Estonian robotics company makes inroads with European armies

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  13 septembre 2022 | International, C4ISR

  US Army customizing communication gear for regional challenges

  '€œIt is a big army,'€ said Nicholaus Saacks with PEO C3T. '€œWe have to be prepared to fight in a lot of different places.'€

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  25 juillet 2018 | International, Aérospatial

  Qatar to upgrade air base used by U.S. to fight terrorism

  By Karen DeYoung and Dan Lamothe Qatar will spend $1.8 billion upgrading the major air base used by the United States for its ongoing military and counterterrorism operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf kingdom said Monday. Expansion of the base, which houses about 10,000 U.S. military personnel, will include new family housing facilities for more than 200 officers and other infrastructure enlargements, along with “operational” improvements, Defense Minister Khaled Mohammed al-Attiyah said in an interview. The improvements, to be formally announced at a groundbreaking ceremony Tuesday, were previewed this year in meetings between Attiyah and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. They come as Qatar and its gulf rivals, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are in the midst of a deep regional dispute and competing for closer relations with the United States. Last summer, fresh from a triumphant visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump sided with the Saudis and Emiratis when they broke relations with Qatar and accused it of ties to terrorism.By fall, however, Trump backed off after Mattis and then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that it was unwise to take sides in what was a long-standing rivalry, and reminded him of U.S. military interests in Qatar. Since then, he has repeatedly called on them to mend their differences and offered to mediate. Last April, when Trump hosted a visit by Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, Qatar was described as a “valued partner and longtime friend” that provided “critical support” for operations against the Islamic State. Qatar is also viewed as a major donor to administration plans to provide development assistance to Gaza and the West Bank as part of a still-unrevealed U.S. plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Qatar is a major customer for the U.S. defense industry, including last year's purchase of $12 billion worth of F-15s. “We have bought a lot of military equipment from the U.S. so we can fly hand in hand with our partners,” Attiya said. He dismissed any notion of regional rivalry, saying that Qatar is “not very much interested in rivalry” but rather was interested in “the stability of the region.” According to a background statement from the Qatar government, the contract for 36 F-15 fighter jets “supports 50,000 total jobs and more than 550 suppliers in 42 states.” Other recent purchases include $20 million worth of Javelin guided missiles, $700 million in logistics support services and equipment, and an estimated $200 million in weapons systems “which support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States.” But the centerpiece of U.S.-Qatar ties is Al Udeid Air Base, home to scores of aircraft, including fighters, bombers, tankers and reconnaissance planes. The base is key to U.S. military efforts in the Middle East and has played a central role in the Pentagon's air campaign against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. In addition to the large U.S. troop presence, it is also the headquarters of Air Forces Central Command, headed by a three-star U.S. general, and a combined air operations center from which the Pentagon tracks the maneuvers of aircraft throughout the region. The U.S. military relationship with Qatar expanded rapidly in the 1990s and early part of the 21st century, as the Qataris built Al Udeid and encouraged the United States to use it. The Pentagon moved its air operations center there from Saudi Arabia in 2003, after Riyadh denied the United States permission to use its Prince Sultan Air Base to attack Iraq. Qatar's willingness to let the United States fly bombers from Al Udeid is seen as particularly significant. Other nations in the region do not allowed bombers, but the Pentagon has had a steady rotation of bomber squadrons through the base. A unit of B-1B bombers arrived this spring, replacing B-52s that carried out airstrikes in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria over the previous two years. The U.S. military has spent about $450 million in construction at Al Udeid since 2003, expanding the facility from an expeditionary airfield in which many U.S. troops lived in tents to the more permanent structures there today. Qatar calculates it has spent $8 billion there to support U.S. operations. The U.S. presence at Tuesday's ceremony is expected to be relatively low-level, as defense officials try to distance themselves from the ongoing inter-gulf dispute. Attiya said that Qatar hoped eventually to see Al Udeid declared a permanent American facility. “Of course we would like to see our colleagues and allies permanently staying here with us,” Attiya said. But the main purpose of the expansion, he said, “is that we have men and women away from home and we are trying always to modify and expand, just to make their stay comfortable.” Over the next five years, Qatar is also building two major new “top-of-the-line” naval bases, Attiyah said, both of which would be “able to host our partner the United States if they feel that it is convenient to send their navy as well.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/qatar-to-upgrade-air-base-used-by-us-to-fight-terrorism/2018/07/23/19e04c84-8eb7-11e8-b769-e3fff17f0689_story.html?utm_term=.fbd30fa0a31d

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  11 février 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  German F-35 decision sacrifices NATO capability for Franco-German industrial cooperation

  By: Hans Binnendijk and Jim Townsend While the German decision last week to remove the Lockheed Martin F-35 from consideration as a replacement for 90 aging Tornado fighters solidifies Franco-German industrial cooperation, it could come at the expense of making Germany's Luftwaffe a less capable air force until at least 2040, when a new advanced Franco-German fighter becomes available. The decision also places German domestic political considerations ahead of Germany's leadership role in NATO. This would be understandable for a nation that does not perceive a significant military threat from Russia, but it is disturbing for those who emphasize the need to maximize NATO's deterrent posture in the East. The decision should be reconsidered. After removing the F-35 (and also the older F-15) from consideration, Germany now has three choices. It can augment its planned 177 Eurofighter Typhoon fleet with up to 90 additional Typhoons adapted for suppression of enemy air defense and electronic warfare missions. That fleet of some 267 Typhoons would simplify servicing and training, but it could also ground the entire German fighter fleet should major structural problems appear in the aircraft. The Typhoon has had considerable readiness problems: Germany would be putting all of its fighter eggs in one basket. Germany could alternatively buy 90 Boeing F-18s (Super Hornets and Growlers), which is still under active German consideration. That decision would provide better air-to-ground and electronic-warfare capabilities for Germany than the additional Typhoons. But it would still leave Germany behind without a fifth-generation fighter as other allies move onto the future of air power. Or Germany could buy some mix of additional Typhoons and F-18s. Today, Germany flies no U.S.-built aircraft, and some observers are betting against the F-18 for that reason. These three remaining alternatives are all second best from the perspective of maximizing Germany's air power and its leadership among NATO air forces. Operationally, the F-35 is by far the best airplane in this mix. It has stealth and battle-management capabilities that are a generation ahead of the Typhoon or F-18. It is a force multiplier that enhances the capabilities of lesser allied aircraft. If the Luftwaffe needs to penetrate heavy air defenses in a future fight, their pilots would be more secure in the F-35. The Luftwaffe without F-35s would be hard-pressed to fight alone in a contested air environment. Currently eight NATO nations have agreed to purchase the F-35. Those nations will have highly interoperable fifth-generation aircraft. They will provide for the elite fighters in future NATO air-superiority and defense-suppression missions. Without the F-35, Germany will be absent from that elite group, and German pilots would probably be given only secondary missions. The F-35 also has advantages to perform Germany's NATO nuclear mission. The ability of the F-35 to penetrate and survive these missions is superior. The F-35 would have been nuclear-certified prior to delivery. Certification for the Typhoon and F-18s would take additional time, money and German political capital. The default position, therefore, might be further life extensions for the old Tornados and further degradation of NATO's nuclear deterrence. It is no wonder that the chief of the German Luftwaffe publicly declared his support for the F-35. He was silenced and retired early. So why did German political leaders make this decision? Money alone is not the answer. While the F-35 is a much better plane, its costs are coming down considerably to the point where they would be about as much as a Typhoon. The Typhoon would, of course, have local labor benefits. Nor is availability the answer. Lockheed has told the Germans that they could have their first F-35 three years after a contract is signed. The answer is more political and industrial. The Merkel government rules by grand coalition, with Social Democrats holding key positions in the Federal Foreign Office and the Finance Ministry. The Social Democrats tend to resist greater defense spending and have a more benign view of Russia's intentions. Many resist Germany's nuclear mission. And no one in the coalition wants to reward U.S. President Donald Trump. More important, France and Germany are drawing closer together on defense policy in the wake of Brexit and President Trump's criticisms of NATO. The recently signed Aachen Treaty committed the two nationsto new levels of cooperation in defense and foreign policy. A center piece of this reinforced Franco-German defense cooperation is an agreement reached last summer to jointly design and produce a next-generation fighter by 2040. Dassault and Airbus plan to leverage their current Rafale and Typhoon aircraft as a bridge to this new joint aircraft. Paris fears that a German purchase of the F-35, especially in large numbers, could undercut the need for the next-gen fighter and harm European capabilities to produce advanced fighters. They have let Berlin know this. A strong Franco-German engine at the heart of European defense is to be encouraged. But it should not come at the expense of optimal NATO air power and deterrence. Nor should it come at the expense of broader NATO solidarity. Germany should reconsider its F-35 decision and purchase at least enough F-35s to retain its leadership position in European air power and its familiarity with fifth-generation aircraft technology. Its European allies, who will also be negatively impacted, should weigh in. Failing this, a purchase of the F-18 would be a second-best option. Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and formerly served as the U.S. National Security Council's senior director for defense policy. James Townsend is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and formerly served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/02/08/german-f-35-decision-sacrifices-nato-capability-for-franco-german-industrial-cooperation/