Nouvelles

By: Ellen Lord The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment is rapidly transitioning from the former OUSD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to an organization focused on enabling our services to use innovative business practices tailored to their needs. AT&L, the enterprise's former moniker, was a congressionally mandated organizational change for the purpose of streamlining business processes to speed capability delivery to the war fighter and maximize value for the taxpayer. On Sept. 4, 2018, we had our first official day as A&S. Though Department of Defense leadership has changed, our mission to support the war fighter through acquisition innovation remains constant. Over the past year, our team has worked to refine the A&S strategy using the National Defense Strategy as our guidebook. Six goals, each with nested sub-priorities, emerged from our senior leadership planning sessions: enable innovative acquisition approaches that deliver war-fighting capability at the speed of relevance; build a safe, secure and resilient defense-industrial base (commercial and organic); ensure safe and resilient DoD installations; increase weapon system mission capability while reducing operating cost; promote acquisition and sustainment initiatives with key international partners; recruit, develop and retain a diverse acquisition and sustainment workforce. A few initiatives that highlight some of these efforts are outlined below. Cyber Model Maturity Certification, or CMMC, is a strategic solution to make security foundational to DoD acquisition. Currently, the metaphorical “mark” is not being met — most defense supply chain partners are not in compliance with the National Institute of Standards and Technology 800-171. CMMC is a DoD certification process that measures a supply chain partner's ability to protect sensitive information through an independent third-party certification. The process will be managed by an accreditation body, which will certify, train, accredit these third parties and issue certificates. Recently, version V.06 of the model was released for review with a final version ready in January to integrate (in a phased-type approach starting fall 2020), as a mandate into all federal contracts. The Adaptive Acquisition Framework, our most transformational acquisition policy change in decades, is set to deploy at the end of this year. It is new in the sense that it directs using the minimum amount of process to enable program managers to acquire a capability versus previous models, which dictated all those things you might not do from a vast array of process steps. Essentially, this framework cuts superfluous bureaucratic process by empowering program teams to choose a pathway based on the specific product or service being acquired. It emphasizes critical thinking and “creative compliance.” A&S recently appointed an intellectual property leader to help develop DoD guidance and training, as well as to provide assistance across the DoD associated with acquisition, licensing and management of the newly published policy on IP (DoD 5010.44). PMs must proactively address protection of data rights at the inception of each program. Concurrently, we must continue our defense against cybersecurity threats that target U.S. IP by ensuring network security. Lastly, we are proactively strengthening the DoD supply chain against adversaries' creative market disruptions in the global marketplace. As such, we have formed a trusted capital, or TC, ecosystem where innovative companies connect with trusted investors. Though we will not promise business, we are creating an ecosystem in technology areas where we need more trusted sources for hardware, software and services to support our war fighter. Drone Venture Day, held on Nov. 13, 2019, represented the inaugural event in a series of TC opportunities to develop domestic manufacturing capabilities by growing and strengthening our defense-industrial base. These are a few examples of how A&S is reinventing DoD acquisition to simply and cost-effectively reduce the process of equipping our military with cutting-edge capability at the speed of relevance. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/pentagon-acquisition-boss-adapting-to-support-the-war-fighter

By: Mike Griffin Nov. 9 marked the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, an event followed within a couple of years by the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the freeing of the Eastern European vassal states. Francis Fukuyama thought we had reached “the end of history,” that global great power conflict was at its end and that the ascendancy of the Western liberal concept was the permanent future. “We won the Cold War” — it says so in all the history books. Winning is great, except for the part where the losers retreat, rethink, retrain and try again; while the winner thinks the race is won once and for all — which is why the United States now finds itself running from behind in certain aspects of today's great power rivalry. How did we get here, and what should we do about it? It turned out that Fukuyama was optimistic; Russia and China never accepted Western ideals as future standards. Their adherence to and promulgation of authoritarian values and behaviors was, at most, slowed by the ascendancy of the Western alliance after World War II. Russia's resurgence and China's rise offer the sobering reminder that individual freedom, property rights, free trade in open markets, transparency and accountability in government, the rule of law, and the sovereignty of nations are not universally accepted as foundational principles for human society. They are privileges to be purchased by every generation, at a high price in blood and treasure. Where possible, the United States has paid with treasure rather than with blood. This principle guided our Cold War policies. Knowing that we could not outnumber our adversaries, we invested to prevail technologically and sustained that discipline through eight presidential administrations. President Ronald Reagan won the Cold War by doubling down on the policies of the seven presidents who preceded him. Premier Mikhail Gorbachev lost because the Soviet Union could not keep up. What did we buy with those investments? First was the nuclear triad: our land-based intercontinental missiles, fleet ballistic missile submarines and strategic bombers. That force left no option for an adversary to surprise the U.S. and its allies with a decapitating first strike because the certainty of complete annihilation following such a strike was always there. Equally critical was the ability to prevail against a larger force in a conventional fight. The U.S. seized the advantage with precision, with a precise conventional strike, enabled by pattern-matching seekers. With a global positioning system to guide force projection to the right place, stealth technology to hide our aircraft from enemy radar, encrypted high-rate communications to enable superior command and control, electronic warfare to deny that advantage to our enemies, unmanned aerial vehicles for both reconnaissance and force projection, and the uncontested dominance of the space domain to tie it all together, we prevailed. These capabilities were transformational when first deployed, beyond the reach of any other society on Earth. But many are now available commercially, and others, such as electronic warfare and stealth, are now widely understood. Some potentially transformative technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, 5G, and microelectronics are driven not by defense but by commercial interests, and not solely by our domestic industrial base. In certain areas with no present commercial applications, such as hypersonic flight, we are simply behind. And in space — once the uncontested linchpin of the U.S. war-fighting advantage — we are challenged by Russian and Chinese determination, and capability, to deny that advantage. In brief, the United States no longer possesses the unquestioned technical superiority to dominate a future fight. At this juncture, we have not undertaken concerted defense modernization in more than a generation, and therefore have made marginal improvements to existing capabilities. These will not affect the outcome of a conflict for which our adversaries, knowing how we fight, have been preparing for a generation. We know what we need to do. The National Defense Strategy outlines the investments we must pursue: a revitalized nuclear triad, microelectronics, cybersecurity, biotechnology, 5G, space, hypersonics, artificial intelligence, directed energy, autonomous systems, networked communications, missile defense and quantum science, among others. Superiority in these technologies, woven into a war-fighting architecture that challenges our adversaries rather than reacting to them, is the key to deterring or winning future conflicts. The taxpayers have been generous with the defense budget, but it is insufficient to purchase more legacy systems while also creating the future force. So we must decide: What near-term risks are we willing to take, and what current systems are we willing to let go, so that we can invest in capabilities that will impose costs on our adversaries and deter them from starting a fight because they know they cannot win? This is the critical national security challenge of our time. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/pentagon-rd-boss-the-challenge-of-our-time

By: Sen. Jim Inhofe Since World War II, the American people have believed our military has had the best of everything, but the technological superiority that kept us 20 years ahead of our competitors has rapidly diminished. In some cases, we're already behind. By 2030, unless we pursue “urgent change at significant scale,” as former Defense Secretary Gen. James Mattis put it, it's likely the U.S. will face an enemy with superior weapons, superior equipment and superior capabilities. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in our strategic competition with China. China used to just steal our technology. Now, through heavy investment, they are improving it. The result? China is outpacing the U.S. in key areas like hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence and biotechnologies — not to mention conventional capabilities. China isn't the only one. Technological development is accelerating across the globe, expanding to more actors and changing the very nature of war. We can't afford to let our advantage erode further. It is up to the Department of Defense and Congress to make sure that the defense-industrial base becomes, as the National Defense Strategy demands, an “unmatched 21st century National Security Innovation Base.” If we want to “sustain security and solvency,” we need to consider wholesale change to industry culture and its interface with the Department of Defense, shed outdated management processes, and reimagine a resilient supply chain that mitigates 21st century risks. This essay is part of the Defense News 2020 Outlook project. Click here for more. This begins with software, which is foundational to military capability. The DoD and its traditional hardware-dominant industry partners have been behind on software in almost every way — talent, tools, development and delivery processes. Software innovation has failed in countless DoD programs, including the Ford-class carrier, the F-35′s Autonomic Logistics Information System and the GPS next-generation operational control system. Instead of taking the Pentagon for granted as an endless source of cash flow, partners must refocus their attention on delivering secure capability that actually works. Next, the Department of Defense needs to continue to expand capacity — prioritizing speed of delivery and adapting its systems to maximize value and output. For too long we have been slow to expand our stockpiles of fifth-generation weapons required to fight peer adversaries. The second production line for JASSM-ER cruise missiles is a good start toward building the capacity needed to retain advantages that will make any enemy think twice before attacking. We must do the same for other fifth-generation weapons, including air-to-air missiles. Shipbuilding, including aircraft carriers, surface ships, submarines and our logistics fleet, is another area where our capacity is severely limited. The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy, which recently surpassed ours in size, is on track to reach 400 ships in 2025 and is nearly self-sufficient for all components. Size of the fleet isn't a sole consideration. We've focused on ensuring the capability of our fleet remains unmatched and bolstering suppliers of critical components, but we must also improve the construction performance of lead ships in new classes to maintain and build upon our capability advantage. The last thing we want is a fair fight. Innovation is best done at the subsystem level through a rigorous engineering-based process centered on building knowledge through full-scale prototypes, which can then inform ship design. We are eager to work with the Navy to identify and fund more of these prototypes, which will serve as the building blocks of the future fleet. We also must accelerate innovation. Recent defense authorization legislation encourages the DoD to streamline acquisition, take a business-minded approach to contracting, and tap into nontraditional suppliers and public-private partnerships. This must continue. Dilapidated testing infrastructure is holding us back from catching up to our enemies. Just look at hypersonic weapons: Beijing is parading around dozens of its newest weapons, and we have yet to build one. The DoD has looked to Silicon Valley, but we are competing with Chinese influence there as well, and the Pentagon has often proven an impossible customer due to its antiquated bureaucracy. Any technological improvements will be meaningless if vulnerable to being infiltrated or stolen. Recent legislation continues support for the DoD as it assesses and mitigates risks to its supply chains posed by adversaries. Both the government and contractors need to cooperate on and use modern verification tools to identify trusted suppliers and manufacturers, as well as fix vulnerabilities. To make these tools useful, the DoD must first establish a working digital model of its suppliers. Lastly, while we must continue to invest in the domestic, organic industrial base, it's important to remember that we can't take on China and Russia alone — which is why the National Defense Strategy emphasizes our network of allies and partners. We must remove unnecessary barriers to industrial cooperation that degrade our collective competitive edge. We do not have to make a false choice between investing domestically and in our allies — we can do both. Under our National Technology and Industrial Base partnership with Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, we can develop a more diverse, resilient industrial base, secure our supply chains, and become a “five eyes for defense procurement.” It's in our best interest to ensure our allies can leverage our technological advantages and we can leverage theirs. Without a strong national security innovation base, the Pentagon cannot implement the National Defense Strategy. Congress' job is to put the appropriate, tailored policy in place and provide sufficient, predictable resources to help the industrial base meet these challenges. Together, we can harness the power of American innovation to ensure that we are able to win the wars of the future. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/sasc-chairman-we-must-build-the-national-security-innovation-base-our-defense-strategy-requires

By: Jens Stoltenberg On June 6, 2019, we marked the 75th anniversary of the D-Day landings. This was a major turning point in the Second World War, leading to the liberation of Europe. And it was a colossal feat for the tens of thousands of Allied troops, many of whom paid the ultimate price for our freedom. Less than 5 years later, NATO was born. An extraordinary idea, driven by the visionary leadership of our 12 founding nations and by the deep desire of our citizens to live in peace and freedom. NATO leaders will gather Dec. 3-4 in London, the very first home of NATO's headquarters, at a critical time for our trans-Atlantic security. This is an opportunity to reflect on everything we have achieved over seven decades. In that time, allies in Europe and North America have built an unprecedented area of peace and prosperity. Our ironclad commitment to protect and defend one another guarantees freedom and democracy for our almost 1 billion citizens, making NATO the most successful alliance in history. But beyond marking those 70 years, leaders will look to the challenges that still lie ahead. Today we face the greatest security threats in a generation — from a more assertive Russia to instability across the Middle East and North Africa, and from cyber and hybrid attacks to the ever-present terrorist threat. At the same time, the global balance of power is shifting around us. And the rapid development of new technology promises to transform our societies — and security — as radically as the first industrial revolution. So we must be ready to respond to any threat from any direction. And that is exactly what NATO is doing. Since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO allies have implemented the largest reinforcement of our collective defense since the Cold War. We have strengthened our presence in the east of our alliance, from the Baltic to the Black Sea regions. And we have increased the size and readiness of our forces. This year we declared two new NATO commands operational: one in Ulm in Germany to improve military mobility in Europe, and one in Norfolk in the United States to ensure trans-Atlantic lines of communication. And we are delivering on our new NATO Readiness Initiative to field 30 air squadrons, 30 combat vessels and 30 land battalions within 30 days. As well as guaranteeing our security today, NATO is preparing for the challenges of tomorrow on land, at sea, in the air, in cyberspace and in space. NATO recently updated the core standards for civilian telecommunications, including 5G, in order to improve the resilience of our networks. And this year allies adopted NATO's first-ever overarching space policy. Finally, all allies are stepping up their investment in our security, not only in cash but also with new capabilities and contributions to NATO missions and operations. European allies and Canada have increased defense spending for five years in a row. By the end of next year they will have added an extra $100 billion to their defense budgets since 2016. More allies are on track to meet their pledge to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense by 2024. But we have to do more because our freedom does not come for free. And in a more unpredictable world, we need to continue to keep our citizens safe. In London, NATO leaders will continue to strengthen our collective defense, modernize our alliance and invest in our shared security. And while NATO's 70th anniversary gives us cause for celebration, this is not the time for complacency. We must never take the trans-Atlantic bond for granted. We must never take freedom and democracy for granted. We must defend them every day. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/nato-secretary-general-alliances-70th-a-time-for-celebration-but-not-for-complacency

Bradley Perrett Japan says it wants international collaboration in developing its Future Fighter for the 2030s, but it wants to lead the project despite limited experience in fighter development. And it aims at a fighter much larger than any operated by a western European country ; the U.S. is not offering a possible joint project. That seems to leave only the choice of indigenous development, perhaps with help from a foreign technical partner. Nevertheless, participation in the UK's Tempest program may also be feasible. The Tempest project—which includes the Royal Air Force, BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce and MBDA—has a cooperation concept that leaves scope for Japan and other partners to use their own systems, weapons, propulsion and even airframes, says Air Commodore Daniel Storr, head of combat aircraft acquisition at the UK Defense Ministry. The model described by Storr gives Japan the flexibility to choose the size of its own fighter. Though evidently not an objective, this mix-and-match approach also creates an opportunity for Japan to continue to claim development leadership—but also to save money by sharing systems. The policy goal of running its own fighter program, stated in 2018, has looked like a big obstacle to Japan's participation in the Tempest or the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project initiated by France and Germany. But if the Future Fighter shared only some features with Tempest, Japan could reasonably say it was leading its own program. BAE Systems promoted the Tempest program at the DSEI Japan exhibition held in Tokyo fromNov. 18-20. Prospective FCAS prime contractors, such as Airbus, did not show their concept. Storr outlined the flexible model of cooperative development at an exhibition conference, but Japanese speakers at that event did not comment on the prospect of Japan joining Tempest. In a Nov. 1 interview with The Financial Times, newly appointed Defense Minister Taro Kono seemed to play down the possibility of participation in a European program, saying Japan should explore all possibilities but needed to maintain interoperability with U.S. forces. Storr addressed that point, emphasizing that working with the U.S. was a high priority for the UK too. Japan's alternative to international cooperation is developing a fighter by itself with the technical help of a foreign company. Lockheed Martin is supporting the Korea Aerospace Industries KF-X and BAE is helping the Turkish Aerospace Industries TF-X in such an arrangement. By working with Lockheed Martin, Boeing or Northrop Grumman, Tokyo would partially compensate the U.S. for its expenditures in defending Japan. But the U.S. would gain little from technical support fees, and Japan is already committed to buying 147 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightnings as the aircraft to precede the Future Fighters. The defense ministry has asked for the development of the Future Fighter to be launched in the fiscal year beginning April 2020. It is not clear whether that means mobilizing resources to commence full-scale development or taking some lesser step to firm up the commitment to create the aircraft. For the past year, the government's policy has been to launch no later than March 2024. However, Japanese companies, especially fighter builder Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), are pushing for a launch as soon as possible. They want to transfer knowledge to young engineers from the older generation that developed Japan's last fighter, the MHI F-2, which the Future Fighter will replace. The UK does not want to commit to launching full-scale development of the Tempest before 2025, but its date for entry into service in 2035 meets Japan's objective, which is sometime in the 2030s. Meanwhile, the FCAS program is aiming at 2040. Sweden and Italy are cooperating with the UK during the current early stage of Tempest research, while Spain has joined France and Germany for FCAS work. Like Storr, BAE has stressed the advantages of partners taking only as much of the Tempest as they want. “There is a range of different partnership models that can be considered,” says Andy Latham, who is working on the program. “Japan has some great technology that any partner can benefit from. Their avionics industry is pretty effective.” The cooperation concept replaces the standard model, one in which partners spend years negotiating and compromising to define a design that all of them must accept. Instead, according to Storr, they can save time and money by agreeing to disagree—to the extent that each is willing to pay the extra cost of independent development and manufacturing of design elements. The Japanese defense ministry's studies point to a need for a very big fighter with an empty weight well above 20 metric tons (40,000 lb.), larger than the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor. Superior endurance and internal weapon capacity are the key factors behind this choice. No western European country has operated a fighter more than about two-thirds as big, but Storr said a large configuration for the Tempest cannot be ruled out. The mockup exhibited at the 2018 Farnborough International Airshow was bigger than the F-22. Still, the UK and other European partners might want a much smaller fighter; concept designs that have not been shown are not as big as the mockup. But the concept for cooperation would allow for Japan to devise its own airframe while, for example, using the same engine and some weapons, software and avionics as other partners. The architecture of the software is intended to be open, accepting different programs easily. Tempest researchers will consider which systems and capabilities will go into the fighter and which will be incorporated into the ammunition or an accompanying drone, which could be fully reusable or optionally expendable, Storr says. The FCAS program is taking a similar approach. The Tempest will need great capacity for generating electricity, he says, and the weapon bay should be regarded as a payload bay, perhaps for holding additional fuel that would extend endurance on surveillance missions. The Japanese finance ministry is insisting upon private investment in the Future Fighter program, in part to ensure contractors are fully incentivized to prevent failure. Contractors will be able to make money in civil programs from technology developed for the fighter, says the ministry, which is highly influential but does not have a final say. “Judging from past program examples, it is clear that the Future Fighter program would bring a risk of a budget overrun and schedule slippage, but would also benefit the private sector,” the finance ministry said in an October presentation to the Council on Fiscal Policy, an advisory body. “The government and private sector should invest funds and resources to build a failure-proof framework.” Noting that MHI used technology from the F-2 program in its development and manufacturing of the outer wing boxes of the Boeing 787, the ministry says contractors can expect to gain similar opportunities for civil applications of technology from the Future Fighter program—so they should invest in it. https://aviationweek.com/defense/japan-could-pick-and-choose-components-tempest

MBDA vient de dévoiler qu'il a procédé à plusieurs essais de la version à portée étendue de son missile surface-air CAMM et destinée à fournir une solution commune aux "trois environnements". MBDA vient de dévoiler avoir réalisé plusieurs essais de la version à portée étendue de son missile surface-air CAMM. Un programme de missile initialement lancé par MBDA pour répondre aux besoins des Forces armées britanniques. Le CAMM se décline en version aérienne, terrestre et maritime. Pour la première, il s'agit d'offrir une alternative à l'ASRAAM. La variante terrestre, parfois dénommée "Land Ceptor", doit remplacer les batteries de missiles Rapier de l'Armée britannique tandis que la variante maritime, "Sea Ceptor", doit remplacer les Sea Wolf de la Royal Navy. La variante à portée étendue ou CAMM-ER bénéficie d'un moteur plus puissant pour atteindre, voire dépasser les 40 km. MBDA indique qu'une portée supérieure à 40 km a été confirmée par les essais réalisés depuis plusieurs mois. Le CAMM-ER a été commandé par les Forces armées italiennes dans ses versions aériennes et terrestres tandis que la Marine italienne envisage d'acquérir la version maritime. https://www.air-cosmos.com/article/mbda-a-mis-son-missile-camm-er-aux-essais-22126

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY Bell Boeing Joint Project Office, California, Maryland, has been awarded a maximum $218,749,892 modification (P00006) exercising the first one-year option period of a one-year base contract (SPRPA1-20-F-CD01) with four one-year option periods for performance based logistics and engineering support for the V-22 platform. This is a firm-fixed-price requirements contract. Locations of performance are Texas and Pennsylvania, with a Nov. 30, 2020, performance completion date. Using customers are Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Foreign Military Sales to Japan. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2020 through 2021 Air Force, U.S. Special Operations Command, Navy and FMS appropriated funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Aviation, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. NAVY Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, San Diego, California, is awarded a $74,726,993 cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for design agent engineering services for networks and network user systems on operational landing platform/dock (LPD)-17 class amphibious transport dock ships. Work will be performed in San Diego, California (80%); Norfolk, Virginia (15%); Mayport, Florida (5%) and is expected to be complete by December 2024. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance, (Navy) funding in the amount of $689,680 will be obligated at time of award and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with 10 U.S. Code 2304 (c) (1), only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements, as implemented by Part 6.302-1 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. This contract was issued on a sole-source basis to Raytheon Integrated Defense Services. This requirement is for design agent engineering and technical services for the overall management, development, testing, troubleshooting, repair, configuration, maintenance and fleet sustainment of fielded networks and associated network user systems/clients on operational LPD 17-class amphibious transport dock ships. These services are in support of Naval Surface Warfare Center, Philadelphia Division, Code 52, which is responsible for the lifecycle in-service engineering agent support of mission critical interior communications data networks. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Philadelphia Division, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is the contracting activity (N64498-20-D-0001). W.R. Systems, Fairfax, Virginia, is awarded a modification to a previously awarded (N65236-19-D-8001) indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee, with provisions for firm-fixed-price task orders, performance based contract. This single award contract (SAC) is currently in its first year with a Feb. 15, 2020, contract expiration date. This modification increases the basic contract estimated ceiling by $61,999,996, and changes the cumulative estimated value of the contract from $49,999,995, to $111,999,992. This SAC is for position, navigation and timing and geospatial information services support to naval ships and shore facilities. Work will be performed in Norfolk, Virginia, and is expected to be completed by February 2020. This SAC was previously procured competitively by full and open competition via the Naval Information Warfare Systems Command e-commerce central website and the Federal Business Opportunities website. This sole-source contract was not competitively procured in accordance with 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1) and only one responsible source (Federal Acquisition Regulation subpart 6.302-1). The Naval Information Warfare Center, Charleston, South Carolina, is the contracting activity. General Dynamics/Electric Boat, Groton, Connecticut (N66604-20-D-D001); Huntington Ingalls/Newport News Shipbuilding, Newport News, Virginia (N66604-20-D-D002); and Oceaneering International Inc., Chesapeake, Virginia (N66604-20-D-D003) are being awarded a $49,921,536 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) multiple-award contract to fabricate submarine safety/Level 1 (SUBSAFE/L1) hardware, and provide technical and engineering services. For these base ID/IQ five-year contracts, funding will not be obligated at time of award; the $1,000 minimum guarantee will be executed on each awardee's initial task order. Work will be performed at the contractors' locations and minimally at government locations, and is expected to be completed by November 2024. This multiple-award contract was competitively procured with three acceptable offers received via the Federal Business Opportunities website. This requirement is to provide SUBSAFE/L1 (or related) hardware, systems engineering, technical analyses, mechanical and electrical design, manufacturing, installation, test and evaluation, maintenance and repair services required to support existing and future fleet programs. In accordance with 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1), only a limited number of responsible sources and no other supplies or services will satisfy the needs of the agency. This tasking was limited to those activities qualified to perform SUBSAFE work per the Naval Sea Systems Command Notice 5000, fiscal 2019 Navy working capital funds. The Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division Newport, Newport, Rhode Island, is the contracting activity. Washington State Community College District #3, Bremerton, Washington, is awarded a not-to-exceed $18,000,000 five-year indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for educational services in support of the apprenticeship, helper and after-hours program, which pays for tuition, lab fees, math fees, tutoring services and assessment fees in an effort to provide customers with quality, timely and cost efficient maintenance, modernization, and technical and logistics support by maintaining a highly trained and skilled workforce. These services are in support of Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Facility in Bremerton, Washington. This contract does not include options. Work will be performed in Bremerton, Washington, and is expected to be complete by December 2024. No funding will be obligated at the time of award. In accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations Part 15, this was a competitive procurement with one offer received via the Federal Business Opportunities website. Operations and maintenance (Navy) funding will be obligated at the task order level prior to each semester. This is a commercial service contract that was competed in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 15. Only one proposal by the incumbent was received. The Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington, is the contracting activity (N4523A20D1300). ARMY General Dynamics Mission Systems, Taunton, Massachusetts, was awarded a $9,164,584 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to procure contractor field service representative support services for the warfighter. One bid was solicited with one bid received. Work will be performed in Taunton, Massachusetts, with an estimated completion date of Nov. 30, 2020. Fiscal 2019 other procurement, Army funds in the amount of $6,363,737 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is the contracting activity (W15P7T-20-F-0004). AIR FORCE Tunista Services LLC, Honolulu, Hawaii, has been awarded a $7,362,228 firm-fixed-priced contract modification (P00006) to previously awarded contract FA4855-18-C-0001 for continuation of operations, maintenance and support services at Melrose Air Force Range. The contract modification provides for the exercise of option year two procured under the basic contract. Work will be performed at Melrose, New Mexico, and work is expected to be completed by Nov. 30, 2020. The total cumulative face value of the contract is $22,676,639. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $7,362,228 are being obligated at the time of award. The 27th Special Operations Contracting Squadron, Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, is the contracting activity. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2029052/source/GovDelivery/

Yannick Smaldore Il y a douze ans, Saab annonçait la production du Gripen Demo, un démonstrateur technologique représentatif d'une nouvelle génération de chasseurs légers Gripen que le constructeur suédois entendait lancer tant sur le marché domestique qu'à l'exportation. Après un parcours parfois mouvementé, la dernière mouture de l'avion, le Gripen E/F, s'apprête à être livrée à ses deux clients. L'occasion pour DSI de revenir sur l'unique programme de chasseur de nouvelle génération actuellement en développement en Europe. En avril 2008, sur le site de Linköping, en Suède, Saab dévoile le Gripen Demo, adapté d'une cellule de Gripen D et première étape vers la prochaine génération de chasseurs légers de l'avionneur suédois. Si l'avion se rapproche extérieurement d'un Gripen biplace standard, un œil averti distingue rapidement des différences loin d'être anodines. Gripen NG, un nouvel ancien avion Le train d'atterrissage principal, qui se rétracte habituellement sous le fuselage, a été déplacé dans des logements conformes sous la voilure, permettant d'installer trois points d'emport ventraux au lieu d'un, mais aussi de combler les anciens logements de roues par des réservoirs internes supplémentaires. Les entrées d'air sont également agrandies afin d'alimenter un unique moteur F414 de General Electric, évolution 20 % plus puissante du F404 produit sous licence par Volvo pour le Gripen de base. Pour sa prochaine itération du Gripen, l'avionneur suédois propose d'intégrer dans cette cellule élargie ce qui se fait de mieux en matière de capteurs et de systèmes de combat. Le tout en respectant une enveloppe budgétaire extrêmement réduite (1) et un calendrier très serré, et en gardant comme ambition de redéfinir complètement la gestion des programmes aéronautiques militaires, rien de moins. Et une décennie plus tard, malgré quelques revers, Saab pourrait bien être en passe de tenir (presque) toutes ses promesses avec son Gripen NG (2). En 2011, la Suisse annonce son intention de commander 22 Gripen NG, ouvrant la voie à une commande de 60 exemplaires de la part de la Flygvapnet suédoise, et aux crédits de développement associés. En 2014, c'est au tour du Brésil de passer une commande ferme pour 36 appareils. Mais le programme connaît un premier coup dur, une votation populaire conduisant la Suisse à annuler sa commande d'avions de combat, ce qui force Saab à ralentir sensiblement son calendrier de développement. Avec plus d'un an de retard, en mai 2016, le premier Gripen E de présérie est dévoilé à la presse et montre immédiatement le paradoxe de ce nouvel appareil : à part une cellule plus longue de 50 cm et quelques différences extérieures, le futur de l'aviation de combat tel qu'annoncé par Saab ressemble à s'y méprendre au Gripen originel. Et pourtant, les évolutions techniques, numériques, conceptuelles et managériales sont bien là, discrètes, mais indispensables à la réussite du programme. Le Gripen E/F sur le plan technique Conserver une cellule pratiquement inchangée découle d'un choix stratégique de la part de Saab qui ne dispose pas des ressources pour développer une toute nouvelle plate-forme, et qui estime que les avancées en matière de capteurs et de travail collaboratif intra-patrouille rendent caduque la furtivité passive des avions dits de cinquième génération. Son Gripen étant déjà relativement discret et bien né, il est décidé d'en conserver l'aérodynamisme autant que possible. Avec une masse maximale passée de 14 t à 16,5 t, un emport en carburant interne augmenté de 40 % et la capacité d'emporter de nouveaux réservoirs externes plus volumineux, le Gripen NG ambitionne toutefois de s'extraire de la catégorie des chasseurs de défense légers pour marcher sur les plates-bandes des biréacteurs médians. Par rapport au Gripen C/D, les Gripen E/F voient l'intégralité de leurs systèmes évoluer vers des équipements de dernière génération. En matière de capteurs, Saab a principalement fait appel à Selex‑ES, depuis intégré à Leonardo. Ce dernier fournit le radar Raven ES‑05, variante du Vixen 1000E. Équipé d'une antenne AESA combinée à un repositionneur mécanique, le Raven possède une ouverture de 200°, contre 140° habituellement pour les radars AESA à antenne fixe. Une telle configuration permet théoriquement de continuer à illuminer une cible alors que le Gripen se trouve sur un vecteur d'éloignement, une capacité qui pourrait donc être exploitée en combat aérien à longue portée. L'IFF Mode 5 intégré au bloc radar est doté d'antennes latérales, afin de garantir une identification de la cible sur l'ensemble du champ d'action du radar, et une optronique infrarouge Skyward‑G est implantée au-dessus du radar. Cet IRST constituerait alors le principal outil de détection contre des cibles furtives. Radar, IRST et IFF sont enfin conçus pour travailler de manière collaborative, chaque équipement contribuant à construire une situation tactique unique que le pilote consulte sur son très large affichage principal, composé d'un unique écran tactile WAD (Wild Aera Display). Comme souvent avec les productions suédoises, le Gripen E/F devrait aussi se démarquer du marché par son équipement de communication et de guerre électronique. En plus des radios tactiques numériques et d'une antenne SATCOM, qui s'imposent de manière standard sur les nouveaux avions de combat, Saab propose plusieurs solutions de liaisons de données, notamment la L‑16 compatible OTAN, mais aussi son Link-TAU à grande bande passante. Fonctionnant en bande UHF, il permet aux Gripen d'une même patrouille d'échanger des données à longue distance et, dans un avenir proche, de fusionner les données issues de leurs capteurs respectifs pour affiner la qualification des pistes et la situation tactique. Pour la guerre électronique, Saab propose son système à large bande MFS-EW, dernière évolution de sa gamme AREXIS. Typique de l'état de l'art en la matière, ce système multifonction est basé sur des antennes AESA en nitrure de gallium (GaN) réparties sur la dérive et au niveau des rails lance-missiles. AREXIS s'appuie largement sur l'usage de systèmes de brouillage à mémoire de fréquence radio numérique, ou DRFM, qui analysent le signal radar adverse et émettent une onde retour modifiée. De quoi tromper l'ennemi sur sa position, sa nature ou sa vitesse, voire de disparaître complètement de certains écrans radars, en théorie. Si de tels systèmes se rencontrent déjà aujourd'hui, notamment sur le Rafale ou sur l'EA‑18G Growler, le Gripen NG innoverait par la capacité de traitement de signal offerte de ses calculateurs, sa capacité d'attaque électronique intégrée, mais aussi par la présence du système BriteCloud de Leonardo, un petit brouilleur DRFM éjecté par les lance-leurres de l'avion et spécifiquement conçu pour tromper les missiles assaillants. https://www.areion24.news/2019/11/29/gripen-e-f-le-dernier-appareil-suedois%E2%80%89/

By: Martin Banks BRUSSELS – The Dutch chief of defense says it would be “stupid” if the UK did not continue to be closely involved in EU-funded defense projects even when it is no longer a member of the bloc. But British future involvement in EU-led initiatives such as the European Defence Fund and PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) remains unclear, with EU member states yet to decide on a legal framework for third-party participation. With Brexit, the UK will technically become an outsider to the European Union's push for greater defense autonomy. That means London will no longer take part in EU decision-making or operational entities, and any British contribution to an EU operation will be subject to the rules that apply to third countries. Adm. Rob Bauer, chief of defense in The Netherlands, told Defense News he believes it is “imperative” that the UK remains “very closely” involved in such projects. Speaking at the sidelines of the annual European Defence Agency conference in Brussels on Thursday, Bauer said, “Remember, from a military point of view, the UK, even after Brexit, will still be a member of NATO and part of Europe. It is leaving the EU, not Europe. If the focus in Europe is on security then the UK should be part of that. To do otherwise would be stupid.” The PESCO initiative aims to develop and deploy forces at the EU level. Nearly 50 projects have been unveiled to date with the aim of pushing member states to work more closely together in the area of security and defense. So far, €13 billion has been allocated to the EDF which seeks to promote cross-border collaboration on defense research and technology projects, plus another €6.5 billion in the pipeline to upgrade roads, bridges, rail lines, ports and airports for military mobility, and €16 billion on space programs. Formal rules on third-party access to PESCO projects and the EDF are still being decided. Discussions are continuing at EU member state level, and no final decision is expected until the UK formally exits the EU, officials here said. London's departure has been delayed for the third time until Jan. 31, 2020. Bauer said, “I have spoken to the Brits about this and they have told me how difficult these discussions have been and continue to be. It is clear that agreement on access is certainly not a done deal.” “But we need to be pragmatic about this and continue to work together in the future.” His comments were broadly echoed by Lieutenant General Franz Leitgeb, Austria's Military Representative to the EU and NATO, another attendee at the EDA summit who told Defense News, “After Brexit, the UK will have third-party status, so third-party partnership rules will apply regarding its contribution to and participation in EU-funded projects like PESCO. “We still need to decide what precisely this means in the UK case but, whatever transpires, the UK has to realise this is a two-way street. That means that if the UK and its defense industry is to have access to EU-funded schemes and projects it has to contribute to these.” “Whatever happens we're going to need the current close relations on defense between the two sides to continue.” Further comment came from Benedikt Zimmer, state secretary at the German defense ministry, who took part in a session on PESCO and the EDF and said, “The more open cooperation is after Brexit, the better.” In a keynote address, Michel Barnier, the EU's chief Brexit negotiator, warned that UK involvement in EU defense and security would only become clearer once discussions start, probably at the start of 2020, on a political agreement between the two sides. Barnier told the packed audience, comprising senior military officials and personnel, that reaching agreement will be an “enormous challenge,” adding, “I do not want to interfere in the current UK election campaign but I am sure the Brits will still have an appetite for continued cooperation in the defense field. But, even so, they have to realize it will no longer be business as normal. I hope that UK defense companies, providing the rules are met, will still participate in European defense. We have the tools to make it happen but we still need to find a new framework for future cooperation.” More than 50 non-EU states have participated in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations since its first mission in 2003, including four regional powers – namely Turkey, Russia, Brazil and South Africa. The official British position on security and defense is ambitious about the possible scope of the UK-EU relationship post-Brexit, talking about a “deep and special partnership” that would go “beyond existing third country arrangements.” However, little in the recent past suggests the UK would seek much CSDP involvement once no longer a member: the UK has not been the most enthusiastic supporter of the EU's defense agenda thus far, and it's questionable if this would change after Brexit. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/11/29/britains-defense-ties-to-the-eu-are-still-up-in-the-air-post-brexit/