22 avril 2021 | International, Aérospatial
Chinese firm claims new stealth drone may rival US Air Force’s B-21
Zhongtian Feilong has made a prototype it says could be used for precision strikes and as part of a swarm for surveillance.
18 juin 2019 | International, Aérospatial
By: Seth J. Frantzman and Kelsey D. Atherton
Rafael Advanced Defense System's Spice bombs now have a new technological breakthrough as the Israeli company enables its Spice 250 with artificial intelligence alongside automatic target recognition to be used with scene-matching technology.
The Spice 250, which can be deployed on quad racks under the wings of warplanes like the F-16, has a 75-kilogram warhead and a maximum range of 100 kilometers with its deployable wings.
Its electro-optic scene-matching technology — which involves uploading terrain data onto the bomb and combining it with real-time electro-optic imagery — allows the weapon to work in GPS-denied environments. And the bomb can use this autonomous capability to navigate and correct its location, according to Gideon Weiss, Rafael's deputy general manager of marketing and business development at the company's air and C4I division.
With its AI and “deep learning” technologies, the weapon has the ability to identity moving ground targets and distinguish them from other objects and terrain. This is based on 3D models uploaded to the bomb as well as algorithms. As the weapon identifies and homes in on its target, such as a convoy of vehicles, it separates the convoy of interest from other vehicles it has “learned” to ignore.
“The deep-learning algorithm is indifferent to the actual data fed to it for modeling targets of interest and embedding their pertaining characteristics into the system," Weiss said. "However, the more the data used for modeling is representative of the target of interest, the more robust the recognition probability will be in real life.”
Rafael has completed the development and testing phase of the Spice 250, including flight tests, which have “proven the robustness of the ATA and ATR, so it is mature for delivery,” Weiss said, using acronyms for automatic target acquisition and recognition.
Asked if the ATR algorithm will select a secondary target if the computer cannot find the initial human-selected target, Weiss said: “This goes into the area of user-defined policies and rules of engagement, and it is up to the users to decide on how to apply the weapon, when and where to use it, and how to define target recognition probabilities and its eventuality.”
Automatically selecting a secondary target may eventually become part of the upgrade profile for the munition, if customers express significant interest in the feature.
With a two-way data link and a video-streaming capability, the bomb can be aborted or told to re-target up until a “few second before the weapon hits its target,” Weiss explained. That two-way data-link, enabled by the weapon's mounting on a Smart Quad Rack, or SQR, will enable future deep learning to be based on data extracted from earlier launches. Data recorded will include either live-streaming video or a burst of still images of the entire homing phase up until impact.
“These are automatically and simultaneously recorded on the SQR — enabling two functions: (a) real-time and post-mission BDI (Bomb Damage Indication); (b) post-mission target data extraction for intel updates, etc.," Weiss said. "The ATR capability, including its deep learning updates, must be more agile than the enemy's ability to conceal and/or change its battlefield footprint, tactics, appearance or anything else which might impede the ATR from accurately recognizing and destroying targets.”
The Spice family of weapons is operational with the Israeli Air Force and international customers.
22 avril 2021 | International, Aérospatial
Zhongtian Feilong has made a prototype it says could be used for precision strikes and as part of a swarm for surveillance.
16 septembre 2024 | International, Aérospatial
The Air Force is bringing operators into the acquisition process earlier under the operational imperative effort, Andrew Hunter said.
11 novembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR, Sécurité
By: Nathan Strout In September 2018, the Trump administration added space cybersecurity to the National Cyber Strategy. Of course, adding space cybersecurity to a strategy document doesn't automatically make those systems secure from cyberthreats. In the year since that document was adopted, the Space Cybersecurity Working Group has been trying to make the administration's desire that United States space assets are cybersecure a reality. “The National Security Council, in very close coordination with the National Space Council, as well as the Office of the vice president, decided to form an inner agency group called the Space Cybersecurity Working Group,” explained Jaisha Wray, cybersecurity director of the National Security Council. “The goals of our working group are to identify and coordinate and prioritize U.S. government efforts to manage cybersecurity risks to space systems.” As the cybersecurity director of the National Security Council, Wray is in charge of developing international cybersecurity partnerships. Previously she served as the acting deputy director of emerging security challenges at the Department of State, where she helped build space and cyber policies. At the CyberSat19 conference Nov. 7, Wray explained how her Space Cybersecurity Working Group was fostering communications between various organizations to enhance cybersecurity in space. Key to developing effective cybersecurity across the nation's space systems is communication, be it between space and cyber communities, the U.S. and international partners, or the government and industry, said Wray. “What we saw was that across departments and agencies in the U.S. government, the space and the cyber people are often located in different offices in different bureaus, and so one of the early successes of our working group is simply just bringing these folks together to try to reduce stovepipes, compare notes and provide updates,” she explained. Those meetings are ongoing and have been embraced by both communities, said Wray. The National Cyber Strategy also directed the National Security Council to enhance partnerships between the U.S. government and commercial and other space-faring nations. “This is particularly important since our efforts in space are becoming increasingly intertwined, both commercially and internationally, and we must ensure that all space systems — not just U.S. government satellites — are protected from cyberthreats,” said Wray. “However, a key challenge is convincing others to spend the extra money and resources necessary to make their satellites more secure when the extent of the threat is not always well known or available in the public domain. So this is why both internationally and with industry we plan to enhance our efforts to raise awareness and share information on cyberthreats and to develop and share best practices and principles to counter these threats.” On the industry front, the working group is backing the efforts of the newly established Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). ISACs are member-driven groups that work with the government to spread information through industry. The formation of a separate Space ISAC was announced in April, and the group held its first board meeting Nov. 7. “We were very pleased to see and now support the efforts of the new Space ISAC, which will help gather, analyze and disseminate critical cyberthreat information related to space among the federal commercial and international community,” said Wray. While the technical side of enhancing space cybersecurity presents its own challenge, it's clear that a major gap in implementing cybersecurity in space is connecting the various stakeholders, be they commercial companies, various agencies or other countries. “I'm confident that through the Space Cybersecurity Working Group, we can continue to make progress and working cooperatively to address these threats,” said Wray. https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/2019/11/08/how-the-space-cybersecurity-working-group-fosters-communication/