun and close air defence systems for the navy's new frigates, which will soon hit the drawing board. An unsolicited defence industry slide deck presentation, obtained by CBC News, questions each of those key components in the planned $60 billion modernization of the fleet. It was circulated earlier this year and put in front of the senior federal officials in charge of the program. The defence industry briefing presentation points out that the Lockheed Martin-built AN/SPY-7 radar system — an updated, more sophisticated version of an existing U.S. military system — has not been installed and certified on any warship. A land-based version of the system is being produced and fielded for the Japanese government. The briefing calls it "an unproven radar" system that will be "costly to support," and claims it comes at a total price tag of $1 billion for all of the new ships, which the undated presentation describes as "an unnecessary expenditure." Lockheed Martin Canada and British-based BAE Systems Inc. were chosen earlier this year by the Liberal government to design and help build 15 new warships to replace the country's existing patrol frigates — the backbone of the navy. Old guns, inadequate defence systems? The briefing raises concerns about DND's choice of a main gun for the frigates — a 127 millimetre MK 45 described by the briefing as 30-year-old technology that will soon be obsolete and cannot fire precision-guided shells. The briefing also singles out as inadequate the Sea Ceptor close air defence system, which is meant to shoot down incoming, ship-killing missiles. Given the Canadian government's past missteps with military procurement — buying used equipment or opting for developmental systems that take years to get into service — a defence expert said the caution being expressed by the industry now is legitimate, but in some respects it's coming years too late. "There's a risk anytime you try to do something new for the first time," said Dave Perry, an analyst who specializes in procurement at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. The navy struggled for years to get second-hand British submarines up to Canadian standards. The air force also sat on its hands while the manufacturer of the CH-148 Cyclone helicopters worked out all of the developmental bugs. The presentation, Perry said, essentially tries to re-litigate decisions made by federal officials over three years ago, when the government's request for proposals was mapped out. 'The ship has sailed' "This is calling into question whether the government set down [technical] markers in an appropriate spot or not," he said. "There is always the possibility that these issues can be revisited, but I think at this point the ship has sailed because a competition was run, it did produce a preferred bidder." The pressure to get the new frigate design right is enormous, given the enormous expense involved and the changing nature of warfare, Perry added. The briefing presentation apparently was circulated by a rival radar-maker which was not part of the bidding process. Federal officials declined to name the company. Raytheon Canada Ltd. and its U.S. parent are among the biggest electronics and radar manufacturers in the world. A request for comment sent to their international business division went unanswered last week. 'We did our homework' The concerns in the briefing were presented last summer to: Pat Finn, former head of materiel at DND; Andre Fillion, the assistant deputy minister of defence purchasing at Public Services and Procurement Canada; and Rear Admiral Casper Donovan, the navy's director general for "future ship capability." DND confirmed the existence of the briefing presentation but refused to say who received it or which defence contractor was pushing it. "It is not uncommon for companies to present unsolicited material to our department when they are unsuccessful in a competitive process," spokesman Andrew McKelvey said recently. "We do not comment on these unsolicited documents as they are provided outside the scope of our established procurement process." Both the department and the commander of the navy stand behind the decisions that were made and the systems chosen for the new frigate. "We did our homework. We talked to other navies. We engaged our allies," said Vice-Admiral Art McDonald, who added DND was aware of other options on the market. Delivering the warships on schedule and on budget in the mid-2020s is a constant preoccupation in the department, he said. He would not say whether the choice of radar system might mean a delay in delivery. A senior executive at Lockheed Martin Canada said the company's radar system is identical to one selected by the U.S. government and other countries. Much of the system's hardware, and some of its software, have been used on U.S. Aegis-type guided missile destroyers and cruisers. The difference between the radar system chosen for Canada's frigates and conventional systems is in its array: the Lockheed Martin system sweeps around and above the vessel, rather than only horizontally. "The work that remains is to integrate it into the ship and integrate it into the ship's combat system," said Gary Fudge, general manager and vice president of Lockheed Martin Canada. "We worked for two years with BAE during the proposal stage to optimize the ship design with this particular radar." https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/frigate-gun-radar-canadian-navy-1.5405054

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  July 14, 2020 | Local, Aerospace

  Canada’s Secret Cold War Submarine Drone Is Still Relevant Today

  Extra-large autonomous submarines may revolutionize intelligence gathering and espionage under the sea. One of these ground breaking projects is the U.S. Navy's Boeing Orca extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicle (XLUUV). It is much larger than any other underwater drone currently in the water. But there is a historical precursor that, despite its epic Cold War story, is not widely known. And its mission, to lay covert sensor networks in the arctic, may be as relevant today as it was then. During the Cold War, NATO believed that Russian submarines were using the ice cap in the Canadian Arctic as cover to covertly move between the Atlantic and Pacific. So the U.S. and Canada placed a special sonar network there, deep under the ice. Canadian engineers had to build the world's largest autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), Theseus, to lay a cable where ships could not reach. The project started in the 1980s, at a time when Russian submarines were getting much quieter. To listen for them, a joint U.S. and Canadian sonar array was to be placed several hundred miles north of the remote Canadian base at CFS Alert. The array was codenamed Spinnaker, in honor of the bar where scientists made many of the unclassified decisions in the project. This was similar to the now-famous SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System), but used classified technology to match its operational circumstances. In fact it must have been much more advanced than the original SOSUS. Connecting the sonar array to the base would require laying a fiber-optic cable for hundreds of miles under permanent ice cap. The solution was to build the world's largest autonomous underwater vehicle. The uncrewed submarine would swim from an ice hole nearer to the base all the way to the Spinnaker array. As it went the cable would unreel out of the back. Thus ‘Theseus' got its name from the mythical hero of Ancient Greece who trailed thread behind him when he ventured into the labyrinth to fight the Minotaur. When we think of advanced Canadian military projects which were ahead of their time, the Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow springs to mind. That delta-winged Mach-2 fighter flew in the 1950s and was cutting edge technology at the time, one of the all-time great aircraft. But it was cancelled abruptly in 1959 before it could enter service. The Theseus AUV is up there with the Avro Arrow, but less well recognized. And unlike the Arrow, it was used operationally, in one of the boldest projects started during the Cold War. The project had many secret aspects. Years later much of what we know about the project comes from Bruce Butler, one of the core team involved. Bulter has written a book, Into the Labyrinth (on Amazon), and recently talked to the Underwater Technology Podcast about the project. Theseus was 35 feet long and about 4 feet across. In AUV terms this is large, even today. In modern naval terminology it would be categorized as a large-displacement uncrewed underwater vehicle (LDUUV). The Spinnaker sonar system was placed on the sea floor right on the edge of the arctic shelf. It was about 84 degrees north, up in the top right-hand corner of Canada, near to Greenland. Such an advanced project took years to realize, so it was not until spring 1996 when Theseus could go to work laying the cable. The whole operation was pushing the boundaries of uncrewed underwater vehicles at the time. Despite some close calls along the way, Theseus was able to navigate to the Spinnaker, letting out the vital thread as it went. Many details of the project and technology involved are still classified. And we may never know whether Spinnaker ever picked up any Russian submarines. By the time it had been laid the Russian Navy was in steep decline following the end of the Cold War. But with a resurgent Russian Navy today, the relevance of systems like Spinnaker may be greater than ever. And one of the roles which large submarine drones like the Orca might do is lay cables on the sea floor, unseen from above. Historical precedents like Theseaus can help us understand the way that these might be employed, and the challenges that they will face. https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/07/12/canada-secret-cold-war-drone-submarine-is-still-relevant-today/#121a2da51e96