11 janvier 2021 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
By: Tom Waldwyn and Haena Jo
Over the next decade, companies from emerging defense industrial nations will provide greater competition for the Western and Russian firms that have previously assisted in their development.
Successive Turkish, South Korean, Brazilian and Polish governments have invested heavily in their defense industries over the past decade, leading to much-improved capabilities and the introduction of complex platforms. While many of these are license-builds of Western equipment, a growing share is of original designs. However, their reliance on key subsystems from Western and Russian companies will likely continue for much of this period, presenting a potential vulnerability.
License-building platforms with technology transfer has been used as a means of developing a local industrial capability with a more realistic chance of success than starting from scratch. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey and South Korea assembled hundreds of F-16 fighter jets, and both have also license-built German submarines, as has Brazil.
Significant investment in these programs has meant that these countries now have the industrial capability to produce an increasing number of platforms with original designs. South Korea's T-50 Golden Eagle (a trainer and light-attack aircraft with multiple variants) was developed based on both the country's experience and technology transfer from assembling F-16s.
Poland's initial license-build of Finnish armored personnel carriers has now led to several local variants based on that design, and Turkey has begun to design a new attack helicopter based on its experience building the Italian-designed T129.
This has gone hand in hand with procurement and industry reform. South Korea created the Defense Acquisition Program Administration in 2006 to manage procurement and develop industrial capability. Poland consolidated most of its state-owned industry under the PGZ holding company in 2015.
South Korea's threefold increase in defense exports over the past decade — $1.52 billion in 2019 with a record high of $2.36 billion in 2016 — has been boosted by its companies winning contracts against European and Russian competitors. The aforementioned T-50 family has won competitions in countries such as Iraq, Indonesia and Thailand at the expense of Western and Russian aircraft. Similarly, South Korean shipyards have now signed deals to export frigates and tankers to a variety of countries including Thailand and the U.K. Significantly, in 2011, a South Korean shipyard secured a contract to supply Indonesia with submarines, beating the German original equipment manufacturer that transferred technology to South Korea in the 1980s for license-production.
Although Turkey's high-profile export successes have largely come due to its political relationships rather than success in open competition, it too has seen its defense and aerospace (including civil) exports more than treble during this time, reaching $2.78 billion in 2019.
Brazil's export successes ($1.3 billion in 2019) have largely come in the aerospace sector with the A-29 Super Tucano trainer/light-attack aircraft being widely exported. Recently the country has begun to secure the first sales of its KC-390 transport aircraft.
Despite strong growth in defense manufacturing capability (both South Korea and Turkey report overall localization rates of around 70 percent, for example), these nations continue to rely on Western and Russian suppliers for key subsystems, with high-end electronics and engines being particular weaknesses. Attempts to fit a locally designed power pack into the K2 Black Panther main battle tank have been wracked with difficulty, forcing South Korea to order additional engines and transmissions from German suppliers. Similarly, Poland's production of its Krab howitzer ran into problems early on due to technical issues with the chassis and engine, forcing a switch to South Korean and German replacements, respectively.
Turkey provides a case study of what can happen when a reliance on foreign subsystems clashes with those countries taking a dim view of your actions. Since the mid-2000s, development of the Altay main battle tank proceeded relatively smoothly, in part because the prototypes were fitted with proven German power packs. However, arms embargoes since 2016 have derailed series production. A 2015 contract to develop a local propulsion system was canceled in 2017 when the Austrian company selected to assist pulled out. Similar issues have hampered the sale of attack helicopters to Pakistan (an Italian design fitted with American engines) as well as the production of armed UAVs (Canadian sensors and engines).
Beyond these emerging challengers for defense exports, other nations also warrant consideration. Japan, a country with a high localization rate since the 1990s, produces a variety of advanced platforms across different sectors. However, changing government and business practices to support export campaigns will take time. India has also invested heavily in its industry, yet bureaucratic conflicts and technical challenges have made fulfilling local requirements a challenge. The United Arab Emirates has begun to export equipment, albeit low-tech materiel.
All this being said, the impact of COVID-19 on government spending will likely be felt for several years, with some importer nations already postponing programs. Whether local demand in exporter nations can make up for this remains to be seen.
Tom Waldwyn is a research associate for defense and military analysis at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, where Haena Jo is a research analyst for defense and military analysis.
22 mars 2021 | International, Terrestre
Amid fears about the strained industrial base for energetics, a key part of munitions and other conventional weapons, the Navy has awarded a six-year contract to accelerate tech breakthroughs over the next six to ten years.
21 avril 2020 | International, Naval
By: Michael D. Brasseur , Rob Murray , and Sean Trevethan Last December, at their meeting in London, NATO leaders declared: “To stay secure, we must look to the future together. We are addressing the breadth and scale of new technologies to maintain our technological edge, while preserving our values and norms.” These two sentences were, in part, a nod to a significant piece of work the alliance is undertaking within the broader mandate of alliance innovation — NATO's Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative. Granted, on its own this sounds both technical and narrow within the context of emerging technology, a context that includes: artificial intelligence, data, space, hypersonic weapons, bio technologies, quantum research, autonomy and more. So why are maritime unmanned systems relevant now? Simply put, developing the numbers of manned submarines, aircraft and ships required to keep pace with potential adversaries is simply not economically viable (almost $3 billion per Virginia-class U.S. submarine). Not since the Cold War has NATO needed the volume of maritime forces to protect our seas and oceans from would-be foes. NATO's areas of interest are expanding. As climate change affects the Arctic, new maritime routes are being created, which Russia in particular is exploiting with its submarines and ships. This matters because it exposes a new flank on NATO's high-north periphery, and if left unchecked is a potential vulnerability whilst also being a potential opportunity; this, coupled with an increasing need to protect our undersea data infrastructure means NATO's geostrategic responsibilities continue to grow. Therefore, if allies are to reinforce NATO's maritime posture, deter Russian aggression, guard against Chinese activity, and protect both critical national infrastructure and our sea lines of communication, NATO must do things differently and at the speed of relevance. NATO's Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative was agreed by 13 defense ministers in October 2018. Since then, the initiative's success has attracted the participation of three more allies and garnered significant interest from all of NATO's maritime nations. The political agreement struck in 2018 provided the mandate for NATO to bring together disparate strands of common work ongoing within nations. NATO, acting as a network, enabled allies to become greater than the sum of their parts. The focus is threefold: utilize world-leading research to increase allied interoperability between conventional forces and unmanned drones; establish new tactics for our sailors to truly leverage these technologies; and develop secure digital communications for military drones across all domains (air, sea and land). Addressing these priorities together will enable this effort to be scaled across the alliance, at pace. To date, the speed of this effort has been breathtaking. So much so that even the United States and the United Kingdom — two allies who have invested the most in this area — are using the NATO initiative as a catalyst for their own national efforts. The last 12-plus months has seen the creation of a NATO project office, a governance body, as well as the planning and successful execution of the world's largest and most complex maritime unmanned systems exercise off the Portuguese coast in September 2019. This event brought together the very best from our navies, industry, scientific institutes and academia. The results were hugely impressive, with many “world firsts” including maritime unmanned systems augmenting conventional forces through multiple scenarios. We now have vast swaths of insight and information to start achieving those three goals of improving interoperability, enhancing our tactics and developing secure communications. The goal of improving allied interoperability is actually about enhancing standards. A topic often overlooked at the policy level but critical to the DNA of the NATO alliance. Standards drive interoperability, which in turn drives readiness, which ultimately aids deterrence. As NATO leads the development of new technologies, so too must come new standards that our industries and military can implement. Open architectures will be key, but allies and industry need to realize that we need to solve problems — not address requirements. No perfect solution will ever be delivered on the first attempt. The alliance will need to both innovate and iterate on operations in order to maintain advantage. This may be a cultural shift to some acquisition purists who are used to developing complex warships over 20-plus-year time frames. However, the challenge remains our ability to scale. With this project we have an agile global team functioning across multiple national and allied bureaucracies, each with their own culture and ways of working. Through engagement and investment, this team is yielding disproportionate results. Indeed, 2019 demonstrated what can be done with some imagination, effort and focus. But continual growth at speed will require faith by allies to maintain the course. Such is the nature of true change and innovation. There is a lot to do, and the stakes are high. Near-peer competitors are once again very real. Despite the global lockdown caused by the new coronavirus, COVID-19, the initiative continues to progress through synthetic networks and simulation, driven by passion and intent. Our economy, our data and its infrastructure still need protecting, now more than ever. This effort strives to accelerate maritime unmanned systems into NATO's arsenal to patrol the vast swaths of ocean and offset evolving threats. Success will be seen because it is being built on allied nations' shared values and norms, the same values and norms that NATO leaders recognized in London last year. Michael D. Brasseur is the director of naval armaments cooperation for the U.S. mission to NATO. He is also the first director of NATO's “startup,” the Maritime Unmanned Systems Innovation and Coordination Cell. Rob Murray is the head of innovation at NATO Headquarters. Sean Trevethan is the fleet robotics officer of the British Royal Navy, working in the future capability division at Navy Command Headquarters in Portsmouth, England. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/20/natos-start-up-charts-a-bold-future-in-maritime-unmanned-systems/
4 septembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité, Autre défense
PATRICK TUCKER Two years after the Pentagon set out to spend billions on 10 breakthrough research and engineering efforts, defense contractors instead are putting most of their money in less ambitious research projects. The development gap between the military and its suppliers troubled investigators at the Government Accountability Office, or GAO, who determined in a report released Thursday that the Defense Department isn't keeping good watch over those private efforts and doesn't know how much of it would fit into the military's tech goals. The Pentagon's undersecretary for research and engineering in 2018 laid out several big idea research areas that would be most relevant to maintaining an edge on China or Russia. Many are in the very early stages of maturation; the biggest breakthroughs are expected in the second half of the coming decade. They are: artificial intelligence, autonomy, biotechnology, directed energy, space, cyber, microelectronics, hypersonics, networked command and control, and quantum science. These areas of the future will go on to determine technology superiority in 2030, and the Department of Defense is eager to invest . It plans to spend $7.5 billion on artificial intelligence, autonomy, hypersonics, and directed energy this year, according to the report. But GAO found that defense contractors in the past four years have been putting only 40 percent of their independent research dollars, sometimes called IR&D, against those priorities. Coincidently, “our analysis also showed that the majority (67 percent) of IR&D projects completed between 2014 and 2018 focused on incremental, rather than disruptive, innovation.” In other words, while defense contractors are spending some of their money on big ambitious goals, they prefer to spend more on low-hanging fruit, in little improvements to existing technologies that they can sell to the government more easily. Part of the reason for the apparent spending priority gap may be that the Defense Department doesn't track contractors' research and development spending very well. “Neither DOD nor the military departments review industry IR&D projects as part of their science and technology strategic planning processes. DOD is not reviewing IR&D projects because DOD's IR&D instruction does not require such consideration of the projects,” notes GAO. The Defense Department maintains a database to track the projects where contractors are spending research money. But individuals within the department make very little use of it. “For example... the Air Force accounted for more than 55 percent of all searches in 2019, primarily, from users with the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL).” The Pentagon's own lack of awareness could result in components, offices, or other parts of the military investing in research projects without knowing that a private company has a similar project underway. GAO recommends a few simple things to put the Pentagon and contractors more on the same page. First, make it mandatory for personnel in the office undersecretary of research and development to actually review defense industry IR&D; and, second, make the database more useful by asking the contractors to submit more data, like whether the projects they are undertaking are disruptive or just incremental, and the estimated cost when completed. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/09/pentagon-defense-contractors-are-out-step-tech-innovation-gao-finds/168237/