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  22 janvier 2020 | International, Naval

  Industry protest ensnares Germany’s multibillion-dollar combat ship

  By: Sebastian Sprenger COLOGNE, Germany — The losing bidder for Germany's MKS 180 large-frigate program has filed a protest against the government's pick of Dutch shipyard Damen for the $6.7 billion job. German Naval Yards, based in Kiel, Germany, on Monday said it had “serious doubts about the legality of the decision” and would “exhaust all legal possibilities at our disposal” to have the decision overturned. The Defence Ministry announced Jan. 13 it selected Damen to build an initial four copies of the new multipurpose combat ships. The pick capped a source-selection process that had become controversial because the government decided to compete the project throughout the European Union. The strategy followed the bloc's principle of a unified market, but it left the domestic shipbuilding lobby miffed. The protest by German Naval Yards and its bid partner ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems kicks off a dispute process that begins with the Defence Ministry reviewing the complaint and then, if it remains unresolved, could wind its way through the German court system. There is no telling how long the process will take — some protests get resolved within weeks, but the process can take a year or longer. The Defence Ministry is expected to offer an indication later this month on whether its attorneys believe the Damen pick can withstand legal scrutiny. Damen has said it wants to build the ships at the shipyards of its German bid partner Lürssen, vowing to invest 80 percent of the contract's value in Germany. The protest comes at a time when Berlin is adopting a new policy that grants an exception to the EU competition mandate when national security is at stake. Specifically, the construction of surface warships would be designated as a “key technology area” so worthy of protection that future programs would be automatically awarded to German manufacturers. For that to be the case, however, two political initiatives have yet to play out: The German parliament must approve a revision of national source-selection rules from October 2019, which formally enable EU acquisition exceptions on national security grounds. In addition, the Cabinet has to greenlight a draft strategy document on nurturing domestic security- and defense-related industries, currently in interagency review, that confers the rank of “key technology area” to naval surface combatants. The strategy document, overseen by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, is expected to be ready for Cabinet consideration within weeks, as Defense News reported last week. Legal experts said the “key technology” debate has no immediate bearing on the German Naval Yards protest. At the same time, it is possible that the complaint's resolution, whichever way it goes, will come at a time when a domestic award preference for similar contracts is already in effect. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/01/21/industry-protest-ensnares-germanys-multibillion-dollar-combat-ship/

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  11 février 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  German F-35 decision sacrifices NATO capability for Franco-German industrial cooperation

  By: Hans Binnendijk and Jim Townsend While the German decision last week to remove the Lockheed Martin F-35 from consideration as a replacement for 90 aging Tornado fighters solidifies Franco-German industrial cooperation, it could come at the expense of making Germany's Luftwaffe a less capable air force until at least 2040, when a new advanced Franco-German fighter becomes available. The decision also places German domestic political considerations ahead of Germany's leadership role in NATO. This would be understandable for a nation that does not perceive a significant military threat from Russia, but it is disturbing for those who emphasize the need to maximize NATO's deterrent posture in the East. The decision should be reconsidered. After removing the F-35 (and also the older F-15) from consideration, Germany now has three choices. It can augment its planned 177 Eurofighter Typhoon fleet with up to 90 additional Typhoons adapted for suppression of enemy air defense and electronic warfare missions. That fleet of some 267 Typhoons would simplify servicing and training, but it could also ground the entire German fighter fleet should major structural problems appear in the aircraft. The Typhoon has had considerable readiness problems: Germany would be putting all of its fighter eggs in one basket. Germany could alternatively buy 90 Boeing F-18s (Super Hornets and Growlers), which is still under active German consideration. That decision would provide better air-to-ground and electronic-warfare capabilities for Germany than the additional Typhoons. But it would still leave Germany behind without a fifth-generation fighter as other allies move onto the future of air power. Or Germany could buy some mix of additional Typhoons and F-18s. Today, Germany flies no U.S.-built aircraft, and some observers are betting against the F-18 for that reason. These three remaining alternatives are all second best from the perspective of maximizing Germany's air power and its leadership among NATO air forces. Operationally, the F-35 is by far the best airplane in this mix. It has stealth and battle-management capabilities that are a generation ahead of the Typhoon or F-18. It is a force multiplier that enhances the capabilities of lesser allied aircraft. If the Luftwaffe needs to penetrate heavy air defenses in a future fight, their pilots would be more secure in the F-35. The Luftwaffe without F-35s would be hard-pressed to fight alone in a contested air environment. Currently eight NATO nations have agreed to purchase the F-35. Those nations will have highly interoperable fifth-generation aircraft. They will provide for the elite fighters in future NATO air-superiority and defense-suppression missions. Without the F-35, Germany will be absent from that elite group, and German pilots would probably be given only secondary missions. The F-35 also has advantages to perform Germany's NATO nuclear mission. The ability of the F-35 to penetrate and survive these missions is superior. The F-35 would have been nuclear-certified prior to delivery. Certification for the Typhoon and F-18s would take additional time, money and German political capital. The default position, therefore, might be further life extensions for the old Tornados and further degradation of NATO's nuclear deterrence. It is no wonder that the chief of the German Luftwaffe publicly declared his support for the F-35. He was silenced and retired early. So why did German political leaders make this decision? Money alone is not the answer. While the F-35 is a much better plane, its costs are coming down considerably to the point where they would be about as much as a Typhoon. The Typhoon would, of course, have local labor benefits. Nor is availability the answer. Lockheed has told the Germans that they could have their first F-35 three years after a contract is signed. The answer is more political and industrial. The Merkel government rules by grand coalition, with Social Democrats holding key positions in the Federal Foreign Office and the Finance Ministry. The Social Democrats tend to resist greater defense spending and have a more benign view of Russia's intentions. Many resist Germany's nuclear mission. And no one in the coalition wants to reward U.S. President Donald Trump. More important, France and Germany are drawing closer together on defense policy in the wake of Brexit and President Trump's criticisms of NATO. The recently signed Aachen Treaty committed the two nationsto new levels of cooperation in defense and foreign policy. A center piece of this reinforced Franco-German defense cooperation is an agreement reached last summer to jointly design and produce a next-generation fighter by 2040. Dassault and Airbus plan to leverage their current Rafale and Typhoon aircraft as a bridge to this new joint aircraft. Paris fears that a German purchase of the F-35, especially in large numbers, could undercut the need for the next-gen fighter and harm European capabilities to produce advanced fighters. They have let Berlin know this. A strong Franco-German engine at the heart of European defense is to be encouraged. But it should not come at the expense of optimal NATO air power and deterrence. Nor should it come at the expense of broader NATO solidarity. Germany should reconsider its F-35 decision and purchase at least enough F-35s to retain its leadership position in European air power and its familiarity with fifth-generation aircraft technology. Its European allies, who will also be negatively impacted, should weigh in. Failing this, a purchase of the F-18 would be a second-best option. Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and formerly served as the U.S. National Security Council's senior director for defense policy. James Townsend is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and formerly served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/02/08/german-f-35-decision-sacrifices-nato-capability-for-franco-german-industrial-cooperation/

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  25 novembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  Lockheed And Pentagon Joust Over Lucrative F-35 Data Rights

  Steve Trimble, Lee Hudson and Michael Bruno An ongoing legal dispute between the U.S. government and Lockheed Martin over intellectual property (IP) rights in the F-35 program has emerged as the source of a 2.5-year delay in activating a key system required to complete initial operational testing and the full-rate production decision. Involving the Pentagon's largest single weapons program ever—and with full-rate production critical to Lockheed's long-term profitability—the dispute has waylaid progress for both sides. But not only is the matter holding up the program, it may set a precedent for the military's increasing reliance on software and the government's desire to reap data-based rewards. “We still do have concerns,” says U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Eric Fick, F-35 program executive officer. “We don't need all the data, but the data that we need, it's important that we pursue it.” “We also have fundamental standards that we need to set down so that it is very, very clear,” adds Ellen Lord, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment. The military's open-air test ranges lack the capacity to fully test the F-35's advanced capabilities, so the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) office is relying on the activation of the Joint Simulation Environment (JSE). The JSE creates a synthetic world that allows operational testers to gauge the F-35's performance in theater-level scenarios, with multiple aircraft flying against an adversary's full arsenal of fighters, missiles and electronic warfare capabilities. The JSE was supposed to be activated in late 2017 but now is scheduled to achieve the first-use milestone in July 2020, Robert Behler, the head of DOT&E, told lawmakers Nov. 13 during a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing on F-35 readiness. The DOT&E has completed 91% of open-air missions during the Initial Operational Test & Evaluation phase required to qualify the F-35 for a full-rate production decision, but the testers still need to use the JSE to complete all of the testing. According to Fick's testimony, the IP dispute has delayed activation of the JSE. The JSE requires Lockheed to supply the software to enable a function nicknamed “F-35 in a Box,” he says. This is a software module that allows the JSE to virtually replicate each of the F-35's sensor subsystems, along with the sensor fusion brain embedded in the operational flight program. The government would then add software modules to replicate various threats, including aircraft, weapons and sensors of various adversaries. A dispute arose because Lockheed asserted an IP claim over nine specific algorithms that were included in the “F-35 in a Box” software package, the general says. The program office responded by bringing in the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to review Lockheed's records. The DCAA's auditors determined they could not find the proof in Lockheed's records that the nine algorithms had been developed solely at Lockheed's expense. Since Lockheed failed to prove its claim, the DCAA determined the nine algorithms belonged to the government. Lockheed has appealed the DCAA's decision to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, where it is still being adjudicated, the general told lawmakers. The dispute over the JSE feeds into a larger source of tension between the government and contractors over IP rights. Lord testified that her office is in the final stages of approving a new, Pentagon-wide policy on preserving the government's rights to IP in acquisition contracts. The policy will be modeled on an approach adopted late last year by the Army, which requires program managers to establish the government's IP rights on specific systems up front, rather than treat the issue as an afterthought. “Before we put together an acquisition strategy, you have to think about what information is critical to a program, particularly in terms of sustainability, so that you're not always held hostage to the prime on that through the life of the contract and [so] that you can find better cost solutions through a variety of different providers,” she said. Still, the new approach could challenge the business models of prime contractors and suppliers, who traditionally have eaten costs up front or bid low to win weapons contracts, with the intent of making money in the two-thirds of the life cycle of the program that includes sustainment. At an Aviation Week defense conference years ago, defense executives were asked to address the idea of giving up IP rights to the government and were determined to resist. “No!” yelled one executive in the closed-door gathering. Indeed, the new policy—which will not require explicit congressional blessing, as it is internal rulemaking—still faces questions by industry lobbying groups, including the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA). John Luddy, AIA's vice president for national security policy, said IP policymaking is “probably the most important” issue currently between his trade lobby group and defense leaders. Industry is not yet behind the emerging Pentagon policy, he indicated during the ComDef 2019 conference in October, because it does not strike the proper “balance,” in industry's view, to allow it to reap profits while letting the government contract to sustain weapon systems more affordably. “We think [it] is headed toward the right kind of balance, but I would just encourage that to continue—we're engaged quite a bit with the department on that,” Luddy said. “We have to find that balance.” Diana Maurer, director of defense capabilities and management at the Government Accountability Office, noted that her auditing office flagged the IP issue in 2014 and is happy to see the Pentagon make progress on the issue. But the changing nature of warfare systems means the issue will likely only grow. “Weapon systems today are essentially flying or sailing or moving pieces of software, and the intellectual property is an important piece of that.” https://aviationweek.com/defense/lockheed-and-pentagon-joust-over-lucrative-f-35-data-rights