Défense : le battle lab Terre va expérimenter son premier drone armé

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  9 décembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  NATO needs a strategy for emerging and disruptive technologies

  By: Lauren Speranza and Nicholas Nelson The incoming Biden administration is expected to reassert ties with Europe, hoping to leverage America's allies and partners at NATO in the great power competition with China and Russia. As U.S. and European leaders set their collective agenda at the next NATO summit, a top priority should be establishing a NATO framework for emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT). For the United States, it is important that the alliance adapt together to defend against algorithms and bots, as much as bullets and bombs. Europe shares this mindset but differs from the United States on key defense tech issues, such as regulation, data, and stakes in national champion companies. To avoid the dangerous transatlantic rifts of the last four years, Brussels and Washington must bridge that gap and forge an alliance approach to EDT. NATO has acknowledged the need to harness the power of such technologies, but current efforts have produced innovation theater, as opposed to fundamental organizational change. NATO lags behind in critical areas such as 5G, hypersonics, artificial intelligence (AI), unmanned systems, and quantum science. In the past, NATO has used frameworks to get member states to agree on priorities, dedicate resources, and empower authorities to act. Looking to the next NATO summit, transatlantic leaders should champion an EDT framework built around four practical pillars: Establishing an organic assessment and coordination capacity at the strategic level. To fulfill its potential as the transatlantic coordinating tool on the security dimensions of EDT, the alliance needs an in-house capability to assess challenges driven by rapidly evolving technologies. It must examine the advantages and vulnerabilities of adversaries and competitors, as well as gaps in NATO's approach and capabilities. NATO must explore how EDT can be applied to tackle below-threshold threats, enhance defense planning, boost exercises, and support decision-making. Building on ongoing efforts, this should occur at the strategic level of the alliance, fusing civil and military perspectives and data to inform the development and introduction of cutting-edge EDT. It must also include a more robust mechanism for aligning capabilities and gaps across members, key partners, and the European Union. As defense budgets contract amidst the Covid-19 crisis, this approach will maximize return on investment and improve NATO's strategic edge. Seeding the market by improving engagement with industry. A strategic assessment function will not be valuable unless industry leaders are engaged and incentivized. NATO needs to connect to the private sector early and often, clearly communicating its priorities and requirements while providing accessible opportunities for industry, including non-traditionals, to readily sell into the alliance. Too often national and international defense organizations do not provide discernable paths to revenue for these companies, artificially limiting their industrial bases. The long lead times for these projects are often unattractive or unfeasible, especially for small companies and start-ups where radical innovation takes place. To remedy this, the alliance should look to the U.S. Department of Defense, which has succeeded in attracting startups and non-traditionals to its ecosystem through rapid awards, proof-of-concept contracts, and matching venture capital funds that start-ups receive. Enhancing standardization and interoperability by creating a system of systems. To meet the challenges of future warfare, the alliance must be able communicate and operate across militaries, capabilities, and domains. This requires more standardized, secure, and resilient platforms, systems, and infrastructure. NATO needs an EDT strategy for integration, not just innovation. Leading candidates for Biden's Pentagon team have emphasized this priority, supporting a CJADC2 concept – a “network of networks” to ensure reliable command and control. The alliance should leverage CJADC2 as a better framework for standardization and interoperability, paving the way for more complex joint operations. This requires a change in doctrine and a shift away from platforms to create a system of systems. Going forward, NATO needs this same approach to rapidly develop and deploy emerging defense and dual-use technologies for conventional and hybrid conflicts. This involves placing big, transformative bets on critical technologies, such as unmanned air and maritime systems, artificial intelligence (AI), and hypersonics. Coordinate with the EU. NATO should better leverage its ability to assign capability and spending targets to encourage its members to innovate. For instance, to complement the 2 percent of GDP defense spending benchmark, NATO could mandate that allies invest a certain portion of that into emerging technologies. It should also rework the 2 percent metric to include civilian investment in dual-use technologies that may fall outside of traditional defense budgets. Where NATO lacks the capacity to enforce these standards, the European Union brings the legislative and budgetary authority to promote them. NATO and the EU should coordinate research and development, provide seed funding toward these targets, and reinforce them with legal tools where possible. NATO and the EU should also initiate a strategic dialogue to address fundamental issues of tech governance and data sharing. The ability to employ emerging and disruptive technologies more effectively than competitors such as China and Russia will shape the global role of the United States and the transatlantic alliance in the coming decades. NATO has begun to talk the talk, but now it must walk the walk. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2020/12/08/nato-needs-a-strategy-for-emerging-and-disruptive-technologies/

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  23 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Armed with a new Arctic strategy, the Air Force seeks increased connectivity in the region

  By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — With commerce, travel and international competition in the Arctic region on the rise, the Department of the Air Force will prioritize making investments that will enable greater connectivity among U.S. military assets, the Air Force's top general said July 21. “Missile warning, space capabilities, air capabilities, how you marry up fifth generation and fourth generation [fighter jets]. It's more the case as we look at the future of warfare that data will be the currency that we operate on,” said Air Force Gen. Dave Goldfein at a roll out of the department's new Arctic strategy hosted by the Atlantic Council. “It's access to data, its manipulation at the speed of relevance. ... How we build the networks that we can operate seamlessly on is where you're going to see most of our investment,” he said. In the new strategy, the U.S. Air Force and Space Force commit to enhancing its northernmost missile defense capabilities, exploring new surveillance and communications technologies and updating its dilapidated infrastructure in the region. But the strategy doesn't provide specifics on how much the service is willing to spend to make its goals a reality, and Goldfein, Air Force Secretary Barbara Barrett and Chief of Space Operations Gen. John Raymond on Tuesday didn't provide much clarity on whether the department's strategic goals will turn into actionable investments. Although the U.S. Navy has a major interest in the region's waterways, the Department of the Air Force maintains the military's largest presence in the Arctic, making up 80 percent of the Defense Department's funding efforts in the region. “We've always valued the Arctic and recognized the importance of its geostrategic location,” Barrett said. However, she added that Russia's recent build-up in region, including “a network of offensive air assets and coastal missile systems,” has led the department to be more aware of the need to recapitalize its own technology in the Arctic. Meanwhile, China — which is not technically an Arctic nation — is attempting to insert itself in the region's affairs as part of its “One Belt, One Road” initiative. That country seeks access to “rare earth minerals, hydrocarbons, and fisheries,” according to the strategy, and has pursued strategic investments that would enhance its air and sea transportation options, such as a failed plan to build an airport in Greenland. The strategy lays out several goals that could result in greater investments in areas like command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C3ISR), space operations and missile defense. It also states that the Air Force and Space Force will work with the other services on an Arctic communications roadmaps that explores current and emerging technologies that could expand connectivity to military forces in the region. It will also work with the joint force on developing data links and ensuring satellite coverage. For missile defense, the strategy states an interest in “continuing to work with Canada to identify materiel and non-materiel solutions to the North Warning System” and updating the missile defense surveillance system in the Northern tier. The Space Force will “develop new technologies and modernize existing assets in the Arctic necessary to ensure access to and freedom to operate in space,” the strategy states, though it does not explain what types of capabilities will be necessary. It will also develop capabilities that can better predict the weather and environmental disturbances. U.S. Air and Space Force operations in the Arctic will have to become more agile, and could involve “expanded fixed bases, unoccupied airfields, or portable radar systems.” But even though the strategy also recognizes the difficulty of moving to a more modular way of operations given the complex nature of supplying installations in remote areas that may be almost completely inaccessible during the winter months, it provides few answers on what a more disaggregated approach to Arctic operations could look like. The department needs to advocate for additional funding to modernize Air Force and Space Force installations in the region, which include major air bases in Alaska like Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Thule Air Base in Greenland, and remote radar sites that make up the North Warning System, the strategy said. “To survive in the region, materials need to meet standards including: high thermal efficiency; long-term durability; tolerance to repeated freeze and thaw cycles; and resistance to permafrost degradation. Infrastructure in many austere locations, like Thule, Greenland, has deteriorated due to extreme environmental factors,” it said. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/07/21/armed-with-a-new-arctic-strategy-the-air-force-seeks-increased-connectivity-in-the-region/

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  17 juin 2024 | International, C4ISR

  MBDA unveils AI-based Ground Warden tool for finding hidden targets

  MBDA makes a similarly named platform, the Sky Warden, which is a counter-drone system designed to control a large range of sensors and effectors.