Un engagement de longue haleine pour une entreprise à l’OTAN

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  11 octobre 2018 | International, Terrestre

  Industry, nations hope to cash in on unmanned ground vehicle growth

  By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — With the presence of drones ubiquitous in the skies, industry and international partners are turning their eyes closer to earth in an attempt to cash in on a growing sector: unmanned ground vehicles. “UGV market growth has historically been slow and steady, mostly S&T and niche procurements. What we're seeing now is an inflection point,” said Joshua Pavluk, a principal with Avascent. “There's a lot of activity happening and several DoD new starts happening nearly all at once.” That inflection point is partly the result of improved autonomy and navigation opening up opportunities, Pavluk said. But there is also a desire to see how these systems can transition from sole-mission capabilities, such as explosive ordnance disposal, to multi-mission systems capable of doing ISR, EW and communications. According to a report from the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, total spending for ground drones in FY19 was set at $429 million, of which only $86 million is for procurement — DoD planned to buy 134 new systems during the fiscal year — and the rest for research and development. That pales in comparison to the $6.05 billion the Pentagon planned to spend on UAVs, and half the expected $982 million in naval drones. But that number shows steady growth, doubling in just two years from $212 million in FY17 and $310 million in FY18. And while explosive ordnance disposal systems still represent the biggest spending from the Army in this arena, it will likely be overtaken by programs such as the Army Common Robotic Systems and Robotic Ground System Advanced Technology Development. “The market won't match overall UAS spending levels anytime soon, but it's fast growing, and there's opportunity for the taking,” Pavluk said. However, Michael Blades, an analyst with Frost and Sullivan, is more subdued in his predictions. “It's a significant market and it is growing, but not at the levels of sea or air systems, or even counter-drone capabilities,” Blades said. “We will see some unmanned-unmanned teaming between UAS and UGV, but the land market for unmanned will be orders of magnitude smaller than the markets for air and maritime.” From a competition standpoint, Blades sees “the usual suspects” who are already in the market continuing to dominate in the coming years. And internationally, there are only a few players, with the market largely dominated by Israel. Could that change in the future? The international market generally lags behind the U.S. on such capabilities, Pavluk said, but he noted that “other countries will get in on the act, and it doesn't have to be large ones” to try and participate. Full article: https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ausa/2018/10/09/industry-nations-hope-to-cash-in-on-unmanned-ground-vehicle-growth

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  16 janvier 2020 | International, Terrestre

  US Army cancels current effort to replace Bradley vehicle

  By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army is taking a step back on its effort to replace its Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle after receiving only one bid in its competitive prototyping program, but this does not mean the end of the road for the future optionally manned fighting vehicle, service leaders told reporters Jan. 16 at the Pentagon. Until now, the Army has been tight-lipped ever since it appeared the competitive effort was no longer competitive, as the service had received only one prototype submission. “Today the U.S. Army will cancel the current solicitation for the Section 804 Middle Tier acquisition rapid prototyping phase of the [optionally manned fighting vehicle]. Based on feedback and proposals received from industry, we have determined it is necessary to revisit the requirements, acquisition strategy and schedule moving forward,” said Bruce Jette, the Army's acquisition chief. “Since its inception, the OMFV program has represented an innovative approach to Army acquisition by focusing on delivering an essentially new capability to armored brigade combat teams under a significantly reduced timeline compared to traditional acquisition efforts. The Army asked for a great deal of capability on a very aggressive schedule and, despite an unprecedented number of industry days and engagements to include a draft request for proposals over a course of nearly two years, all of which allowed industry to help shape the competition, it is clear a combination of requirements and schedule overwhelmed industry's ability to respond within the Army's timeline,” Jette said. “The need remains clear. OMFV is a critical capability for the Army, and we will be pressing forward after revision." In October, the Army ended up with only one bidder in the OMFV competition — General Dynamics Land Systems. The service had planned to hold a prototyping competition, selecting two winning teams to build prototypes with a downselect to one at the end of an evaluation period. Defense News broke the news that another expected competitor — a Raytheon and Rheinmetall team — had been disqualified from the competition because it had failed to deliver a bid sample to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, by the deadline. A bellwether for what was to come in the prototyping competition happened earlier in the year when BAE Systems, which manufactures the Bradley, decided not compete, Defense News first reported. And, according to several sources, Hanwha also considered competing but decided against the opportunity. The CEO of BAE Systems' U.S.-based business, Jerry DeMuro, told Defense News in a recent interview that the company didn't regret its decision not to pursue OMFV as the requirements and schedule were previously laid out, but said it continues to talk to the Army about future opportunities. “It was a very challenging program,” DeMuro said. “It always comes down to three things: requirements, schedule and funding. The schedule was very, very aggressive, especially early on, and at the same time trying to get leap-ahead technologies. There's a little bit of dichotomy there. “The requirements that were being asked for was going to require, in our estimation, significantly more development that could not be done in that time frame and significantly more capital than the Army was willing to apply.” Jette said the Army had a large number of vendors interested in the effort, hosted 11 industry days and had a number of draft requests for proposals on the street, but, he said, “it's always a challenge for industry. I was on the outside two years ago, and you get an RFP in after the discussions — it still cannot align with what you thought, and that is what you have to respond to is the RFP.” The acquisition chief believes what happened in this case is there was “a large number interested, they started paring down, which started causing us some uncertainty about the competition, but we still had viable vendors in. And when you get out to actually delivering on those requirements, we had one vendor who had challenges meeting compliance issues with delivery, and the second vendor had difficulty meeting responsive issues, critical issues within the requirement — not knowing how to fulfill that.” When pressed as to whether GDLS met the requirements with its bid sample, the Army's program executive officer for ground combat systems, Brig. Gen. Brian Cummings, who was present at the media roundtable along with the Next-Generation Combat Vehicle Cross-Functional Team leader Brig. Gen. Ross Coffman, said the Army could not discuss results and findings regarding the company's submission. Several sources confirmed a letter was circulating around Capitol Hill from GDLS to the Army secretary that strongly urged the service to continue with the program without delay. So now it's back to the drawing board to ensure the Army gets the prototyping program right. Jette took pains to stress that the OMFV effort is not a failed program with the likes of Comanche, Future Combat Systems, Crusader or the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter. “This is a continuing program. This is an initial effort at trying to get to a programmatic solution yielded, input that we needed to evaluate, which said we needed to revise our approach, not abandon the program or that it was a failure.” Some major failed programs in the past, Jette noted, were canceled after spending large amounts of money and still moving along even though problems were identified as the service proceeded. Crusader cost about $2 billion, Comanche about $6.9 billion and Future Combat Systems about $19 billion, Jette said. “We've spent a very small amount of money in trying to get to where we are, and in fact a good bit of the technology development that was part of the assessment phase is still totally recoverable," he added. Army Futures Command chief Gen. Mike Murray told the same group of reporters he is hesitant to call OMFV a program because it's a prototyping program, not a program of record. “We are still committed to this. This is like a tactical pause,” he said. The effort so far “gave us a great deal of clarity in understanding what is truly doable,” Jette noted. Army leaders said they would be unable to estimate how long its renewed analysis on the program might take before proceeding with a new solicitation to industry, or what that would mean for the program's schedule in its entirety. The original plan was to field OMFV in 2026. Last month, Congress hacked funding for the OMFV prototyping program, providing $205.6 million in fiscal 2020, a reduction of $172.8 million, which would have made it impossible to conduct a competitive prototyping effort. What happens to that funding or congressional support for the overall program is unclear. While sources confirmed to Defense News in early October that the failure with the OMFV prototyping effort revealed rifts between the acquisition community and the Army's new modernization command, Army Futures Command, Jette said while there is a bit of “scuffing here and there" the two organizations are working together “much better.” Murray added it is his view that the acquisition community and Army Futures Command is moving forward as “one team” with “one goal in mind.” https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/01/16/army-takes-step-back-on-bradley-replacement-prototyping-effort/

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  22 juillet 2020 | International, C4ISR

  The new ways the military is fighting against information warfare tactics

  Mark Pomerleau One of the clearest examples of how the military wants to defeat adversaries using information warfare is by publicly disclosing what those enemies have been doing and what capabilities they have. Information warfare can be abstract, combining cyber, intelligence, electronic warfare, information operations, psychological operations or military deception as a way to influence the information environment or change the way an adversary think. “At our level, the most important thing we can do is to be able to expose what an adversary is doing that we consider to be malign activity, in a way that allows that to be put in the information environment so that now more scrutiny can be applied to it,” Lt. Gen. Timothy Haugh, commander 16th Air Force, the Air Force's newly established information warfare organization, told reporters during a media round table in late February. One of the first ways the Department of Defense has sought to test this is through U.S. Cyber Command's posting of malware samples to the public resource VirusTotal. Malware samples discovered in the course of operations by the Cyber National Mission Force are posted to the site to inform network owners. It also helps antivirus organizations of the strains build patches against that code and helps identify the enemies' tools being used in ongoing campaigns. Haugh, who most recently led the Cyber National Mission Force, explained how these cyber teams, conducting what Cyber Command calls hunt forward operations, were able to expose Russian tactics. U.S. military teams deploy to other nations to help them defend against malign cyber activity inside their networks. “Those defensive teams then were able to identify tools that were on networks and publicly disclose them, [and] industry later attributed to being Russian tools,” he said. “That was a means for us to use our unique authorities outside the United States to be able to then identify adversary activity and publicly disclose it.” Officials have said this approach changes the calculus of adversaries while also taking their tools off the battlefield. “Disclosure is more than just revealing adversary intent and capabilities. From a cyberspace perspective, disclosure is cost imposing as it removes adversary weapons from the ‘battlefield' and forces them to expend resources to create new weapons,” Col. Brian Russell, the commander of II Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group, told C4ISRNET in June. “Disclosure forces the adversary to ask: ‘How were those capabilities discovered?' It causes them to investigate the cause of the disclosure, forcing them to spend time on something other than attacking us. If I can plant a seed of doubt (messaging) that the disclosure might have been caused by someone working on the inside, it makes them question the system's very nature, perhaps spending more time and resources to fix the system.” The NSA has demonstrated a similar tactic when it created its cybersecurity directorate in late 2019. The entity was formed in part, due to the fact that adversaries were using cyberspace to achieve strategic objectives below the threshold of armed conflict. Now, the directorate uses its intelligence and cyber expertise to issue advisories to the network owners of cybersecurity threats so they can take the necessary steps to defend themselves. One recent advisory had direct bearing on a nation state's malicious activity, according to a senior intelligence official. In late May, the agency issued an advisory regarding a vulnerability in Exim mail transfer agent, which was being widely exploited by a potent entity of Russia's military intelligence arm the GRU called Sandworm. “Quickly thereafter, we saw five cybersecurity companies jumped on it and really used that to deepen and expand and publish information about the GRU's infrastructure that they use to conduct their cyberattacks and further information as well,” the official told reporters in early July. “That was terrific because we felt that that had a direct impact on a major nation state in terms of exposing their infrastructure ... and we saw significant patch rates go up on a vulnerability that we knew they were using. That's the kind of thing that we're looking for.” The military has had to think differently to combat for how adversaries are operating. “A central challenge today is that our adversaries compete below the threshold of armed conflict, without triggering the hostilities for which DoD has traditionally prepared,” Gen. Paul Nakasone, commander of Cyber Command, wrote in prepared testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in early March. “That short-of-war competition features cyber and information operations employed by nations in ways that bypass America's conventional military strengths.” These disclosures or efforts to call out malign behavior have also taken the forms of media interviews and press releases. For example, Gen. Jay Raymond, the head of U.S. Space Command and the commandant of Space Force, said in a February interview in which he detailed what he deemed unacceptable behavior by Russia in space, a surprising charge given how tight lipped the U.S. government typically is about its satellites. “We view this behavior as unusual and disturbing,” he said of Russian satellites creeping up to American ones. “It has the potential to create a dangerous situation in space.” Or consider that leaders from Africa Command on July 15 issued a press release detailing the activities of the Wagner Group, a Russian security company, as acting on behalf of the Russian state to undermine the security situation in Libya. “U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has clear evidence that Russian employed, state-sponsored Wagner Group laid landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in and around Tripoli, further violating the United Nations arms embargo and endangering the lives of innocent Libyans,” the release said. “Verified photographic evidence shows indiscriminately placed booby-traps and minefields around the outskirts of Tripoli down to Sirte since mid-June. These weapons are assessed to have been introduced into Libya by the Wagner Group.” Moreover, Africa Command's director of operations called out Russia, noting that country's leaders have the power to stop the Wagner Group, but not the will. Sixteenth Air Force, at the request of C4ISRNET, provided a vignette of such behavior from Russia in the form of how it covered up the explosion of a radioactive rocket, dubbed Skyfall. According to the service, Russia took extreme steps to curb monitoring of the site where the explosion took place and sought to conceal the true nature of the explosion potentially hindering surrounding civilian populations from receiving adequate medical treatment and guidance. With new forces integrated under a single commander, using unique authorities to collect intelligence and authorities to disclose, 16th Air Force is now better postured to expose this type of malign activity, which previously the U.S. government just didn't do. Top Pentagon leaders have explained that the dynamic information warfare space requires a new way of thinking. “We've got to think differently. We've got to be proactive and not reactive with messaging,” Lt. Gen. Lori Reynolds, the Marine Corps' deputy commandant for information, told C4ISRNET in an interview in March. “We have been very risk averse with regard to the information that we have. You can't deter anybody if you're the only one who knows that you have a capability.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/information-warfare/2020/07/20/the-new-ways-the-military-is-fighting-against-information-warfare-tactics/