Navy, Air Force cleared to fly Ospreys after inspecting gears

Sur le même sujet

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  10 novembre 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Cyber’s uncertain future: These radical technologies and negative trends must be overcome

  James Van de Velde The fate of the world may literally hinge on which states develop and appropriately introduce the radical technologies that are likely to disrupt cyberspace and the world. What are they, and what disruption do they pose? Here are a few, split into two categories: Radical-leveling technologies have leapt from linear to exponential capabilities and will shape the future competition: Additive manufacturing (i.e., 3D printing): “Who can manufacture what” may no longer be decided by governments. Human-machine interfacing: Where will this lead intelligence collection, privacy and security? The Internet of Things' expanded attack surface: The IoT may invite a near-constant struggle between good and malicious cyberspace actors throughout our government, intelligence, defense and commercial lives. Chain algorithm (i.e., blockchain) and cryptocurrencies: We have yet to discern how blockchain technology will be integrated into both public and private networks, such as for protecting the national currency of states, and what such integration will mean for intelligence collection and effects operations. Algorithmic-driven operations: Relying on algorithms in operations may aid both our and our adversaries' operations. Data analytics: Successful application of data analytics will help reduce false positives and aid in forensics (by discerning trends better). But new ways to collect, manage and analyze data will have to be discerned. Data localization: States are likely to Balkanize cyberspace into defensive pockets to capture and protect data (rather than surrender control entirely to the cloud or to servers outside their states). Russia and China are already Balkanizing their networks; many states will follow Russia and China's lead. New forms of encryption, including decentralized, local and private encryption: Enabled by quantum computing, new forms of encryption will make cyber operations more difficult. Emerging technologies represent new tech — currently developed or developed within five to 10 years — that will shape the future competition: Artificial intelligence (i.e., machine learning): China has declared that it plans to be the world's leader in AI and integrate it as much as possible into its technology and military forces and strategy. How will AI assist or thwart cyber intelligence collection, or affect the development of offensive or defensive cyberspace operations? Setting norms for AI will present new intellectual, technical and legal challenges. Quantum computing: The integration of quantum computing will assist and thwart cyber intelligence collection, as well as affect the development of offensive and defensive cyberspace operations. China's announced 2030 goal to develop a high-performing quantum computer with decryption capability is an existential threat to Western society, as it would afford adversaries unprecedented leverage and advantage over U.S. society. Shifting to quantum-resistant algorithms and encryption present certain costs and technical challenges, and a likely long-term transition. Nanotechnology: How will life as well as state vs. state competition change if devices that can impact the environment, health care or energy efficiency are built on the scale of atoms and molecules? Neuroscience technologies — biology and cyber: We have yet to discern how biology and cyberspace will converge to afford biological levels of cybersecurity and cyber biosecurity. The United States will also face challenging technological, political, historical, numerical and policy trends that will complicate efforts to absorb these technologies; the United States may soon have to adopt asymmetric strategies to contend with its competitors: The United States is telling itself that it is a status quo power (and that attempting domain dominance in cyberspace is somehow dangerous, wrong or imperial). The country currently suffers from “cyberspace fatigue” — a sense that our daily loss via cyberspace to ransomware, financial and proprietary theft, privacy invasion, and political influence is inevitable and inescapable. China and Russia both enjoy “asymmetry in interest.” That is, both Russia and China believe they care more about their foreign policy, national security, and cyberspace interests and activities than the United States and Americans generally do. It will soon be impossible for the United States to compete with China via numbers — even in cyberspace. Chinese forces will soon outnumber U.S. forces in every sector, including cyberspace forces. As the private sector compiles and controls unprecedented amounts of data on U.S. and non-U.S. citizens around the world, new public-private sector relationships must be devised. The private sector will have many more times the quantity of data on individuals and commercial activity than the U.S. government could ever obtain. China is now “out-cycling” the United States. The Chinese can do acquisition faster now than the United States, which means they will be able to collect on technological countermeasures and adopt counter-countermeasures to our attempts to defeat Chinese technology. The United States has yet to acknowledge explicitly that we are not so much in a “great power” competition, but instead we are in an era of the rise of authoritarian, anti-liberal democratic states. This is a much more serious problem, as, if left unacknowledged, the United States will appear as morally equivalent. The U.S. government may no longer be the lead for all complex technologies, including those involved in national security, computing, sensing or data analytics. Sad fact. We have — to date — accepted policy inferiority in cyberspace. We defend against malicious cyberspace operations, but we have been reluctant to conduct the escalation necessary to restore the norms we seek to protect. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/11/09/cybers-uncertain-future-these-radical-technologies-and-negative-trends-must-be-overcome/

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  3 août 2021 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Contracts for August 2, 2021

  Today

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  4 décembre 2020 | International, Terrestre

  Army taps industry for Gray Eagle payloads for joint ops against high-end threats

  By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — The Army wants its Joint All Domain Operations (JADO) Gray Eagles to have synthetic aperture radars, moving target indicators, electronic intelligence and communications intelligence capability as well as air-launched effects and radar warning receivers, according to a new market survey. Now, the Army wants help from industry with those payloads for its Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft systems. Specifically, the service is looking for systems that are capable of helping with joint operations across all warfighting domains against high-end threats from adversaries such as China and Russia, according to a solicitation published Dec. 2 to a government contracting website. The service's Aerial Enhanced Radar, Optics and Sensors (AEROS) product manager wants industry to “identify potential existing sources capable of providing Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AISR) payloads for the MQ-1C Gray Eagle Unmanned Aircraft System platform that meet the JADO environment,” the solicitation posted to Beta.Sam.Gov states. These Gray Eagles payloads must be capable of increased ranges and resolutions “to support target location and Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPF) without the use of traditional line of site visual equipment to include Electro Optical, Infrared (EO/IR) and Full Motion Video (FMV) required for today's Counter Insurgency (COIN) mission,” the request for information stresses. Traditional COIN payloads won't hold up against peer and near-peer adversaries, the Army noted, as they will “employ anti-access, area denial strategies, posing a significant challenge to the current AISR fleet,” the solicitation states. Gray Eagles must survive against an “Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)-rich environment,” the request notes. This means the Gray Eagle would fly “racetrack patterns tangential to the IADS threat at 80 km distance” and would be capable of deploying Air-Launched Effects (ALE) forward into enemy territory to detect, identify and locate targets and take out or disrupt threats, according to the request. The Gray Eagle would also have payloads that could detect IADS threats, locate them and transfer the information to other sensor systems capable of recognizing targets and coordinating long-range fires, the solicitation describes. The Army is conducting the survey ahead of a Gray Eagle sensor payload JADO demonstration that could potentially take place in fiscal 2022 where systems will be “quantitatively compared” to find the highest performing and best value payloads based on technology readiness and production cost, the request lays out. The solicitation for more advanced payloads for Gray Eagle comes at a time when the Army is trying to design a complex architecture of helicopters and unmanned aircraft systems that would be part of tight-knit kill chain to include space and ground assets underpinned by an advanced network. The Army experimented with the kill chain to include air assets at Project Convergence at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, over the summer. The effort brings together future weapons and capabilities envisioned for a 2030s battlefield against near-peer adversaries such as Russia and China. It includes using a machine learning and artificial intelligence-enabled battle management system that is in development. Gray Eagle represented a Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) surrogate. During the first mission thread at Project Convergence, which focused on the penetration phase laid out in the Army's Multidomain Operations warfighting concept, Gray Eagles and ALE partnered with space-based assets, APNT, and LRPF capabilities to locate, then degrade and destroy enemy assets modeled after the Russian Pantsir air defense systems and other weapons. The ALE pushed ingested data forward through the network to get it to the right shooters, whether that would be an Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) system on the ground or a Gray Eagle or another ALE. The Army was able to extend the ALE capability out to almost 62 kilometers, which would provide deep standoff for manned aircraft like FARA. The ALEs performed both the reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting acquisition mission and worked as a mesh network to extend the battlefield. Two ALEs were truck launched and four were air launched. Also during the final shot of the entire campaign at Project Convergence, a soldier on the ground took control of a LRPF munition surrogate (a Hellfire missile in this case) on a Gray Eagle and fired on the target. The Gray Eagle at Convergence was able to route around and avoid threat weapon systems and also fired a live Dynetics-made GBU-69 small glide munition. Previewing the future, the Army also used an open system architecture that was flexible enough for payloads and capabilities to be swapped in out of its Gray Eagles without having to rely on the original equipment manufacturer to do it. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/12/02/army-taps-industry-for-gray-eagle-payloads-for-joint-ops-against-high-end-threats/