14 janvier 2019 | International, Terrestre
By: Grant Turnbull
Senior British army officers have signaled their intent to accelerate the fielding of several unmanned — and increasingly autonomous systems — following successful army trials at the end of 2018, but much like other forces around the world the United Kingdom faces challenges from how to modify archaic acquisition processes, to overcoming technical issues.
In December, the British army concluded its landmark experimentation exercise known as Autonomous Warrior, in which the service evaluated more than 50 unmanned systems from industry over a month-long period in the south of England.
The exercise, which put the robotic systems through grueling trials in muddy fields and a purpose-built facility for urban fighting, was the first attempt by the British army, as well as industry, to determine how the technology will work in a combat environment. Much like other forces around the world, the service hopes to use robots to carry out the dangerous, and often tedious, elements of combat.
Over 200 troops — made up of infantry, marines, engineers, airmen as well as U.S. Army personnel — were equipped with a variety of robotic and autonomous systems with the aim of improving areas such as combat mass, soldier lethality and overall information gathering.
For example, in one scenario, soldiers used robotic engineering vehicles to clear an obstacle, while a small quadcopter flew overhead to provide infrared imagery before armored infantry rolled in to take an enemy position. Robotic systems with varying levels of autonomy were a key part of the exercise, ranging from radar-equipped drones for detecting buried IEDs, to small two-wheeled robots that are thrown into buildings to search for enemy fighters.
The head of the British army, Gen. Mark Carleton-Smith, has directed the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to speed up the fielding of technology used during the exercise. “His direction to me is very clear,” said Maj. Gen. Chris Tickell, director of capability for the British army. “He wants to see some of this kit in the hands of the field army in 12 to 18 months.
“Success or failure will absolutely hinge on what happens after the experiment,” he added. “And that is about the exploitation and proving to industry that we are as good as our word and we are going to take some of these ideas and put them into the hands of the user.”
For Tickell, an equipment budget of £22 billion ($28 billion) over the next decade will allow the MoD to purchase new unmanned technologies, but the “trick is to turn the ideas that you see here into tangible capability.”
This may require the MoD “to adjust and even devise new acquisition processes to enable rapid acquisition”, said Trevor Taylor, an expert in defense acquisition at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank. “How will requirements, business cases, competitive tendering or ‘partnering,' testing and safety cases be addressed?”
A related challenge continues to be the British army's lack of experience using unmanned and autonomous systems, with commanders using the Autonomous Warrior exercise to better understand capability enhancements as well as the inevitable shortfalls.
The officer responsible for coordinating the exercise, Lt Col Nick Serle, told C4ISRNET that while the British army has worked with industry on new technologies it had not previously focused on robots and autonomous systems. “That's why this year we decided to spend a month on Salisbury Plain just focusing on robotics and autonomous systems,” Serle said. He also commands the British army's experimentation unit, known as the Infantry Trials and Development Unit.
“This is a real opportunity to bring stuff into the field and really see if it does what industry thinks it's going to do, but also to see if military users will use it the way [industry] thinks they will use it,” Serle said. “There's no one single piece of kit that will solve all our problems, it's a combination of something in the air such as a surveillance asset, something on the ground, perhaps with a weapon on it or just doing logistics, but then it all links through an information system where you can pass that data and make better decisions to generate tempo.”
An issue highlighted by Serle was an increasingly crowded radiofrequency spectrum, especially as several unmanned systems jostle for space to beam back high-resolution data from onboard sensors. “The problem is when they start cutting each other out, we are dealing with physics here, if we want to have great high definition video passing across the battlefield we need to trade somewhere else.”
Taylor noted that not only will there be a need to ensure that the control systems do not interfere with each other, but also that army leaders “will have to be convinced that new systems are not simply too vulnerable to jamming and other disruptive techniques by an adversary.”
A promising development from the exercise is the ability to optionally man a standard vehicle using applique kits that can be fitted within a few hours. Several examples were on display when we visited the exercise in December, including a remote-controlled Warrior infantry fighting vehicle and a lightweight MRZR tactical vehicle.
As part of the experimentation, troops used the vehicles in unintended ways. One U.S. Army soldier noting that the MRZR had been a helpful surveillance tool because of its onboard camera. Squads were also keen to use the UGVs to help in entering buildings and also as modern-day pack horses to carry supplies or people.
“What we have found is that when troops are using these [UGVs], naturally they just want to jump on the vehicle because it goes faster than they can, and you can move groups very quickly on them,” Serle said. He added that for safety reasons the soldiers were not allowed to hop on board during the exercise. “Optionally manned is good, but whether it needs to be optionally manned with a steering wheel and a seat I don't know, I think you could do it more like a Segway. But there's no doubt people want to get on them.”
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By: Jerry McGinn Ms. Lisa Hershman, an accomplished former CEO who has been serving in the Department of Defense for over two years, received Senate confirmation by unanimous consent to become the DoD chief management officer shortly before Christmas. At the same time, however, the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act required two studies from the DoD that openly posit eliminating the CMO function altogether. What gives? The mixed signals coming out of these discordant events underscore the fact that the theory behind the current CMO function (and similar efforts over the past two decades) does not match the reality of the business structure of the DoD. The solution that will ultimately work best for the DoD is one that truly takes a business-based approach to DoD business operations. The CMO function is the latest in a long-running series of efforts since the early 2000s to reform the business of defense. The essential idea has been to bring the best commercial business practices into DoD business operations through organizational and legislative changes. While the rationale for these respective initiatives is unassailable, they have struggled in execution. The CMO and its predecessor organizations, for example, have focused on the acquisition or certification of DoD business systems. These efforts, however, have largely devolved into bureaucratic battles over resources and authorities, pitting the business-focused organization against the formidable military departments and the “fourth estate.” Whatever the outcome, the business-focused organization ends up being seen as weak and ineffective. Why is that? Having worked for years in and around these respective efforts in both government and industry roles, I have come to the conclusion that these well-meaning initiatives are just the wrong type of solution. This is largely because their respective organizations, often despite strong leadership and empowered by various degrees of legislative authority, have not had the bureaucratic throw-weight to succeed in Pentagon battles with the services and the fourth estate. The solution to this challenge, however, is not to further tinker with the CMO's authority or to create a larger or different CMO organization. Part of the solution is to recognize that while the DoD is not a business, it is in many ways a businesslike organization. There are no profit and loss, or P&L, centers in the DoD, but the military departments frankly function in much the same way as a P&L line of business. The services are directly responsible for training and equipping their soldiers, sailors and airmen just as P&L leaders are responsible for delivering products and solutions on time and profitably. Likewise, fourth estate entities such as the defense agencies and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have direct responsibility over their respective functions. Harnessing the power and authority of these organizations through the training and enabling of good business practices is a much more natural fit for the DoD. Devolving responsibility in and of itself is not the answer, however. The other part of the solution is accountability. Commercial businesses do not have a CMO function. Instead, well-run businesses are led by strong executives who are responsible and accountable for delivering results to their employees and shareholders. Those that succeed are rewarded, while those that fail are replaced. The same goes for the DoD. DoD leadership should focus on establishing business-reform objectives for each major DoD organization, and then holding leaders of these respective organizations accountable to the achievement of measurable business goals. This should be driven by the secretary and the deputy, and enabled by a much smaller CMO function. Secretary Mark Esper appears to be headed in that direction in his recent memo on 2020 DoD reform efforts, which focuses the CMO's efforts on the fourth estate and makes the services directly responsible “to establish and execute aggressive reform plans.” That is the right approach. In short, the DoD does not need a management organization to oversee the business of defense; it needs to enable its leaders to utilize business best practices, and then hold these leaders accountable for results. Jerry McGinn is the executive director of the Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University. He previously served as the senior career official in the Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy at the U.S. Defense Department. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/01/15/does-the-pentagon-need-a-chief-management-officer