22 avril 2020 | International, Naval

Defense Department study calls for cutting 2 of the US Navy’s aircraft carriers

By: David B. Larter

WASHINGTON – An internal Office of the Secretary of Defense assessment calls for the Navy to cut two aircraft carriers from its fleet, freeze the large surface combatant fleet of destroyers and cruisers around current levels and add dozens of unmanned or lightly manned ships to the inventory, according to documents obtained by Defense News.

The study calls for a fleet of nine carriers, down from the current fleet of 11, and for 65 unmanned or lightly manned surface vessels. The study calls for a surface force of between 80 and 90 large surface combatants, and an increase in the number of small surface combatants – between 55 and 70, which is substantially more than the Navy currently operates.

The assessment is part of an ongoing DoD-wide review of Navy force structure and seem to echo what Defense Secretary Mark Esper has been saying for months: the Defense Department wants to begin de-emphasizing aircraft carriers as the centerpiece of the Navy's force projection and put more emphasis on unmanned technologies that can be more easily sacrificed in a conflict and can achieve their missions more affordably.

A DoD spokesperson declined to comment on the force structure assessment.

"We will not comment on a DoD product that is pre-decisional,” said Navy Capt. Brook DeWalt.

The Navy is also working on its own force structure assessment that is slated to be closely aligned with the Marine Corps' stated desire to become more closely integrated with the Navy.

Cutting two aircraft carriers would permanently change the way the Navy approaches presence around the globe and force the service to rethink its model for projecting power across the globe, said Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and analyst with the Telemus Group.

“The deployment models we set – and we're still keeping – were developed around 15 carriers so that would all fall apart,” Hendrix said, referring to standing carrier presence requirements in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific. “This would be reintroducing reality. A move like this would signal a new pattern for the Navy's deployments that moves away from presence and moves towards surge and exercise as a model for carrier employment.”

A surge model would remove standing requirements for carriers and would mean that the regional combatant commanders would get carriers when they are available or when they are needed in an emergency.

With 9 carriers, the Navy would have between six and seven available at any given time with one in its mid-life refueling and overhaul and one or two in significant maintenance periods. The net result would be significantly fewer carrier deployments in each calendar year.

The assessment reducing the overall number of carriers also suggests that the OSD study didn't revamp the Carrier Air Wing to make it more relevant, Hendrix said.

Esper has taken a keen interest in Navy force structure, telling Defense News in March that he had directed the Pentagon's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), along with the Navy, to conduct a series of war games and exercises in the coming months in order to figure out the way forward toward a lighter Navy, but said any major decisions will be based around the completion of a new joint war plan for the whole department, which the secretary said should be finished this summer.

“I think once we go through this process with the future fleet — that'll really be the new foundation, the guiding post,” Esper told Defense News. “It'll give us the general direction we need to go, and I think that'll be a big game changer in terms of future fleet, for structure, for the Navy and Marine Corps team.”

When it comes to carriers, Esper said he saw a lot of value in keeping carriers in the force structure, and that it wasn't going to be an all-or-nothing decision.

“This discussion often comes down to a binary: Is it zero or 12?” Esper said. “First of all, I don't know. I think carriers are very important. I think they demonstrate American power, American prestige. They get people's attention. They are a great deterrent. They give us great capability.”

Revamped Surface Fleet

The OSD assessment also calls for essentially freezing the size of the large surface combatant fleet. There are about 90 cruisers and destroyers in the fleet: the study recommended retaining at least 80 but keeping about as many as the Navy currently operates at the high end.

The Navy's small surface combatant program is essentially the 20 littoral combat ships in commission today, with another 15 under contract, as well as the 20 next-generation frigates, which would get to the minimum number in the assessment of 55 small combatants, with the additional 15 presumably being more frigates.

The big change comes in the small unmanned or lightly manned surface combatants. In his interview with Defense News, Esper said the Navy needed to focus integrating those technologies into the fleet.

“What we have to tease out is, what does that future fleet look like?” Esper said. “I think one of the ways you get there quickly is moving toward lightly manned [ships], which over time can be unmanned.

“We can go with lightly manned ships, get them out there. You can build them so they're optionally manned and then, depending on the scenario or the technology, at some point in time they can go unmanned.

“To me that's where we need to push. We need to push much more aggressively. That would allow us to get our numbers up quickly, and I believe that we can get to 355, if not higher, by 2030.”

The Navy is currently developing a family of unmanned surface vessels that are intended to increase the offensive punch for less money, while increasing the number of targets the Chinese military would have to locate in a fight.

That's a push that earned the endorsement of the Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday in comments late last year.

“I know that the future fleet has to include a mix of unmanned,” Gilday said. “We can't continue to wrap $2 billion ships around 96 missile tubes in the numbers we need to fight in a distributed way, against a potential adversary that is producing capability and platforms at a very high rate of speed. We have to change the way we are thinking.”

Aaron Mehta contributed to this report from Washington.

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/04/20/defense-department-study-calls-for-cutting-2-of-the-us-navys-aircraft-carriers/

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  • Budget and pandemic present challenges to Russia’s defense industrial base

    17 août 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Budget and pandemic present challenges to Russia’s defense industrial base

    By: Fenella McGerty The two Russian defense companies in this year's Top 100 list — air defense missile systems manufacturer Almaz-Antey and weapons developer Tactical Missiles Corporation JSC — have again fallen in rank. Almaz-Antey has fallen to 17th place from 8th and 15th in 2018 and 2019 respectively. Similarly, Tactical Missiles Corporation JSC has fallen to 35th place from 25th and 32nd in 2018 and 2019 respectively. The falling revenues of the companies this year reflect the difficult market conditions these enterprises are operating in as a result of the impact of COVID-19 on government budgets. Even before the pandemic and the consequent contraction in economic output emerged, the outlook for Russian defense spending was already subdued in light of persistently low oil prices in 2019. Domestic spending was further constrained this year as the oil price fell below $20 per barrel in April, with the projected average price for the year reaching just $40 per barrel. The International Monetary Fund forecasts a 6.6 percent contraction in Russia's real gross domestic product this year as lockdown measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 subdued domestic and international economic activity, the latter further weakening global energy demand. The 4.1 percent growth projected for 2021 means the Russian economy will only return to pre-pandemic output in 2022. Last month, as part of wider measures to offset the bleaker fiscal setting, the Russian Ministry of Finance proposed a 5 percent reduction in financing for the state armament program over the next three years. Under the new plans, the 20 trillion rouble (U.S. $271 billion), 10-year military appropriations program (known as GPV 2027) that runs to 2027 covering defense procurement, repairs, research and development, and infrastructure investment will be reduced by a total of 225 billion roubles between 2021 and 2023. Wider defense funding could be reduced by as much 323 billion roubles. The previous state armament program (GPV 2020) saw significant increases enacted to defense investment between 2011 and 2016 as the country pursued ambitious modernization targets. As a proportion of GDP, the official Russian defense budget peaked in 2015 at 3.8 percent. If one includes wider defense spending items such as military pensions, social support and housing, total Russia expenditure accounted for as much at 4.8 percent of GDP that year. This period of significant defense investment helped to recover some lost ground from the previous two decades. Progress was remarkable but by no means comprehensive, with strategic nuclear forces and defense aerospace surpassing modernization targets, while maritime and land forces fared less well. Pockets of advanced capability — e.g., air defense, weapons, combat aircraft — evolved alongside less efficient entities that failed to deliver against the ambitions of GPV 2020. Nonetheless, as Russia approached the overarching target of 70 percent “modern” equipment within the armed forces inventory, defense spending increases slowed and the country moved from a period of dramatic capability buildup toward a sustainment phase — a move further presaged by wider economic constraints at the time As such, GPV 2027 is less ambitious than GPV 2020, and annual defense budget allocations have reflected this. Russian defense spending has been stagnant in real terms since 2017, as sanctions impacted government finances, energy revenues remained subdued and modernization ambitions were deemed close to fulfillment. Official projections of the budget for national defense saw slightly stronger growth in 2021 and 2022, although this was proposed in the months before the full economic ramifications of the pandemic were realized. Russian companies therefore face a tighter domestic market — as indeed will most countries in the wake of the pandemic — while the burden of debt has stifled investment in new technologies and R&D. This lack of funds to invest in research has created a further challenge for companies facing increasing political pressure domestically to diversify production efforts toward the civil market. The reported moves to restructure defense industry debt will ease some of the stress on companies and provide some temporary bandwidth with which to focus on investment. However, such moves will further constrain domestic defense spending, as funds to absolve debt will inevitably squeeze investment elsewhere in the budget. Perhaps on the positive side, the further weakening of the rouble against the dollar in 2020 has the potential to provide Russian defense equipment with an added price advantage in global defense markets and to facilitate exports. The comparatively cheaper kit will appeal to countries that find they have less investment funds at their disposal than a year ago. As competition in export markets intensifies and funding tightens, buyers may find they can demand greater industrial participation, partnership and technology transfer in moves to bolster self-sufficiency and resilience. Markets which have previously shown preference for Western equipment may find such capabilities are no longer affordable with Russia's relative willingness to offer favorable exchange rate agreements and flexible financing terms, offering a further advantage in constrained export markets. Fenella McGerty is a senior fellow for defense economics at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/08/17/budget-and-pandemic-present-challenges-to-russias-defense-industrial-base

  • Lockheed Martin is Waging War on Boeing’s F-15EX

    20 mars 2019 | International, Aérospatial

    Lockheed Martin is Waging War on Boeing’s F-15EX

    BY MARCUS WEISGERBER The F-35 makers sees the Pentagon's plans to buy new F-15s for the first time in 19 years as a threat. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has reportedly been racking up kills against older warplanes during U.S. military drills in Nevada — even the F-15, whose record in real combat is a flawless 104 to zero. Now the two jets are heading into a fierce dogfight, one that doesn't involve missiles or guns. The battle between Lockheed Martin's F-35 and Boeing's F-15EX is being fought by lobbyists in and around Congress, which is beginning to review the Pentagon's fiscal 2020 budget request. Tens of billions of dollars are up for grabs over the coming decade. This week, Pentagon officials proposed buying new F-15s for the first time since 2001, even though top Air Force officials have said as recently as two weeks ago that they didn't necessarily want the the planes. For nearly two decades, Air Force officials have argued against buying so-called fourth-generation planes, preferring for stealthier fifth-generation planes with newer technology. The proposed F-15 purchase is rather small: eight jets in 2020 and a total of 80 through 2024. By comparison, the Pentagon wants to buy 78 F-35s in 2020, with 48 going to the Air Force. SUBSCRIBE Receive daily email updates: Subscribe to the Defense One daily. Be the first to receive updates. But Pentagon budget documents also signal that the Air Force could buy hundreds of F-15s over the next decade. A tranche of 144 planes would “initially refresh” squadrons that fly Cold War-era F-15C Eagles designed for air-to-air combat. And the plane has the “potential to refresh the remainder of the F-15C/D fleet and the F-15E fleet.” In all, that's more than 400 planes. That was enough to draw a full-court press from Lockheed. One day after that announcement, company officials began circulating a three-page white paper detailing the “F-35's decisive edge” over unnamed fourth-generation warplanes. Defense One reviewed the white paper. Lockheed's arguments boil down to bang-for-the-buck: The F-35 will cost about the same or less than the F-15 soon (the long-criticized price has in fact been coming down), its operating costs will be less than the F-15's within six years, and it can fly a more diverse set of missions. Boeing's argument: The F-35 was never intended to replace the air-to-air F-15C — but the F-15EXcould do so while expanding those squadrons' capabilities. Pilots would not need to extensive training to fly the jet, which could carry heavy loads of weapons, plus Eagle bases would not need major infrastructure upgrades. And the new F-15EX is multirole, similar to the F-15E Strike Eagle, meaning that it could strike targets in the air, on the ground or at sea. Boeing has been pitching new F-15s to the Air Force on and off for more than a decade, most recently offering a similar version of the plane it builds for Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The latest effort started to pick up steam last summer. The idea was embraced within parts of the Air Force, but not by top Air Force leaders. Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson acknowledged on Feb. 28 that the planes were not in the service's initial budget plans. But analysis by the Joint Staff and Pentagon Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office “on the kinds of capabilities that we require in the aviation realm” led officials to recommend buying the F-15EX, a senior defense official said. Elaine McCusker, the Pentagon deputy comptroller, said Tuesday that former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis made the decision to include the F-15EX in the Defense Department's budget request. “The F-35 remains a critical program for the joint force as we look to the future and the kinds of capabilities we require,” Lt. Gen. Anthony Ierardi, director of force structure, resources and assessment on the Joint Staff, said Tuesday. “The F-15EX provides additional capacity and readiness, especially in the near years to mid years, as we look at the threats and the kinds of combat potential that we needed to bring to bear.” Whether Congress agrees with that rationale is yet to be seen. In February, five Republican senators — all with ties to Lockheed F-35 manufacturing work or F-35 bases — sent a letter to President Trump in opposition of the F-15EX. “We are extremely concerned that, over the last few years, the DoD has underfunded the F-35 Program and relied on Congress to fund increases in production, sustainment, and modernization,” they group led by Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, wrote. “In order to meet the overmatch and lethality goals laid out in the National Security Strategy, the DoD needs to make these investments in the F-35 to affordably deliver and operate this fifth-generation fighter fleet. The F-35 is the most affordable, lethal, and survivable air dominance fighter, and now is the time to double down on the program.” The 2020 budget request includes $11.2 billion to buy 78 F-35s — 48, which would be Air Force jets. That money would also go toward improving jets already built. Lawmakers have routinely added F-35s to the Pentagon's request. For instance, last year they added 16 planes to the 77 requested by the Defense Department. The 2020 budget request includes $1.1 billion for the eight F-15EX jets. Some of that money would go toward standing up the production line. 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  • The key to securing the defense industrial base is collaboration

    16 juillet 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

    The key to securing the defense industrial base is collaboration

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