26 novembre 2024 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

CISA Urges Agencies to Patch Critical "Array Networks" Flaw Amid Active Attacks

CISA flags Array Networks flaw CVE-2023-28461 for active exploitation; agencies urged to patch by December 16.

https://thehackernews.com/2024/11/cisa-urges-agencies-to-patch-critical.html

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  • Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties

    9 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties

    By: Sarah Bidgood Russia recently published a new document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Its release marks the first time that Russia's official policy on deterrence has been made publicly available. As others have observed, this document is an example of declaratory policy aimed primarily at a foreign audience — and should be read with this orientation in mind. Still, it contains information that helps readers better understand how Russia thinks about nuclear weapons, and this certainly makes it worth a close examination. Some of the more useful insights this document offers pertain to Russia's threat assessments and what it sees as likely pathways to nuclear use. A number of these threats line up with American declaratory policy as reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These overlaps are noteworthy, since the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been able to work together to mitigate mutual threats even when their bilateral relationship is in crisis. As such, they can point toward ways to get arms control back on track at a time when it is in deep trouble. One such area of overlap appears in section 19C, which covers the conditions that could allow for nuclear use. This list includes an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions." The similarities between this language and that which appears in the 2018 NPR are considerable. That document identifies “attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian populations and infrastructure and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” as a significant non-nuclear strategic attacks that could warrant the use of nuclear weapons. These parallels suggest that an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear command, control and communications systems could be of interest to both Washington and Moscow. A treaty along these lines would help to shore up crisis stability while rebuilding trust and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. It could also become a multilateral approach involving the five nuclear weapon states, which have been meeting regularly to discuss risk reduction and other topics. This would represent one of the few concrete outcomes of these discussions, which have been met with cautious enthusiasm but have so far failed to bear much fruit. Another example of mutual U.S.-Russia threats appears in section 12E of the Russian document. Here, the “uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture” are described as risks that nuclear deterrence is meant to neutralize. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons seems to remain a focus of U.S. nuclear policy, too, and the 2018 NPR commits to strengthening institutions that support “verifiable, durable progress on non-proliferation.” This ongoing shared interest is an argument for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, especially as it relates to strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. There is a long history of engagement between the two largest nuclear weapon states on nonproliferation, even at times of major discord in their relationship. Successful outcomes of this cooperation include the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty itself, which the United States and the Soviet Union concluded 50 years ago to stop additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite decades of joint work toward this shared goal, the rift between Washington and Moscow has now brought most bilateral efforts in this area to a halt. As some in Iran, Turkey and Germany contemplate the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it's time for the U.S. and Russia to shore up the credibility of the regime they built. Other sections of Russia's document offer additional glimpses into Moscow's perceived threats, although not all find ready analogs in U.S. declaratory policy. Many relate instead to the possibility that an adversary will carry out a conventional attack on Russia. Sections 12 and 14, for instance, reference the risks posed by adversary deployments of medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons. They also mention the deployment of missile defense systems in space; military buildups by would-be adversaries of general-purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in territories neighboring Russia; and the placement of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapons states, among others. There is little here that would surprise most Russia-watchers, but if the U.S. is serious about pursuing “next generation” arms control, it is useful to have a list of potential topics for discussion that go beyond ballistic missile defense. This list might also prove helpful in negotiating asymmetric treaties or in identifying confidence-building measures that cross domains. Overall, this short document does provide greater clarity with respect to Russia's deterrence strategy, but it is ambiguous on many points as well. Olga Oliker, the International Crisis Group's program director for Europe and Central Asia, noted, for instance, it does not settle the debate over whether Russia has an “escalate-to-deescalate” policy, and it is (unsurprisingly) vague about the precise circumstances under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons. Still, despite leaving some questions unanswered, the document offers a valuable window into Russia's strengths and vulnerabilities as they appear from Moscow. While likely not the intended signal this document was meant to send, it nevertheless points to possible opportunities for engagement when other good alternatives are hard to see. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/08/russias-new-nuclear-policy-could-be-a-path-to-arms-control-treaties/

  • Australian Defence Force ditches European helicopters

    13 décembre 2021 | International, Aérospatial

    Australian Defence Force ditches European helicopters

    Australian Defence Minister Peter Dutton announced Friday Canberra is seeking to buy up to 40 Sikorsky UH-60M Black Hawk battlefield helicopters to replace the Australian Defence Force's fleet of NH Industry MRH 90 Taipan Multi Role Helicopters.

  • Army picks 6 to work on autoloader for extended-range cannon

    27 janvier 2020 | International, Terrestre

    Army picks 6 to work on autoloader for extended-range cannon

    By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — The Army has picked six companies to work on concepts and designs for an autoloader for the service's future Extended-Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) program currently under development, according to a Jan. 24 Army Futures Command statement. While the first ERCA cannons will be fielded in fiscal 2023, the goal is to begin fielding the system with an autoloader just one year later. The companies — Actuate (formerly Aegis Systems, Inc.); Apptronik, Inc.; Carnegie Robotics LLC; Pratt & Miller Engineering; Neya Systems, LLC and Hivemapper, Inc. — will work under the Army Capability Accelerator and the Army Applications Laboratory (AAL) as part of the Field Artillery Autonomous Resupply (FAAR) “cohort” and will come up with novel, outside-of-the-box concepts for the autoloader. AAL is part of AFC, the Army's new four-star command in charge of rapid modernization that will align with the service's new developing doctrine. The cohort began work on Jan. 13 in Austin, Texas, where the AAL and AFC reside, and will wrap up work with capability presentations on April 2, the statement notes. “Sourced from across the country, the selected companies represent a range of technologies and expertise all aimed at developing autonomous resupply capabilities,” the statement reads. Among the companies selected, Actuate specializes in artificial intelligence focusing on computer vision software that turns any security camera into an “intruder- and threat-detecting smart camera," the release states. Apptronik is a robotics company spun out of the Human Centered Robotics Lab at the University of Texas at Austin. Pittsburgh-based Carnegie Robotics specializes in robotic sensors and platforms for defense, agriculture, mining, infrastructure and energy applications and was founded out of Carnegie Mellon University's National Robotics Engineering Center. Pratt & Miller's focus has been on addressing technology challenges in the motorsports, defense and mobility industries. Neya Systems, also from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is another robotics company focused on advanced unmanned systems, off-road autonomy and self-driving vehicle technologies. The AAL has become the face of doing business with the Army in the startup community and has set up shop in the heart of Austin within an innovation incubator hub called the Capital Factory. Anyone can walk through an open garage door and pitch ideas to the Army and the service. But the Army is also going out to companies and trying to convey problems they need solved on the battlefield in the hopes of finding new and novel solutions. “Designed for small businesses and companies that don't typically work with the federal government, the program connects qualified companies that want to grow a new line of business into the DoD with Army stakeholders who want to speed capability development, transition to a program of record, or de-risk and inform requirements,” according to the statement. “We've spent the past year working to introduce commercial business models that translate to the Army and can help evolve its approach to capability development,” Porter Orr, product innovation lead at AAL, said. “We're helping nontraditional companies build a new line of business into the government. And that's important, but it's just as important that we're giving Army leaders a choice between writing a large check or doing nothing. This is a way for them to get more insight—more confidence—in a solution before purchasing it. That will mean a higher probability of success in the field.” Cohort participants receive $150,000 to complete a 12-week program ending in a pitch to the Army. FAAR is the pilot effort of likely many attempts to bring in non-traditional businesses to help solve some of the Army's problems both big and small. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/01/24/army-picks-6-to-work-on-autoloader-for-extended-range-cannon

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