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  13 novembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre

  Here’s how a CR could hurt America’s nuclear weapons modernization

  By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — A long-term continuing resolution will result in delays for modernizing America's nuclear warheads, while putting at risk an already challenging plan to build plutonium pits needed for the next generation of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear officials are warning. The National Nuclear Security Administration is a semiautonomous agency under the Department of Energy that handles the manufacturing and maintenance of America's nuclear warheads. Like other government agencies, NNSA would be limited to fiscal 2019 funding limits under a continuing resolution, and it would be unable to start new contracts. The current continuing resolution, or CR, is set to end Nov. 21, but there is little expectation that regular budgeting will then resume. Congress is debating the merits of pushing the CR through December, but analysts are concerned the CR could extend into next year. “We are in a situation right now where we have single-point failures throughout our enterprise,” Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, the NNSA administrator, said during a Defense Writers Group breakfast earlier this month. “It's necessary for us, for the NNSA and for the nuclear security enterprise to receive consistent and robust funding to modernize our infrastructure as well as continue ongoing operations.” “We're looking at where we can move funding insofar as CRs will allow us to do so,” she added. “We're working very closely with OMB and the administration to see what we can do to continue our important programs to modernize the infrastructure as well as the stockpile and our workforce initiatives and our endeavors.” Gordon-Hagerty did not go into detail about specific CR-related worries, but according to an NNSA source, the agency has identified three main areas of concern under a longer CR. The first is, broadly, keeping the warhead modernization efforts on schedule. Two of those modernization programs — the B61-12 gravity bomb and W88 submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead — already face program delays thanks to an issue with a commercial part that has to be redesigned. Gordon-Hagerty said a CR should not impact that particular issue, as the funding for a solution is coming from a realignment of other warhead modernization programs. But a delay to one program caused by a CR “does affect all of the other modernization programs and all of the other work that we have ongoing throughout our nuclear security enterprise,” she said. The second major area of concern is the surplus plutonium disposition program, which is supposed to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess plutonium at a South Carolina facility. That program emerged as the successor to the controversial MOX program, and has faced opposition from South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham. Construction on that facility could be delayed under a CR. The NNSA source said that the agency requested extra funding for the surplus plutonium disposition program through the budget anomaly process, but was not given the resources it requested. The third area of concern is a 10-year plan to develop a native plutonium pit in the United States. The NNSA has been charged with producing 80 plutonium pits a year by 2030, a target that Gordon-Hagerty acknowledged is a tight window for the agency to hit, even with stable funding. “We are again rebalancing, looking at our budget across the entire enterprise to see what it is we need to do to meet the scope and schedule of that 2030,” she said. “Am I confident we can get there? Yes. Is it fraught with — probably a bad way of saying it — land mines? It is.” Construction costs Construction featuring prominently on this list should not be a huge surprise; NNSA officials are quick to point out in public events that they are still using some buildings that date back to the Manhattan Project. According to Gordon-Hagerty, more than 50 percent of NNSA facilities are more than 40 years old, and over a third of those are about 70 years of age. The looming CR extension comes as the agency launches a number of construction projects, and a CR could lead to major delays in standing up those facilities. While that's an issue for every agency under a CR, the NNSA is concerned that the specialty construction talent needed to build those facilities may not available if a contract is frozen and then picked up again later. There could also be high-dollar costs. Responding to a lawsuit by environmental groups trying to halt the construction of the Y-12 facility in Tennessee, NNSA said a six- to 12-month delay in construction at that location could result in almost $1 billion in extra costs for taxpayers and the agency may have to lay off 1,000 construction personnel. Those numbers, first reported by the Exchange Monitor, likely have resonance with other potential delays at construction sites caused by a CR — meaning construction delays at one or more sites could quickly become costly for an agency whose facilities and construction needs have traditionally been underfunded. “It's been on schedule and on budget for the last six years. It will be finished in 2025 for approximately $6.5 billion,” Gordon-Hagerty said of the Y-12 facility. “If that funding somehow fails to materialize, then we've got over 1,000 crafts [personnel] working at the site right now. Crafts personnel are hard to come by, especially those that are qualified. So if they see a question about funding or funding gets pulled back, they're going to find positions elsewhere.” https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nuclear-arsenal/2019/11/12/heres-how-a-cr-could-hurt-americas-nuclear-weapons-modernization/

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  17 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Why defense firms need to get systematic about M&A — big and small

  By: Eric Chewning and Frank Coleman III After years of growth, defense budgets will likely flatten (or decline). In such a financial environment, the U.S. Department of Defense will consider trade-offs between funding modernization, sustaining legacy equipment and preserving force structure. These hard choices will be informed by the DoD's strategic acquisition priorities, which will likely continue to reflect the need for innovation around leading-edge capabilities in areas like space, C5ISR, long-range precision fires, unmanned vehicles and artificial intelligence. To support these evolving mission requirements, the defense industry will need to ensure the industrial base is able to deliver technological advantage. This requires attracting world-class talent as well as the necessary financial capital to operate global industrial enterprises. Attracting these resources requires continued value creation through growth and return on invested capital improvements. But in a down budget environment, where is this growth to come from? While many will think organic growth is the best value-creating option (and often is), the answer also lies in augmenting a classic portfolio strategy with a systematic approach to transactions. Mergers and acquisitions are a proven growth accelerant for defense companies, and have generated superior shareholder returns and greater resilience for companies that have pursued it systematically. At first glance, this may simply seem like an obvious description of recent history. The aerospace and defense sector, after all, has seen rapid consolidation in the last five years, with deals worth $358 billion struck between 2015 and 2019, three times the total between 2010 and 2014. The problem for defense companies looking for more of the same is that this wave of consolidation now appears to have run its course. The combined market value of the top five defense hardware players is now more than four times that of the next five; so even as further mega-deals are theoretically possible, they will be increasingly difficult to execute, underscoring the value of programmatic M&A. Distinct from selective or organic deal-making approaches, programmatic M&A involves a company conducting two or more small or midsized deals per year, with an aggregate value greater than 15 percent of its market capitalization over five years, that align with their overall corporate strategy (which is hopefully linked to the “fast streams” of growth in the budget (see exhibit below)). These deals get choreographed around a specific business case, such as scaling or integrating vital digital capabilities, and are rooted in a disciplined appraisal of transactions. In the defense industry, programmatic M&A should be deployed against a strategy supported by the customer's need for innovation, lower costs and better mission outcomes for the war fighter. Our analysis shows that over the last decade, few defense companies took a programmatic approach to M&A. Those who did outperformed their peers in total shareholder returns by 10.4 percent. M&A was also an important key to resilience during the last defense spending downturn in 2007-2011: The top quintile of outperforming companies, as well as optimizing cash and flexing capex, used it as an opportunity to grow less cyclical parts of the business and build digital capabilities. Defense companies may be deterred by the current market environment, featuring stretched valuations, competition from institutional capital and a squeeze on mid-tier players. They may be cautious about the challenge of integrating smaller nondefense acquisitions into company processes and culture — a process that is easier to get wrong than right to be sure. The very complexity of these circumstances creates opportunities for bold players to differentiate themselves from their peers, align their strategies with national defense priorities and add significant value for shareholders. When done well, programmatic M&A can form a central pillar of their growth strategy. With a proactive approach to deal sourcing, holistic diligence, and in-house execution and integration expertise, companies can establish M&A as a critical capability and avoid the risks of reactive, one-off projects. In the challenging environment that confronts the defense industry today, those who act boldly will succeed in creating enduring businesses that can adapt to the evolving needs of the national defense. Eric Chewning and Frank Coleman III are partners at McKinsey and Company. Chewning previously served as chief of staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and before that as the Pentagon's industrial chief. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/11/16/why-defense-firms-need-to-get-systematic-about-ma-big-and-small/

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  3 mars 2024 | International, Aérospatial

  Poland to launch military satellites in 2025, deputy defence minister says