11 janvier 2021 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
By: Ben Wallace
The Estonian town of Tapa sits less than 100 miles from the Russian border, and in December I was there to visit some of the 900 British troops that have been stationed there since 2017 — our largest land deployment outside of the U.K.
This is not just a useful training exercise with our Danish and, in a few months' time, French allies, but rather a strategic defensive presence in a region that is vital for global security. Our Estonian allies are bolstered and reassured by having us there.
A more active, more deployed armed forces, such as those in Tapa, is a sign of things to come for U.K. defense. Like Estonia, we meet the 2 percent commitment to NATO, and in the U.K.'s latest spending review, the Ministry of Defence secured a record settlement of £16.5 billion (U.S. $22.4 billion) of funding above our election manifesto commitment over a four-year period.
The prime minister and I share a vision for how that funding will transform U.K. defense.
It is crucial to putting our defense spending on a sustainable footing — living within our means, addressing the underfunding of previous years and paving the way for a modernization that is much overdue.
It means being an even greater and ever-reliable defense ally to our friends around the world. It means adopting a more proactive posture with our forces more forward, more present and more assertive. It means remaining a leader in NATO, spending above 2 percent of gross domestic product, making the largest single commitment to the Readiness Initiative and helping drive the modernization of an organization that has kept us safe for more than 70 years. And, of course, it means remaining the United States' most reliable, capable and committed ally.
It is not just a coincidence that this is the biggest defense investment since the end of the Cold War. Estonians know this only too keenly — and with an increase in Russian presence in the U.K., we have felt this too. Our Quick Reaction Alert forces have seen their busiest period in a decade, with our Royal Air Force fighters scrambling 11 times to intercept Russian warplanes. Meanwhile, the Kremlin's activity in U.K. waters has risen by 26 percent since last year, with Royal Navy vessels escorting each and every one of them. From our airspace to cyberspace, the North Sea to the High North, we know the threat they pose.
So in an age of 21st century challenges, it's more important than ever that we work together. That's why, following our departure from the European Union, we are opening up fresh opportunities to strengthen our global relationships and stay ahead of the curve. The integrated review that we will publish in 2021 will make the most of new technologies, improve integration across the domains and demonstrate that we remain the international partner of choice: a burden-sharing, self-confident and active nation, stepping up to our responsibilities in an ever more contested world.
Ben Wallace is Britain's secretary of state for defense.
22 juillet 2021 | International, Aérospatial
The U.S. Navy plans to modernize the most critical standoff jamming system in the military’s inventory for the first time since 1971.
4 août 2020 | International, Terrestre
By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — After years of working various jobs related to security cooperation, Lt. Gen. Charles Hooper took over the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency in August 2017. It was an appointment that coincided with a major push by the Trump administration to increase weapon sales as an economic driver. Three years later, as he gets ready to retire, Hooper sat down with Defense News for an exclusive exit interview. This interview was edited for length and clarity. You came in as DSCA director in 2017, when the Trump administration was making a concerted push to increase arms sales abroad. Has that push been successful? Certainly I think the answer to that question is: “Yes, absolutely.” When I assumed responsibility at DSCA, we saw a convergence of three authorities that helped to create conditions that would help us to move forward and to elevate security cooperation. The first one was the fiscal 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, which [gave me] responsibilities in the Department of Defense to reform security cooperation, in ways that would make it more efficient and effective. The second one was the revision and the updating of the administration's arms transfer policies. And the third was the National Defense Strategy with which has three lines of effort, the second of which was strengthen alliances and attract new partners. So those three authorities created by convergence — what I call a perfect storm of authorities — and conditions to allow us to elevate and push for security cooperation and foreign military sales. And I made it my mission to take advantage of those conditions to move it forward. You have talked often about the need to both trim time and cost for partners and allies buying American systems. What are some highlights for you? In 2018, we lowered the admin surcharge rate from 3.5 to 3.2 percent. And since the new rates have gone into effect, our partners have saved $250 million on FMS cases. Next, we reduced the transportation rates in 2018. And since that reduction has gone into effect, since Aug. 15, 2018, our partners saved about $15 million. Then this year, we reduced the FMS contract administration surcharge from 1.2 percent to 1 percent. Although we don't have enough data as of yet to determine actual savings, we estimate that our allies and partners will save about 17 percent on contract administration over the life of each FMS case, which averages about seven or eight years. That perfect storm of authorities allowed us to move forward with many of the initiatives that we've been able to accomplish over my tenure as DSCA director. And then the Defense Security Cooperation University. I'm very proud of that, and we were able to bring that online in less than two years: The establishment of a civilian career field for security cooperation specialists, so that we are able to train and educate a cadre of people specifically focused on security cooperation, and foreign military sales through their mid-career and all the way to their capstone years. We all know one big FMS case can skew an entire year's numbers, but do you feel confident that enough has been done to ensure FMS sales will continue to grow? Although we tell everyone what the total value was of the cases that were implemented in that year, we think a three-year running average is a much more accurate measure of the success of FMS over time. And if you look at the three-year running average, over the past three years we're actually up around 16 percent, I believe. So the answer to your question is, yes, I think that we're still on a very positive trajectory. And I think that's the result of many of the changes that have taken place over the last three years that were made possible by the authorities that we were given. So for example, we looked at those surcharge [changes], we revised our financial collection policies to align collections with the actual anticipated billing requirements. And so by decreasing those early collections, foreign partners will experience less financial strain, aligning FMS procurement with fiscal realities. And we've also introduced new flexible financing options for our allies and partners to fit their own unique national budget and fiscal requirements. I'm very optimistic that we're going to continue to see positive trends in our foreign military sales this year, and in the years to come. The DSCA job is moving from a three-star role to a civilian job, with Heidi Grant taking over. You've often talked about the benefit of having years of relationships, going back to your younger officer days, with officers from other countries. Do you see any downside with the position being civilian? What's most important about this position is the person coming into it, and Heidi Grant has all the qualifications that you would need to be an exceptional DSCA director. She has time in combatant commands; of course time on the Air Force secretary's [staff]; her time as the director of the Defense Technology Security Administration. So it is the right person, with the right skill set, to be an upstanding director of DSCA and, frankly, I'm excited to see all the accomplishments that she's going to have. There is speculation that a potential Biden administration could roll back some of the arms control changes made under the Trump administration. If that were to happen, what would be the impact? I'm not going to hypothesize here about what ifs. What I can say is that we're clearly on a very positive trajectory as a result of the three steps that have taken place. And I think that the results that have come forward — I mean, the results that we've seen today are a reflection of the NDAA, the conventional arms transfer policies and National Defense Strategy. Future administrations will of course consider things as they will consider them. And I wouldn't want to speculate on that. But I think the progress we've made today speaks very, very strongly toward the effectiveness of the measures in place. We hear a lot about Russia and China looking at foreign arms sales as a way to exert influence around the globe. Are they successful in pushing the U.S. out of certain markets? Both of our main strategic competitors are mounting challenges to the United States, and I think we see that in a number of places all over the world. But I would say that the proper characterization of this is that they are challenging us. They are competing with us. Certainly they've mounted challenges around the world and in providing goods and services that are not quite the quality of the United States, trying to replace the United States as the partner of choice. Whether it's been successful or not, I think that we have recognized that they've mounted this challenge and we've taken some of the steps that I've articulated for you here that we've done to ensure that we remain the partner of choice and that we complicate their efforts to compete with us. In addition to providing partners with the hardware, our approach ensures that we strengthen these institutions — logistics, doctrine, infrastructure, institutional support, financial management — so that they can learn how to pay the people who will actually fix the equipment. And this is what makes our approach so unique. And this is why we will win this great power competition. Our values set us apart from the other great power competitors. You were the defense attache to the embassy in Beijing for two years, and obviously have a view on China's efforts from your current spot. How do you asses the country's defense export capacity? Certainly, the Chinese are going to look across the spectrum, but certainly they're looking in areas where they think they can challenge us. We know, of course, that the Chinese have marketed UAVs and other things. So they'll look for market niches in areas where they think they can be competitive with the United States. They have economic reasons for doing so, as well as strategic reasons for doing so. But once again, their approach stops at the point of sale. And this is the inherent weakness in their approach and the inherent strength in our approach. Do you think UAVs will be the main area that China targets? No. I used that solely as one example. We've seen attempts by the Chinese to compete across the spectrum, from small arms, small missile sets and others all the way up to more sophisticated equipment such as UAVs and others. We've seen a comprehensive effort by the Chinese to compete across the spectrum of defense articles and services. And I think we've seen a comprehensive effort on their part to try and market systems that replicate U.S. systems and U.S. capabilities across the spectrum, from small arms through artillery systems and other things. So I think we have to be vigilant across the spectrum of defense articles and services to where the Chinese are probing. I think the Chinese will generally try to press forward in areas where they sense that the U.S. position is perhaps a bit weaker, and they will push forward in those areas. And I think rather than having a strategy of competing in any particular sector of defense articles and services, I think that they're more interested in trying to compete across the spectrum, where what they perceive to be potential areas where they might be able to make some advances, and moving forward in those. In what areas is the U.S. potentially vulnerable, and are those where the U.S. needs to increase sales? I don't look at it that way. Defense exports are driven by a rapidly evolving security environment and emerging threats. And so we can't really predict this system or that system, or this category of systems. That said, we know what our military leaders are saying: that [the capabilities] they need in the field to ensure our strategic and operational edge [is what] our allies and partners will want as we move into the more modern areas of conflict. In the past, there was a lag between when the United States would introduce a system and when our allies and partners would ask for us to export it, and those days are behind us. We're in a world where interoperability is the key to success, and we cannot afford to have delays in when we introduce new technology and when we consider exporting them. Now, there are inherent challenges here, between conducting the cost-benefit analysis of risk versus gain, but we have the talent and the ability to rapidly assess these, and to move forward and provide our partners their defense articles and services that they want and that they need, and that will make them better allies and partners for the United States. So rather than predict any particular segment, I would say that the steps that we're taking to improve our overall approach will ensure that whatever the evolution of systems and the evolution of threats is, we will be able to respond and react quickly, and work with our allies and partners to provide them those defense articles and services in a timely fashion. Both the commercial and defense industries are investing heavily in new technologies, including artificial intelligence, which can be tricky to export. How does this work going forward? That's a great question. And I'll tell you, early this year I took a visit out to Silicon Valley and Stanford, and had an opportunity to talk to some of the people out there. Ever since I came back from that trip, I've been thinking about this question and related questions. And, to be honest with you, I think we've yet to determine — we know that this will be one of the principal challenges for security cooperation moving forward. We absolutely know this. And I'm confident that we're thinking deeply about this because I've had this discussion with my colleagues and others. I don't have any solutions for you right now. But I think we've all come to the conclusion that the rapid evolution of technology is going to require us to conduct risk assessments and cost-benefit analysis more quickly, without sacrificing the due diligence necessary to determine the relative cost and benefits of whether or not we want to move forward with [exporting] a certain technology. We all recognize that we have a challenge to come together and determine how we will move forward in the security cooperation realm to address space, cyber, artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies. Should there be a hard and fast rule for whether technology like AI can be exported, given its nature? Listen, never ever forget that security cooperation is a policy function at its core. That's why DSCA resides in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. And policy is a process of adjudicating on a case-by-case basis, based upon a number of economic, diplomatic and political factors, as well as the right steps to take to secure the security of the United States. Just as security cooperation now is a case-by-case consideration of a number of factors, I don't see why, as the technology evolves, it would be any different. All of this, everything we do, is on a case-by-case basis because our national security is predicated on a comprehensive assessment of the situation as it exists, the factors impacted on that situation and the ramifications of a decision for the security of the United States. https://www.defensenews.com/interviews/2020/08/03/us-weapon-sales-boss-talks-china-arms-exports-and-his-agencys-future/
21 août 2019 | International, Terrestre
By: Jen Judson UPDATE: This story has been updated to include a statement from Raytheon. WASHINGTON — The Pentagon has moved from taking a “strategic pause” on the Redesigned Kill Vehicle program to outright killing it. The Department of Defense decided to terminate the current Boeing contract to develop the RKV — effective Aug. 22 — “due to technical design problems,” according to an Aug. 21 statement by the department. Raytheon is the actual developer of the RKV and serves as a sub-contractor to Boeing. The RKV would have replaced the current Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) on the Ground-Based Interceptor, which makes up the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system designed to protect the homeland from ballistic missile threats. It would have also been fielded on all future ground-based interceptors — a total of 64 ultimately. The EKV is designed to destroy targets in high-speed collisions after separating from the booster rocket. The EKV required technical changes in the past several years due to issues in tests. The Missile Defense Agency decided to initiate a program to redesign the kill vehicle. In the meantime, MDA has had several successful tests of the GMD system with the EKV following engineering changes. Now that the RKV is dead in the water, the Pentagon plans to move forward with a new, next-generation interceptor competition, the statement said. According to a defense official, no more ground-based interceptors will be built, and all future interceptors that are fielded as part of the GMD system will be the new interceptors. “Ending the program was the responsible thing to do,” Mike Griffin, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, said in the statement. “Development programs sometimes encounter problems. After exercising due diligence, we decided the path we're going down wouldn't be fruitful, so we're not going down that path anymore. This decision supports our efforts to gain full value from every future taxpayer dollar spent on defense.” With the blessing of the undersecretary of defense, Griffin made the decision on Aug. 14 to terminate the program, one week after he told reporters at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, to expect a decision on the way forward for RKV soon. MDA and Boeing in December 2018 deferred a critical design review of the RKV “due to the failure of certain critical components to meet technical requirements as specified in the development contract,” the statement noted. After MDA assessed the issues, it issued a stop work order on the contract in May to analyze alternative options. “The department ultimately determined the technical design problems were so significant as to be either insurmountable or cost-prohibitive to correct,” the statement said. The DoD plans to take data garnered from research and testing of the RKV prior to its cancellation to inform the next-generation interceptor program, “which will include a new kill vehicle,” according to the statement. “The U.S. Missile Defense Agency is updating its requirements in the face of an increasingly complex threat environment," Raytheon said in a statement. The company “supports their decision to cease work on the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) and initiate a competition for the next-generation interceptor to meet these advanced threats. Raytheon will continue to develop and offer a wide range of advanced missile defense technologies available to protect the United States now and in the future.” There are 44 ground-based interceptorss in place at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, with plans to add 22 additional missile silos at Fort Greely to support 20 more ground-based interceptors. The defense official said the Pentagon is still working through the details of a new, next-generation interceptor competition, including when it will be initiated and the pace at which the technology will be developed and fielded. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/08/21/dod-tanks-redesigned-kill-vehicle-program-for-homeland-defense-interceptor/