21 juin 2019 | International, Aérospatial

Did F-35 Testing for Extreme Weather Conditions Fall Short?

By Oriana Pawlyk

SALON DU BOURGET, PARIS -- More than 400 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters are operating from 17 bases worldwide. From the near-Arctic region of Ørland, Norway, to a recent deployment in the Middle East, the fifth-generation jet is expanding its reach.

But a recent news report shows that weather conditions have some effect on the Pentagon's stealthy fifth-gen fighter, raising concerns about its performance in extreme climate locations.

In a recent Defense News report series, the outlet obtained documents showing that cold weather triggered a battery sensor in an F-35 Lightning II in Alaska. While the battery was not affected, the weather "overwhelm[ed] the battery heater blanket" that protects it, prompting the sensor to issue a warning and causing the pilot to abort his mission and land immediately, Defense News said.

"We have already developed an update to the software and the battery's heater control system to resolve this issue, and this updated software is available for users today to load on their aircraft in the event they will be conducting extreme cold weather operations," Greg Ulmer, vice president of Lockheed's F-35 aircraft production business, said in an interview with Military.com at the Paris Air Show, adding the update will be in new planes by 2021.

The U.S. military anticipated taking the Lockheed Martin-made F-35 around the world, with partners and allies flying the plane in both hot and cold regions, including some that are changing.

"The [F-22 Raptor] and plenty of other aircraft have flown out [to Alaska] just fine for decades," Rebecca Grant of IRIS Independent Research told Defense News. Grant is a former director of the Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies at the Air Force Association. "The F-35 should have had all that sorted out in the climatic lab."

Ulmer, however, said all necessary steps were taken in lab testing, and the issue identified was a normal part of the design and development process.

"You do the best you can relative to the engineering, understanding of the environment, to design the part. And then you actually perform, and [you realize] your model was off a little bit, so you have to tweak the design ... to account for it," Ulmer said. An F-35A from Hill Air Force Base, Utah, was on static display here during the show.

"We're confident in the F-35s performance in all weather conditions," he said.

The battery issue was first discovered during extreme cold weather testing at -30 degrees and below at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, in February 2018, he added.

Ulmer explained there are various tests points done before the plane heads to the McKinley Lab at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, for robust experiments. The lab is responsible for high-range weather testing of military and commercial aircraft, munitions and weapons.

The lab's refrigeration chamber can go as low as -70 degrees, lab chief Dwayne Bell told Military.com during a visit to the facility in 2017. He said at the time that the F-35 program had been one of the most expensive programs tested in the lab to date. There's a wide range of testing costs, but they average roughly $25,000 a day, he said.

It cost about $7 million to test the Marine Corps' B-model from the Patuxent River Integrated Test Force, Maryland, over a six-month period, Bell said.

The Lightning II was put through major weather testing -- the lab can do everything but lightning strikes and tornadoes -- such as wind, solar radiation, fog, humidity, rain intrusion/ingestion, freezing rain, icing cloud, icing build-up, vortex icing and snow. It handled temperatures ranging from 120 degrees Fahrenheit to -40 degrees, officials said in 2017.

But even testing at McKinley is limiting, Ulmer said.

"What doesn't happen is that they don't stay there a long time, so once we released [Block] 3F [software] capability, now the operational fleet can actually" test new extremes, he said, referring to both speed and temperature changes.

Defense News also found that supersonic speeds caused "bubbling and blistering" on the JSF's low-observable stealth coating, and that hot environments impeded sufficient engine thrust to vertically land the Marine variant.

"So they take it" to new environments "and they expose it more than flight test exposed the airplane. I'm an old flight test guy. You expect to learn in the operational environment more than you do in the [developmental test] environment because you don't necessarily fly the airplane [in that environment] all the time," Ulmer said.

"So we learned a little bit, and you refine the design, and you solve it," he said, adding that the design and maintenance tweaks are ongoing. "The probability of the issue reoccuring on aircraft in the operational fleet is very low and with minimal impact to safety of flight or operational performance."

Thirteen Category 1 deficiencies were found and reported by operators, according to the for-official-use-only documents Defense News obtained. Cat 1 is a label for problems that would directly impact safety or the mission. Those ranged from coating fixes; pressure anomalies in the cockpit that gave pilots ear and sinus pain; and washed-out imagery in the helmet-mounted display, among others.

The Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps each fly a variant of the aircraft designed for different scenarios, from landing on conventional runways on land, to catching arresting cables on aircraft carriers, to landing like a helicopter on amphibious assault ships.

Responding to the Defense News article series, Lockheed Martin said each deficiency "is well understood, already resolved or on a near-term path to resolution."

"We've worked collaboratively with our customers, and we are fully confident in the F-35's performance and the solutions in place to address each of the items identified," the company said in a statement June 12.

Growing pains with new planes and weapons programs are common. But the F-35 program has been under scrutiny since its inception, mainly for cost-effectiveness and functionality. A new estimate suggests that operating and supporting fighters for the next 60-plus years will cost the government $1.196 trillion.

The older F-22 Raptor has had similar issues, especially with its stealth coating, which officials have said is more cumbersome to fix than the F-35, which was built with a more functional and durable coating in mind.

"The [low-observable] system has significantly improved on the F-35 when compared to the F-22," Ulmer said Tuesday. "That's all lessons learned from F-22, applied to F-35."

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/06/20/did-f-35-testing-extreme-weather-conditions-fall-short.html

Sur le même sujet

  • Air Force’s information warfare hub seeks high-tech sensors, AI tools

    19 septembre 2024 | International, Aérospatial

    Air Force’s information warfare hub seeks high-tech sensors, AI tools

    The Air Force’s information warfare organization, 16th Air Force, has been working over the last year to ramp up its sensor and AI capabilities.

  • Will defense budgets remain ‘sticky’ after the COVID-19 pandemic?

    27 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Will defense budgets remain ‘sticky’ after the COVID-19 pandemic?

    By: Eric Lofgren Congress' unprecedented fiscal response to COVID-19 has many in the defense community wondering whether belt tightening will hit the Pentagon. On May 19, the Congressional Progressive Caucus wrote a letter arguing for substantial defense budget cuts to support additional spending on the pandemic. Nonprofit progressive supporters have been asking to cut a much larger $350 billion each year from the Pentagon in their “Moral Budget” proposal. What the progressives perhaps do not fully appreciate is the “stickiness” of defense budgets. In economics, stickiness refers to rigidity in the movement of wages and prices despite broader economic shifts pushing for new equilibrium. The phenomenon is apparent in defense budgets as well. Most expectations are that the fiscal 2021 budget will remain over $700 billion. Consider an analogy: the 2008 financial crisis. Lehman Brothers collapsed just a couple weeks before fiscal year 2009 started, leaving that $666 billion defense budget largely beyond recall. The following years' budgets were $691 billion, $687 billion, $646 billion and then finally in FY13 a more precipitous 10 percent fall to $578 billion. It took four years for the Pentagon to really feel the squeeze of the financial downturn. The uninitiated may believe COVID-19 happened with enough of lead time to affect the FY21 budget. Congress received the president's budget in February 2020 and has until the start of October to make targeted cuts without encountering another continuing resolution. The defense budget, however, represents the culmination of a multiyear process balancing thousands of stakeholder interests. It reflects a vast amount of information processed at every level of the military enterprise. The Pentagon's work on the FY21 budget request started nearly two years ahead of time and includes a register of funding estimates out to FY25. Moreover, defense programs are devised and approved based on life-cycle cost and schedule estimates. Cuts to a thorough plan may flip the analysis of alternatives on its head, recommending pivots to new systems or architectures and upsetting contract performance. Not only are current budgets shaped by many years of planning, but they get detailed to an almost microscopic level. For example, the Army's FY21 research, development, test and evaluation request totaled $12.8 billion, less than 2 percent of the overall Pentagon request. Yet the appropriation identifies 267 program elements decomposing into a staggering 2,883 budget program activity codes averaging less than $10 million each. Congressional staff is too small to understand the implications of many cost, schedule and technical trade-offs. To gather information on impacts, the Pentagon is thrown into a frenzy of fire drills. More draconian measures, like the FY13 sequestration, leading to indiscriminate, across-the-board cuts can sidestep hard questions but comes at a significant cost to efficiency. Targeted cuts at a strategic level, such as to the nuclear recapitalization programs and other big-ticket items, can expect stiff resistance. First, there is real concern about great power competition and the damage that may be wrought by acting on short-term impulses. Second, targeted programs and their contractors will immediately report the estimated number of job losses by district. Before measures can get passed, a coalition of congressional members negatively impacted may oppose the cuts. Resistance is intensified considering the proximity to Election Day. Budget stickiness is built into the political process. The FY22 budget is perhaps the first Pentagon budget that can start inching downward. More than likely, severe cuts aren't in the offing until FY23 or FY24 at the very earliest. That gives time for policymakers to reflect on the scale of the rebalancing between defense and other priorities. In some important ways, congressional control of the Pentagon through many thousands of budget line items restricts its own flexibility. For example, continuing resolutions lock in program funding to the previous year's level until political disagreements can be resolved. The military cannot stick to its own plans, much less start new things. If budget lines were detailed at a higher level, such as by major organization or capability area, then the Pentagon could make more trade-offs while Congress debates. Similarly, if the Pentagon had more budget flexibility, then Congress could more easily cut top lines and allow Pentagon leaders to figure out how to maximize with the constraint during the year of execution. Congress could gain the option to defer the hard questions that can make cuts politically difficult. The Space Force recently released a proposal for consolidating budget line items into higher-level capability areas. It reflects the idea that portfolio-centric management is an efficient method of handling rapid changes in technologies, requirements or financial guidance resulting from economic shocks. Until such reforms are pursued, expect defense budgets to remain sticky. Eric Lofgren is a research fellow at the Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University. He manages a blog and podcast on weapon systems acquisition. He previously served as a senior analyst at Technomics Inc., supporting the U.S. Defense Department's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/26/will-defense-budgets-remain-sticky-after-the-covid-19-pandemic/

  • Mustang Panda Deploys Advanced Malware to Spy on Asia-Pacific Governments

    11 septembre 2024 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Mustang Panda Deploys Advanced Malware to Spy on Asia-Pacific Governments

    Mustang Panda's refined malware tools, including PUBLOAD and PlugX, target APAC governments, escalating cyber espionage.

Toutes les nouvelles