8 novembre 2018 | International, Aérospatial
By: Burak Ege Bekdil
ANKARA — The Turkish government has launched a competition to buy hundreds of multi-rotor micro drones, with scores of local companies having already expressed interest.
SSB, Turkey's procurement authority, has said that the planned drones would be used in homeland security missions like search and rescue, surveillance and reconnaissance, remote sensing and mapping. An SSB official said all drone programs come with a “priority” tag.
Under the multi-rotor micro drone program, SSB will procure a total of 499 units. Twenty-two companies have replied to SSB's Request for Proposal (RfP).
“The level of interest [in the contract] and potential competition during the race reflects the vibrancy of Turkey's fast-growing drone industry,” said Özgür Ekşi, an analyst with C4Defense.com, a defense industry specialist. “Especially when you think that only a decade ago there was not a single drone maker in the country.”
Turkey has long prioritized developmental and operation of unmanned systems for its military and for export. The Turkish military was largely dependent on the Israeli-made Heron unmanned aerial vehicles in its fight with Kurdish insurgents in early 2000s when the government-controlled Tusas Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) started working on the Anka, Turkey's first indigenous drone. In 2013 TAI won a contract from the Turkish government to supply 10 Ankas and ground control stations. The Anka, a medium-altitude, long-endurance drone, can fly at an altitude of 30,000 feet for 24 hours and can carry up to 200 kg payload.
TAI later developed the armed and satellite-controlled versions of the Anka as the country's dependency on drones in its asymmetrical warfare against Kurdish insurgency deepened.
The Anka has paved the way for the entry into the market of private sector players. Kale-Baykar, a consortium, has successfully developed the Bayraktar TB-2, a drone system that comes in unarmed and armed versions, and delivered to the military six systems in 2017.
The Bayraktar uses the MAM-L and MAM-C, two mini smart munitions developed and produced by state-controlled missile specialist Roketsan. Turkey's local industry also is developing BSI-101, a SIGINT system, for the Bayraktar to end Turkey's dependence on U.S.-made SIGINT systems for drones.
The Bayraktar can fly at a maximum altitude of 24,000 feet. Its communications range is 150 kilometers. The aircraft can carry up to 55 kilograms of payload.
“We encourage private companies to spend more on drone R&D and come up with solutions cut for our specific (mostly asymmetrical) requirements,” said one procurement official. “there is a lot of activity going on and the market will deepen in quantity and quality in the years ahead.”
Ekşi from C4Defence.com said: “Twenty-two local bidders in a relatively small drone competition is a sign that the market, infant by age, will flourish soon.”
10 juin 2022 | International, Terrestre
The House advanced legislation on Thursday that would require the Defense Department to set up a pilot program that would transition entire nontactical vehicle fleets at certain installations to electric vehicles.
14 janvier 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval
by Michael Peck “The Navy continues to struggle with rebuilding the readiness of the existing fleet due to enduring maintenance and manning challenges,” the report finds. “As the Navy seeks to expand its fleet by 25 percent, these challenges will likely be further exacerbated and the Navy will likely face additional affordability challenges.” The Navy must fix the teething troubles of a new and complicated aircraft that lacks sufficient spare parts: in 2017, only 15 percent of Marine F-35Bs were rated fully mission-capable. “The Navy and the Marine Corps may have to decide whether they are willing to accept less reliable and maintainable aircraft than originally planned,” GAO warned. How can the U.S. Navy buy more ships and planes when it can't maintain the ones it has? That's the question posed by a new Government Accountability Office report . “The Navy continues to struggle with rebuilding the readiness of the existing fleet due to enduring maintenance and manning challenges,” the report finds. “As the Navy seeks to expand its fleet by 25 percent, these challenges will likely be further exacerbated and the Navy will likely face additional affordability challenges.” Auditors point to seven problems that GAO, Congress's watchdog agency, have highlighted over the past several years, but which have yet to solved: Training: After a series of embarrassing collisions at sea in 2017, which led to fears that Navy has forgotten basic ship-handling skills, training was revamped along with fewer waivers for required training. Still, “while the Navy has demonstrated its commitment to ensuring that crews are certified prior to deploying, training for amphibious operations and higher-level collective training may not be fully implemented for several years.” Maintenance backlogs: Between 2012 and 2018, only 30 percent of maintenance was completed on schedule. In particular, most Navy attack submarines have suffered maintenance delays. The backlog is caused by insufficient capacity in public shipyards as well as shortages of shipyard workers. Overworked sailors: In 2017, GAO concluded that the Navy was underestimating how many sailors were needed to man ships, leading to undersized crews and overworked sailors. The Navy says it is aiming for surface ships based overseas to have a minimum of 95 percent of their complement, but GAO auditors who interviewed crews in Japan were told that “the Navy's methods for tracking fit and fill do not account for sailor experience and may be inaccurately capturing the actual presence of sailors onboard and available for duty on its ships. Moreover, sailors consistently told us that ship workload has not decreased, and it is still extremely challenging to complete all required workload while getting enough sleep.” Unrealistic budgeting: The Navy wants to boost the number of ships by 25 percent, and is planning to buy 301 new ships between now and 2048 as well as extending the life of older destroyers and submarines. But GAO and the Congressional Budget Office have calculated that the Navy “has consistently and significantly underestimated the cost and timeframes for delivering new ships to the fleet. For example, the Navy estimates that buying the new ships specified in the fiscal year 2019 plan would cost $631 billion over 30 years while the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that those new ships would cost $801 billion—a difference of 27 percent.” Aging aircraft: Numerous aircraft models across the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps have been plagued by low availability rates due to aging aircraft, lack of spare parts for older planes, and too few mechanics. Too few pilots: The shortage of Marine Corps fighter pilots quadrupled to 24 percent between 2006 and 2017, while the Navy has been scrambling to fill pilot vacancies. “Further compounding their pilot shortages, we also found that the services have not recently reevaluated squadron requirements to reflect an increased fighter pilot workload,” said GAO. “As a result, the reported shortage actually could be greater.” The F-35: The Navy must fix the teething troubles of a new and complicated aircraft that lacks sufficient spare parts: in 2017, only 15 percent of Marine F-35Bs were rated fully mission-capable. “The Navy and the Marine Corps may have to decide whether they are willing to accept less reliable and maintainable aircraft than originally planned,” GAO warned. Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/sink-feeling-navys-7-big-problems-one-f-35-41502
26 juin 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
Today, foreign affairs ministers and defence ministers discussed the implementation of the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence. The Council then adopted conclusions which highlight the significant progress in strengthening cooperation in the area of security and defence and provide further guidance on next steps. Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) The Council adopted today a common set of governance rules for projects within the PESCO framework. The sequencing of the more binding commitments undertaken by member states participating in PESCO is expected to be defined through a Council recommendation, in principle in July 2018. An updated list of PESCO projects and their participants, including a second wave of projects, is expected by November 2018. The general conditions for third state participation in PESCO projects are expected to be set out in a Council decision in principle also in November. Capability development plan and coordinated annual review on defence (CARD) The Council approved the progress catalogue 2018, which provides a military assessment of the prioritised capability shortfalls and high impact capability goals to be achieved in a phased approach. It forms a key contribution to the EU capability development priorities. These priorities are recognised by the Council as a key reference for both member states' and EU defence capability development initiatives. The aim of CARD, for which a trial run is being conducted by the European Defence Agency, is to establish a process which will provide a better overview of national defence spending plans. This would make it easier to address European capability shortfalls and identify new collaborative opportunities, ensuring the most effective and coherent use of defence spending plans. European defence fund The European Defence Fund is one of the key security and defence initiatives by the Commission, reaffirmed in its proposal for the future multiannual financial framework (2021-2027), with a proposed envelope of €13 billion. The European Defence Fund aims to foster innovation and allow economies of scale in defence research and in the industrial development phase by supporting collaborative projects in line with capability priorities identified by Member States within the CFSP framework. This will strengthen the competitiveness of the Union's defence industry. Under the current financial framework, with the same objectives, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) was agreed by the representatives of the co-legislators on 22 May 2018. The Council welcomes this agreement. The EDIDP should aim at incentivising collaborative development programmes in line with defence capability priorities commonly agreed by EU member states, in particular in the context of the capability development plan. European peace facility The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy proposed the creation of a European Peace Facility in the context of the future multiannual financial framework, an off-EU budget fund devoted to security and defence. The aim of the facility would be: funding the common costs of military operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (currently covered by the Athena mechanism); contributing to the financing of military peace support operations led by other international actors (currently covered by, for example, the African Peace Facility); and providing support to third states' armed forces to prevent conflicts, build peace and strengthen international security. The Council takes note of the proposal and invites the relevant Council preparatory bodies to take the work forward and present concrete recommendations on the proposed facility. Military mobility The aim of improving military mobility is to address those obstacles which hinder the movement of military equipment and personnel across the EU. The High Representative and the Commission presented a joint communication on improving military mobility in the EU on 10 November 2017 and an action plan on 28 March 2018. The Council welcomes this action plan and calls for its swift implementation. As a first step in this direction, the Council approves the overarching high-level part of the military requirements for military mobility within and beyond the EU. The Council also stresses that improvement in military mobility can only be achieved with the full involvement and commitment of all member states, fully respecting their national sovereignty. The conclusions also touch on other strands of work in the field of EU security and defence, including strengthening civilian CSDP, developing a more strategic approach for EU partnerships on security and defence with third countries, and increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to counter hybrid threats, including further developing the EU's strategic communication approach together with member states. Background On 14 November 2016, the Council adopted conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence. These conclusions set out three strategic priorities in this regard: responding to external conflicts and crises, building the capacities of partners, and protecting the European Union and its citizens. Since then, the EU has significantly increased its efforts in the area of security and defence. Progress was noted and further guidance provided through Council conclusions on 6 March 2017, on 18 May 2017 and 13 November 2017. Council conclusions on strengthening civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) were adopted on 28 May 2018. At the same time, the EU has also increased its cooperation with NATO, on the basis of the joint declaration on EU-NATO cooperation signed by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and NATO Secretary-General on 8 July 2016 in the margins of the Warsaw summit. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/25/security-and-defence-cooperation-eu-will-enhance-its-capacity-to-act-as-a-security-provider-its-strategic-autonomy-and-its-ability-to-cooperate-with-partners/