F-35 talks to US Army’s missile command system, says Lockheed

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  7 mai 2020 | International, Naval

  Navy Wants Robot Boats But Will Still Need Sailors To Fix Them

  "We need to find a balance of vehicle designs that enables the cost to be cheap enough that we can afford them, but it's not so highly optimized towards the purely unmanned spectrum that it's cost prohibitive to maintain them." By PAUL MCLEARYon May 06, 2020 at 3:27 PM WASHINGTON: The Navy needs to comb through a host of thorny issues before deploying a new fleet of unmanned ships to confront China, Russia, and Iran. “You don't hear me talking about artificial intelligence and machine learning and things like that just yet,” said Capt. Pete Small, the Navy's program manager for Unmanned Maritime Systems at a C4ISRnet conference this morning. “Those aren't my first concerns. My first concerns are about the field stability and sustainability of these systems right now.” The Navy just isn't equipped to deploy or sustain a new fleet of unmanned vessels yet. “Our infrastructure right now is optimized around manned warships,” Small said. “We're gonna have to shift that infrastructure for how we prepare, deploy, and transit” over large bodies of water before large numbers of unmanned vessels can be effective, he said. It's not clear where that planning stands, but the service has already invested tens of millions in the early work of developing a family of large and medium unmanned vessels, and is looking to vastly ramp that up in the 2021 budget, asking for $580 million for research and development. In 2019 an unmanned Sea Hunter prototype autonomous vessel sailed from San Diego to Hawaii, but it needed to repair several broken systems along the way, forcing sailors to board the ship. It was the first experiment of its kind, one the Navy has not repeated. Those mechanical problems point to work the Navy must do to reconfigure its logistics tail to meet the needs of a new class of ship. “We're going to have to transition from a [system] more optimized around our manned fleet infrastructure to a more distributed mix of these large manned platforms to smaller platforms,” Small said, “we're gonna need to talk about things like, tenders for heavy lift ships, or forward operating bases, things like that.” The early thinking is the service will use the ships as sensors deployed well forward of manned ships and carrier strike groups, which could be at risk if they maneuvered too close to contested waters. But the Navy isn't going to pin everything on a nascent fleet of robot boats — a new class of manned frigates is also being built to operate inside the range of enemy precision weapons. The frigates are going to be smaller and faster than current destroyers, with the ability to generate much more power so they can use lasers and other weapons for both offensive and defensive missions. The Navy is considering several sizes of USVs, including a large variant between 200 and 300 feet in length and having full load displacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000 tons. The ships should be low-cost, and reconfigurable with lots of room capacity for carrying various payloads, including mine hunting and anti-surface warfare. The 2021 budget submission proposes using research and development funding to acquire two more prototypes and another in 2022. Plans then call for buying deployable LUSVs at a rate of two per year. Medium unmanned ships will likely come in at between 45 to 190 feet long, with displacements of roughly 500 tons. The medium ships are thought to skew more toward mission modules revolving around intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance payloads and electronic warfare systems. The first MUSV prototype was funded in 2019, and the Navy wants to fund a second prototype in 2023. Fundamental issues need to be sorted out before the Navy buys one of these ships. “We need to find a balance of vehicle designs that enables the cost to be cheap enough that we can afford them, but it's not so highly optimized towards the purely unmanned spectrum that it's cost prohibitive to maintain them,” Small said. If the maintenance is too complicated and time consuming, and “we have to take the whole vehicle out of the water and take it apart in some explicit manner to replace the parts, it's not gonna really support what we need in the field. So really, the sustainability of the technology is as important — if not more important — in the near-term than the technology itself.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/navy-wants-robot-boats-but-will-still-need-sailors-to-fix-them/

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  11 février 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  German F-35 decision sacrifices NATO capability for Franco-German industrial cooperation

  By: Hans Binnendijk and Jim Townsend While the German decision last week to remove the Lockheed Martin F-35 from consideration as a replacement for 90 aging Tornado fighters solidifies Franco-German industrial cooperation, it could come at the expense of making Germany's Luftwaffe a less capable air force until at least 2040, when a new advanced Franco-German fighter becomes available. The decision also places German domestic political considerations ahead of Germany's leadership role in NATO. This would be understandable for a nation that does not perceive a significant military threat from Russia, but it is disturbing for those who emphasize the need to maximize NATO's deterrent posture in the East. The decision should be reconsidered. After removing the F-35 (and also the older F-15) from consideration, Germany now has three choices. It can augment its planned 177 Eurofighter Typhoon fleet with up to 90 additional Typhoons adapted for suppression of enemy air defense and electronic warfare missions. That fleet of some 267 Typhoons would simplify servicing and training, but it could also ground the entire German fighter fleet should major structural problems appear in the aircraft. The Typhoon has had considerable readiness problems: Germany would be putting all of its fighter eggs in one basket. Germany could alternatively buy 90 Boeing F-18s (Super Hornets and Growlers), which is still under active German consideration. That decision would provide better air-to-ground and electronic-warfare capabilities for Germany than the additional Typhoons. But it would still leave Germany behind without a fifth-generation fighter as other allies move onto the future of air power. Or Germany could buy some mix of additional Typhoons and F-18s. Today, Germany flies no U.S.-built aircraft, and some observers are betting against the F-18 for that reason. These three remaining alternatives are all second best from the perspective of maximizing Germany's air power and its leadership among NATO air forces. Operationally, the F-35 is by far the best airplane in this mix. It has stealth and battle-management capabilities that are a generation ahead of the Typhoon or F-18. It is a force multiplier that enhances the capabilities of lesser allied aircraft. If the Luftwaffe needs to penetrate heavy air defenses in a future fight, their pilots would be more secure in the F-35. The Luftwaffe without F-35s would be hard-pressed to fight alone in a contested air environment. Currently eight NATO nations have agreed to purchase the F-35. Those nations will have highly interoperable fifth-generation aircraft. They will provide for the elite fighters in future NATO air-superiority and defense-suppression missions. Without the F-35, Germany will be absent from that elite group, and German pilots would probably be given only secondary missions. The F-35 also has advantages to perform Germany's NATO nuclear mission. The ability of the F-35 to penetrate and survive these missions is superior. The F-35 would have been nuclear-certified prior to delivery. Certification for the Typhoon and F-18s would take additional time, money and German political capital. The default position, therefore, might be further life extensions for the old Tornados and further degradation of NATO's nuclear deterrence. It is no wonder that the chief of the German Luftwaffe publicly declared his support for the F-35. He was silenced and retired early. So why did German political leaders make this decision? Money alone is not the answer. While the F-35 is a much better plane, its costs are coming down considerably to the point where they would be about as much as a Typhoon. The Typhoon would, of course, have local labor benefits. Nor is availability the answer. Lockheed has told the Germans that they could have their first F-35 three years after a contract is signed. The answer is more political and industrial. The Merkel government rules by grand coalition, with Social Democrats holding key positions in the Federal Foreign Office and the Finance Ministry. The Social Democrats tend to resist greater defense spending and have a more benign view of Russia's intentions. Many resist Germany's nuclear mission. And no one in the coalition wants to reward U.S. President Donald Trump. More important, France and Germany are drawing closer together on defense policy in the wake of Brexit and President Trump's criticisms of NATO. The recently signed Aachen Treaty committed the two nationsto new levels of cooperation in defense and foreign policy. A center piece of this reinforced Franco-German defense cooperation is an agreement reached last summer to jointly design and produce a next-generation fighter by 2040. Dassault and Airbus plan to leverage their current Rafale and Typhoon aircraft as a bridge to this new joint aircraft. Paris fears that a German purchase of the F-35, especially in large numbers, could undercut the need for the next-gen fighter and harm European capabilities to produce advanced fighters. They have let Berlin know this. A strong Franco-German engine at the heart of European defense is to be encouraged. But it should not come at the expense of optimal NATO air power and deterrence. Nor should it come at the expense of broader NATO solidarity. Germany should reconsider its F-35 decision and purchase at least enough F-35s to retain its leadership position in European air power and its familiarity with fifth-generation aircraft technology. Its European allies, who will also be negatively impacted, should weigh in. Failing this, a purchase of the F-18 would be a second-best option. Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and formerly served as the U.S. National Security Council's senior director for defense policy. James Townsend is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and formerly served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/02/08/german-f-35-decision-sacrifices-nato-capability-for-franco-german-industrial-cooperation/

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  8 octobre 2021 | International, Aérospatial

  National Reconnaissance Office opens door for more commercial services

  The new Broad Agency Announcement is designed to help the NRO access and evaluate emerging commercial satellite capabilities.