Defense Innovation Unit embed to connect INDOPACOM to commercial tech

Sur le même sujet

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  6 mai 2024 | International, Aérospatial

  Lockheed, Maxar ink agreement to enhance F-35 flying simulator

  Doing things digitally can save real-world materiel from wear and tear while also boosting the amount of hours one can practice.

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  26 janvier 2021 | International, Terrestre

  Infantry Squad Vehicle is a cramped ride, but US Army says it meets requirements

  By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army's new Infantry Squad Vehicle is a cramped ride and offers limited protection from certain threats, according to a recent report from the Pentagon's chief weapons tester, but it still meets the service's requirements in tests and evaluations, the product lead told Defense News. The ISV “key requirements are being met and we are increasing soldier operational readiness by providing an operationally relevant vehicle that can transport small tactical units to a dismount point faster and in better physical and mental condition for the fight,” said Steven Herrick, the Army's product lead for ground mobility vehicles within the Program Executive Office Combat Support and Combat Service Support. The vehicle was designed for easy transport to operational environments with the infantry's current rotary and fixed-wing transport platforms. The key performance parameters required that the vehicle's weight not exceed 5,000 pounds and that it fit inside a CH-47 Chinook cargo helicopter. Those requirements “force dimensional requirements only allowing the vehicle to be a certain height, width and length,” he said. The requirements led to a vehicle that makes it hard for soldiers with all their gear needed for a 72-hour mission to comfortably fit inside and be able to access rucksacks on the move. The Army assessed three vendors in developmental testing from December 2019 through January 2020. The service chose General Motors Defense to supply the vehicle to the force, with the company beating out an Oshkosh Defense and Flyer Defense team as well as an SAIC and Polaris team. All offerings were capable of carrying a nine-soldier infantry squad with weapons and equipment during movement, the director of operational test and evaluation said in the report. But the Pentagon also noted the ISV “has not demonstrated the capability to carry the required mission equipment, supplies and water for a unit to sustain itself to cover a range of 300 miles within a 72-hour period.” The Army, however, has assessed the ISV requirement and solution set is in alignment, Herrick said. The DOT&E report, he said, “indicates a desire to include more equipment than a standard nine-soldier squad would carry on a 72-hour mission.” This lack of space, the report stated, “may create a logistics and operational burden” and might limit the type of missions and duration for ISVs. The soldiers that participated in the touch point evaluating the vehicles were asked to bring their Advanced Combat Helmet and Improved Outer Tactical Vest with plates; individual weapon; night vision devices; and ruck with three days' worth of supplies, Herrick said. “All vendors' ISVs are cramped and soldiers cannot reach, stow, and secure equipment as needed, degrading and slowing mission operations,” the report explained. During tests “soldiers on all ISVs could not readily access items in their rucksacks without stopping the movement, dismounting, and removing their rucksacks from the vehicle.” The soldier touch point took into account soldier comfort, visibility and ability to execute the mission, Herrick said. This was all factored into the Army's decision to choose GM Defense's vehicle. “Additionally, no current or planned combat or tactical vehicle allows access to rucksacks while moving to support operator safety,” Herrick noted. “Crew spaces on the ISV are designed to allow mission performance of specific duty tasks.” Units also lacked reliable communication capability, according to the report, using hand-held or manpack radios between 62 and 300 miles. The ISV does not have a mounted radio requirement. “Communication between the squad leader, soldiers, and the platoon leader was intermittent and not reliable,” the report found. Because of the concept of the ISV providing an effective aid to insert soldiers into combat operations, the requirements support just what the soldier carries, so there is no mounted requirement yet, Herrick said. That requirement could be added as a growth capability later. The DOT&E report also noted that the ISV doesn't have an underbody and ballistic survivability requirement, which could mean the unit would be susceptible to certain threats, but the ISV's speed as well as its small, low profile might help deal with those issues. Adding protection to the vehicle would sacrifice the speed the squad needs to rapidly inject itself into operations. Overall, GM Defense's vehicle had the highest reliability among the three vendors, demonstrating 585 mean miles between operational mission failures. The Army's user requirement is 1,200 mean miles for that situation. Herrick noted that reliability and maintainability testing was not scheduled or conducted by Army Test and Evaluation Command or the program office, so the calculations used in the DOT&E report were “not supported by traditional [reliability and maintainability] RAM elements, such as scoring conferences and time for the vendor to implement changes.” The mileage accumulated and referenced in the report was “not meant to evaluate RAM by the Army, but rather to provide the program office and contractor an initial insight on the capability of the system over 500 miles,” Herrick added. The vehicle's RAM testing is scheduled to begin this month, he added.. The service wasn't able to evaluate every aspect of the vehicle before moving into production, but it plans to test the vehicle's ability to be carried by a Chinook during its initial operational test and evaluation this year. Now that the Army has chosen the GM Defense vehicle, it has already initiated developmental testing that will lead to an initial operational test and evaluation in August 2021 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. That testing began in November 2020. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2021/01/25/infantry-squad-vehicle-is-a-cramped-ride-but-army-says-it-meets-requirements/

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  4 décembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  How to take EU-NATO relations from words to action

  By: Jeffrey A. Stacey After the successful 2011 Libya operation, it appeared the U.S. and European allies were on the cusp of a new era of working together on international crises, only to stall out thanks to economic austerity and populist elections. Now that the refugee crisis in Europe is subsiding and allied troops and equipment have deployed to Poland and the Baltics, the window of opportunity has once again opened for deepening relations between the European Union and NATO. By setting up an EU-NATO informal track, regularizing operational transitions and embarking on expanded coordination in out-of-area operations — all of which are more crucial, given a potential Brexit and the 2020 U.S. election — these two crucial, overlapping alliances can step into a new era. There are two logical diplomatic tracks to be pursued: a formal track centered on implementation of EU and NATO ministerials/summits, as well as an informal track centered on working through difficult issues and preparing them for decision-makers. Senior officials from both organizations have commented recently that the informal track would be particularly useful for the kind of deep-dive, “peer around the corner” strategizing that busy officials are rarely afforded an opportunity to engage in. The EU is a global leader in what it calls “crisis management,” and what NATO refers to as “stabilization and reconstruction.” Joint planning ahead of such operations, aligning civil/military planning in advance, will allow for improved outcomes in theater. In general, NATO would gain a new capability to act in the immediate aftermath of its military operations when a crisis occurs, and the EU would gain the opportunity to spearhead joint Western crisis management as a matter of course. Taking a cue from the so-called changing of berets in the 2004 NATO mission in Bosnia — when European soldiers involved in the terminating NATO mission simply changed their uniforms out for EU uniforms and remained in place to take part in the EU follow-on mission — there is a strong likelihood that a similar arrangement can be made for deployed civilians. The EU and NATO have ample reasons to agree to regularize operational leadership transitions in moving from the military phase of a conflict to the post-conflict stabilization phase. Here's how it could work: The EU would be designated to spearhead the stabilization phase, having jointly planned this phase of the operation with NATO civilian planners at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. NATO would commit to always selecting a European as the head of the NATO temporary civilian operation, and would call up a modest number of civilian experts from the nations, who would deploy to theater and engage in a delimited number of core stabilization tasks with the plan for a larger EU-led civilian deployment to absorb the NATO operation. NATO civilian operators would focus on a discrete set of core stabilization tasks awaiting the follow-on EU mission to become more comprehensive. Once a decision to deploy a civilian mission occurs in Brussels, the NATO stabilization mission would devolve to the EU. Most of the civilian experts will already be from EU countries, with the mission head also European. The rest of the NATO civilians can be seconded to the civilian operation mission via framework agreements such as the extant one between the U.S. and the EU that already has seconded Americans to EU missions in Africa. This operational compromise would prevent either alliance from playing second fiddle, ushering in a new era of co-planning and cooperating for both. Why can't both sides “just do it,” i.e., simply enact a leadership transition in theater whenever the need arises? Pragmatism can work in the moment, but it doesn't set precedents, as proven by the fact this is not already happening; past “impromptu” experiences of working together on the ground have not led to any pattern or even expectation of repeat or improved cooperating since. This proposal is firmly in the EU's interests, as it will put it fully in the driver's seat of crisis management and bring the EU the recognition it deserves for its existing capabilities and substantial operational experience. This proposal is also firmly in NATO's interests, for the alliance that almost split over its ongoing Afghanistan operation has no interest in further prolonged field deployments. There is also an additional strategic opportunity for both, as closer EU-NATO cooperation would be an important means for keeping the U.K. connected with its EU partners in the security and defense field following Brexit. But with crises around the world proliferating, in more pressing terms these two critical overlapping alliances among Western allies need to jointly become more operationally ready. Despite the political challenges in numerous Western countries, an agreement to overcome the EU-NATO operational impasse is on the cards. Prior to the negative impact of U.S. President Donald Trump's arrival, NATO-EU relations had been at their pinnacle. With an EU-NATO informal track and a means for overcoming the operational hurdle in hand, substantial progress can still be made prior to the next U.S. administration. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/12/03/how-to-take-eu-nato-relations-from-words-to-action/