Google Patches Yet Another Actively Exploited Chrome Zero-Day Vulnerability

Sur le même sujet

• 

  26 octobre 2018 | International, Terrestre

  Textron buys ground robot manufacturer Howe & Howe

  By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — Textron Systems has announced its intention to purchase Maine-based Howe & Howe Technologies, a developer of robotic land vehicles, in a move Textron says will position the company to be a “global leader” in autonomous systems. The purchase, which does not have an announced price tag, is expected to close in mid-December. It comes as industry around the world eyes the potential military unmanned ground vehicles market as an area for future growth. Howe produces a number of systems in use by the U.S. government, including the small Ripsaw Super Tank and the RS2-H1 SMET, which was down-selected to compete to be the U.S. Army's platoon load-carrying robot. The company also produces a pair of firefighting unmanned systems, the Thermite and Bulldog. While having some experience in the ground-based unmanned sector, Textron Systems has largely focused on UAVs. Hence, adding Howe's ground systems expertise to its portfolio makes economic sense, said Textron Systems head Lisa Atherton in a company statement. She called Howe the “original disruptors in the advanced robotic vehicle space.” “Textron Systems is now positioned to be a global provider of unmanned capabilities across all three domains. We are clear on the U.S. military's vision and their future technology needs for autonomy, robotics and unmanned systems,” she added. “Bringing together Textron Systems' and Howe & Howe's talent, capabilities and proven products will join two of the best, and we are excited at the idea of advancing the industry even further as one team.” Michael Howe, president of Howe & Howe Technologies, added that “the deep experience and forward thinking of Textron Systems, coupled with the innovation and sheer competitiveness of Howe & Howe, will make for a formidable combination. We expect that the whole will be immeasurably greater than the sum of our parts and will be positioned to forge the 21st century world leader in ground robotics and mobility.” The Pentagon set aside $429 million for unmanned ground systems in fiscal 2019, doubling in just two years from $212 million in FY17 and $310 million in FY18. And while explosive ordnance disposal systems still represent the biggest spending from the Army in this arena, it will likely be overtaken by programs such as the Army Common Robotic Systems and Robotic Ground System Advanced Technology Development. https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2018/10/25/textron-buys-ground-robot-manufacturer-howe-howe

• 

  26 septembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre

  Défense : un budget en hausse de 4,5% tourné vers les nouveaux équipements

  Le budget du ministère des Armées va de nouveau croître en 2020, à 37,5 milliards d'euros. C'est un budget qui ne connaît pas la crise, malgré le contexte économique. Le budget du ministère des Armées va de nouveau croître en 2020 à 37,5 milliards d'euros, soit +4,5%, conformément à la loi de programmation militaire 2019-2025 (LPM), permettant d'investir dans de nouveaux équipements militaires. Il s'agit du ministère qui bénéficie de la plus forte hausse des crédits dans le projet de loi de finances (PLF) pour 2020. "L'effort en faveur de la défense, très nécessaire après une dizaine d'années de restrictions très fortes, est assez exceptionnel dans le contexte budgétaire et financier actuel", commentait-on mercredi dans l'entourage de Florence Parly. Les crédits de la mission "Défense" (nouveaux programmes d'armements, défense spatiale, cybersécurité, nouvelle politique de rémunération des militaires) seront augmentés de 1,7 milliard d'euros l'an prochain après deux années consécutives de hausse. Objectif: 2% du PIB d'ici 2025 Hors de ce périmètre, les crédits de la mission "Anciens combattants" baissent quant à eux d'environ 150 millions d'euros. La LPM prévoit que le budget défense bénéficie d'une hausse de 1,7 milliard d'euros par an jusqu'en 2022, avant des "marches" de 3 milliards par an à partir de 2023. En 2020, les dépenses consacrées à la défense atteindront ainsi 1,86 % du PIB français. L'exécutif s'est engagé à y consacrer 2% du PIB d'ici à 2025. "Les engagements sont tenus", se félicitait mardi soir la ministre Florence Parly au micro d'Europe 1. L'an prochain, "deux tiers de cette hausse, soit 1,1 milliard d'euros, seront consacrés à l'accroissement de nos capacités" militaires, souligne-t-on au ministère des Armées. En 2020, dans le cadre du programme Scorpion de renouvellement des capacités de combat terrestre, le ministère prévoit de commander 271 blindés lourds Griffon (destinés à remplacer la flotte vieillissante de véhicules de l'avant blindé - VAB), 364 blindés légers Serval et 42 engins de reconnaissance et de combat Jaguar, comme prévu dans la LPM. Dans la Marine, les sept premiers avions de reconnaissance maritime (AVSIMAR) seront commandés, ainsi que trois avions de guet aérien Hawkeye E2D. L'Armée de l'Air bénéficiera de la rénovation de quatre avions de transport C-130H. Côté livraisons, les armées recevront en 2020 128 blindés Griffon et quatre blindés Jaguar, le premier sous-marin d'attaque (SNA) de type Barracuda, deux hélicoptères NH90, deux avions ATL-2 rénovés, deux Mirage 2000D rénovés, un avion ravitailleur A330 Phénix ainsi que deux avions de transport militaire A400M. Quelque 12 000 nouveaux fusils d'assaut Les militaires français recevront 12 000 nouveaux fusils d'assaut HK-416 (remplaçant du Famas), dont le nombre dans les forces s'élèvera à 41 300 d'ici fin 2020. Côté ressources humaines, quelque 300 postes supplémentaires seront créés dans les armées en 2020 (contre 450 en 2019), dont 150 dédiés au renseignement et une centaine dans la cyber-défense. Dans un souci de fidélisation, le ministère consacrera par ailleurs 40 millions d'euros à des "mesures catégorielles", notamment sous la forme de primes. "L'enjeu est de retenir les militaires, alors que l'on recrute 26 000 personnels par an", explique le cabinet de Florence Parly. Le montant des provisions destinées à financer les opérations extérieures (Sahel, Levant...) sera augmenté l'an prochain à 1,1 milliard d'euros, contre 850 millions en 2019. https://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/actualite-economique/defense-un-budget-en-hausse-de-4-5-tourne-vers-les-nouveaux-equipements_2099727.html

• 

  25 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Four factors to consider in keeping NATO relevant

  By: Hans Binnendijk and Daniel S. Hamilton The NATO alliance survived four years of U.S. President Donald Trump due largely to strong congressional support and clever leadership by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. After the bell ringing and fireworks end in European capitals to welcome President-elect Joe Biden, the alliance will need to realize that it can not go back to business as usual. The world has moved on during those four years and the alliance will need to continue to rejuvenate in order to remain relevant. That rejuvenation process will be enshrined in a new Strategic Concept, which should emerge over the next year or so. Stoltenberg already has a so-called reflection process underway designed to identify key areas where change is needed. Biden's foreign policy team will now weigh in. NATO's rejuvenation might unfold under what we call the “Four Cs.” We should want an alliance that is more coherent, more capable, more comprehensive in scope and with a more co-equal balance of contributions to the common defense. The return of Joe Biden alone will contribute to NATO's coherence, and reverse poisonous trans-Atlantic political relations. But the problem is deeper. Threat perceptions differ markedly across the alliance. There is broad lack of confidence in commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty, including its mutual defense Article V. There is democratic backsliding among several NATO members. Allies are facing off against each other in the Eastern Mediterranean. There are differing attitudes about Russian behavior around the Black and Baltic sea. There are differences about the endgame in Afghanistan. And there are uncertainties of how the alliance should address China's growing security role in Europe and the global commons. The new Strategic Concept will need to enhance coherence by reaffirming common democratic values and recommitting to the common defense. This will be the most important element of a new Strategic Concept. A review of the Strategic Concept can provide a process through which allies can assess mechanisms to uphold their mutual commitment to strengthen their free institutions, avoid straying from agreed democratic practices and prevent allies from confronting each other militarily. Second, the alliance needs to continue its efforts to strengthen its capabilities in two distinct areas: conventional military might and resilience against so-called hybrid or non-kinetic attacks. Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO nations have begun to focus again on a major power competitor. Four NATO battlegroups are forward-deployed to the Baltic states and Poland. A small, very high-readiness force and a larger readiness initiative were undertaken to back up those battalions. A mobilization initiative was designed to make sure ready forces can forward-deploy quickly. But European defense budgets constrained by COVID-19 will put those initiatives in jeopardy. The Strategic Concept will need to prioritize those programs. The alliance must also more methodically address unconventional challenges to human security from Russia such as media disinformation, corrosive cyber operations, supply chain disruptions and energy intimidation. The Strategic Concept needs to design resilience programs so that alliance members can better protect the critical functions of our societies to such disruptive dangers. Next, the scope of NATO's mission needs to be more comprehensive. NATO's core tasks of collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security must be expanded to include countering challenges that contribute to global instability. Those challenges would range from managing global warming and pandemics through the refugee crisis to the rise of China. NATO has recently used its mobility and civil defense assets to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. NATO navies have contributed to saving the lives of refugees at sea. In addition, the consequences of a major ice melt will have a significant security impact in the Arctic, along urban coastlines and on further refugee flows. To remain relevant, NATO must begin to define its role in these areas. Stoltenberg has focused the alliance's attention on China. That nation is increasingly partnering with Russia in the military arena including defense industrial cooperation and joint exercises. It also has invested in European strategic infrastructure, created technology dependencies and used coercive diplomacy to stifle European voices. NATO's expanded role should include reducing those dependencies and developing much closer partnership ties with America's Asian allies. Finally, the new Strategic Concept should result in more co-equal trans-Atlantic distribution of military capabilities and responsibilities. This is less about traditional burden-sharing than it is about responding to two historical trends. Europe's response to the Trump years has been to seek greater strategic autonomy. China's military challenge has American planners focusing on Asia first. Many American friends of Europe are discussing a possible new division of labor, with the United States focusing more on China and European militaries focusing on Russia. This, however, could leave Europe poorly defended and open to coercion. The Strategic Concept will need to divine an elegant solution, perhaps with Europe accepting the responsibility to provide half of the capability needed to defend against a major Russian attack. NATO has remained history's strongest alliance precisely because it has adapted to new strategic conditions. It can do so again. Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and formerly served as the U.S. National Security Council's senior director for defense policy. Daniel S. Hamilton is an Austrian Marshall Plan distinguished fellow and the director of the Global Europe Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/11/24/four-factors-to-consider-in-keeping-nato-relevant/