2 octobre 2023 | International, Aérospatial

Space Force can bolster Greenland ties by buying local for Arctic base

A first step is to abide by international agreements and U.S. law would be for the service to procure supplies from Greenlandic companies, the authors say.

https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2023/10/02/space-force-can-bolster-greenland-ties-by-buying-local-for-arctic-base/

Sur le même sujet

  • If the US Navy isn’t careful, its new unmanned tanker drone could face a 3-year delay

    12 juin 2020 | International, Naval

    If the US Navy isn’t careful, its new unmanned tanker drone could face a 3-year delay

    By: David B. Larter   WASHINGTON — The US Navy could face a three-year delay in testing of the MQ-25 Stingray carrier-based tanking drone if it doesn't get its designated test ships through the required modernizations on time, a possibility the Navy said was remote. Two carriers — Carl Vinson and George H.W. Bush — have limited windows to complete the installation of unmanned aircraft control stations, and if operational commitments intervene it could create significant issues for the program, according to Navy officials and a government watchdog report. “Program officials stated that, among other things, the Navy's potential inability to maintain its schedule commitments could require modifications to the contract that would impact the fixed-price terms,” the Government Accountability Office reported. “Specifically, the Navy faces limited flexibility to install MQ-25 control centers on aircraft carriers. “If the Navy misses any of its planned installation windows, the program would have to extend MQ-25 development testing by up to 3 years. According to officials, such a delay could necessitate a delay to initial capability and result in a cost increase.” Navy officials say a three-year delay is “extremely unlikely,” however the Navy has struggled in recent years to balance its modernization schedules with operational commitments, a problem that its “Optimized Fleet Response Plan” deployment rotation scheme was supposed to address. Ultimately, a delay would further push back the Navy's ability to extend its carrier air wing's range through unmanned tanking, critical to keeping the service's powerful strike arm relevant against long-range guided munitions. The Navy believes it can avoid a schedule delay and is working toward keeping the program on track, said Jamie Cosgrove, a spokesperson for Naval Air Systems Command. “The Navy is still planning to achieve [initial operating capability] in 2024,” Cosgrove said. “A three-year extension of development testing and a delay to IOC is extremely unlikely and represents improbable scenarios where both aircraft carriers currently designated to support MQ-25 testing are unavailable due to operational requirements, or the program misses the planned periods to install the MQ-25 test equipment on those two carriers. “Should either of these unlikely scenarios occur, the program will reevaluate the schedule and determine how to best mitigate schedule impacts to deliver the mission-critical MQ-25 to the Fleet ASAP.” Unmanned control The specific alternations needed to operate the MQ-25 Stingray include special control and network equipment, Cosgrove said. The program of record is the Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission Control System and installing it will include setting up a control room known as the Unmanned Aviation Warfare Center on the ship. The equipment in the UAWC will include control stations, network interfaces and routing equipment, commanding and control equipment and network infrastructure, Consgrove said. The Navy awarded Boeing an $805 million contract to build the first four MQ-25 aircraft, with options for three additional aircraft. In April, the Navy announced it had exercised the option to the tune of $84.7 million, bringing the total number of Stingrays under contract to 7. Ultimately the Navy plans to buy 69 additional aircraft as part of the its full production run, according to the GAO report. The Navy's former air boss Vice Adm. Mike Shoemaker told USNI Proceedings in a 2017 interview that the MQ-25 would extend the carrier air wing's range by up to 400 miles. Juggling maintenance The Navy has struggled to maintain its carrier schedules in recent years as the problems have arisen with carriers during their availabilities. For example, last year, the carrier Abraham Lincoln was extended on its deployment because its relief, the carrier Harry S Truman, was stuck in maintenance to repair unforeseen issues. That can throw a monkey wrench into the Navy's overstretched deployment rotation scheme, meaning that other carriers have their deployments extended while still others have their maintenance availabilities truncated to play catch up. But that can lead to even more problems down the road with differed maintenance and worn-out equipment that ultimately adds up to a significant readiness hole that is tough to dig out from. All of this is exacerbated by crushing demands from Combatant Commanders for Navy forces overseas, which ultimately is driving the vicious cycle. That means the Navy will have to manage the risk of impacting the Vinson and Bush's upcoming maintenance availabilities to not set back the MQ-25 development cycle. https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/06/10/if-the-us-navy-isnt-careful-its-new-unmanned-tanker-drone-could-face-a-3-year-delay/

  • The US Air Force’s top acquisition exec talks hypersonic prototypes and more

    31 juillet 2018 | International, Aérospatial

    The US Air Force’s top acquisition exec talks hypersonic prototypes and more

    By: Valerie Insinna FARNBOROUGH, England — Will Roper took the job of assistant secretary of the U.S. Air Force for acquisition, technology and logistics in February, but he's likely better known for his prior gig as head of the Pentagon's Strategic Capabilities Office. As the first-ever director of the new SCO, Roper drew attention for projects that used off-the-shelf tech to prototype new capabilities like swarming drones. Now he's turning his eye toward making sure the Air Force quickens the pace in which it acquires new weapons, focusing especially on prototyping as a method to push the service toward a solution on a faster timeline, he told Defense News in a July 16 interview at Farnborough Airshow. What current programs involve prototyping? We've got a whole set of programs that we're accelerating, and what I love about our acceleration is that there's no rhyme or reason to what type of program they are. Some of them are sustainment programs like putting a new engine on the B-52. Others are more traditional prototype efforts like hypersonics where we're doing an advanced weapon acceleration. Others are software, where we're accelerating F-22 software drops, our protected [satellite communications] delivery. The good news about this is it doesn't appear that there is [only] one type of program that's able to be accelerated. The difference is that we're not using traditional [Department of Defense] 5000 [acquisition principles]. Instead we're using the new authorities from Congress, and all they encourage us to do is to tailor the way that we acquire the system to the specific needs of what we're buying. And that sounds completely obvious. You ought to do something specific to the needs of what you're buying. But if you look at the 5000 process, which is traditional acquisition, it has more of a generic approach. And in that generic approach, there are a lot of steps that don't make sense for all systems. So we're just cutting those out, and that's where the acceleration is coming in. How are you prototyping new B-52 engines? Aren't there off-the-shelf systems already available? There are. That's what we want to use. The question is: How do you go out and do that acquisition? If you do it a traditional way, you'll spend years doing studies, [with] the government pretending it knows enough about those commercial engines to make a decision to pick one and go field it. If we were a company, we would know that we don't know enough about those engines without getting our hands dirty, without getting some grease on our hands and sleeves. So they would go out. They would downselect to a top set of vendors, have each one create a digital twin of their engine, do the digital representation of its integration on their aircraft, fly them off against each other, determine which one will give you the most fuel savings and then pick the engine based on the one that saves you the most money overall. By: Valerie Insinna So, a simulated flyoff? Exactly. So in the accelerated acquisition paradigm, which uses the 804 authority, we don't have to go the 5000 route of doing years of study. We can do it like a commercial company. And what I love about this example is that it's not just faster, it's about three-and-a-half to four years faster in total time. It's also better because we'll be making the decision with a lot more data than we would if we were staring at a wad of paper that was analysis but not actual simulation. This is an example of what tailoring means and what it gets you. This approach may not apply to other programs, but it makes a ton of sense for this one. So that's what we're developing right now, is buying a commercial engine the way a company would. Buying and integrating it the way a company would, not a military. What's the schedule? We're working the acquisition plan right now. I've approved it for one of our 804 accelerations, so we'll use the new authorities. I've given this guidance to the program office. Let's go do a digital twin flyoff the way that industry would, and I'm just letting them work the details before we approve and get started. But it's a great example; a digital twin flyoff is pretty cool. You wouldn't think putting a new engine on the B-52 would be a cool program. You would expect the hypersonics program would be where all the cool kids would go. But in my view, there's a lot of great engineering and great acquisition to be done in all programs, and what's been awesome about being in this job is I'm seeing innovation across the Air Force, not just in the high-tech programs you'd expect. The light-attack experiment is obviously one example where you're doing this prototyping and experimentation. Some in Congress want to give you money in fiscal 2019 to buy planes, but the Air Force hasn't even figured out whether to turn this into a program of record. Do you have the contractual authorities to make that happen? I think we can do it using new authorities that Congress gave us in the last National Defense Authorization Act. Light attack is a great example of being able to move into an authority called “middle-tier rapid procurement fielding.” The requirement is that it's something that you need to be able to buy off the shelf with only a little upfront development in six months total. And light attack is a great example of doing experiments to make sure that you understand the ability of existing planes to do a mission we need to do, and then moving into an acquisition decision which is based on buying a currently available product. I'm confident as we go through all of the light experiment data — we're doing that right now — that any of the options we look at, I'm confident none of them will be 100 percent perfect, but that's exactly what's wrong with acquisition today. We pursue 100 percent solutions until we get them. Light attack is a great example of realizing that we can get 90 to 95 percent today at a lower cost, and since we've gone out and flown before we bought, I think we have a much better chance of doing this acquisition with confidence, that what we give the operators will do the mission and be sufficient. By: Valerie Insinna You mentioned hypersonics as another area that involves prototyping. Can you say more about that? Hypersonics is an area that I'm very passionate about. I feel like we need to not fall behind any country in this domain. And it was an area, coming in from SCO, I really wanted to dive into these prototyping efforts and see is there anything that we can do to speed them up. And in fact, there is. This is another example of another program where the rapid authorities appear to make a big difference on how quickly you can go. But the big difference is really shifting the program so that it embraces the potential for failure. You saw this a lot from me at my last job. Failure is very much an option, and as a matter of fact, if we're going to fail and we do it early in a program, we've probably learned something valuable that we need to understand before progressing. Hypersonics is a program where I would expect us to get out and learn a lot as we test. So rather than taking time to ensure that your tests are checking the box of something you're confident you can do, you compress the schedule to go out and make the test focused on learning something. Just that difference in mindset takes years out of our hypersonics program. We're hoping to [get to initial operational capability] within three to four years, and all of that is due to doing it as an experimental test program vice a long compliance period. Are you speaking of the hypersonic weapons program that Lockheed Martin recently won? We just awarded a contract to Lockheed, and that will be the vehicle that we use to fund this. Are you relying on digital prototyping or physical demonstrators? It will be all [of them]. Hypersonics is a new regime for weaponry, so we very much want to have digital models that we believe. So getting in the wind tunnel so that we can go out and simulate flights before we do them. But because this is a pretty exotic domain of physics in terms of pressures and temperatures, we're going to need to get out and fly and test [real prototypes]. [Information technology is] very important that we're instrumenting our flight bodies so that we're collecting data. There's nothing that I'm telling you that's peculiar to this program — this is pretty common for any envelope-pushing program. I think the big difference in hypersonics now versus a couple of years ago is just shifting to a test focus and embracing the potential for failure as a spectacular learning event or whatever word you want to use as a good name for failure. It's a great failure of our English language that there's no word that means “good failure.” We say we need to embrace failure. We don't often do it because it still comes with a stigma, and that's one of the things I'm really hoping to do in this job. I'm looking for those people to take smart risks, to go out to be daring, and my job is going to be to give them top cover, applaud them and reward them when they do because we're going to need that across the Air Force if we're going to speed up. Can you give me a status update on T-X? On T-X, we're going through source selection, so we're hopeful we'll get through that — should be in the fall. The fall? We had been hearing summer. I guess, if September is summer — I guess September is technically summer. End of summer is still fair based on where we are now. With JSTARS, I understand the Air Force is still doing source selection as Congress figures out the path forward. Will it be ready to announce in short order if you are forced to move forward on the program? We're hoping that we can shift to the new [advanced battle management system] ABMS program because if we're going to deal with a contested environment, we are going to have to learn to take things that used to be integrated, complicated system that are high-value targets, and break them up into less contestable targets that can work together. I don't view that as particular to JSTARS; it's something we need to learn how to do writ large. I view it as an architecture challenge that the Air Force has to pick up if we're going to learn how to do distributed systems. I would like to be able to do it for JSTARS because I think it's a great candidate. If Congress does require us to do the recap, we're making sure that we have not dropped the ball on doing that. But we are hoping to be able to shift to the future concept. As an SCO director and former program manager, I would love to manage that program. I think there will be a lot of things to learn and tryn and it definitely needs to be a program where we embrace failure up front and prototype because there's going to be a lot of learning to do about how do you make things work together as a team. We get a sense of how commercial industry is solving it, and I imagine we can use a lot of their lessons learned, but probably not all of them. It sounds like the ABMS architecture is still being worked through as far as what will fit in that and how. I'd say it's an architecture at this point. And that's unusual for a program when, if you were in my job, you're getting tasked like, “I need a new airplane, I need a new sensor pod,” and you get a list of how well it has to perform. ABMS is more [like], you're given a mission and your can choose how to allocate the requirements for that mission across a system of systems. So it's not the mission requirements — you're doing the design requirements. And you can just imagine one designer saying: “I'm going to collect a lot of data from nose to the edge. I'm going to do a massive amount of processing at the middle.” I bet you'd get high performance that way, but you'd have huge communication challenges. Another designer might say: “I'm going to put my processing on the edges themselves, so I'm not dependent on getting to that central node.” You probably have more graceful degradation if you have one of those nodes taken out. But you might give up performance. This is a real architecture problem, and acquisition historically does not do architecture. When we need to build something, we don't allocate it across systems of systems. In the future, it looks like we're going to have to start doing that. https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/farnborough/2018/07/27/the-us-air-forces-top-acquisition-exec-talks-hypersonic-prototypes-and-more/

  • Opinion: Aviation’s Cybersecurity Imperative

    22 mai 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Opinion: Aviation’s Cybersecurity Imperative

    Remzi Seker May 22, 2020 With the expansion across the aviation industry of connectivity and computing services, cybersecurity has become ever more important. Connecting people, processes and assets creates new vulnerabilities and multiple attack points—from flight-critical avionics to passenger inflight entertainment networks and airline backend operations. Information about systems, protocols and technologies such as software-defined radio are now readily available well beyond the industry. Demand for greater efficiency meanwhile continues to increase connectivity and accelerate computerization within aviation infrastructure, including aircraft. Fortunately, ongoing efforts to protect aircraft, airlines and passengers from cybersecurity threats have been largely unaffected by the global pandemic, suggesting an opportunity for the industry to ramp up cybersafety programs and training amid the current slowdown. The comprehensive, coordinated nature of aviation cybersecurity initiatives means committees have long carried out their work primarily through virtual meetings, so those efforts are able to continue in full swing. With slowdowns taking place in other areas, the industry can address cybersafety at a more rapid pace. The aviation industry and its stakeholders have been working hard to tackle cybersecurity challenges comprehensively—from the supply chain and the maintenance of aircraft to operations. Such efforts remain essential so that cyberthreats affecting safety can be mitigated before they materialize, whether that happens during flight through physical access to a bus, by interfering with equipment through Wi-Fi or remotely disrupting operations. The need to weigh cyberthreats according to their safety impact, a practice referred to as “cybersafety,” requires a different perspective than that of IT cybersecurity. Cybersafety differs from traditional IT cybersecurity because of the need for safety certification, which relies on guaranteeing a system's behavior, or “determinism.” This unique characteristic of aviation cybersafety means that solutions widely used across traditional computing systems may pose serious certification challenges. Imagine rolling out security patches for every avionics component on a commercial aircraft. Tackling cybersafety challenges requires a coordinated, comprehensive, global effort. Multiple agencies are cooperating to establish much-needed standards. For example, the U.S. FAA and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency have been working with the RTCA and the European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment to set harmonized cybersecurity standards. Efforts to secure the aviation ecosystem also include dedicated committees such as the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee Aircraft System Information Security/Protection working group. Similarly, the Aerospace Industries Association has established the Civil Aviation Cybersecurity Subcommittee. In the U.S., the Aviation Cyber Initiative (ACI) is led by the Defense Department, Department of Homeland Security and FAA. The ACI includes experts representing government, defense, industry and academia who collaborate to tackle aviation cybersecurity threats. The Aviation Information Sharing and Analysis Center shares global threat intelligence among aviation companies. Globally, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) leads this work. Its Trust Framework Study Group (TFSG) includes experts from the FAA, EASA, commercial industry and academia and has established three important working groups. Academic institutions play a critical role in advancing cybersecurity research and training, too. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, for example, develops engineering solutions and provides degree, certification and training programs in aviation cybsersecurity. Faculty researchers contribute expertise to cyberdefense and preparedness efforts by serving on national and international committees and working groups and by organizing the annual Aero-Cybersecurity Symposium. Aviation's impeccable safety culture positions it well to combat and defeat cybersafety risks. In the years ahead, the industry will need to invest in expanded education and training as well as research to secure high-assurance systems that can be updated with minimal impact on certification. Computerization and Cyberphysical Systems As computing becomes ever more affordable, functions that were traditionally implemented through hardware are now being realized through software, and inclusion of software has supported increased customization. Cyberphysical systems are designed to perform a set of functions with limited impact on the physical environment, such as temperature control, welding and parts assembly. One feature of cyberphysical systems is a failsafe property that involves shutting down—an approach that is clearly not desirable midflight. Connectivity Inexpensive and ubiquitously available computing, combined with advancements in networking, have accelerated the networking of devices. The Internet of Things concept does not require any form of certification or service-quality assurance, let alone any safety requirement or oversight. Rather than leveraging the Internet of Things, the aviation industry might consider using “networked wings” to underscore its safety commitment. Remzi Seker is the associate provost for research at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. The views expressed are not necessarily those of Aviation Week. https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/safety-ops-regulation/opinion-aviations-cybersecurity-imperative

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