16 juin 2024 | International, Aérospatial
The single-award, indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract has a one-year base period of performance, with four one-year options and one six-month option.
16 août 2022 | International, Terrestre
Once delivered, the PRTVs will undergo a period of testing prior to a full-rate production decision.
10 décembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial
By: Vivienne Machi   STUTTGART, Germany — The cogs are churning for the four-nation Eurodrone unmanned aerial system program, with a development contract approved last month and formal contract signing expected early next year, an Airbus official said Dec. 9. Speaking at the company's annual trade media briefing, Airbus' Unmanned Aerial Systems director Jana Rosenmann shared that the company reached an agreement Nov. 19 with the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) to develop the next-generation medium-altitude, low-endurance drone. OCCAR is managing the Eurodrone program on behalf of the four European partners: Germany, France, Spain and Italy. The program's industrial team, composed of lead contractor Airbus Germany, along with Dassault Aviation and Leonardo, submitted a bid for the program in June. Since then, the companies have been involved in “very interesting and very lively discussions” with OCCAR, Rosenmann said during the briefing, which was held virtually. “I believe that what we have now, today on the table, is a fair and reasonable offer for both sides, both for the customer, as well as for industry,” she said. While a formal contract signing is expected in nearly 2021, the industry teams will now prepare for the Eurodrone program's ramp-up, to include filling 7,000 new technical positions around the continent. Rosenmann also revealed that the Eurodrone's final assembly will take place at Airbus' hub in Manching, Germany. “We will only have a single final assembly line,” she said. “This is for efficiency purposes, and clearly also for cost reasons for our customers.” Certain elements may be manufactured elsewhere, and then transferred to Manching for final assembly and ground testing. The delivery center will also be located in Manching, she noted. The aircraft fuselage will be fully integrated and assembled in Spain, before being transferred to Germany, Rosenmann added. Meanwhile, questions remain on who will supply Eurodrone's 120 total engines. “As we are in a competitive process at the moment, we're not at liberty to reveal any further details,” Rosenmann said. The COVID-19 pandemic caused significant disruption to industries around the world, and Airbus was not exempt, Rosenmann noted. But the UAS division began to pick up steam once again at the end of calendar year 2020, and is eager to maintain momentum on its portfolio of programs, including Eurodrone, she said. While the company awaits the formal contract signing, Airbus anticipates Eurodrone's first flight in 2025, and deliveries to begin in 2028, per Rosenmann. The current contract provides for 20 Eurodrone systems, each of which will include three aircraft for a total of 60 twin-engine air platforms. Currently, Germany as the program's lead nation is on contract for seven systems, while Italy has committed to five systems. Spain and France are each targeting four Eurodrone systems. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/12/09/airbus-prepares-for-eurodrone-contract-signing-in-early-2021
31 juillet 2018 | International, Aérospatial
BY PATRICK TUCKER A research team is training computers to find and fuse clues from wildly different rivers of digital data. Hiding illicit nuclear programs might be getting harder, thanks to new ways of gleaning and combining clues from various rivers of digital data. That's the conclusion of new research funded in part by the U.S. Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration. Satellites offer one kind of information; social media another — particularly inside countries that may be trying to flout inspections. But large volumes of satellite imagery and social media data aren't similar. You can have one analyst examine satellite pictures and another look at social media posts to see if they align, but the process is time-consuming and generally far from comprehensive. The study's authors developed a method for fusing different types of data in a machine-readable way to offer a much clearer picture. “In light of their ubiquitous emergence, social media increasingly promise to be of great value even though associated applications have thus far remained simple, and their fusion with other data has been largely ad hoc,” the team from North Carolina State University writes in “Fusing Heterogeneous Data: A Case for Remote Sensing and Social Media.” Only by creating a new statistical method for fusing the outputs of satellite data and social media data do you get something you can use to predict what might happen next within a given area of interest, such as a specific nation's nuclear enrichment or weapons development. The researchers looked at satellite and social media data from August 2013, when deadly floods killed eight people and caused widespread damage in Colorado. They sought to show that if you could algorithmically identify which imagery showed the flooding from space, and which geotagged tweets described it on the ground, you could could much more quickly verify one data set against another — that is, you could determine whether incoming social media data supports the conclusions you might be reaching from your satellite data, and vice versa. “Next steps for the project include evaluating nuclear facilities in the West to identify common characteristics that may also be applicable to facilities in more isolated societies, such as North Korea,” notes a press release on the paper. One of the authors, NCSU computer and electrical engineering professor Hamid Krim, said the team would try to “address the insufficient knowledge in general in areas of great interest (e.g. N. Korea and Iran). The goal is to come up with systematic methodologies to transport knowledge about nuclear environments available in other areas (e.g., in the West) to these domains where there is very little available. Creating such an environment in these places of interest will help them detect potential undesired activity.” Of course, there are limitations to media monitoring in Iran and North Korea. The former's social media environment is largely underground, thanks to bans on Twitter and many other social networks. The latter has virtually no social media environment at all. Krim noted that the “adversarial strategy” of social-media censorship makes his team's analysis harder. But even social posts from nearby countries can help illuminate their more secretive neighbors, he said — think tweets from Japan after earth tremors are felt. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/07/satellite-imagery-social-media-new-way-spot-emerging-nuclear-threats/150146/