When it comes to network innovation, we must protect the data ‘pipes’

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  12 août 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  Finland’s Air Force chief tackles recruiting challenges and its quest for a future fighter

  By: Valerie Insinna TIKKAKOSKI, Finland — The Finnish Air Force is changing. In a matter of years, it will decide on its future fighter — a €7-€10 billion (U.S. $7.8-$11.2 billion) program that could tie Finland more closely to the country that wins the competition. It's revamping its command-and-control infrastructure. And like other international air forces, it's putting increased pressure on itself to boost readiness. Maj. Gen. Pasi Jokinen, who became the commander of Finland's Air Force in April, oversees the transformation. The job has its perks: During U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Dave Goldfein's trip to Finland in July — his first visit to the nation — the two officers took a break from meetings and sat backseat in two Finnish F/A-18 Hornets for a training mission. Goldfein later said the flight signified the growing trust between the two air forces. Jokinen spoke on July 21 with Defense News, which traveled to Finland with Goldfein, about the service's readiness challenges and its modernization priorities. Tell me about your conversation here today with Gen. Goldfein. Well, we talked about a lot of interesting topics. We talked about the operation environment and the Finnish Air Force and what we do here, and the cooperation with the U.S. and all that. He obviously was aware of a lot of things, but we went into very good detail about everything like that. We know what's happening here, we are strongly here, we are committed here and everything is running smoothly. You said you talked about the operational environment for Finland right now. Can you characterize that, and is it changing? Well, I think we have been using that word “new normal” after Crimea and after 2014, so activity in the Baltic region and in this region is in a little bit elevated level — let's put it that way. And of course our eastern neighbor is actively doing things in Syria and eastern Ukraine. It has had some effects. It seems that they have this big exercise cycle, [in] running the Zapad [exercise] and how they rotate the different regions. In 2017 we saw again this western Russia exercise, and it was noted. It was at peak activity level. Activity-wise, 2017 was the highlight, and now we are calmed down a little bit, but still we are above the level before 2014. Is it fair to say that the number of intercepts peaked in 2017? Yeah, well, when their activity is high, our activity is high. And of course the Gulf of Finland, which is the international airspace nearby our border, that's one of the areas of interest. You used the word “intercepts,” though; that activity is there. I mean, of course then they are operating also in the other, the northeast and eastern border, but that's a solid border. I mean, obviously they are on their side and we are on our side. Then the international airspace where we meet, OK. The Gulf of Finland is mainly transit for mainland Russia to Kaliningrad and back, and in the southern Baltic Sea, or the Baltic sea down more south, there's more room to maneuver, do stuff like that. Here is the very narrow — long but narrow — corridor that normally there is no operational type of maneuvers, neither side, but it's a transit. But we like to know who is going where and all that. Then obviously one the things are that they do not always use transponders or flight plans. There are no flight plans, so we need to find out who is there. That has improved a bit over the years. The equipment is newer and they have the western transponders and they use them, so it's a little bit better situation that we had a few years back, but it's not 100 percent covered with the flight plans or transponders. As you look across the entire Air Force, what's your No. 1 concern? Is it budget? Is it what you're seeing threat-wise from potential adversaries? Well, I'm not concerned about the adversary. Things are relatively stable. We have good relations in all the directions, all directions there. Defense forces in general has been resourced relatively well. The readiness, of course, requires some money. And of course the Army has had a bigger transition the last few years out of the services, from a training organization into a readiness organization. There's of course a need for more money, for operating money also. And the government has been giving quite good money in the last few years. Now the future is not that bright. I mean, there's some dark clouds there. I'm concerned. Of course, the main procurement program, like the HX [fighter replacement program], seems to be well on track, and I'm very happy about that, and that is their main priority, of course, to keep that in schedule and in budget for the procurement side of the house. People have been — I don't know if “stressed” is the right word — but they have been under pressure for the readiness, and we've also gotten more vacant jobs. We are recruiting people, people on the field and into the practical work— so the aircraft maintenance, the surveillance tasks. It's very important that the recruitment works. Aside from HX, are there other modernization efforts that you're trying to keep on track? Well, we are, before the HX selection, before the HX comes in. Right now we are working on our C4I system. But we have had quite a lot of new pieces there and they are IOC [initial operational capability], becoming FOC [full operational capability]. Then whatever solution or whatever HX candidate is chosen, there is a requirement to be able to process and handle all that [information]. So we are working that before so when selection is done and it's actually coming in, the infrastructure is prepared for that. Obviously we need to then fine-tune it, depending on the selection, at the end of the day, but right now we are working on the basic infrastructure. What has Finland already fielded? What is coming up that is still in the planning stages or in the competitive stages? For the C4 side of house? Well, OK, we've got our sensors, relative new sensors for the surveillance sensors. And our networks and the infrastructure and the servers, kind of like the infrastructure there, both the networks and for the servers. They are relatively new. So it's there, and we are getting that into use as we speak or in the near future. Then it's all about the processes and methods and how to handle the data and how to use the data. So that's something that people in organizations need to learn. Not the hardware, but the people need to learn, so that's something that we are working on. Then, when we get the HX here and we know what it is, then we do the necessary adjustments. And it's obviously platform-specific and [dependent on] the requirements there. In all cases, we need to be able to be better in joint warfare inside Finland with data services and of course maintain the international interoperability portion, whether it's about tactical data links or whether it's other things. Did you discuss interoperability with the U.S. Air Force with Gen. Goldfein? Well, yeah, sure. Technology is one thing. You are interoperable and you can use the data and all that. But the processes [of] how you do it is one thing, but then there's this policy side of the house, that if you don't have the policy or to actually be there — interoperable all the time — then you just need to be prepared for that. We are an independent nation. We are not a NATO member, and we are not doing common planning. We are operating as neighbors here. Our AOR [area of responsibility] and the EUCOM [U.S. European Command] AOR and NATO AOR, they are all overlapping or next to each other. Coordination and deconfliction [are] some things that we need to be ready to do. The policy is important and the SOPs [standard operating procedures] and all that. The U.S. is interested in rapidly generating air power in times of crisis. How can the U.S. better defend its bases or set up new expeditionary air bases if needed? From what I understand, that's something that Finland has the capability to do. Did that come up in conversation, and do you think that there are things that the U.S. can learn from Finland in that area? In Finland, we have our main base. But yes, we can deploy and we can swarm, distribute our assets, and then have them under the command and control, and make centralized effects out of those distributed things. So yeah, that was talked about. Of course, it requires the ability to move and begin to move [your resources from the base]. It requires a good situational awareness and plans [for] how to do it, and then the timely execution of that. We've talked about the general concept, and yes, it was mentioned by Gen. Goldfein that they are looking for a more expeditionary mindset, that huge massive bases that you can generate the air power may not be the thing that you want to stick. Finland is not that small [of an] area. There are smaller nations than us, but still in the global or the U.S. scale, it's still a small area. The thing is to look for the agility and mobility and know what's happening and do the right things from there, either move or disperse. Is that a capability in which Finland continues to invest? Yeah, it's part of the HX program. So now the question is how much. It's good for that fight that you distribute, but the main operation is get out there and do the job, then come back and you can go out again. That is the important thing — that you get the effect in the air, what you're doing from the air or in the air. Then it's nice for the survivability part and all that to be distributed. That's what we are still looking [at]. But then, to what extent? That is to be determined. We will find it out when the HX goes forward. On HX, I understand Finland is looking for some industrial incentives. Has it become clear yet what each company might be willing to offer? We are in the middle of the process. I don't know whether the offers are final. We have the ideas that we are discussing. There is a requirement that we need to be able to do certain stuff in Finland, with the Finnish resources and [people with] Finnish passports. That is a requirement [that] is still there. How do you think Finland will have to balance the cost of this project with the capability it wants? That equation needs to be solved, but we have two years of time to solve it. We have the money — €7 billion to €10 billion. And we need to maximize the capability on that money. Are you making additional investments in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities? There is a desire to have the proper amount of ISR. Obviously the HX is going bring something into it, and we also have a recent area there that we are investigating. Probably when there's better visibility, when we are actually selecting and getting through HX, then we [will] know where the gaps are, and then we are going to fill them in [with] other programs. https://www.defensenews.com/2019/08/09/finlands-air-force-chief-tackles-recruiting-challenges-and-its-quest-for-a-future-fighter/

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  6 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Opinion: Why Interest On Federal Debt Matters For Defense

  Byron Callan June 30, 2020 The COVID-19 pandemic has stoked consternation that U.S. defense spending is going to be significantly pressured in the 2020s. Congress will likely stick to the $740.5 billion defense discretionary top line agreed to in last year's budget deal for fiscal 2021. But the combination of trillions more in federal debt from higher spending and lower tax receipts this year and next and the probability that there will be future federal spending to better prepare for pandemics raise a higher probability of defense spending pressure. “Flat” was already the new “up,” but “flat” now may be a budget that does not keep pace with annual inflation. The fears may be that defense spending will decline in the 2020s after a couple of good years of largesse from Congress and the White House. Despite trillions in additional deficits and federal borrowing in 2020-21, there is one bright spot that indicates less dire defense spending pressures than now perceived—the interest on the federal debt. U.S. federal debt is comprised of debt held by the public and intragovernmental debt, which is owned by different federal trust funds, the largest of which is Social Security. As of May, total debt held by the public was $19.8 trillion, and intragovernmental debt was another $6 trillion. Often, these two sums are lumped together, but they should be treated separately. The interest paid on debt held by the public is dispersed by the Treasury in the form of outlays to the owners of that debt. The interest paid on intragovernmental debt is, in essence, interest the federal government pays itself. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in its annual projections of outlays, breaks out these two components of interest outlays to show net interest outlays. This is mandatory spending, and so it has been paid along with the other mandatory and discretionary funding the U.S. federal government provides. One of the silver linings of the pandemic has been the Federal Reserve's aggressive lowering of interest rates. This makes federal debt more affordable, much in the way that a lower interest rate on a home mortgage can make a place to live more affordable. The OMB projections released in February showed net interest outlays of $378 billion for fiscal 2021 rising to $665 billion by 2030. One could take issue with the deficit projections behind these outlay projects, as they may have rested on GDP growth expectations that were too optimistic and nondefense spending cuts that were not going to be realized. However, dividing interest outlays on debt held by the public by debt projections implied an interest rate of 3% or more over the forecast period. The pandemic has trashed those rate projections. Federal debt held by the public is offered in different maturities. Treasury bills, which mature in a year or less as of May, were 23% of the total debt held by the public. Treasury notes that mature in 1-10 years were 51%, and bonds that mature in 10-30 years were 12%. (There is another 10% of other Treasury instruments.) Rates now are much lower, although clearly that would only matter for new debt that is issued by the Treasury. The rate on a 90-day Treasury bill is currently 0.13%. On a five-year note, it is 0.33%, and on the 10-year note, 0.69%. The 30-year note rate is 1.4%. This implies that interest outlay projections should be declining, although new projections may have to wait until the White House releases its 2022 fiscal budget request and out-year projections, presumably in February-March 2021. Net interest outlays could be at least $100 billion less in 2022-23 than the February 2020 projections on higher debt but lower rates. In the scheme of total federal outlays, which the OMB projected to be $4.8 trillion for 2021, $100 billion is not a lot, but it indicates there is a bit more headroom for defense spending and other nondefense discretionary spending than a focus on federal debt alone might suggest. Federal infrastructure spending could be one area of more traction in the 2020s, and the issue of social justice may also spur more demand for federal resources. One outcome of the pandemic, however, will be to make defense expectations more sensitive to interest rate expectations. It is not too difficult to project scenarios with rising debt and interest rates that increase to more “normal” levels. The pandemic also underscores that the unthinkable should be given a bit more room on long-term projections. It is quite conceivable that a major military conflict, a massive natural disaster or another economic contraction could further add to federal debt in the 2020s. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/budget-policy-operations/opinion-why-interest-federal-debt-matters-defense

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  19 septembre 2018 | International, Terrestre

  These six companies have been selected to compete in the Army’s submachine gun program

  By: Todd South After some fits and starts, the Army submachine gun program has reached its next phase as officials have selected the six companies they want to provide guns for consideration. The program caught attention when it was first mentioned at the annual National Defense Industrial Association's Armament Systems forum. Lt. Col. Steven Power, product manager of Soldier Weapons for Program Executive Office-Soldier noted the then-recent posting of a Request For Information on sub gun options for soldier personal security. Fairly quickly, more than a dozen companies sent their offerings, and the designs ranged from the classic Heckler & Koch MP5-style to the smaller M4-type guns chambered in 9mm. Sub guns or subcompact guns have been in use in the military for a variety of purposes dating back to the Thompson Submachine gun developed during World War I and put into use in World War II. That heavy-duty, high-capacity weapon fell out of use in the subsequent decades, while other lighter versions with smaller rounds such as the 9mm came into fashion. Sub guns have long been used by special operations forces, such as the Navy SEALs, for close-quarters battle shooting scenarios. But they were not in common use among the rank and file for some time. That seems to be part of the reason that posting caught the attention of military-gun focused readers. Then, it appeared the program halted when the RFI was canceled after 13 submissions were received. But, in a few short weeks, a Prototype Opportunity Notice by Army Contracting Command was posted, modifying some of the requirements. The new notice wants a “highly concealable [Sub Compact Weapon] system capable of engaging threat personnel with a high volume of lethal force while accurately firing at close range with minimal collateral damage.” The sub gun now had to be optimized specifically to fire a 147-grain 9mm and include 20- and 30-round magazines. It must fire 60 rounds per minute for five minutes without a cookoff. The following companies were selected for the next phase: Trident Rifles, LLC Sig Sauer Shield Arms Global Ordnance, LLC B&T USA Angstadt Arms If selected, the companies could be asked to manufacture up to 350 guns initially, and possibly as many as 1,000 of the sub guns, depending on Army requirements. First, the companies will have until mid-October to provide 15 weapons for an evaluation. The six companies selected make for some interesting developments on the design front. Though details on specific submissions have not been made public, at least two of the companies on the list, Angstadt and Shield Arms, both make M4-style 9mm variants, as reported by Soldier Systems, a military gear-focused website. The Firearm Blog notes that the original MP5-style designs from Heckler & Koch, Zenith and PTR are now off the list, as are some of the companies typically associated with this type of gun. That includes Colt, Beretta, CMMG, CZ-USA, LMT and Noveske, the website reported. Sig Sauer has had recent success, nabbing last year's contract to replace the common sidearm for all the services in the M17 9mm handgun, part of the Modular Handgun System. It also garnered attention from Special Operations Command for its work on the MCX Rattler, chambered in .300 Winchester Blackout, this year. One company not selected, Handl Defense, reportedly told TFB that they planned to file a protest on the selections, alleging they were excluded on a “procedural basis.” https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/09/18/these-six-companies-have-been-selected-to-compete-in-the-armys-submachine-gun-program