8 mai 2019 | Local, Aérospatial
One can only imagine the astonishment in Ottawa when a letter arrived from Washington, reminding the Canadian government that military procurement projects are about procuring military equipment, not creating Canadian jobs. I like to imagine flabbergasted bureaucrats reading the letter over and over, before finally putting it down, rubbing their temples and musing aloud, “Don't the Americans realize how things are done here?”
They do, it seems. And they don't like it.
On Monday, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute published a new report, “Catastrophe: Assessing the Damage from Canada's Fighter Replacement Fiasco.” The title tells you most of what you need to know about the tone of the report. Author Richard Shimooka recaps the long and embarrassing history of Canada's inability to properly replace our rapidly aging and slowly attritting fleet of almost-40-year-old CF-18 jets. The report mostly covers a story that's been oft-told, including here in the National Post. But it did break some news: apparently, Washington's frustration with Canada is boiling over, and it's not keeping quiet about it anymore.
Shimooka recaps the long and embarrassing history of Canada's inability to properly replace our rapidly aging ... CF-18 jets
Shimooka's report reveals the existence of two letters previously unknown to the public, sent last year by American officials to Canadian counterparts. The specifics of the complaints involve fairly legalistic and technical aspects of Canada's membership in the international consortium that helped finance the development of the F-35 stealth fighter. Suffice it to say that Canada, as a participating nation, gets access to a rock-bottom price for the fighter (meaning the same cost paid by the U.S. military) and Canadian firms have been part of the production of the planes from the very beginning. That's the deal. It's a pretty good one.
But Canada wants a different deal. Specifically, it wants the same kind of deal it always insists on when buying military equipment from abroad. We want any foreign company we're purchasing equipment from to invest heavily in Canada, so that even a contract signed with a foreign supplier can be shown to have helped Canadian jobs, and the middle class, and those working hard to join it. Even this is only a second-best option, a procurement Plan B. Canadian politicians would much rather have stuff built in Canada by Canadians, no matter how much that ends up costing us in terms of cost overruns and delays. But when that's simply not possible, we'll settle for industrial offsets from foreign companies.
You'll note that in the above paragraph on military procurement, there was very little emphasis on actually successfully procuring equipment for the Armed Forces. Ottawa is much too sophisticated for that kind of concern. The real action is in the jobs, the industrial benefits, the gigantic novelty cheques, the ribbon cuttings, the question period talking points and the partisan mailers crowing about all the money flowing to Canadian firms. That's what military procurement is really for, at least in the eyes of Canadian officials. That's why our national shipbuilding strategy was to first build out a shipbuilding industry and then build some ships, almost as an afterthought, when we could have bought them faster and almost certainly cheaper from an ally.
The Americans, it seems, have had enough, and are threatening to pull the F-35 from consideration in Canada's upcoming program to select our next fighter. To their mind, Canada has already been offered an objectively good deal: access to one of the world's most advanced fighter jets at the same cost the U.S. military pays, and billions in industrial benefits. It's true that the F-35 program has been troubled, but most of those problems are now behind it. These jets are entering service in large numbers in the U.S. military and in allied forces, as well. The F-35 isn't perfect but it's available, now, and Canada has already paid the cost of entry to the club. Angling for a better deal than everyone else is getting, is a slap in the face to the Americans and all the other allied nations who are part of the process.
Angling for a better deal than everyone else is getting, is a slap in the face to the Americans
Now a cynic will say that it's just good business. There's nothing wrong with Canada trying to get the best deal for itself. In general, I have an open mind to this kind of argument. But Canada isn't a business. It's a country that has signed alliances and agreements with our democratic peers, theoretically in good faith. We have our own interests, to be sure, but we also have obligations. Canada's membership in the F-35 consortium does not obligate us to buy F-35s. We'd retain the industrial benefits even if we select another fighter. But certainly it obligates us to at least honour the agreement we've already made?
The Liberals have never been keen on the F-35. Before the past election, they actually pledged to never purchase them, before realizing that that was an impossible pledge to keep if we actually intended to hold a fair and open competition to select the next plane. The prime minister himself once dismissively described the F-35 as a plane that didn't work, even as the United States was putting its first squadron into active service. Part of me wonders if the Liberals are deliberately structuring our selection process to make it impossible for the U.S. to sell us F-35s. That would certainly solve that particular problem for the Liberals.
Alas, the more realistic answer is probably, as ever, the simplest one. The Canadian government is probably baffled that the Americans would object to us behaving as we always do. Military procurement in Canada isn't about procurement, or the military, or honouring our commitments to our friends. It's about political booty that can be flung around the country come election time. That's just the way we do things here. Why would that ever change?
6 avril 2022 | Local, Aérospatial
When Boeing submits its proposal for the Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft project to replace the CP-140 Aurora, it is likely to be the P-8A Poseidon. We take a closer look at the Poseidon’s potential.
13 février 2019 | Local, Aérospatial
by Chris Thatcher An Ontario Senator says defence procurement needs better oversight and an improved process if it is to avoid the problems affecting the government's efforts to replace the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) CF-188 fighter jet fleet. “The fiasco of fighter jet replacement is the best example of a procurement system that is cumbersome, bureaucratic and beset by political interference,” Senator Nicole Eaton wrote in an article originally published in The Hill Times. “Unless ministers start to devote close attention to the management of major projects, or until the process is overhauled, Canadians can continue to expect poor outcomes and wasted taxpayer dollars.” Eaton is a member of the Senate National Finance Committee, which launched a study last fall into the processes and financial aspects of defence procurement. It held its first hearing on Oct. 30 and expects to conclude later this year. In her article, the senator critiqued the process by which Conservative and Liberal governments have struggled to replace the aging CF-188 Hornets, noting that while both Canada and Australia are members of the U.S.-led Joint Strike Fighter program to develop the F-35, Australia received its first two operational F-35s in December while Canada, as part of an interim measure, is poised to take delivery of the first of 25 “well-used” Australian F-18s. “As we take possession of Australia's scrap, Canada is in the early stages of a minimum five-year-long process to pick a replacement for the F-18, which will be more than 50 years old before it is retired in the 2030s,” she wrote. The current government bears blame for creating some of the problems with the fighter file, she wrote, but “military procurement has bedeviled successive governments, Liberal and Conservative alike.” She attributed part of the problem to political interference for both partisan advantage and regional turf protection, but said the main reason for “paralysis in military procurement in Canada is it is too cumbersome and bureaucratic. Process is paramount and results are secondary. “There are layers of committees, depending on the size of the project, with membership from Public Services and Procurement Canada, National Defence, and Innovation, Science and Economic Development,” she wrote. “The consensus-based decision-making process on which these committees operate is supposed to avoid a big mistake — no doubt an appealing quality for a risk-averse bureaucracy, but the downside is the system is not conducive to fast action. Simply put, the buck stops nowhere.” Eaton suggested that bureaucratic morass has resulted in an inability to spend allotted project budgets, an indication the government could struggle to fulfil the commitments laid out in its 2017 defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE). “In the last fiscal year, the policy projected capital spending of $6.1 billion, yet only $3.7 billion was spent. This year, $6.55 billion is called for under SSE, but total appropriations to date amount to $4 billion,” she noted. “Given this poor track record, the idea that military spending can be cranked up by 70 per cent over 10 years, as envisioned in Strong, Secure, Engaged, looks increasingly fanciful. At the Finance committee's first hearing on the procurement system, Patrick Finn, assistant deputy minister, Materiel at the Department of National Defence, and André Fillion, assistant deputy minister for defence and marine procurement at Public Services and Procurement Canada, faced a barrage of questions on ongoing participation in the F-35 program, the authorities and mandates of interdepartmental committees involved in military procurement, and about the challenge of balancing military requirements with equipment costs and opportunities for Canadian industry. “Buying a fighter plane isn't like buying a compact car, and the role of the government is very important. We had to adapt our method of supply to the context of fighter jets,” Fillion told the senators. He said a draft RFP released in late October “was the result of many months of consultation on all five potential options (to replace the CF-188s). “There has been a lot of back and forth over the last several months to make sure that what we are asking meets the requirements of the Air Force and ensures that we do not inadvertently limit the competition. I feel very confident that what we've put together is fair, open and transparent to all the potential suppliers.” Finn said the government had met with and learned lessons from allies who had conducted similar fighter replacement programs. He also dismissed some of the concerns about acquiring used Australian aircraft to fill a gap while the government proceeds with the replacement project. “In our opinion, Canada has the best expertise related to this type of aircraft. Some companies in Montreal do maintenance for the United States and other countries because they have the necessary knowledge,” he said. “This aircraft will really increase our fleet, and it is not the number of aircraft that counts; it is rather the hours of use in the future. We are looking for an aircraft that will remain in service for another 14 years. What is needed is enough hours on the structural side. We will be able to use these aircraft until the entire fleet is no longer in service.” https://www.skiesmag.com/news/senator-critiques-defence-procurement-process
17 décembre 2020 | Local, Aérospatial
By Garrett Reim14 December 2020 Saab is offering to open two new aerospace centres as part of its Gripen E proposal for Canada's Future Fighter Capability Project. The aerospace facilities, the Gripen Centre and the Aerospace Research & Development Centre, would be based in the greater Montreal region, the company announced at Aero Montreal's International Aerospace Innovation Forum 2020 on 14 December. Mission system software and hardware development, as well as integration, for the proposed Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Gripen E would be done at the Gripen Centre. The Aerospace Research & Development Centre would focus on a variety of aerospace technologies, including automation, artificial intelligence and “greening” technologies. That work may or may not be directly related to the Gripen E. Rather, the research and development would focus on next-generation aerospace technologies more generally. Saab is also in talks with undisclosed local universities about partnerships related to the aerospace centres, it says. Saab has only about 50 people working in Canada currently, across various businesses such as maritime traffic management and army training and simulation work. However, between the two aerospace centres, the company anticipates at least 3,000 people being directly employed. The RCAF is looking to buy 88 advanced fighters to replace its fleet of Boeing CF-18 Hornets. Canada's Department of National Defence estimates acquisition of the aircraft, related equipment and entry into service will cost C$15-19 billion ($11.8-14.9 billion). A contract is scheduled to be awarded in 2022 after evaluation by the RCAF. The air force wants the first jets received as soon as 2025. The new fleet is expected to fly beyond 2060. In addition to Saab, the RCAF received bids in July from Boeing, which is offering its F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and Lockheed Martin, which is offering F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters. Canada is also part of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme, spending more than $500 million on the effort since 1997, an investment that has allowed Canadian companies to secure C$1.8 billion in contracts from the project. However, Ottawa has not yet committed to buying F-35s, hence the acquisition competition. Politicians objected to F-35s in part due to the high cost of early examples of the stealth fighter. The cost of the F-35A has fallen to $77.9 million per unit, though operating costs remains high, at $35,000 hourly. Lockheed has promised to lower that figure to $25,000 hourly by 2025. For its part, Saab has proposed that Canada's IMP Aerospace & Defence would handle in-country production of the Gripen E, and provide support over the lifetime of the fleet. The company says initial aircraft would be produced in Sweden to meet Ottawa's goal of first fighter delivery in 2025. It is still evaluating how many aircraft could be made in Canada, but says it aims to “maximise” the number. The rest of the Saab Gripen for Canada team would include CAE, which is to provide training and mission systems; Peraton Canada, which is to supply avionic and test equipment, as well as component maintenance, repair and overhaul, and material management; and GE Aviation, which is set to provide and sustain the fighters' turbine engines. https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/saab-offers-two-aerospace-centres-in-gripen-e-proposal-for-canadas-future-fighter/141602.article