3 février 2021 | International, Naval

How Kathleen Hicks will approach nukes, shipbuilding and the budget

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WASHINGTON — Following a smooth confirmation hearing, it appears Kathleen Hicks is headed to the Pentagon.

As had been expected, Hicks, the nominee to be deputy secretary of defense for Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, received little in the way of pushback from senators. A significant number of them — including outgoing Senate Armed Service Committee Chairman Jim Inhofe, R-Okla., and his successor, Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I. — indicated they would support her nomination out of the committee.

The hearing, which lasted more than three hours, gave insight into how Hicks would approach a number of key issues for the Defense Department if she arrives in office.

Hicks is open to changing budget traditions to drive joint activity. It is commonly accepted in defense circles that the Pentagon's budget will be flat at best, if not declining, in the coming years. That led to a number of questions from senators about how to drive reforms and find savings for the department.

Hicks said the incentive structure must change, particularly for general officer- and senior civilian-level hires, in order to focus on joint impacts.

A service that has “given up the capacity or the capability often believes that they will lose out overall, and the incentive structure is built around budget share. We should make clear always from a leadership perspective that the incentive is about serving the joint war fighter,” she said. “So the incentives start around promotion, but they also include how we keep the money, if you will, oriented towards services who are putting forward good ideas, even if those good ideas seem to go against a vested interest.”

Hicks later committed to looking at “pass through” funding included in the Air Force budget each year. That money, which can account for as much as 20 percent of the service's budget request, goes to other government organizations and has for years been a thorn in the side of Air Force advocates, who argue it leads to the service having a smaller budget than the Army and Navy.

The Navy's shipbuilding plan may get changed. The Trump administration delivered a long-awaited shipbuilding plan to Congress toward the end of 2020, one that was met with a skeptical eye from outside analysts who questioned some of the baked-in assumptions. Hicks, it seems, falls into that camp, although she said the broad structure is likely correct.

“There's some really interesting operational themes that I'm attracted to: There's a focus on increasing use of autonomy, there's a focus on dispersal of forces and there's a focus on growing the number of small surface combatants relative to today,” Hicks said. “But there are some things in that unclassified report, as I mentioned to you, that I saw as flags. There's an indication that the information in there would require further analysis to validate the numbers.”

Hicks said she would hope to work quickly once Navy leadership is in place on developing the Biden administration's plan.

Focusing just on allied defense spending misses the point. President Donald Trump often focused his personal ire on allied nations who were not spending as much on defense as he would like. While NATO, with its pledge for countries to spend 2 percent of their respective gross domestic product on defense, was an early and common target, Japan and South Korea also drew his ire over the last four years.

Hicks said she watched that with “concern,” noting that the focus purely on spending would impact how other nations work with the U.S. She believes the Biden administration will work to smooth over tensions around burden-sharing.

“We should always be focused on burden-sharing, ensuring that allies fulfill their commitments. But when it becomes that tactical issue that overrides the strategic value of the alliances, alliances that the Chinese and Russians could only hope to match ... if we get to that point, we have become astrategic,” Hicks said.

“We need to make sure that we're taking a strategic approach to what commitment means,” she added. “I think we need to make sure that allies are as into the security relationship as we are. Sometimes it's through spending. Sometimes it's through defense spending. And sometimes that commitment is expressed in other ways, and I think we should be strategic about how we consider those commitments.”

Because of Austin's recusals, she'll be the point person on any Raytheon projects. Prior to assuming office, Austin served on the board of defense giant Raytheon Technologies. During his confirmation process, he pledged to recuse himself, if at all possible, from any decisions related to Raytheon while serving as defense secretary. That means Hicks will be the highest-ranking voice on programmatic decisions regarding two key nuclear capabilities: the replacement program for America's intercontinental ballistic missiles known as the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, or GBSD; and the Long Range Standoff Weapon, or LRSO, a nuclear cruise missile.

In her written answers to members, Hicks noted she would likely end up running programmatic decisions on those systems as well as “other timely missile defense issues.”

Hicks backs nuclear modernization, but won't comment on specific projects. Like Austin did during his confirmation hearing, Hicks was unequivocal in her support for broad nuclear modernization. But just like Austin, she stopped short of pledging specifically to uphold the entirety of the current nuclear modernization strategy, notable at a time when both the LRSO and GBSD programs find themselves as targets from the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, as well as from the nonproliferation community.

She deferred on technical questions about GBSD and its timeline, noting she doesn't currently have access to that data.

“My view is that the triad has served us very well, it has created stability and it has value,” Hicks said.

However, she stressed that major decisions on nuclear policy, including about a potential “no first use” declaration, would come from above her. “I think our decisions on nuclear weapons should be driven foremost by strategy,” not money, she added.

Hicks said it is her “understanding” that a Nuclear Posture Review will be conducted by the Pentagon; the assumption among experts is that the NPR under a Biden administration will come to some different conclusions than that of the Trump administration, whose document called for the creation of two new low-yield nuclear warheads.

The transition fight will impact the fiscal 2022 budget. Before being announced as the deputy defense secretary nominee, Hicks was the leader on President Joe Biden's Pentagon landing team. While transitions between administrations are usually smooth, the unprecedented situation of Trump's refusal to accept his election loss bled over into the transition effort at the Department of Defense.

By mid-December, officials on the Biden team were publicly complaining about political appointees at teh DoD blocking their access. Pentagon officials canceled a number of planned meetings but insisted there was no issue.

Asked during Tuesday's hearing about the impact those delays may have going forward, Hicks stressed the issue was “really around a handful of folks who made things difficult,” but said there would be a hangover effect for the FY22 budget.

“I think the biggest challenge that I will face, if confirmed, because of this is around budget transparency,” she said, indicating that the transition team was unable to look at what the Trump administration was doing with the FY22 budget request until late in January.

“Typically that information is shared with the transition team because the administration will owe to Congress a president's budget submission in the spring. So the inability to look at that information ... I think it will cause some delay in the timeline by which we can give budget quality information back to Congress. So that would be the area [where] I would ask for a little relief or understanding.”

https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2021/02/02/how-kathleen-hicks-will-approach-nukes-shipbuilding-and-the-budget/

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  • Army Wrestles With SIGINT vs. EW

    1 août 2018 | International, Terrestre, C4ISR

    Army Wrestles With SIGINT vs. EW

    This internal budget battle in the Army could cede the actual battlefield to high-powered Russian and Chinese jammers, electronic warfare advocates fear, with the same lethal consequences for US troops that Ukrainian forces have suffered since 2014. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. CAPITOL HILL: Can the Army unite its rival tribes to retake the high-tech high groundof modern warfare, the electromagnetic spectrum? Those are the stakes in the service's ongoing internal struggles over doctrine, organization, and an obscure but critical program known as TLIS, the Terrestrial Layer Intelligence System. Army leaders see TLIS as a powerful synergy between Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), which eavesdrops on and locates enemy transmissions, and Electronic Warfare (EW), which jams those same transmissions and can be used for cyber warfare. But TLIS, as the “intelligence” in its name implies, began as a pure SIGINT system, before it absorbed the former Multi-Function Electronic Warfare (MFEW) program, and there's always the possible it might regress. At least some electronic warriors hear worrying rumors that the more powerful SIGINT branch wants to save money on TLIS by cutting back on its jamming capabilities, leaving it as a passive sensor rather than an active weapon. This internal budget battle in the Army could cede the actual battlefield to high-powered Russian and Chinese jammers, electronic warfare advocates fear, with the same lethal consequences for US troops that Ukrainian forces have suffered since 2014. “The intel people will finally be able to get rid of EW, again, by taking it over, again, and crushing it,” said Col. Jeffrey Church, who until his retirement last year was the most senior Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) in the Army: There are no EW generals, in stark contrast to SIGINT and cyber. Church was also the last EWO to run the electronic warfare directorate on the Army's Pentagon staff: His immediate successor was an engineer — an expert on bridges and minefields, not electrons. Both the staff directorate and the EWO specialty have since been folded into Army cyber. “Next,” Church predicted in a bitter post on LinkedIn, “they will cancel the intel portions of MFEW they insisted be written into the EW requirements (i.e. when MFEW was folded into TLIS) and thereby kill the MFEW program.” “I don't think your article will affect anything for Army EW,” a weary Church told me. “The only thing that will is when a bunch of our soldiers get killed. Then the Army will act shocked by it and be compelled to bring EW into the force with real gear, real operators, real training and real EW leadership.” Synergy or Tension? From drones to foot troops, radio to radar, networks to GPS, everything in a 21st century military has to send and receive signals through the electromagnetic spectrum — which means everything can be detected, targeted, and disrupted. Russia and China have invested massively in electronic warfare since the end of the Cold War while the US disbanded most EW. Today, while the Navy and Air Forcehave high-cost jamming aircraft — the EA-18G Growler and EC-130H Compass Call respectively — they're too rare, expensive, and over-powered to support small units on the ground. But the US Army's own arsenal consists almost entirely of short-range jammers that fit in backpacks or on Humvees, most of them designed to disable radio detonators for roadside bombs. Meanwhile Russia and China have fleets of heavy trucks packed with high-power EW gear that can scramble US signals hundreds of miles away. The Army's original solution to this problem was called Multi-Function Electronic Warfare (MFEW), a common family of sensors and jammers meant to go on trucks, drones and manned aircraft — eventually. But the service decided to fold MFEW into the land-based TLIS and an as-yet-unnamed airborne counterpart instead. “We are specifically looking at putting SIGINT, EW and cyber on the same platform, both on the ground and in the air,” Maj. Gen. Robert Walters told a July 18 forumorganized by the Association of Old Crows, an EW professional group. As commander of the Army's intelligence center at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., Walters is the Army's lead “proponent” for TLIS requirements, with the cyber center at Fort Gordon, Ga. in a significant supporting role. There's a natural synergy here, Walters said. SIGINT finds the enemy signals and analyzes them, then cyber and electronic warfare can target the weak links in the enemy network. While he didn't say so out loud, that's how it's done by the current masters of the art, the Russians, whose SIGINT and EW officers often sit side by side in the same vehicle so they can quickly coordinate devastating electromagnetic maneuvers, as in Ukraine. But there's also a tension between the two sides. Intelligence naturally wants to keep listening to the enemy signals to find out more, whereas cyber/EW warriors want to shut them down or use them to feed cyber weapons into. Now, you can try to shut down only the enemy's most secure networks so they have to use the ones SIGINT can easily crack. That's what the Russians did against the Ukrainians, forcing them off their military radios onto personal cellphones — but it's not easy to pull off. Second, when EW turns on its jammers, their powerful signal doesn't just disrupt enemy transmissions: It also provides a big target for enemy missiles and artillery radars to home in on. At best, that means the combined SIGINT/EW unit has to relocate frequently, disrupting listening operations. At worst, it means the combined unit blows up in one shot. (You can reduce the risk to your troops by putting the jammers on drones or ground robots operated from a distance by remote control, but that creates a new problem: The enemy can detect, decode and jam your communications with the robots). So how well will the Army balance these tensions? Right now, said one well-connected electronic warfare expert, the intelligence branch is in the driver's seat, and “once again intel has defaulted back to SIGINT, which disappoints me.....It's not looking too good.” This attitude may be overly pessimistic. But there's little cause for optimism in Army's unhappy history of internecine intramural rivalries and cancelled procurement programs. Is Big Six Missing One? The current Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, is trying to make a break with the service's dysfunctional past. He has named six modernization priorities, each with its own Cross Functional Team (CFT), led by a general who can pull in people from across the bureaucracy and put them in one room until they thrash out how to get things done. Those CTFs, in turn, will play a leading role in the new Army Futures Command being stood up in Austin. But electronic warfare has no clear home in this new structure. Of the six priorities — 1) long-range artillery, 2) armored vehicles, 3) aircraft, 4) networks, 5) air & missile defense, and 6) soldier equipment, in that order — the closest fit is with Priority No. 4, the network. That covers all the computerized communication and data systems the Army uses to transmit orders and intelligence: Lose all those and you're back to carrier pigeons. So, understandably, the emphasis of the network Cross Functional Team is on defending the US network from jamming and hacking, not on attacking enemy networks with our own jammers and hackers. A spin-off CFT on Precision Navigation & Timing has a similar defensive focus: How can US forces keep track of where everything is and when it has to happen if the enemy disrupts GPS? For that matter, the entire cyber center at Fort Gordon, despite having responsibility for electronic warfare, evolved when the old Signal Corps school took on a growing role in not just setting up communications networks but defending them. It's only recently taken on an offensive role, and primarily in cyberspace rather than electronic warfare. So all these leading Army organizations have the same focus on defense. Their job is to keep the network working under attack. But defense is not enough on its own. A tank doesn't just need armor: It needs a gun. Maybe a network doesn't just need cybersecurity and resilience against jamming: It needs to be able to attack the other side's network. A rmy Secretary Mark Esper has made clear the Big Six priorities are unlikely to change, so don't expect him to add electronic warfare as Big No. 7 any time soon. But there is still some wiggle room to spin off subsidiary priorities with their own Cross Functional Teams. In fact, from the beginning, there've been eight Cross Functional Teams, not six: The network priority is also supported by that Precision Navigation & Timing CFT, while the soldier equipment CFT spun off a training simulations CFT. Now, that eight-fold structure hasn't changed since the initial announcement in 2016. But there's no fundamental reason why the Army couldn't add a ninth CFT for electronic warfare, supporting the network priority area alongside the PNT team. What this would take — besides a memo from Esper and Milley — would be a fundamental change in how the Army thinks about “the network,” as an offensive weapon instead of a mere technical function. his is a philosophical shift. There's a longstanding tendency in Western militaries to focus on reducing what Clausewitz called the friction and fog of war, the innumerable minor mishaps, miscommunications, and misunderstandings that constantly impede military operations. The ambition to “lift the fog of war” reached its peak of hubris in the “transformation” movement before the invasion of Iraq, where the fog rolled in again unstoppably. Eastern tradition, by contrast, has long seen fog and friction as not only obstacles but weapons: You want to reduce them for your own side, of course, but also to increase them for the enemy. Hence Sun Tzu's maxim that “all warfare is based on deception,” a concept the Russians have embraced with their doctrine of maskirovka and which seems well-suited to the information age. So, instead of treating the network simply as an electromagnetic means to reduce our fog and friction, why not extend the concept to include electromagnetic means to increase the enemy's fog and friction? Instead of an asset to be defended, what if it's a weapon to attack? s the Network a Weapon? There are signs the Army is starting to think this way. At the Capitol Hill forum, Lt. Gen. Stephen Fogarty — current head of Army Cyber Command and former chief of the Cyber Center at Fort Gordon — even talked about the network as a “weapon” and (intentionally or not) echoed Sun Tzu. “We've truly started to operationalize the Army networks,” Fogarty said. “That's the foundational weapons platform for a modern military.” Without the network, he said, you can't do persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); long-range precision fires (LRPF) with missiles and artillery; logistics; medical evacuation; or command and control (C2, what the Army now calls “mission command”). Now, Fogarty's list is about how the network enables other parts of the Army, rather than the network taking the offensive itself. Still, calling the network a “weapons system” is a long way from the old-school Army view of it as a mere utility, a technical convenience the geeks set up in the back room so the real mencan go up front and fight. Why is the network so fundamental, in Fogarty's view? Because, he said, “our ability to operate and defend that network is what gives our commanders the ability to do two things: to see the adversary and see ourselves.” Once again, Fogarty is not talking about using the network to attack, only to “operate and defend.” Nevertheless, he's sounding an awful lot like Sun Tzu: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.” Or as Fogarty put it, with less elegance but more specificity: “In the multi-domain battlespace, not of the future but of today, against peer and near-peer adversaries, whoever has the ability to sense, understand, decide, and act faster than their opponent (will) enjoy decisive advantage.” (He's referring to an updated version of the classic OODA loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, & Act). That requires bringing formerly disparate specialties together in new ways, said Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, the deputy chief of Army staff for intelligence (G-2). “Our primary challenge is one of integration,” he told the AOC forum. “Future forces must integrate SIGINT, electronic warfare, and cyber capabilities to provide situational awareness” — i.e. know yourself, know your enemy — “and enable commanders to deliver kinetic and non-kinetic fires” — i.e. both physical attacks, like missiles, bombs, and shells, and intangible ones, like hacking and jamming. This transition can be intellectually and culturally wrenching, Berrier admitted. “While the tribes have come together, there are still members of the tribes that are a little obstinate,” he said to laughter. For those who don't see the inherent benefits, however, Berrier added, “another reason we're doing it is that the Chief of Staff of the Army told us to do it.” https://breakingdefense.com/2018/07/army-wrestles-with-sigint-vs-ew/

  • US approves $7.5 billion in foreign weapons sales in one day

    7 juillet 2020 | International, Terrestre

    US approves $7.5 billion in foreign weapons sales in one day

    By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — It was a happy Independence Day for American defense companies, with the U.S. State Department announcing Monday it has approved almost $7.5 billion in potential foreign military sales to five different countries. The potential sales, announced on the website of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, involve UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters for Lithuania, E-2D Hawkeye aircraft for France, MV-22 Osprey aircraft for Indonesia, Stryker infantry vehicles for Argentina and aviation fuel for Israel. DSCA announcements mean that the State Department has decided the potential FMS cases meet its standards, but is not a guarantee the sales will to happen in their announced forms. Once approved by Congress, the foreign customer begins to negotiate on price and quantity, both of which can change during the final negotiations. Israel: The biggest price tag, at $3 billion, is 990 million gallons of petroleum-based fuel for Israel, including JP-8 aviation fuel, diesel fuel and unleaded gasoline. Vendors will be selected “using a competitive bid process through Defense Logistics Agency Energy for supply source,” according to the announcement. Israel operates the American-made F-35I Joint Strike Fighter, among other aviation assets. France: The French request to purchase three E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft comes with an estimated price tag of $2 billion. The aircraft is to replace France's legacy E-2C Hawkeye fleet. In addition to the aircraft, the country wants 10 T-56-427A engines, three AN/APY-9 radar assemblies, four AN/ALQ-217 electronic support measure systems and one Joint Mission Planning System, among other technologies. “The E-2D aircraft will continue and expand French naval aviation capabilities and maintain interoperability with U.S. naval forces,” the DSCA announcement read. “As a current E-2C operator, France will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and support into its armed forces.” Primary work will be done at Northrop Grumman's Melbourne, Florida, location. There will be industrial offsets required in the future, but those have not been defined at this point. This is the first DSCA notification of an arms sale to France since at least September 2017, as the country prefers to rely on its domestic arms industry. Indonesia: Indonesia was cleared to spend an estimated $2 billion to buy eight MV-22 Block C Osprey aircraft. Also included are 24 AE 1107C Rolls-Royce engines; 20 each of the AN/AAQ-27 forward-Looking infrared radars, AN/AAR-47 missile warning systems and AN/APR-39 radar warning receivers; and 20 each of the M-240-D 7.64mm machine guns and GAU-21 machine guns, among other gear. The potential sale is announced at a time when the U.S. is seeking to beef up both its presence and the capabilities of partner nations in the Pacific in order to blunt Chinese interests in the region. This is the first DSCA notification of an arms sale to Indonesia since at least September 2017. “This proposed sale will support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of an important regional partner that is a force for political stability, and economic progress in the Asia-Pacific region. It is vital to U.S. national interest to assist Indonesia in developing and maintaining a strong and effective self-defense capability,” the DSCA notification read, adding the sale will “enhance Indonesia's humanitarian and disaster relief capabilities and support amphibious operations.” Primary work will be done by Bell Textron in Amarillo, Texas, and Boeing in Ridley Park, Pennsylvania. Lithuania: The Baltic nation of Lithuania plans to spend $380 million to procure six UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters. The standard U.S. configuration requested includes 14 T700-GE-701D engines, 12 M240H machine guns, night vision goggles, a number of radios and thousands of rounds of ammunition. “The proposed sale of these UH-60 helicopters to Lithuania will significantly increase its capability to provide troop lift, border security, anti-terrorist, medical evacuation, search and rescue, re-supply/external lift, combat support in all weather,” per the DSCA. “These UH-60 helicopters will allow for interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces in rapid response to a variety of missions and quick positioning of troops with minimal helicopter assets. Lithuania intends to use these defense articles and services to modernize and expand its armed forces to provide multi-mission support in its region and combat terrorism threats.” The Black Hawks will replace the nation's Soviet-made Mi-8 fleet. The U.S. is helping fund Lithuania's purchase through the European Recapitalization Incentive Program, or ERIP, a tool developed in 2018 alongside U.S. European Command to speed up the process of getting allied nations off Russian gear. The State Department kicked in $30 million of ERIP funding to help complete that deal. So far, three of the eight countries to receive ERIP funds have used them to purchase Black Hawk helicopters. Work will primarily be done at Sikorsky's Stratford, Connecticut, location and General Electric Aircraft Company in Lynn, Massachusetts. Argentina: The South American nation seeks 27 M1126 Stryker infantry carrier vehicles, with an estimated $100 million price tag. In addition to the vehicles themselves comes a pile of equipment, including 27 M2 Flex .50-caliber machine guns, radios and smoke grenade launchers. In addition, the vehicles come with special de-processing services outside of the continental United States as well as contractor-provided training. “The proposed sale will improve Argentina's capability to meet current and future threats by increasing operational capabilities and force availability,” per DSCA. “Argentina will use the Stryker vehicles to conduct stability operations in support of disaster relief and international peace keeping obligations.” Primary work will occur at the General Dynamics Land Systems facility in Anniston, Alabama. This marks Argentina's second FMS request of the fiscal year, after a December request for $70 million worth of support for its aging P-3C fleet. https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2020/07/06/us-approves-75-billion-in-foreign-weapon-sales-in-one-day

  • Exportations d'armements : l'année fabuleuse de la France en 2021

    7 janvier 2022 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR

    Exportations d'armements : l'année fabuleuse de la France en 2021

    La France a exporté pour environ 28 milliards d'euros en 2021. Un montant jam...

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