Renforcer la coopération pour améliorer la crédibilité européenne en matière de sécurité

Sur le même sujet

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  1 février 2021 | International, Aérospatial

  Royal Australian Air Force benefits from Airbus SmartForce digital services

  Amberley (Australia), January 28, 2021 – Airbus has recently signed a contract to provide a digital services focus for the maintenance of the Air Refueling Boom System (ARBS) on the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport (A330 MRTT) fleet. Based on the Airbus suite of digital services SmartForce, this service is intended to support the operator in reducing maintenance costs and improving fleet availability by optimizing the fault diagnosis and troubleshooting tasks for the ARBS of the tanker aircraft, based on data analytics applications. The Central Data System plays a key role, allowing operators to draw on the flight data recorded by the Mission Recording System and provides information outputs about issues registered during the flight and recommended maintenance actions to fix them. Within the KC-30A Enterprise, the Central Data System is a joint development built upon a successful long-standing collaboration among Airbus, the Commonwealth of Australia (CoA) and the Australian KC-30A Through Life Support (TLS) provider Northrop Grumman Australia, in sharing data and defining the architecture of the system. Future proposed development of the capability will allow customers which apply this technology to their fleet to be able to extend the ARBS analytics to entire aircraft level diagnostics. Stephan Miegel, Head of Military Aircraft Services at Airbus Defence and Space, said:“Since the launch of SmartForce in 2018, Airbus is fully committed to support the digital initiatives of our customers. Working collaboratively with them, we have signed five agreements for the co-development of new services and technologies. We are proud to see that military operators are increasingly joining us on our digital journey.” Jake Adams, Northrop Grumman Australia KC-30A Program Manager, said: “The introduction of the Central Data System has provided significant benefits in terms of increased availability of the ARBS. The recent agreement between Airbus and Northrop Grumman Australia ensures that the RAAF continues to benefit from this capability as well as providing the opportunity for ongoing collaboration and sharing of data and analytics to enhance the ARBS capability.” Group Captain Scott Parry, Officer Commanding Heavy Air Lift Systems Program Office, commented: “The Central Data System delivers a significant capability benefit for the KC-30A aircraft and demonstrates the strong commitment within the KC-30A enterprise to innovation and improvement.” SmartForce is a suite of services enabling military operators to exploit aircraft data to improve troubleshooting, optimize maintenance effort, predict maintenance actions and plan smartly for material demand and improving the fleet availability. SmartForce capitalizes on the new power of big data analytics coupled to secured connectivity to maximize mission readiness. @AirbusDefence @AusAirForce #A330MRTT Your Contact Pablo Correa External Communications - Airbus Defence +34 6 89 66 96 02 Send an email Belinda Ng Communications - Airbus Asia-Pacific +65 9683 6361 Send an email View source version on Airbus: https://www.airbus.com/newsroom/press-releases/en/2021/01/royal-australian-air-force-benefits-from-airbus-smartforce-digital-services.html

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  20 décembre 2018 | International, C4ISR

  How 5G Will Shape Innovation and Security

  Executive Summary The fifth generation of mobile network technologies, known as “5G,” promises greater speed, security, and capacity. 5G will underpin the internet economy and provide the backbone for the next generation of digital technologies. So, it is unsurprising that there is intense competition among companies and countries for 5G leadership. 5G will determine the direction the internet will take and where nations will face new risks and vulnerabilities. Who makes 5G technologies will affect security and innovation in an increasingly competitive technological environment. Decisions made today about 5G will affect national security and economic performance for decades to come. This is a competition among companies and groups of companies but also a competition between market-based and state-directed decisionmaking. The United States has relied on the former, China on the latter, and Europe falls somewhere in between. American technology remains essential for 5G mobile telecommunications. American companies have been strong performers in developing 5G technologies, but the United States and its allies face a fundamental challenge from China. The focus of competition is over 5G's intellectual property, standards, and patents. Huawei, for example, has research programs to develop alternatives to American suppliers, and U.S. trade restrictions have accelerated China's efforts to develop its own 5G industry. While American companies lead in making essential 5G technologies, there are no longer any U.S. manufacturers of core telecommunications network equipment. Four companies dominate the market for the core network technologies needed for 5G networks. None of these companies are American. 1The choices are between European security partners (Ericsson and Nokia) and China (Huawei and ZTE). Telecom is a strategic industry and having two companies with close ties to a hostile power creates risk for the United States and its allies. A secure supply chain for 5G closes off dangerous areas of risk for national security in terms of espionage and the potential disruption to critical infrastructures. China's aggressive global campaign of cyber espionage makes it certain that it will exploit the opportunities it gains as a 5G supplier. One way to envision this is to imagine that the person who built your house decides to burgle it. They know the layout, the power system, the access points, may have kept a key, and perhaps even built in a way to gain surreptitious entry. Major telecom “backbone” equipment connects to the manufacturer over a dedicated channel, reporting back on equipment status and receiving updates and software patches as needed, usually without the operator's knowledge. Equipment could be sold and installed in perfectly secure condition, and a month later, the manufacture could send a software update to create vulnerabilities or disrupt service. The operator and its customers would have no knowledge of this change. The United States can manage 5G risk using two sets of policies. The first is to ensure that American companies can continue to innovate and produce advanced technologies and face fair competition overseas. American and “like-minded” companies routinely outspend their Chinese competitors in 5G R&D and hold 10 times as many 5G patents. Chinese companies still depend on the western companies for the most advanced 5G components. The second is to work with like-minded nations to develop a common approach to 5G security. The United States cannot meet the 5G challenge on its own. When the United States successfully challenged Chinese industrial policy in the past, it has been done in concert with allies. Another task will be to find ways to encourage undecided countries to spend on 5G security. Huawei's telecom networks cost between 20 to 30 percent less than competing products. Huawei also offers foreign customers generous terms for leasing or loans. It can do this because of its access to government funds. Beijing supports Huawei for both strategic and commercial reasons. Many countries will be tempted by the steep discount. Not buying Huawei means paying a “premium” for security to which economic ministries are likely to object. The United States will need to encourage others to pay this security premium while at the same time preparing for a world where the United States unavoidably connects to Huawei-supplied networks and determine how to securely connect and communicate over telecom networks in countries using Chinese network equipment. The United States does not need to copy China's government-centric model for 5G, but it does need to invest in research and adopt a comprehensive approach to combatting non-tariff barriers to trade. 5G leadership requires a broader technology competition policy in the United States that builds the engineering and tech workforce and supports both private and public R&D. The United States also needs to ensure that U.S. companies do not face obstacles from antitrust or patent infringement investigations undertaken by other countries to obtain competitive advantage. In the twentieth century, steel, coal, automobiles, aircraft, ships, and the ability to produce things in mass quantity were the sources of national power. The foundations of security and power are different today. The ability to create and use new technologies is the source of economic strength and military security. Technology, and the capacity to create new technologies, are the basis of information age power. 5G as the cornerstone of a new digital environment is the focal point for the new competition, where the United States is well-positioned to lead but neither success nor security are guaranteed without action. This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-5g-will-shape-innovation-and-security

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  13 décembre 2021 | International, Naval

  How a 221-year-old shipyard is leading a US Navy modernization effort

  The Navy is beginning to modernize and optimize a shipyard built in 1800 '€” and is learning some important lessons already that will shape the 20-year, $21 billion planned effort to overhaul all four naval shipyards.