7 mars 2022 | International, Naval
The detailed design and systems integration planning process for the Polish frigates is expected to conclude later this year, with construction starting next year and completion of the first ship in 2028.
6 décembre 2023 | International, Terrestre
Ukraine's latest list of U.S. weapons it says it needs to fight the Russian military includes sophisticated air defense systems, F-18 "Hornet" fighter jets, drones, Apache and Blackhawk helicopters, according to documents seen by Reuters.
16 janvier 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
By: Jerry McGinn Ms. Lisa Hershman, an accomplished former CEO who has been serving in the Department of Defense for over two years, received Senate confirmation by unanimous consent to become the DoD chief management officer shortly before Christmas. At the same time, however, the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act required two studies from the DoD that openly posit eliminating the CMO function altogether. What gives? The mixed signals coming out of these discordant events underscore the fact that the theory behind the current CMO function (and similar efforts over the past two decades) does not match the reality of the business structure of the DoD. The solution that will ultimately work best for the DoD is one that truly takes a business-based approach to DoD business operations. The CMO function is the latest in a long-running series of efforts since the early 2000s to reform the business of defense. The essential idea has been to bring the best commercial business practices into DoD business operations through organizational and legislative changes. While the rationale for these respective initiatives is unassailable, they have struggled in execution. The CMO and its predecessor organizations, for example, have focused on the acquisition or certification of DoD business systems. These efforts, however, have largely devolved into bureaucratic battles over resources and authorities, pitting the business-focused organization against the formidable military departments and the “fourth estate.” Whatever the outcome, the business-focused organization ends up being seen as weak and ineffective. Why is that? Having worked for years in and around these respective efforts in both government and industry roles, I have come to the conclusion that these well-meaning initiatives are just the wrong type of solution. This is largely because their respective organizations, often despite strong leadership and empowered by various degrees of legislative authority, have not had the bureaucratic throw-weight to succeed in Pentagon battles with the services and the fourth estate. The solution to this challenge, however, is not to further tinker with the CMO's authority or to create a larger or different CMO organization. Part of the solution is to recognize that while the DoD is not a business, it is in many ways a businesslike organization. There are no profit and loss, or P&L, centers in the DoD, but the military departments frankly function in much the same way as a P&L line of business. The services are directly responsible for training and equipping their soldiers, sailors and airmen just as P&L leaders are responsible for delivering products and solutions on time and profitably. Likewise, fourth estate entities such as the defense agencies and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have direct responsibility over their respective functions. Harnessing the power and authority of these organizations through the training and enabling of good business practices is a much more natural fit for the DoD. Devolving responsibility in and of itself is not the answer, however. The other part of the solution is accountability. Commercial businesses do not have a CMO function. Instead, well-run businesses are led by strong executives who are responsible and accountable for delivering results to their employees and shareholders. Those that succeed are rewarded, while those that fail are replaced. The same goes for the DoD. DoD leadership should focus on establishing business-reform objectives for each major DoD organization, and then holding leaders of these respective organizations accountable to the achievement of measurable business goals. This should be driven by the secretary and the deputy, and enabled by a much smaller CMO function. Secretary Mark Esper appears to be headed in that direction in his recent memo on 2020 DoD reform efforts, which focuses the CMO's efforts on the fourth estate and makes the services directly responsible “to establish and execute aggressive reform plans.” That is the right approach. In short, the DoD does not need a management organization to oversee the business of defense; it needs to enable its leaders to utilize business best practices, and then hold these leaders accountable for results. Jerry McGinn is the executive director of the Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University. He previously served as the senior career official in the Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy at the U.S. Defense Department. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/01/15/does-the-pentagon-need-a-chief-management-officer
2 mai 2022 | International, Autre défense
DÉFENSE L'industrie d'armement allemand redore son blason mais craint un rationnement sur le gaz Mardi 26 avril, la ministre de la Défense, Christine Lambrecht, a surpris ses homologues de l'OTAN réunis sur la base américaine de Ramstein, en Allemagne, en acceptant d'acheminer en Ukraine des chars Guepard, un matériel fabriqué par le constructeur Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW). Par ailleurs, Olaf Scholz souhaite sanctuariser son plan de 100 Md€ sur 5 ans, en l'inscrivant dans la Loi fondamentale allemande, une proposition qui fait débat outre-Rhin. Parias de l'industrie, mal-aimées aussi bien dans la population que dans le monde politique, les entreprises d'armement allemandes, entièrement privées, sont revenues sur le devant de la scène depuis le déclenchement de la guerre en Ukraine. Dès le lendemain du discours d'Olaf Scholz, le patron du groupe KMW, Armin Papperger, avait surpris le secteur en proposant une liste d'équipements que son groupe pouvait livrer à la Bundeswehr ces prochaines années, pour un montant total de 42 Md€. Le tournant allemand en matière de Défense va-t-il permettre d'accélérer la formation d'une véritable industrie de défense européenne intégrée, dans laquelle les groupes allemands joueraient un rôle important ? Rien de moins sûr pour Christian Mölling, expert défense et sécurité à l'institut allemand de politique extérieure (DGAP) : « Le gros problème, c'est que l'Allemagne n'a pas encore effectué le basculement mental nécessaire au vu des circonstances ». Les projets de système d'armement commun dans l'air (FCAS) et sur terre (MGCS), en discussion depuis dix ans, ont peu avancé. La question est de savoir si ce dossier est susceptible d'effectuer une avancée décisive avec un couple franco-allemand Macron-Scholz, renforcé par les élections françaises. Autre préoccupation majeure de l'industrie lourde allemande : la crainte d'un rationnement sur le gaz en provenance de Russie. Des sociétés comme BASF, dans le secteur des hydrocarbures, verrait 40% de sa production se paralyser en cas d'arrêt brutal des livraisons ; le groupe sidérurgique ThyssenKrupp a, lui, annoncé la mise au chômage partiel de 1 300 salariés récemment. L'industrie allemande représente environ 37% de la consommation de gaz du pays, très dépendante des approvisionnements russes. Le Monde et les Echos du 29 avril