19 novembre 2021 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
Contracts for November 18, 2021
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2 décembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
Head of European Defence Agency: EU strategic autonomy is an opportunity, not a threat
By: Jorge Domecq
The European Union's strategic autonomy in defense is on everybody's lips since it was put forward as a long-term goal in the EU's 2016 Global Strategy. Yet, it remains unclear what it means in practice and how it would impact NATO and our trans-Atlantic relationship. This has led to a mostly academic debate about the concept's end goal, fueled by doubts and fears stoked from both sides of the pond. However, the risk of too much abstract talk is that we get distracted from the concrete action needed to bring us closer to, what in my view, is a laudable objective.
It is time we approach strategic autonomy more positively and look at it as a constructive project — not something directed against NATO, the United States or anybody else. It's about putting EU member states in a position where they can autonomously develop, operate, modify and maintain the full spectrum of defense capabilities they need. It's about giving the EU the option and tools — political, operational, technological, industrial — to take military action whenever needed, either together with partners (notably NATO) wherever possible, or separately if necessary.
Instead of undermining trans-Atlantic trust and security, as some fear, a more robust and autonomous European defense will ultimately lead to a stronger NATO. It is in the interest of our trans-Atlantic partners to have a more capable and efficient EU in defense. The U.S. wants Europe to take on its fair share of burden in defense? A stronger and more credible European pillar in NATO will contribute to that.
The EU's ambition, as stated in the 2016 Global Strategy, is to reach “an appropriate level of strategic autonomy” in order to “ensure Europe's ability to safeguard security within and beyond its borders.”
However, it takes more than ambition and political will to get there.
Strategic autonomy presupposes at least two things. First, that our member states' armed forces have at their disposal the full spectrum of military assets that, taken together, could enable the EU to take military action, and on its own if necessary. Second, that the functionality and usability of these assets is not restricted by any technological or political caveats controlled by non-European actors.
Today, admittedly, this is not the case yet. Hence the need to invest more, and better, in defense. The good news is that we are moving in the right direction, both in terms of “more” and “better.”
But more spending does not automatically guarantee more efficiency or interoperability. To achieve that, we must invest better through cooperation: from joint priority setting to the development, procurement and deployment of cutting-edge defense capabilities.
Prioritization is the foundation stone on which all subsequent steps must build. It is already in place: the Capability Development Plan, developed through the European Defence Agency and revised in 2018, lists member states' joint priorities for the years to come. One of them targets cross-domain capabilities that can contribute to strategic autonomy. Using the priorities as a compass will ensure efforts and funding are spent on assets that are really needed and contribute to making the EU more efficient in military terms. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, another new tool to boost joint capability planning and development, will help keep the focus on agreed priorities.
To achieve strategic autonomy, the EU must also be able to master cutting-edge technologies and their integration into defense products. That's why it is so crucial that it acquires, maintains and develops the technological knowledge and industrial manufacturing skills required to produce the defense equipment it needs. Those key strategic activities have to be preserved and strengthened if we want to turn the goal of strategic autonomy into reality.
EDA, which is the EU hub for defense innovation and collaborative capability development, has for years been involved in this critical work. The agency identifies critical, overarching strategic research areas and other key strategic activities underpinning the EU's strategic autonomy. The aim is to identify, and then support, must-have technologies and industrial capacities, without which strategic autonomy isn't possible. Artificial intelligence, micro- and nanotechnologies, or unmanned and autonomous systems are only a few examples of such critical disruptive technologies that are reshaping defense.
It's through concrete action — not political and academic rhetoric — that we can make progress toward strategic autonomy. At the same time, we must ensure coherence and avoid any unnecessary duplication with NATO, which will continue to be the cornerstone of collective defense for its members.
EU strategic autonomy isn't necessarily just around the corner, but it is attainable. The closer we get to it and the more additional defense cooperation it triggers, the better.
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18 mars 2022 | International, Aérospatial
L'Inde commence l'assemblage du prototype de l'AMCA, son avion de combat multi rôle de 5ème génération
L'entreprise d'état indienne HAL (Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd) a annoncé la fabrication du premier bord d'attaque du prototype de l'avion de combat multi rôle indien 5ème génération AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft). Le premier vol est prévu « pour 2024-2025 avec une mise en production début 2030 », selon Air & Cosmos. L'AMCA, d'une masse de 25 tonnes, aura une charge utile interne de 1.5 tonne et une charge utile externe de 5.5 tonnes en addition de 6.5 tonnes de carburant. Il sera disponible en version furtive et non furtive. Concernant ses deux moteurs, ses variantes connaîtront deux étapes : une version MK1 équipée des moteurs GE414 qui équipent le LCA Tejas (génération précédente d'avions de combats indiens), puis une version MK2 équipée d'une motorisation plus puissante (110kN, légèrement en dessous du NGF). « Un accord de collaboration devrait être signé prochainement avec Safran ou Rolls-Royce pour le développement de ce moteur », souligne Air & Cosmos, qui rappelle que Safran a déjà travaillé avec HAL sur le développement du moteur Shakti de son hélicoptère ALH. Air & Cosmos du 18 mars
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3 août 2020 | International, Naval
US Navy prepares major surge of littoral combat ship deployments
By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy is taking major steps in an attempt to shake off years of false starts and setbacks with the Littoral Combat Ship program, an effort Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday said he'd oversee on his watch. In an exclusive interview with Defense News on July 16, Gilday listed LCS as a major priority, saying he will turn up the heat on efforts to get the ship to become a major contributor to fleet operations. “There are things in the near term that I have to deliver, that I'm putting heat on now, and one of them is LCS,” Gilday said. “One part is sustainability and reliability. We know enough about that platform and the problems that we have that plague us with regard to reliability and sustainability, and I need them resolved.” “That requires a campaign plan to get after it and have it reviewed by me frequently enough so that I can be sighted on it. Those platforms have been around since 2008 — we need to get on with it. We've done five deployments since I've been on the job, we're going to ramp that up two-and-a-half times over the next couple of years, but we have got to get after it,” he added. “LCS for me is something, on my watch, I've got to get right.” Gilday's renewed focus on LCS comes after years of fits and starts as the Navy struggled with almost every aspect of the complicated program: from manning and maintaining the hulls, to keeping the gear running or even fielding the sensor suites needed to perform the missions for which they were built. The ship has become a perennial whipping boy for a Congress frustrated by the service's struggle to field new technologies, such as those built into the LCS or the Ford-class aircraft carrier, conceived in the early 2000s. Two of the technologies the Navy has yet to field are the mine-hunting mission module, intended to replace the service's aging minesweepers, and the anti-submarine warfare mission module. Both are years overdue, though they have made significant progress. Getting those fielded is among Gilday's top priorities. “I have to deliver ... both the mine and ASW modules,” Gilday said. “These ships are probably going to [start going] away in the mid-2030s if the [future frigate] FFG(X) build goes as planned. But I need to wring as much as I can out of those ships as quickly as I can.” The LCS program comprises two hulls: a monohull version built in Marinette, Wisconsin, by Lockheed Martin and Fincantieri; and a trimaran version built by Austal USA in Mobile, Alabama. Congress funded 35 of the ships and has commissioned 20 of them, but deploying the ship has been a challenge because of reliability problems with the complicated propulsion systems designed to meet the Navy's 40-knot speed requirement. In 2016, the Navy fundamentally reorganized the program, jettisoning the signature modularity of the program where a single LCS would have a small, permanent crew and switch out anti-surface, anti-submarine or mine-warfare mission packages on the pier depending on the mission. Each mission package would then come with a group of specialists to operate the equipment. After a series of accidents, the Navy sought to simplify the concept; semi-permanently assign mission packages to each hull; and change a complicated three-crews-for-two-LCS-hulls model to a blue-and-gold crewing model used in ballistic missile submarines as a way of boosting operational tempo. The reorg was in response to concerns that the rotational crewing model reduced crew ownership of the vessel, potentially contributing to some of the accidents that plagued the program. One of the major accidents wrecked the then-forward-deployed Fort Worth's combining gear (roughly the same as the clutch on a car) when the crew started up the system without lube oil running. Prior to the Fort Worth accident, the combining gear onboard the Milwaukee encountered problems on the ship's transit from the shipyard to its home base in Florida and had to be towed into Norfolk, Virginia. Mission packages Gilday's goal of fielding the mission modules is well along already, according to two sources familiar with the progress, who spoke to Defense News on condition of anonymity. The mine-warfare mission module is on track for a final test and evaluation by the end of this year, a source with knowledge of the program told Defense News, and the individual components have already passed testing and are in initial low-rate production. End-to-end testing of the mine-warfare mission module is set to begin in fiscal 2021 and is on track to have its initial operating capability declared in 2022, another source said. The status of the ASW mission module, which has been a regular target of Congress-imposed budget cuts, is a little less clear. The next major milestones for the ASW mission package will likely slip to next year due to budget cuts, a source with knowledge of the program said. The mission module has been integrated into the LCS Fort Worth and testing began last fall. It's unclear if the testing will be delayed or interrupted if the Navy is able to carry through its plan to decommission the first four littoral combat ships. For the Independence variant — the trimaran hull — testing for the ASW mission module is slated to be installed on the LCS Kansas City, but there is no fixed date yet, according to a Navy official. Missions Aside from the issues with a buggy propulsion train and the delayed mission modules, Gilday said he was happy with where LCS is with regard to manning, and said the blue-gold crewing was giving him a lot of availability to play with. “I do think we have it about right with manning,” Gilday said. “We were honest with ourselves that the original design wasn't going to do it. I really like the blue-and-gold construct because I get way more [operational availability] than I would with just the single crew. “So I can get these ships out there in numbers doing the low-end stuff in, let's say, 4th Fleet where I wouldn't need a DDG.” The Navy deployed the LCS Detroit to South America — the 4th Fleet area of operations — last year on a counternarcotics mission, and it returned earlier this month. Those are the kinds of missions for which the LCS is perfectly suited, Gilday said. “I can deploy these things with a [law enforcement detachment] and a signals intelligence capability, and I can do that on LCS with carry-on gear,” Gilday said. “It's the right kind of platform for that. Also in 5th Fleet, those maritime security missions that we were heavily sighted on in the late 1990s and early 2000s: They still exist, I'd just prefer to do them with an LCS instead of a DDG if I can.” But without getting more reliability out of the propulsion system, even the low-end missions the Navy wants of the LCS will be a challenge. The heart of the issue seems to lie with long ocean transits, such as the one from San Diego, California, to Singapore, where the ships are supposed to be forward based. Cutting back on that transit, and the wear it puts on the ship, should be core to the Navy's strategy to getting more from LCS, said Bryan Clark, a retired submarine officer and senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. “The propulsion architecture's unreliability means you are going to have to come up with a different way to deploy the ship that doesn't require every deployment to be transoceanic,” Clark said. “By the time the ship gets to Singapore, it needs a lot of work done to it and your deployment time is cut down by the fact that you have to repair the ship once it arrives. Then it has to return to the U.S. So both those trips are so fraught that the Navy ends up devoting a lot of time and resources to it.” One alternative would be to forward-station the ships for a longer period of time than the 16-24 months the Navy envisioned, and place them in Sasebo, Japan, rather than Singapore, Clark said. Sasebo has always been in the cards for LCS as a home for the mine-warfare LCS hulls. When it comes to the delays on the mission modules, Clark said, the Navy should consider fielding those capabilities in the mine-warfare mission module that are already workable, or consider an alternate structure based on the model used by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians. “The other thing they need to do is come up with a way for the mine-warfare capabilities to the degree they are available. And come up with the concept of operations for that, meaning the warfare folks in San Diego would need to come up with concepts for the equipment they do have rather than what they want to have,” he said. As for the ASW mission module, that might be something the Navy will want to revisit, he added. “They need to decide if the ASW mission package is going to be part of LCS,” Clark explained. “The ASW module is the module with the most proven capability in it and is the one that would offer the best improvement in LCS contribution to the fleet. “But it's also the most expensive. And if LCS is not deploying, then why spend the money on it? And with the frigate coming along, it's going to be doing the same missions with the same kind of systems, so why invest in the LCS version?” What is clear is that leadership from the upper echelons of the Navy should help move things along, Clark said. “It's good to hear Gilday is taking it on,” he noted. “But I think part of that is going to be accepting that we're never going to get where we wanted to be on LCS, and accepting second best is probably the best way to get the most from LCS. “You'll have to say: ‘We accept the fact that we're not going to have a full mine-warfare mission module. We accept that we'll have to deploy them forward and eliminate these long transits and ASW is probably out the window.' So it is about making hard choices like that and taking the heat.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/07/31/the-us-navy-is-preparing-a-major-surge-of-lcs-deployments/