15 février 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

Germany moves to protect its military-cyber industry

Sebastian Sprenger

MUNICH — A new German strategy document declares defense-related cyber technologies as key national assets, affording the domestic sector some protection from international competition.

Government officials made the move with the publication of a paper this week outlining the types of technology Berlin wants to buy at home, in Europe or from global vendors. The designation of a key technology means the government can sidestep European Union rules requiring public acquisitions be open to companies throughout the bloc.

The areas of artificial intelligence, electronic warfare, networked operations and cryptology, and defense-related information and communications technology are in the category deemed so crucial to national security that the government wants to keep the sector healthy.

“A technological challenge for our security and defense lies in the area of digitalization and artificial intelligence,” read the strategy document, issued by the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.

“Maintaining cybersecurity is the prerequisite for the digital advancement of the state, the economy and society, and it is equally important for the sovereignty of Germany and Europe,” it added.

The new designation of cyber technologies as worthy of special protection sets up a delicate dance between maintaining a national industrial ecosystem while remaining true to the idea of a European Union with a single market.

German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said her agency remains focused on cyber capabilities from a European perspective. For example, officials are working to ensure the relevant U.K. authorities remain plugged into EU networks after Brexit.

The bloc, she said, must increase its cooperation on cyber issues, or risk falling behind China and the United States, Kramp-Karrenbauer said at the Munich Security Conference on Thursday.

Germany's contributions to the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force drives the country's plans for fielding a new information backbone for the land forces of the Bundeswehr, she said. In that context, officials have begun studying new approaches to managing the electricity required to power new communications kit on the battlefield, the minister added.

It remains to be seen how the government will use the new strategy document on key national technologies to make investment decisions, said Matthias Wachter, a defense analyst with the Federation of German Industries, or BDI.

For example, the stated domestic preference in electronic-warfare technology will be put to the test with the Air Force's upcoming buy of new aircraft for electronic warfare, Wachter said. In the running are the Airbus-made Eurofighter as a local option and the Boeing F-18 Growler from the United States.

“There is nothing legally binding” in the new document, the analyst said, which means the decision could go either way. “But if you take the paper seriously, the Growler would be out.”

https://www.fifthdomain.com/smr/munich-security-conference/2020/02/14/germany-moves-to-protect-its-military-cyber-industry/

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  • The Marines want to get rid of their tanks. Here’s why.

    9 avril 2020 | International, Naval, Terrestre

    The Marines want to get rid of their tanks. Here’s why.

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  • Busting The Green Door: Army SIGINT Refocuses On Russia & China

    31 juillet 2018 | International, Terrestre, C4ISR

    Busting The Green Door: Army SIGINT Refocuses On Russia & China

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There is a foundation of success to build on, Army leaders told the Capitol Hill forum, which was organized by the Association of Old Crows, the leading professional association for electronic warfare. Intelligence in general and SIGINT in particular, they said, have gotten better integrated with other Army branches since 9/11 — and especially since 2016. “It has been a remarkable two years,” said Brig. Gen. Jennifer Buckner. Formerly deputy commander of Joint Task Force ARES, which led Cyber Command operations against ISIS, she is now cyber director in Section G-3/5/7 of the Army's Pentagon staff. Increasingly close cooperation between intelligence analysts and tactical commanders, she said, has made it possible “to normalize operations like this so we truly are using the intelligence to inform and enable further targeting.” Ultimately, said the Army's deputy chief of staff for intelligence (G-2), Lt. Gen. 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So to meet this challenge, Berrier said, he recently approved a Signals Intelligence strategy with four main lines of effort: Build a SIGINT force that's responsive to and closely integrated with tactical units, from corps headquarters on down; Apply what SIGINT has learned in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism over the last 17 years to high-intensity warfare; Buy new equipment, ground-based and airborne, that's up to the challenge of great power adversaries; and Develop new doctrine, field manuals and concepts for large-scale combat. Thanks to enthusiastic support from both Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, and recently departed chief of Pacific Command, Adm. Harry Harris, an experimental unit called the Multi-Domain Task Force is already exercising some of these concepts in PACOM. 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But in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the US military was trying to find, target, and capture or kill key insurgents and terrorists, who kept constantly on the move. That meant intelligence on their location had to get to tactical commanders fast, before the target moved again. If you wanted the drone to fire the Hellfire at the right target, or the special operators to kick down the right door, you needed to bust down the green door first. Conversely, once ground troops grabbed a High Value Target, they had to get his cellphone, laptop, and other devices to the intelligence analysts ASAP so his contacts could be tracked down and special operators could go after them before they scattered. The result was a self-reinforcing cycle that generated much more intelligence than you'd get by just passively listening to the enemy. 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But cyber is the newest branch, albeit benefiting from rapid growth and high-level attention, with its offensive capabilities highly secret and tightly restricted. And Army electronic warfare was largely disbanded after the Cold War and remains a small, underfunded force with very little actual hardware beyond short-range jammers to keep roadside bombs from detonating. So while the “green door” between intelligence and operations may have been kicked down, very real barriers remain between intelligence, cyber, and electronic warfare. The CENTCOM Model Central Command — which oversees Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria — has forced intelligence officers and combat commanders to work together in new ways, said Lt. Gen. Stephen Fogarty. This is possible, in part, because intelligence has gotten better at “sanitizing” information so tactical operators can use it without inadvertently revealing intelligence sources and methods, he said. 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National Security Agency SIGINTers — “both civilian and military” — were actually sitting side-by-side with combat officers in Army brigade headquarters and, in some cases, even on company-sized Combat Outposts (COPs), he said. (This is very similar to how the National Reconnaissance Office has operated over the last decade on the battlefield with its Field Representative program.) Now many of the company, battalion, and brigade commanders who grew accustomed to this close support are leading the Army. “The guys who were lieutenants, captains, majors, lieutenant colonels that are now two, three, and four stars today, that's what they expect,” Fogarty said. Of course, what broke down the traditional barriers between intelligence and operations was “the tremendous pressure” of wartime, when US and allied lives were in danger every day. “What we've got to make sure,” Fogarty said, “is we maintain that pressure and that we don't regress to where we were potentially back in the Cold War.” What's New? So what is Army intelligence actually doing to build on the counterterrorist successes of the past and prepare for a great power conflict in the future? Most immediately, the Army is changing how it trains, everything from new schoolhouse courses for officers to new field exercises for entire brigades. When an infantryman or tanker gets promoted to a leadership role, Berrier noted, they attend specialized courses to help them develop a bigger-picture perspective on the battlefield. For their part, intelligence leaders need to go beyond technical training in purely intelligence tasks — as complex and challenging as that is — and learn how to “integrate our highly technical skills into tactical formations” alongside infantry, armor, artillery, aviation, cyber/electronic warfare, and the rest. Intelligence soldiers and officers also need to practice their technical and tactical skills in real-world conditions. That's not easy to arrange. First, the law is far more restrictive of training in the US than operations overseas, especially when it comes to intelligence collection in the vicinity of US citizens. Second, the electromagnetic transmissions SIGINTers need to practice detecting can interfere with civilian electronics, and the Army doesn't want to fight the FCC. Training for electronic warfare, which involves deliberately disrupting signals, is even trickier. The best site for such training in the US, not coincidentally, is the Army Electronic Proving Ground at Fort Huachuca, home of the intelligence branch. Berrier commanded Fort Huachuca until he handed the job over to Maj. Gen. Robert Walters. Since units testing or training there are isolated from civilian population centers by broad deserts and high mountains, Walters told the Capitol Hill forum, “they can turn their jammers on and we don't have planes crashing in Tucson.” Unfortunately, US electronic warriors don't have many jammers to turn on, not yet. (We'll delve into that tomorrow). But at least Army SIGINT systems like Prophet can train at Huachuca on detecting and analyzing real signals. The Army is also trying to replicate or simulate enemy signals at its Combat Training Centers in California, Louisiana, and Germany. Even so, some aspects of high-tech, high-intensity warfare may only be replicable in simulations, Berrier said. The Army's key tool here is a simulator called IEWTPT, the Intelligence Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer. Training to do better with current technology, however, is not enough. Current systems were designed and fielded at a time when the US could operate freely in the electromagnetic spectrum, Berrier said, where the main problem was not enemy activity but inadvertent interference from other US systems (known as “electronic fratricide” or “blue on blue”). Against Russia, China — or anyone who's bought their latest systems — the spectrum will become a battlefield. So the Army needs to develop new equipment designed to withstand hacking, jamming, and other rigors of high-tech combat, like advanced anti-aircraft systems that can shoot down scout planes, drones, and helicopters. Ultimately, the Army envisions multi-purpose systems that can not only detect and analyze enemy signals — the SIGINT function — but also disrupt or subvert those signals — the cyber/electronic warfare functions. That makes a lot of sense, in theory, since cyber/EW needs SIGINT to find its targets in the first place. But it's much more complicated to implement in practice, less because the technology is tricky than because of the intense tribal rivalries within the Army. We'll delve into those divisions and possible solutions in a second article, due out tomorrow. https://breakingdefense.com/2018/07/busting-the-green-door-army-sigint-refocuses-on-russia-china/

  • Italy plans to slash half a billion dollars from defense in 2019

    25 octobre 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Italy plans to slash half a billion dollars from defense in 2019

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