Nouvelles

The congressional calendar and strategic inertia may come together to keep the defense budget relatively high. The calendar helps because the fiscal 2021 defense budget will likely be passed while Congress is in a free-spending mood. By MARK CANCIAN The current Washington consensus sees deep defense budget cuts in the face of soaring deficits driven by the emergency legislation to stabilize the American economy as it reels from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. It may be wrong. The congressional calendar and strategic inertia may come together to keep the defense budget relatively high. The calendar helps because the fiscal 2021 defense budget will likely be passed while Congress is in a free-spending mood. The next administration — Republican or Democratic — will develop budgets beyond that, but the constraints of long-standing strategy will prevent major changes to force structure and acquisition that would drive deep budget cuts. The Challenge The conventional narrative holds that the defense budget will be squeezed as the debt level rises, and the public focuses inward on rebuilding the country's health and economic position. These are reasonable concerns. The deficit in fiscal 2020, initially projected to be about one trillion dollars ― itself getting into record territory without emergency spending― is now projected to be $3.7 trillion, and Congress is not finished spending. Debt held by the public will rise to 101 percent of GDP, a level not seen since World War II. Even if the world is willing to take US debt, rising interest payments will squeeze the rest of the budget. Simultaneously, the electorate is likely to focus inward. The pandemic is already the leading popular concern, not surprisingly. The economic devastation caused by restrictions on normal commercial activities has produced the greatest downturn since the Great Depression. It would be reasonable to put these factors together and project a substantially reduced defense budget. However, the congressional calendar and the inertia of a long-held strategy will likely mitigate any downturn. The Calendar The calendar will help because Congress is likely to pass the 2021 appropriation this fall, when the government will still be operating under emergency conditions. Congress has already passed four bills for pandemic response and economic stimulus and is developing another in the multi-trillion range. There are a few voices for fiscal constraint, but they are overwhelmed by a sentiment to “do more.” Indeed, some lawmakers and commentators are proposing increases to the defense budget to stimulate the economy, enhance deterrence of China, or protect the defense industrial base. Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has indicated his reluctance to do more than protect the industrial base, but a future stimulus bill could include such enhancements as part of a bipartisan deal. Finally, last year's bipartisan budget agreement set levels for defense and domestic spending in fiscal 2021. Undoing that agreement would be a major lift, requiring a bipartisan consensus that does not seem to be occurring. Even if the Democratic left wanted to make such cuts, defense hawks in the House and Senate could block them. Thus, in the near-term proposals for enhancements seem to be offsetting thoughts about cuts. As both the House and Senate consider their authorization acts, they seem to be aiming at roughly the level of the president's proposal and the bipartisan budget agreement. Strategic Inertia The United States has had some variation of the same national security strategy since the end of the Second World War (or perhaps more accurately, since the Korean War and publication of NSC 68, which enshrined a long term competition with the Soviet Union). That strategy involves global engagement, forward-deployed forces, alliances to offset global competitors, and commitment to maintaining an international system of free trade, human rights and secure borders. Scholars can argue about the details and how well the United States has implemented such a strategy, but the major elements have been constant. President Trump has chafed at many of these elements but has generally gone along, however reluctantly. One would expect such reluctant continuity in a second Trump administration, should that occur One would also expect strategic continuity in a Biden administration. Biden was, after all, vice president during the Obama administration, which, after the shocks of 2014, laid out a strategy of confronting five threats: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and terrorism. One would expect Biden to implement something like that strategy if he were in office. That does not mean that a Biden administration would do everything a Trump administration would do. The left-wing of the Democratic party would push some level of cuts, perhaps 5 percent, and take aim particularly at nuclear modernization, foreign arms sales, and Middle East conflicts. But this longstanding strategy of global engagement will put a floor on defense cuts. Remaining engaged with NATO, supporting our Asian allies like Japan and South Korea, and maintaining some presence in the Middle East, even if scaled back, takes a lot of forces. These need to be at a relatively high level of readiness to deploy globally and be credible. The all-volunteer force needs to maintain compensation and benefits at a sufficient level to compete for labor in a market economy. Competing with China and Russia requires investment in a wide variety of high technology―and costly―new systems, as well as the R&D foundation to support these innovations. Other strategies are certainly possible. Members of the Democratic left and Republican right, as well as some elements of the academic and think tank community, have proposed strategies of “restraint”, whereby the United States would significantly scale back overseas engagements. Such strategic change would produce a substantial cut in the defense budget. However, neither major candidate has supported such a change, and the national security policy community (aka “the blob”) is adamantly opposed. Despite this relatively optimistic assessment, the future is still cloudy. The president's budget proposal forecasts a level budget in constant dollars. That meant that the defense buildup was over, even if Republicans continued in office. Such budgets do not come close to the 3 to 5 percent real growth that defense officials had talked about to implement the National Defense strategy and would entail choices between readiness, force structure and modernization. A Democratic administration, with a notional 5 percent cut in the defense budget, would not constitute the deep cut that a Sanders or Warren administration might have entailed, but the $35 billion that a 5 percent cut would entail is still a lot of money. Forces would get smaller, likely wiping out all the recent force expansion, and new programs would be delayed. Bottom line: Defense may not be heading into a budget hurricane, but it is not heading into sunlight either. It faces the friction that occurs when expensive plans collide with constrained resources. Mark Cancian, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, was a Marine colonel and senior official at the Office of Management and Budget before he joined CSIS. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/huge-deficit-defense-budget-cuts-maybe-not/

The Army wants to do a tech demonstration in the southwestern desert – COVID permitting – of how the new weapons systems it's developing can share data. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. WASHINGTON: As the Army urgently develops its 31 top-priority technologies for future war, service leaders are studying a proposal to field-test some of them together later this year, Army officials told me. The technology demonstration, known as Project Convergence, is still tentative, a spokesperson for the Army's Pentagon headquarters cautioned me. There's no guarantee it will even happen this year, in no small part because the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted field testing, wargames, and training exercises across the Army. If it does happen, it's far from settled which systems will be involved. Nevertheless, from what I've gleaned, Project Convergence will probably try to form a “sensor-to-shooter” network that shares data between systems being developed in at least three of the Army's Big Six modernization portfolios: Long-Range Precision Fires, the Army's No. 1 modernization priority, which aims to rebuild the artillery with new long-range cannons and surface-to-surface missiles to hit ground targets; The Army Network, priority No. 4, which will link Army units using everything from software-defined digital radios to new Low Earth Orbit satellites; and Air & Missile Defense, priority No. 5, which is developing its own specialized, high-speed network, IBCS, to relay targeting data on fast-flying threats with split-second accuracy. I've not heard specifically about systems from the Army's other three major modernization portfolios: armored vehicles (priority No. 2), high-speed aircraft (No. 3), and soldier gear (No. 6). But the Army envisions all of them as sharing intelligence over the network. “The Next Generation Ground Vehicle is an important sensor and observer for Long-Range Precision Fires,” said Brig. Gen. John Rafferty, the LRPF director at Army Futures Command. “Same with Future Vertical Lift, same with the Army's space strategy led by APNT, and the network enables all of this.” In fact, the Army ultimately wants to connect its units to the Air Force, Marines, Navy, and Space Force through a future network-of-networks called JADC2. That's short for Joint All-Domain Command & Control, a vision of seamlessly coordinating operations across the five official “domains”: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. “We have to make sure that what we technically demonstrate later this year fits into a larger JADC2 architecture,” Rafferty told me in a recent interview. “I view this as kind of the ground portion of JADC2. How do we meet JADC2 in the middle? We're going to start from the ground up, they're going from space down.” “We have to have a capability to converge these different systems at the decisive place and time,” he said. “We have to have a network.” Many of the necessary network technologies are ones under consideration for what's called Capability Set 23, a package of network upgrades set to enter service in three years. The first round of upgrades, CS 21, goes to infantry units next year. But CS 23, focused on far-ranging armored formations, aims to add extensive new long-range communication capabilities using Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) and Mid-Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites. “Every two years we're developing a new set of kit that we deliver as part of those capability sets,” Col. Shane Taylor told last week's C4ISRnet online conference. “We've got Project Convergence that we're working with the Network CFT this fall out in the desert, and you're gonna see a lot of MEO work out there.” Taylor works for Program Executive Office (PEO) Command, Control, & Communications – Tactical (C3T), which is independent, by law, of Army Futures Command but works closely with it to develop and build the network. Satellites are essential to connect units that can't form direct radio links because of intervening mountains, buildings, or the horizon itself. But LEO and MEO are particularly valuable for communications, because they can relay signals with less lag and greater bandwidth than high-altitude satellites in Geosynchronous (GEO) orbits. “In some cases, it's almost having fiber optic cable through a space-based satellite link,” Army Futures Command's network director, Maj. Gen. Peter Gallagher, told me in a recent interview. That kind of network capacity is particularly crucial for connecting “sensors to shooters.” Sure, old-fashioned radio or more modern chat-style systems work okay for reporting where a unit is moving or what supplies are running low. But targeting data, especially for moving targets, requires much more precision and becomes out of date much more quickly. “It's the second oldest challenge for artillery,” Rafferty told me, ever since 19th century cannon began to shoot over the horizon at targets their gunners couldn't see. “The oldest challenge is shooting farther, the second challenge is the sensor to shooter part: How do you minimize the time between the observation of the target and the delivery of the effects?” For the longest-range new weapons the Army is developing, like ground-based hypersonic missiles and thousand-mile superguns, the sensor-to-shooter problem is even harder, because the Army doesn't have any sensors that can see that far. Nor does it intend to build them: The service's deputy chief of staff for intelligence, Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, has said publicly the Army doesn't need its own reconnaissance satellites. So while the Army is buying new Grey Eagle -Extended Range scout drones with an estimated range of 200 miles, longer-range shots will rely on Space Force satellites and Air Force and Navy reconnaissance planes to spot targets. Another potential source of information for long-range offensive fires, Rafferty said, is the Army's air and missile defense force. While air and missile defense radars are designed to track flying targets, they can also often calculate where missiles and artillery shells are being fired from, and those enemy batteries are prime targets for the Army's own long-range weapons. It's also much easier to blow up an enemy launcher on the ground – ideally before it fires – rather than try to shoot down projectiles in flight, so, where possible, the best missile defense is a good offense. “I started to really think about this a few years ago when I did an exercise in Europe, called the Austere Challenge, when I was still a brigade commander,” Rafferty told me. “It was an eye-opening exercise for me because I'd never really operated at the theater level.... I started to see the importance of that teamwork between the theater-level [offensive] fires and the theater-level air defense systems.” Training and modernization for both offensive and defense fires are based out of Fort Sill, Okla. “We're lucky because the Air and Missile Defense Cross Functional Team is right downstairs,” Rafferty said. Rafferty's counterpart for air and missile defense is Brig. Gen. Brian Gibson. “It's about connections and access to the data,” Gibson told me in a recent interview. “Sharing the right data with the right user at the right time, along latency timelines that are useful... is really where the trick to this puzzle lies.” “The most important part,” Gibson said, “where most of the work has gone on, is to understand where the linkages need to occur” between the Army's general-purpose Integrated Tactical Network (ITN) – that's what CS 21 and CS 23 are building — and the specialized, high-performance network for air and missile defense, IBCS. As hard as it is to hit a moving target on the ground, it's exponentially more difficult to hit one in the air, especially a supersonic cruise missile or ballistic missile moving at many times the speed of sound. If your targeting data is a millisecond out of date, you may miss entirely. So, explained Gibson and his acquisition program partner, Maj. Gen. Robert Rasch (PEO Missiles & Space), you can't add anything to the IBCS network without making very sure it won't slow that data down. But IBCS can certainly output the data it's already collecting for other systems to use, including long-range precision fires. “They can be a consumer of IBCS,” Rasch told me. And since ground targets don't move as fast as missiles, he said, IBCS wouldn't have to send updates to offensive artillery batteries at the same frenetic pace that air and missile defense units require. “It doesn't have to be in milliseconds,” he said. “It can be in seconds.” Yes, seconds seem like a long time in missile defense, but to someone shooting at ground targets, that's lightning-quick. “We've got great opportunities to leverage IBCS,” Rafferty said. “The way I view it, that's another sensor, with very capable radars, and that integrated air defense network is reliable and fast.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/project-convergence-linking-army-missile-defense-offense-space

Although defense production has largely continued during the coronavirus pandemic, manufacturing plants have not escaped the reach of the disease. Facilities have been shut down for short periods of time or the number of workers has been reduced in order to ensure the safety of the workforce. The U.S. Defense Department anticipates a three-month slowdown for most of its development and procurement programs. Here is a look at some of the specific factory closures and slowdowns that have occurred since the spread of COVID-19 began. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/how-covid-19-has-affected-defense-production

By: Bill Brown, L3Harris Technologies The Department of Defense and defense industry have a long history of responding quickly and forcefully to crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic is no exception. Today, hundreds of thousands of dedicated defense workers remain at their posts – delivering mission-critical products and services to support our troops around the world, while also providing personal protective equipment and other supplies to first responders and health care workers here at home. However, this most recent crisis has re-exposed weaknesses in our defense industrial base – highlighting the need to significantly bolster the nation's vital supply chain. This serves as a call to action to develop a strategic, long-term approach across government and industry. We witnessed the fallout from the 2008-09 financial crisis. Thousands of suppliers shuttered or permanently shifted precious capacity to other verticals when defense budgets were indiscriminately cut following the Budget Control Act of 2011 and sequester of 2013. When budgets began to recover several years later, the damage was clear – longer lead times that in some cases doubled or more, and increased reliance on single-source and international suppliers for critical components, such as microelectronics. In 2017, President Trump signed an executive order and established a multi-agency task force to study supply chain resiliency. The task force identified five macro forces that create risk to the supply chain and national security preparedness including sequestration and the uncertainty of government spending, the overall decline of U.S. manufacturing capabilities and capacity, harmful government business and procurement practices, industrial policies of competitor nations, and diminishing U.S. STEM and trade skills. Task force members proposed a comprehensive set of risk-reduction actions – ranging from establishing sustained and predictable multi-year budgets and developing an adaptive acquisition framework, to directing investment to small businesses and diversifying the supplier base. Over the past two years, the government has made initial strides on a number of these fronts, including working to reduce U.S. reliance on foreign sources for critical rare earth minerals and decreasing the country's dependence on China and other international suppliers for semiconductors and related components. Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic emerged before these and other task force initiatives gained serious traction and forced the DoD to refocus its near-term priorities. And the urgency escalated when we began to see the brutal impact the pandemic was causing in the commercial aerospace sector, an important vertical market for many defense suppliers. The department quickly designated defense suppliers as essential and increased progress payments, spurring larger defense contractors to accelerate payments to thousands of small business suppliers. These actions helped companies to continue operating, maintain their employment and hiring goals, and sustain critical spending on internal research and development (IRAD) to keep the innovation engine humming. At L3Harris, for example, we recommitted to investing nearly 4 percent of revenues in IRAD, hiring 6,000 new employees and maintaining our apprenticeship and internship programs to provide opportunities for the workforce of the future. The combined DoD and industry efforts demonstrate the power of a focused, collaborative approach to mitigate and address the damaging effects of the pandemic and to support the broader defense industrial base. Today, we are at a critical juncture. We have an opportunity to make the necessary strategic investments that could significantly strengthen our supply base for generations to come, including: · Ensure sustained/predictable budgets – stable, long-term funding helps companies better plan and encourages them to invest in staffing, technology and facilities needed for the country to maintain its technical superiority. Now is not the time to pull back the reins on defense spending. · Accelerate contract awards – shorter decision and acquisition cycles enable suppliers to invest in and deliver technologies faster than with traditional methods, and in the near term could help offset the impact of the commercial aerospace downturn. · Expand domestic supplier base – increasing domestic capabilities reduces vulnerabilities and increases access to critical components, such as rare earths and microelectronics, and over time can help reduce the proportion of sole/single-source supply. · Increase workforce investment – providing advanced STEM education opportunities drives innovation and productivity by enhancing critical skillsets for existing employees, while attracting, training and growing the workforce of the future. · Institutionalize process improvements – the COVID-19 pandemic forced government and industry to find new and more efficient ways to work. The challenge now – to make these advances permanent. These are not quick fixes. However, they provide a strong platform for a more resilient national defense supplier base, which is vital at a time when near-peer adversaries continue to invest heavily in new technologies that threaten our nation's security. The imperative is clear – and the opportunity is now. Bill Brown is chairman and CEO at L3Harris Technologies. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/18/our-nations-defense-supply-chain-imperative/

AIR FORCE Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Redondo Beach, California, has been awarded a not-to-exceed $2,375,000,000 undefinitized contract modification (P00013) to contract FA8810-18-C-0006 for Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared Polar Space Vehicles 1 and 2. This modification adds Phase One for design/development, critical path flight hardware procurement, and risk reduction efforts leading to a critical design review to the basic contract. Work will be performed in Redondo Beach, California, and is expected to be completed by December 2025. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $70,500,000 are being obligated at the time of award. Total cumulative face value of the contract is $2,419,295,532. Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, California, is the contracting activity. Lockheed Martin Corp., Orlando, Florida, has been awarded a ceiling $485,000,000 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for Department of Defense and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Sniper, Infrared Search and Track (IRST); and Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) navigation pod (fixed wing) hardware production. This contract provides the necessary resources required for the management, fabrication, upgrade/retrofit, integration support and testing and shipping of its non-developmental item (NDI) Sniper Advanced Targeting Pods (ATP) System, NDI LANTIRN Fixed Image Navigation Set upgrades, and the NDI IRST system as it relates to the requirements document associated with each specific delivery order placed under this contract. Work will be performed in Orlando, Florida, and various locations to be identified at the order level. The work is expected to be completed by May 2025. This contract involves FMS to (this list is not all inclusive): Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey. This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition. FMS funds in the amount of $34,900,000 are being obligated at the time of award under delivery order FA8540-20-F-0034 for the country of Morocco. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, is the contracting activity (FA8540‐20‐D‐0001). Canadian Commercial Corp., Ottawa, Canada, has been awarded a $44,473,960 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for the installation of the Block Upgrade 7.0/8.1 kits into C-130J cargo aircraft. This contract provides for installation of government provided BU 7.0/8.1 kits into designated C-130J aircraft. Work will be performed in British Columbia, Canada, and is expected to be completed by Oct. 5, 2025. This award is the result of a competitive acquisition and four offers were received. Fiscal 2020 aircraft procurement funds in the amount of $4,690,950 are being obligated at the time of award. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the contracting activity (FA8625-20-D-2016). The Corporation of Mercer University, Warner Robins, Georgia, has been awarded a $9,039,309 task order (FA8523-20-F-0029) on basic contract FA8523-20-D-0001 to provide Laboratory Intelligence Validated Emulators (LIVE)-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) closed loop engineering test and evaluation of newly developed electronic warfare (EW) systems. This order provides integration of gold-standard intelligence community threat definitions into the Electronic Warfare and Avionics Integrated Support Facility, where LVC closed loop operational test – vertical testability demonstration simulations and testing will be conducted to inform the baseline capability and to identify growth areas for improving operational survivability, reliability and mission success of fielded EW systems in support of airborne U.S. warfighting elements. Work will be performed in Warner Robins, Georgia, and is expected to be completed by May 13, 2022. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $4,140,106 are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, is the contracting activity. JOINT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., McLean, Virginia, has been awarded a five-year, $800,000,000 task order contract (47QFCA20F0032) to deliver the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) artificial intelligence (AI) enabled products to support warfighting operations and be instrumental in embedding AI decision-making and analysis at all tiers of Department of Defense (DOD) operations. This is a General Services Administration (GSA) Alliant 2 government-wide acquisition contract for AI products that will leverage the power of DOD data to enable a transformational shift across the DOD that will give the U.S. a definitive information advantage to prepare for future warfare operations. Specific tasks of this order will encompass a wide mix of technical services and products across the full spectrum of technical support to the JAIC Joint Warfighter National Mission Initiative. This will include data labeling, data management, data conditioning, AI product development, and the transition of AI products into new and existing fielded programs and systems across the DOD. The task order contract award has a base period through May 2021 with option years that run through May 2025. GSA Federal Systems Integration and Management Center, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity. ARMY Lockheed Martin Corp., Grand Prairie, Texas, was awarded a $497,301,405 modification (P00035) to contract W31P4Q-17-D-0026 for Phased Array Tracking on Radar to Intercept Advanced Capability-3 missile support center post-production support. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of May 18, 2022. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity. Central Environmental Inc., Anchorage, Alaska, was awarded a $26,990,428 firm-fixed-price contract to relocate an existing road. Bids were solicited via the internet with two received. Work will be performed in Porterville, California, with an estimated completion date of July 30, 2021. Fiscal 2018 civil construction funds in the amount of $26,990,428 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Sacramento, California, is the contracting activity (W91238-20-C-0009). Dignitas Technologies LLC,* Orlando, Florida, was awarded an $8,723,110 firm-fixed-price contract to provide technical and management support for the Program Executive Office for simulation, training and instrumentation and provide access to Army Mission Command information systems. Bids were solicited via the internet with five received. Work will be performed in Orlando, Florida, with an estimated completion date of May 31, 2025. Fiscal 2018, 2019 and 2020 other procurement (Army); 2020 research, development, test, and evaluation (Army); and 2020 operations and maintenance (Army) funds in the amount of $1,615,202 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Orlando, Florida, is the contracting activity (W900KK-20-C-0024). DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Clear Resolution Consulting, Baltimore, Maryland (HHM402-20-D-0018); NextGen Federal Systems, Morgantown, West Virginia (HHM402-20-D-0019); S2 Technologies, Smithfield, North Carolina (HHM402-20-D-0020); LBO Technology LLC, Leesburg, Virginia (HHM402-20-D-0016); Lock4 LLC, Red Springs, North Carolina (HHM402-20-D-0017); Parra Consulting Group, Middletown, Maryland (HHM402-20-D-0014); and SHINE Systems, Charlottesville, Virginia (HHM402-20-D-0021), have been awarded an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract with a ceiling of $99,500,000 for facility management, logistics, administrative, readiness, executive and security support services to support the National Media Exploitation Center. Task orders will be competed among all awardees. The contract has a base period of performance from May 29, 2020 to May 28, 2025, with an optional ordering period from May 28, 2025 to May 27, 2030. All task orders must be completed no later than one year after the end of the ordering period. Work will be performed in the National Capital Region; Charlottesville, Virginia; and Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $1,000 are being obligated on task order after award. This contract has been awarded through a HUBZone set-aside competitive acquisition and sixteen offers were received. The Virginia Contracting Activity, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity. DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY Metrex Research LLC, doing business as Orascoptic, Madison, Wisconsin, has been awarded a maximum $45,000,000 fixed-price with economic-price-adjustment, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for hospital equipment and accessories for the Defense Logistics Agency electronic catalog. This was a competitive acquisition with 115 responses received. This is a five-year contract with no option periods. Location of performance is Wisconsin, with a May 17, 2025, performance completion date. Using military services are Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2020 through 2025 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (SPE2DH-20-D-0040). CORRECTION: The contract announced on May 8, 2020, for S&L Aerospace Metals LLC,* Flushing, New York (SPRRA1-20-D-0043), for $24,386,400, was announced with an incorrect award date. The correct award date is May 15, 2020. MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems, Moorestown, New Jersey, is being awarded a $22,300,000 cost-plus-fixed-fee modification (P00365) under Aegis Combat Weapon System development contract HQ0276-10-C-0001, which covers multiple Aegis Weapon System baselines and platforms. This modification increases the total cumulative contract value by $22,300,000, from $3,211,352,549 to $3,233,652,549; $64,900,000 of which was obligated for Aegis Ashore Japan (under Contract Line Item Number 0135). Under this modification, the contractor will continue performing engineering design support services necessary for continuation of planning efforts and risk reduction efforts required to maintain initial operational capability schedule to support the Aegis Ashore Japan Foreign Military Sales main case. The work will be performed in Moorestown, New Jersey, with an expected completion date of July 31, 2020. Funds from the government of Japan in the amount of $22,300,000 are being obligated at the time of award. This contract modification is the result of a sole-source acquisition. The Missile Defense Agency, Dahlgren, Virginia, is the contracting activity. WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES Chenega Healthcare Services LLC, San Antonio, Texas, has been awarded an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract with an overall ceiling of $10,000,000. This contract provides COVID-19 contact tracing for the Pentagon support services. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $508,000 are being obligated at the time of the award. The expected completion date is May 17, 2025. Washington Headquarters Services, Arlington, Virginia, is the contracting activity (HQ0034-20-D-0008). *Small business https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2190758/source/GovDelivery/

By BRYAN CLARK and TIMOTHY WALTON on May 19, 2020 at 4:01 AM The Electromagnetic Spectrum is the key to waging electronic warfare, and EW is key to waging modern war. An enemy who can jam communications or GPS, mislead you (spoofing is the term of art) and stop your weapons from functioning (cyber attacks using radio waves). The US largely abandoned EW after the Cold War ended. Then the Russians made it very clear in their war against Ukraine just how effective EW could be and senior folks in the US military grew uneasy. They and Congress realized how much we had made ourselves vulnerable and the Hill ordered creation of a group to devise a strategy to restore American EW eminence. Bryan Clark and Tim Walton of the Hudson Institute preview the new strategy below — only at Breaking D Read on! The Editor. The electromagnetic spectrum is getting more popular and crowded every day. As Breaking D readers know, the DoD and FCC are battling over frequencies adjacent to those used by GPS, which the telecommunication company Ligado wants to use for its satellite-based 5G network. DoD worries that Ligado's transmissions will drown out the relatively weak signals that reach Earth from GPS satellites. Ligado fired what is only the first of what will be many salvos in the 5G spectrum battle. To achieve 5G's promised low latency and broadband speed telecommunication companies require wider swaths of spectrum compared to 4G–some of which they don't control. With high-frequency millimeter wave 5G towers only able to reach a few city blocks, telecom providers like Ligado are pursuing mid and low-band spectrum below 6 Ghz that enables greater coverage–but also puts them in conflict with FAA and military radars, radios, and GPS. The clamor for 5G spectrum comes as DoD is itself fielding a collection of new networks to support its concept of Joint All Domain Command and Control, or JADC2. The Army Integrated Tactical Network, Air Force Air Battle Management System, and Navy Integrated Fire Control combine existing datalinks and radios with emerging communications systems to connect all U.S. forces across a theater, placing new demands on spectrum. But the EM spectrum is also a global common like the air or sea. To prevent U.S. forces from operating effectively, the Chinese and Russian militaries spent the last 20 years modernizing their electronic warfare equipment, training new EW operators and technicians, and placing EW forces in every unit or formation. During the same period, DoD rested on its Cold War laurels and failed to invest in EW systems or training. DoD strategies developed in 2013 and 2017 addressed the growing challenges of managing and controlling the EM spectrum by directing services to develop better versions of current capabilities and concepts but failed to significantly close the gaps between the U.S. and adversary militaries. Congress, increasingly worried, mandated that DoD stand up an EM Spectrum Operations Cross-Functional Team and create a new strategy. That is nearing completion and may be DoD's last opportunity to gain an enduring advantage in the EM spectrum. New EM Spectrum Superiority Strategy Instead of incrementally improving existing EM systems and tactics in a doomed effort to solve capability shortfalls, the new EM Spectrum Superiority Strategy will emphasize how to undermine the strengths and exploit the weaknesses of adversaries in the EM spectrum. The strategies' initiatives will be targeted at fundamental asymmetries between U.S. and opposing militaries that can provide DoD leverage. A change in approach is desperately needed. The U.S. military didn't fall behind in EW and EM Spectrum Operations due to a lack of funding, as spending for both rose steadily since 2015, but because the additional dollars were not spent implementing a coherent strategy. Funding instead upgraded legacy systems to fill various capability gaps, not all of which were high priorities. Under today's plans, DoD will take decades to catch great power adversaries enjoying “home team” advantages and the luxury of focusing on only one potential opponent. Moreover, post-pandemic budget constraints will likely prevent increasing funding to plug capability gaps faster. The key asymmetry between the U.S. and opposing great power militaries is the simple facft that Chinese and Russian are close to likely areas of conflict. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Russian Armed Forces can place EW and sensor systems on their own territory or in nearby sea or airspace where they can rely on reliable and difficult-to-jam wired or line-of-sight EM communications. Leveraging their understanding of the environment, Chinese and Russian forces can employ passive, multistatic, and low-frequency EM sensors and pre-architected systems of systems and tactics to find and attack U.S. forces. The U.S. military must span the world. This requires a more expeditionary force and adaptable C2 process compared to the Chinese or Russians, and which can accommodate more contested communications, changing force packages, and the variety of local conditions. When communications are lost, junior leaders of U.S. forces would employ mission command, exploiting their initiative and judgement to improvise a course of action that follows the commander's intent. Giving The Enemy Something To Worry About The PLA's reliance on pre-planned, static systems of systems and tactics could be a liability against highly dynamic and unpredictable U.S. spectrum operations. The EM Spectrum Superiority Strategy should exploit this opportunity by adopting new operational concepts that emphasize maneuver and complexity. A maneuver-centric approach doesn't require across-the-board improvements to U.S. EM spectrum systems. To create complexity for opponents U.S. forces need capabilities for dynamic and automated spectrum sharing with commercial or military users guided by electronic support sensors and electromagnetic battle management, or EMBM, systems. To protect themselves from enemy attack, U.S. forces would rely on passive or multistatic sensing, complemented by LPI/LPD communications and electronic countermeasures. And U.S. electronic attacks would need the agility afforded by AI-enabled cognitive jammers that use photonics to move across wide ranges of spectrum. The ability of cognitive jammers or EMBM systems to understand the EM environment will depend on their access to information on threat, friendly, and civilian EM spectrum systems. Today, data and analysis from the Intelligence Community is slow to reach operators and slower still to be programmed into EW equipment. DoD will need to establish new frameworks for EM spectrum information sharing and build on its recent success in accelerating the reprogramming process by incorporating AI to a greater degree in deployed EW and EMBM systems. Capabilities for complex and unpredictable EM operations will be difficult to define for today's top-down requirements process, which seeks a point solution for a particular application and situation. DoD will need to identify potential new EM capabilities through comprehensive assessments of their mission impact in a variety scenarios using modeling and simulation or experimentation and mature them through new processes like the DoD Adaptive Acquisition Framework. The most challenging element of a new strategy will be preparing EW and EM spectrum operators for maneuver warfare. DoD's current ranges are unable to provide realistic EM operating environments for experimentation or training due to a lack of modern threat systems and concerns that adversaries can monitor U.S. EM emissions during live, open-air events. Rather than focusing on expensive range upgrades, DoD should shift its emphasis to virtual and constructive events, which would enable concept development, tactics innovation, and training against the most challenging threats at all security levels. The urgency to change DoD cannot continue pursuing EMS superiority through incremental, evolutionary improvements. This approach is too unfocused, will take too long to reach fruition, is potentially unaffordable, and cedes the initiative to America's adversaries. DoD should move in a new direction and focus EM capability development on implementing concepts for maneuver warfare that create adaptability for U.S. forces and complexity for adversaries. If the DoD does not mount a new more strategic and proactive approach to fighting in the EM spectrum, adversaries could be emboldened to continue their efforts to gain territory and influence at the expense of U.S. allies and partners. Demonstrating the ability to survive and fight in a contested and congested EM spectrum could help U.S. forces slow Chinese and Russian activities and give them something to worry about for a change. Bryan Clark is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. Timothy Walton is a fellow at Hudson. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/winning-the-spectrum-pentagon-unveils-new-strategy/

Andrew Eversden Booz Allen Hamilton won a five-year, $800 million task order to provide artificial intelligence services to the Department of Defense's Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC). Under the contract award, announced by the General Services Administration and the JAIC on May 18, Booz Allen Hamilton will provide a “wide mix of technical services and products” to support the JAIC, a DoD entity dedicated to advancing the use of artificial intelligence across the department. The contracting giant will provide the JAIC with “data labeling, data management, data conditioning, AI product development, and the transition of AI products into new and existing fielded programs,” according to the GSA news release. “The delivered AI products will leverage the power of DoD data to enable a transformational shift across the Department that will give the U.S. a definitive information advantage to prepare for future warfare operations,” the release said. The contract will support the JAIC's new joint warfighting mission initiative, launched earlier this year. The initiative includes “Joint All-Domain Command and Control; autonomous ground reconnaissance and surveillance; accelerated sensor-to-shooter timelines; operations center workflows; and deliberate and dynamic targeting solutions,” said JAIC spokesperson Arlo Abrahamson told C4ISRNET in January. The joint warfighting initiative is looking for "AI solutions that help manage information so humans can make decisions safely and quickly in battle,” Abrahamson said. The award to Booz Allen Hamilton will push that effort forward, Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, the center's director, said in a statement. “The Joint Warfighting mission initiative will provide the Joint Force with AI-enabled solutions vital to improving operational effectiveness in all domains. This contract will be an important element as the JAIC increasingly focuses on fielding AI-enabled capabilities that meet the needs of the warfighter and decision-makers at every level," Shanahan said. DoD CIO Dana Deasy told Defense News in December that the JAIC would embark on its first lethality project in 2020, which Abrahamson said would be part of the joint warfighting initiative. According to an April blog post from the JAIC, the initiative's first RFP released in March included the ethical principles DoD adopted this year, an effort to quell concern about how the Pentagon uses artificial intelligence. The award to Booz Allen Hamilton was made by the GSA through its Alliant 2 Government-wide Acquisition Contract, a vehicle designed to provide artificial intelligence services to the federal government. The GSA and JAIC have been partners since last September, when the pair announced that they were teaming up as part of the GSA's Centers of Excellence initiative, a program meant to accelerate modernization with agencies across government. “The CoE and the JAIC continue to learn from each other and identify lessons that can be shared broadly across the federal space,” said Anil Cheriyan, director of the GSA's Technology Transformation Services office, which administers the Centers of Excellence program. “It is important to work closely with our customers to acquire the best in digital adoption to meet their needs.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/artificial-intelligence/2020/05/18/booz-allen-hamilton-wins-massive-pentagon-artificial-intelligence-contract

Le budget du ministère des Armées, premier budget d'investissement de l'État, a un « rôle majeur à jouer » pour soutenir l'industrie de défense française, dont de nombreuses entreprises sont affaiblies par la crise, a affirmé le 17 mai la ministre Florence Parly dans un entretien à Ouest-France. « Nous avons un rôle majeur à jouer pour répondre aux besoins de nos forces et pour soutenir l'ensemble de la base industrielle et technologique de défense, ses grands groupes et ses milliers de PME et PMI, et leur éviter d'être impactées par la crise du coronavirus », déclare-t-elle. Le secteur, réuni au sein du Conseil des industries de défense française (Cidef) juge ainsi « fondamental » un plan de relance de l'économie, dont il bénéficierait. Sans l'évoquer formellement, Florence Parly indique que le gouvernement y semble favorable. Le Premier ministre « a donné des éléments de réponse en disant que l'investissement de défense se construit dans le long terme, que le monde dans lequel nous vivons ne sera ni moins dangereux ni moins risqué, comme le montre la période actuelle », rappelle-t-elle. Le Figaro du 17 mai 2022 - AFP du 17 mai 2020 - Ouest-France du 17 mai 2020

La crise sanitaire liée au Covid-19 a eu des répercussions sur le bon déroulement de nombreux programmes d'armement. « À la date d'aujourd'hui, le premier bilan des opérations d'armement est le suivant : à fin avril, 80% des jalons présentent un décalage calendaire de l'ordre de 1 à 2 mois selon les opérations », a expliqué le délégué général pour l'armement Joël Barre lors d'une audition fin avril à l'Assemblée nationale. Fin avril, le niveau d'activité des industriels, qui remonte progressivement, était évalué à environ 75%. « L'industrie annonce un retour d'activité de l'ordre de 100% entre mai et fin juillet, selon les industriels et les domaines concernés », a observé Joël Barre. La Tribune du 18 mai 2020