22 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial

L’avion qui aurait pu remplacer le F-35

Point clé: L'armée avait le choix entre quelques options lorsqu'elle recherchait le prochain chasseur furtif. Il a finalement décidé de ce qui allait devenir le F-35.

Le ministère de la Défense (DoD) n'a pas eu à opter pour le F-35. Dans les années 1990, Boeing et Lockheed Martin ont soumissionné pour le prochain gros contrat de chasse, un avion qui servirait dans chacune des forces aériennes, navales et marines, ainsi que pour soutenir les forces aériennes de nombreux alliés américains. Boeing a servi le X-32; Lockheed le X-35.

Le Pentagone a choisi le F-35. Compte tenu des luttes de la dernière décennie avec le Joint Strike Fighter, il est impossible de ne pas se demander ce qui aurait pu être; Et si le DoD était parti avec le X-32 de Boeing à la place, ou avec une combinaison des deux appareils?

Histoire:

À la fin de la guerre froide, le Pentagone a proposé un projet de chasseurs conjoints dans l'espoir de réduire la queue logistique globale des forces en campagne, ainsi que de minimiser les coûts de développement. Chacun des trois services d'avions de chasse avait besoin d'être remplacé par l'avion de 4e génération dans son inventaire; les F-15 et F-16 dans le cas de l'Air Force, et les F / A-18 et AV-8B Harrier dans le cas de la Navy et du Marine Corps. Le nouveau chasseur avait donc besoin de configurations conventionnelles, porteuses et STOVL (atterrissage vertical à décollage court).

Historiquement, le DoD n'avait pas eu de chance avec les programmes conjoints, mais l'espoir était qu'une «articulation» accrue entre les services, combinée à des techniques de production plus avancées et à des procédures logistiques plus soigneusement affinées, ferait qu'un combattant partagé en valait la peine. Toutes les parties ont compris que le vainqueur de la compétition connaîtrait probablement un grand succès à l'exportation, car de nombreuses forces aériennes du monde entier avaient besoin d'un chasseur de cinquième génération. En bref, il s'agissait de la plus grosse transaction à l'horizon de l'industrie de la défense de l'après-guerre froide. Boeing et Lockheed Martin ont remporté des contrats pour développer chacun deux démonstrateurs.

L'histoire continue

Capacités:

Construits selon les mêmes spécifications, le X-32 et le F-35 avaient des paramètres de performances relativement similaires. Décidant de rivaliser sur les coûts, Boeing a conçu le X-32 autour d'une aile delta monobloc qui s'adapterait aux trois variantes. Le X-32 n'avait pas la portance du turboréacteur entraîné par l'arbre du F-35, utilisant à la place le même système de vectorisation de poussée que l'AV-8 Harrier. Le système du X-32 était moins avancé que celui du F-35, mais aussi moins complexe.

Le X-32 a été conçu pour atteindre Mach 1,6 en vol conventionnel. Il pourrait transporter six AMRAAM ou deux missiles et deux bombes dans sa baie d'armes interne. Les caractéristiques de portée et de furtivité étaient généralement similaires à celles attendues du F-35, et le corps de l'avion pouvait accueillir une grande partie de l'équipement électronique avancé que le F-35 transporte maintenant.

Décision:

Une chose est sûre; le X-32 était un avion ridiculement laid. Cela ne ressemblait pas tellement à la ponte d'un A-7 Corsair et à un lamantin hideusement déformé. Le F-35 n'est pas un prix d'un point de vue esthétique, sans les lignes élégantes et dangereuses du F-22, mais le X-32 a rendu le F-35 positivement sexy en comparaison. Quelle importance cela devrait-il avoir? Pas du tout. Quelle importance cela avait-il? Bonne question. Les pilotes de chasse n'aiment pas piloter des avions qui semblent pouvoir être écrasés par un hors-bord en Floride.

Pour des raisons plus concrètes, la stratégie de Boeing a probablement nui à ses chances. Au lieu de construire un démonstrateur capable de répondre aux exigences des trois services, Boeing en a construit deux; l'un capable de vol supersonique conventionnel, et l'autre de décollage et d'atterrissage vertical. Le prototype de Lockheed pourrait faire les deux. Le Pentagone a également apprécié la nature innovante (bien que risquée) du turbolift du F-35. Enfin, l'expérience de Lockheed avec le F-22 a suggéré qu'il pourrait probablement gérer un autre grand projet de chasseur furtif.

Conclusion:

Choisi en 2001, le F-35 est devenu le plus grand projet d'approvisionnement du Pentagone de tous les temps et l'un des plus assaillis. Le X-32 a échappé à tous les défis les plus importants pour le F-35. Le X-32 n'a jamais fait face à des décennies de tests et de refonte; il n'a jamais connu de dépassements de coûts massifs; il n'a jamais été soumis à une série interminable d'articles sur la façon dont il ne pouvait pas déjouer un F-16A. La nostalgie de ce qui aurait pu être est courante dans les compétitions d'avions, et il est impossible de dire si le X-32 aurait rencontré les mêmes difficultés que le F-35. Étant donné la nature complexe des projets de chasse avancés, la réponse est presque certainement «oui».

Mais avec le recul, il aurait presque certainement été plus logique de choisir un chasseur alternatif VSTOL pour le Marine Corps. Cela aurait éliminé l'aspect le plus complexe du projet «conjoint»; la nécessité de créer un avion qui partage des composants critiques à travers trois variantes très différentes. Cela aurait également aidé à répartir la richesse entre les différents grands entrepreneurs de la défense, une pratique qui est devenue de plus en plus une priorité du Pentagone. Bien sûr, étant donné que les aspects STOVL des F-35 et X-32 ont été intégrés au stade de la proposition, cela aurait nécessité de revenir en arrière jusqu'en 1993, pas seulement en 2001.

Robert Farley, un contributeur fréquent de TNI, est l'auteur du Battleship Book. Il est maître de conférences à la Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce de l'Université du Kentucky. Son travail comprend la doctrine militaire, la sécurité nationale et les affaires maritimes. Il blogue sur Avocats, Armes à feu et Diffusion d'argent et d'informations et Le Diplomate.

Cela est apparu pour la première fois en 2016.

https://www.breakingnews.fr/international/lavion-qui-aurait-pu-remplacer-le-f-35-523306.html

Sur le même sujet

  • UK: Speech by Admiral Sir Philip Jones, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff

    30 novembre 2018 | International, Naval

    UK: Speech by Admiral Sir Philip Jones, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff

    Introduction Good morning everyone, and Nick [Childs, IISS], thank you very much for the introduction, for the invitation for Mike [Noonan, RAN] and I to be here with you all this morning, and to everyone here at IISS for facilitating this event. And a special thanks to Mike. He looks as fresh as a daisy this morning, but he's on a bit of a world tour, taking in London having also taken in some substantial visits in Europe to check on future RAN capability, I'm sure you'll hear more about that later, and then after a trip to Scotland tomorrow to have a look at what a Type 26 looks like, and we'll see the significance of that of course, we're then travelling together to Chile on Thursday night to help them commemorate the 200th Anniversary of their navy. So you've covered a lot of ground as Chief of Navy but for very good reason and it's really good to have you with us, Mike, today. What I wanted to do is to set the scene, before we hear from the Theatre expert, Mike, on the Asia Pacific Region, about how the Royal Navy sees that region and the way we've shifted some of our posture to reflect that in the last year or so. RN Pacific Presence Because it won't have escaped the attention of most of you who are tracking what the Royal Navy does and where it goes that this year has seen a very public return to that region. The deployments of the frigate HMS Sutherland initially, which also went to Australia, the LPD HMS Albion and her embarked Royal Marines, now followed by the frigate HMS Argyll which is in the region as we speak, and then HMS Montrose, who I'll be on board in Chile in a couple of days' time, is then crossing the Pacific to New Zealand and Australia on her way through the region too; so all of that has drawn no small amount of interest and commentary, both in the region and back here in the UK. And I hope that comes as no surprise because those deployments have had in the region, I am told, a really tangible effect. Whether on be operations: helping to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions against the DPRK, or the significant programmes of defence engagement they have been conducting right across the region – Indonesia, Vietnam, the Republic of Korea, Brunei, Japan and of course Australia to name but a few. But why now? Why has that change of focus to the region come now? Importance of the Pacific Those of you who are aficionados of IISS events may have been at their other site in June when, the US CNO, Adm John Richardson, and I spoke at a similar event about the challenges we share together in the maritime domain, challenges that have grown considerably into threats, and threats have both intensified and diversified. And whilst it's perhaps unsurprising that our combined UK/US geographical focus is principally in the Atlantic area, we made the point that the same challenge to freedom and security on the high seas is to be found in many other places in the world, perhaps most notably over the last year or so in the Indo-Pacific region. And that's a region we here in the UK simply can't afford to ignore. As I said at my Sea Power conference at RUSI a few weeks before that IISSevent I did with CNO, we were feeding off the UK Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre's analysis of Global Strategic Trends which clearly identifies the economic shift towards the Indo-Pacific region; that's already on the way and will only intensify in the years to come When you combine this with the well established importance and growth of global maritime trade, and the UK's ambitions for an enhanced global trade network once we depart from the European Union, it becomes very easy to see why the Indo-Pacific region will be of such strategic importance to this island nation in the years to come – physically separated from that region by several thousand miles though we may be. But this renewed ambition for trade links in the Indo-Pacific, where some of the largest and fastest growing economies reside, does rely on influence in the region; you have to earn your place there. And that's where the key attributes of a navy can come into play, the ability, as one of my predecessors, Adm Sir Mark Stanhope, once put it, to do ‘engagement without embroilment', and that can come into play in support of cross-government objectives. But to paraphrase our Secretary of State for Defence: it's not all about soft power, it's also about being able to back it up with credible, hard power if required. And the way we can proactively contribute to regional maritime security is clearly one component of that. China In any assessment of the Indo-Pacific region, the growing role and influence of China will play a major part. China is the most populous country in the world, it's home to the largest supply of natural resources, it boasts the second largest world economy. So it is perhaps only natural that given their place in world they should look to exert their influence as a world power. And we're seeing this ambition play out very clearly in the maritime domain as the PLA(Navy) evolves from a coastal force to a regional force, and now very clearly a global force; they had 5 different task groups on deployment around the world last year. It's an ambition backed up by a programme of Naval expansion that massively exceeds any other country in the world, including the United States. If you look at the scale of their shipbuilding programme purely in terms of tonnage, it broadly equates to launching the equivalent of the whole Royal Navy or French Navy, every year, and they'll be able to do that for the next 10 years. Combine this with their equally rapid development of tactics and doctrine and it is very clear that they now possess a potent Naval force, equipped and ready to support China's national agenda, and this will be the case more and more in the years to come as they become bigger and more and more capable. Now there are probably differing, even conflicting views as to how this growth in Chinese military capability is to be perceived, but these perceptions are surely influenced in no small part by their recent actions like the militarisation of artificial features in the South China Sea, and I suspect not influenced for the better. UK/China relationship At the national political level, Britain is very clear eyed in its relationship with China, it's a good relationship and one we hope will continue to prosper for all sorts of reasons. And at a Head of Navy level, I'm pleased to say my relationship with Admiral Shen Jinlong, Commander of the PLA(N) is a good one. I visited him in China this year and we had a further meeting at the International Sea Power Symposium in Newport, Rhode Island a couple of months ago. Now unquestionably there were issues on which we do not see eye to eye, but the open, honest and frank discussion we have over a myriad of issues which affect all of us in the maritime domain are open and genuinely valuable, and I thank him for it. But at the same time, to again paraphrase my Defence Secretary, we will not shy away from telling them when we feel that they do not respect the commonly accepted rules and norms of international behaviour, the laws and systems from which we all benefit and therefore have a duty to protect. Specifically, in the Maritime domain, we are committed to ensure that the global commons remain secure and freely available for all mariners who are going about their lawful purpose, anywhere in the world, and we will continue to work to ensure that the laws and conventions that exist to protect those rights are followed. Return to Pacific So it's clear that the Pacific is somewhere the Royal Navy needs to be, in defence of our national interests and to promote our national prosperity, but also to exert our influence in the region as we seek to uphold the rules that have underwritten our collective security since the middle of the last century. But all of this comes after something of a fallow period in the Royal Navy's record of operations in this region, and I'm very keenly aware of that. Following the decision in the 1960s to withdraw naval forces from the region, and the demise of the Far East Fleet in 1971, our last ship, HMS Mermaid, left the Sembawang Basin in Singapore in September 1975. Since then we have seen a steady decline in the Royal Navy's presence in the region, exacerbated further by the withdrawal from Hong Kong in 1997, to the extent that when Sutherland arrived back in the region earlier this year, that was the first Royal Naval presence in the region for 5 years. The stark contrast of this year's near constant presence shows that we've now passed that nadir of presence and engagement, and I think we can now look forward to far closer engagement with our key regional partners there, whether it be in the guise of FPDA activity or bi-lateral and tri-lateral relationships such as our burgeoning relationship we have with Japan, and after Chile I fly on to Japan with Admiral Richardson to have another one of our close tri-lateral meetings with Admiral Murakawa, the head of the Japanese Defence Force. RN/RAN But whilst we may have been removed from the Pacific for a while, we have not lost our links with Pacific-based powers, especially the Royal Australian Navy. Throughout, our 2 navies have continued to enjoy a significant programme of personnel exchanges, building those all important personal relationships, shared experiences and mutual understanding. And at the tactical and operational level, our collective efforts in the Middle East in particular have kept our 2 navies closely aligned. As 2 of the 4 central members around which the 33 nation Combined Maritime Forces coalition has been built over the last 15 years or so, our ships have worked side by side and we have each taken a large share of Task Force Commander responsibilities. And if you've seen in the press in the last couple of days, we've also started to muscle in on the Royal Australian Navy's drug busts as well. In the course of these commitments the Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy have shared in a plethora of operational tasking – and no small amount of operational success – be it counter piracy and counter narcotics focussed maritime security tasking right the way through to offensive military action. Going back to 2003, on the gun line off the Al Faw peninsula during 3 Cdo Bde RM's assault, that gunline was HMS Marlborough, HMS Richmond, HMS Chatham and HMAS Anzac. And that Combined approach was far from unprecedented either; 12 years earlier during the 1991 Gulf War, HMS Gloucester and HMS Cardiff had operated in the high end of the Gulf establishing air defence supremacy alongside their Australian counterparts HMAS Brisbane and HMAS Sydney. All of that is evidence of how closely our 2 navies have, and can, integrate with each other. Interoperability I hope we can take it as an established fact that interoperability lies at the heart of successful international partnerships. And that for effective interoperability, how we operate and why we operate is just as important as where we operate and when we operate. So it's about far more than simply our ability for our comms fits to speak to each other – important though that may be. In this sense, the Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy are always going to be natural partners. We have those ties that bind our 2 countries together, our common history including being part of the Commonwealth, and we're always going to share near identical outlooks and values, and I would contend that this is especially true in the relationship between our 2 navies. But now we have a generational opportunity to further enhance this Naval partnership. The decision by Australia to buy and operate Type 26 frigates means that our 2 navies will soon be operating common Anti-Submarine Warfare platforms, the Australian Hunter class working side by side with our near identical Royal Navy City Class. And if you add to that our common outlook on how we generate these common platforms, how we bring that capability and its characteristics into service, it's but a short leap to see that we can find a way to operate them more closely together. And therein lies the opportunity to set the gold standard for interoperability – in the Asia-Pacific region, in Combined Maritime Forces and more widely amongst the ‘Five Eyes' community. And if the Type 26 has a coalescing effect for Combined RN/RAN operations, it will surely enhance our Anti-Submarine Warfare strategic partnership too, and Admiral Mike and I have signed an agreement today to push that between our too navies. There's no small amount of truth in the old adage that ‘2 heads are better than 1'. So the ability to tap into all of the skills, knowledge and experience that our navies both share, to address the future challenges in the underwater battlespace that we know we face, I think that makes a really powerful partnership. US and Regional Leadership Potent though this combined force may be, I think it would be remiss of me not to reflect on the predominant Naval power in the Pacific, which of course remains the US Navy, a navy with whom both the Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy also work incredibly closely. Given the number of maritime facing nations in the Indo-Pacific region, some of which may be small but all of which are rightly proud and keen to play their part, leadership opportunities abound. And working alongside the USN, there's no doubt that there's something the Royal Australian Navy can provide in leadership through the region, which is significant; providing the lead for other navies to follow and providing a unifying role within the region. And I think this is something our 2 navies very much have in common. Just as the Royal Australian Navy provides that leading role within the Pacific, I would like to think the same can be said for the Royal Navy's corresponding leadership role in the Atlantic and the adjoining seas, bringing together, in our case, principally European navies to work together alongside the US, in our case most often under the framework of NATO. So the leadership role we play in our respective oceans is a real point of connection for us, and I hope this is something that will allow the Royal Navy to quickly begin to deliver effect alongside the RAN in the Pacific. I hope that this work, the unifying effect that we can bring with the Royal Australian Navy, can achieve within the region the leadership opportunity that I think is there, and by bringing to bear our mutual close relationship with the US Navy and a host of other navies in the region, I think this can have a powerful effect. Conclusion A few weeks ago we marked the centenary of the armistice that brought to an end the First World War. The Royal Australian Navy might only have been formed 3 years before the outbreak of that war, but from the very outset our 2 navies were entirely compatible. The Royal Australian Navy had almost all its major units operating as part of the Royal Navy's Grand Fleet in the North Sea for most of the Great War, and the Royal Naval Division landed directly alongside the Anzacs at Gallipoli. In the Second World War, 5 Australian destroyers distinguished themselves repeatedly as part of Admiral Cunningham's Mediterranean fleet and over 1,000 Australians were serving in the Royal Navy on D Day. Through the subsequent campaigns in Korea and Malaya, and right up to the present with those 2 recent conflicts in the Arabian Gulf, our 2 navies have been at each other's side. It's a partnership steeped in history. But it's also modern, forward looking, and it's hugely valued, certainly on my side, and I look forward to seeing it grow in the future. So I'm hugely grateful to Mike for being here today and for all your team is doing to lean so heavily in to the optimisation of this relationship. Because as we re-assert our presence in your region I have no doubt our cooperation with you will continue to feature very heavily. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/iiss-global-partnerships-event-2018

  • Naval sales buoy French arms exports in new tally

    4 juin 2020 | International, Naval

    Naval sales buoy French arms exports in new tally

    By: Christina Mackenzie PARIS – France remained in the world's top five defense exporters in 2019 with €8.3 billion ($9.3 billion) worth of contracts signed, notably with European partners Belgium, the Netherlands, Hungary and Spain, according to a defense ministry report published this week. Half of these contracts were in the naval sector, a very sharp rise from the average 10 percent this sector represented in the past. The contract to replace the mine-hunters for the navies of Belgium and the Netherlands, a program piloted by Belgium on behalf of the two nations, accounted for more than 40 percent of naval sector sales. These sales also partially explain the very sharp rise in 2019 of exports to EU member states: 42 percent of the total, a figure that rises to almost 45 percent if one includes European non-EU members, compared to 25 percent in 2018 and an average 10-15 percent in previous years. The next major export client was the United Arab Emirates (with the Gowind corvette contract) but the 30 percent share of exports in the Africa/Middle East zone was 20 points down compared to 2018 but also compared to the average of the past decade. The report notes that France's exports are, above all, aimed at preserving its own security by establishing bilateral cooperations with European countries and strengthening transatlantic ties. The bilateral cooperations are high-level, long-term, intergovernmental agreements and exports to help the partner nations strengthen and adapt their military capacity. The sale of 16 H225M helicopters and 20 H145M helicopters to Hungary, of two telecommunication satellites to Spain and of the mine-hunters to Belgium and the Netherlands illustrate this philosophy. These exports are on par with those of the past decade “and were obtained in a particularly competitive context with the confirmation of U.S. supremacy and the emergence of new major exporters (notably China).” The parliamentary report also notes that Russia “occupies a very strong position on markets with limited financial resources [...] notably to conquer clients outside its traditional sphere of influence. Over the past few years, Russia has strengthened its position on the Asian markets, in the Middle-East and in north Africa.” There were 4,634 export licenses delivered in 2019, either for transfer of equipment (within the European Union) or for export (to all non-EU countries). But each license does not necessarily mean that an export took place, they merely give the framework for the authorization and establish the conditions for the export. Twenty-five license requests were turned down and some 110 were withdrawn by the applicant. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/06/03/naval-sales-buoy-french-arms-exports-in-new-tally/

  • NATO's East Is Rearming, But It's Because of Putin, Not Trump

    14 août 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR

    NATO's East Is Rearming, But It's Because of Putin, Not Trump

    Ott Ummelas Donald Trump has taken credit for a rise in military spending by NATO states, but in the alliance's eastern reaches, it's his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, who's driving the rearming effort. Last month, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg thanked the U.S. President for “clearly having an impact” on defense spending by allies while Trump said his demands had added $41 billion to European and Canadian defense outlays. But the jump in acquisitions behind the former Iron Curtain of aircraft, ships and armored vehicles began when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine, well before Trump's 2016 election victory, according to analysts including Tomas Valasek, director of Carnegie Europe in Brussels. While the median defense expenditure of NATO members is 1.36 percent of gross domestic product, below the alliance's requirement of 2 percent, eastern members comprise seven of the 13 members that are paying above that level. “Countries on NATO's eastern border do not need Donald Trump to boost defense spending,” Valasek said. “They decided this long before he came to power. The spending boost was because of a president, but it was Vladimir Putin, not the U.S. President.” Constant overflights by Russian aircraft into NATO airspace, cyberattacks on government and military installations, wargames on the borders of the Baltic states and accusations that Russia was behind a failed coup in newest member Montenegro have put NATO's eastern quadrant on alert for what it says is an increasingly expansionist Russia. Of the 15 members exceeding the bloc's guideline that 20 percent of total defense spending should go to equipment, six are from eastern Europe. At the time of the NATO summit in Brussels, Romania said it would buy five more F-16s from Portugal, raising its squadron to 12, after it signed a $400-million deal to acquire a Patriot missile air-defense system with Raython in May. The country of 20 million people bordering Ukraine, Moldova and the Black Sea plans to buy 36 more F-16s, four corvettes, at least 3,000 transport vehicles and coastal gun batteries over the next five years. Slovakia also announced the purchase of F-16 fighter jets at the summit to replace its aging Russian Mig-29s in a deal that was years in negotiating. And last month, Bulgaria asked for bids for at least eight new or used fighter jets by October at a total cost of 1.8 billion lev ($1 billion). By end-2018, the government in Sofia plans to buy 1.5 billion lev worth of armored vehicles and two warships for 1 billion lev. Neighboring Hungary said in June that it had agreed to buy 20 Airbus H145M multi-purpose helicopters, the country's largest military purchase since 2001. NATO's European members are expected to spend around $60 billion on equipment this year, with the 13 eastern members accounting for about 10 percent, said Tony Lawrence, a research fellow with the International Center for Security and Defense in Tallinn. The newer members will together spend about $2 billion more on equipment this year than last, he said. According to NATO, seven of its 10 biggest spending increases will be in the east. “Since these nations' membership in NATO, there has been a clear inclination to foster and strengthen their link with the U.S.,” said Martin Lundmark, a researcher with Swedish Defense University in Stockholm. “By procuring strategic defense systems, they willingly become interdependent and inter-operable with the U.S.” https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-13/nato-s-east-is-rearming-but-it-s-because-of-putin-not-trump

Toutes les nouvelles