24 janvier 2020 | International, Terrestre
WASHINGTON: For the third time in 11 years, the Army's attempt to replace the 1980s-vintage M2 Bradley ran afoul of the age-old tradeoff between armor and mobility, several knowledgeable sources tell Breaking Defense.
The General Dynamics prototype for the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle – the only competitor left after other companies bowed out or were disqualified – was too heavy to meet the Army's requirement that a single Air Force C-17 cargo jet could carry two complete OMFVs to a war zone, we're told. But the vehicle had to be that heavy, GD's defenders say, to meet the Army's requirement for armor protection.
Now, the Army hasn't officially said why it cancelled the current OMFV contract. Senior leaders – Chief of Staff, Gen. James McConville; the four-star chief of Army Futures Command, Gen. Mike Murray; and the civilian Army Acquisition Executive, Assistant Secretary Bruce Jette – have all publicly acknowledged that the requirements and timeline were “aggressive.” (Yes, all three men used the same word). Jette was the most specific, telling reporters that one vendor – which, from the context of his remark, could only be GD – did not meet all the requirements, but he wouldn't say which requirements weren't met.
So, while we generally avoid writing a story based solely on anonymous sources, in this case we decided their track records (which we can't tell you about) were so good and the subject was so important that it was worth going ahead.
“Industry told the Army the schedule was ‘unobtainium,' but they elected to proceed anyway,” one source told us: That's why the other potential competitors dropped out, seeing the requirements as too hard to meet. In particular, the source said, “industry needs more time to evaluate the trade [offs] associated with achieving the weight requirement.”
With more time, industry might have been able to refine the design further to reduce weight, redesign major components to be lighter, or possibly – and this one is a stretch – even invent new stronger, lighter materials. But on the schedule the Army demanded, another source told us, reaching the minimum allowable protection without exceeding the maximum allowable weight was physically impossible.
Why This Keeps Happening
The Army's been down this road before and stalled out in similar ways. The Ground Combat Vehicle was too heavy, the Future Combat Systems vehicles were too light; “just right” still seems elusive.
In 2009, Defense Secretary Bob Gates cancelled the Future Combat Systems program, whose BAE-designed Manned Ground Vehicles – including a Bradley replacement – had been designed to such strict weight limits that they lacked adequate armor. The Army had initially asked for the FCS vehicles to come in under 20 tons so one could fit aboard an Air Force C-130 turboprop transport. After that figure proved unfeasible, and the Air Force pointed out a C-130 couldn't actually carry 20 tons any tactically useful distance, the weight crept up to 26 tons, but the added armor wasn't enough to satisfy Gates' concerns about roadside bombs, then taking a devastating toll on US soldiers in Iraq.
Four years later, amidst tightening budgets, the Army itself gave up on the Ground Combat Vehicle, another Bradley replacement, after strict requirements for armor protection drove both competing designs – from General Dynamics and BAE Systems – into the 56-70 ton range, depending on the level of modular add-on armor bolted onto the basic chassis. (A much-publicized Governmental Accountability Office study claimed GCV could reach 84 tons, but that was a projection for future growth, not an actual design).
Not quite nine months ago, after getting initial feedback from industry on the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle, the Army made the tough call to reduce its protection requirements somewhat to make it possible to fit two OMFVs on a C-17. If our sources are correct, however, it didn't reduce the armor requirement enough for General Dynamics to achieve the weight goal.
One source says that two of the General Dynamics vehicles would fit on a C-17 if you removed its modular armor. The add-on armor kit could then be shipped to the war zone on a separate flight and installed, or simply left off if intelligence was sure the enemy lacked heavy weapons. But the requirements didn't allow for that compromise, and the Army wasn't willing to waive them, the source said, because officers feared a vehicle in the less-armored configuration could get troops killed.
Other Options
Now, there are ways to protect a vehicle besides heavy passive armor. Some IEDs in Iraq were big enough to cripple a 70-ton M1 Abrams. Russian tanks get by with much lighter passive armor covered by a layer of so-called reactive armor, which explodes outwards when hit, blasting incoming warheads before they can penetrate. Both Russia and Israel have fielded, and the US Army is urgently acquiring, Active Protection Systems that shoot down incoming projectiles.
The problem with both reactive armor and active protection is that they're only proven effective against explosive warheads, like those found on anti-tank missiles. They're much less useful against solid shells, and while no missile ever fielded can use those, a tank's main gun can fling solid shot with such force that it penetrates armor through sheer concentrated kinetic energy.
(Protecting against roadside bombs and land mines is yet another design issue, because they explode from underneath, but it's no longer the all-consuming question it once ways. Advances in suspension, blast-deflecting hull shapes, and shock absorption for the crew have made even the four-wheeled Joint Light Tactical Vehicle remarkably IED-resistant and pretty comfortable).
If the Army were willing to take the risk of relying more on active protection systems, or give industry more time to improve active protection technology, it could reduce its requirements for heavy passive armor. Or the Army could remove the soldiers from its combat vehicles entirely and operate them with a mix of automation and remote control, which would make crew protection a moot point. In fact, the service is investing in lightly-armored and relatively expendable Robotic Combat Vehicles – but it still sees those unmanned machines as adjuncts to humans, not replacements. As long as the Army puts soldiers on the battlefield, it will want the vehicles that carry them to be well-protected.
Alternatively, the Army could drop its air transport requirements and accept a much heavier vehicle. Israel has already done this with its Namer troop carrier, a modified Merkava heavy tank, but then the Israel army doesn't plan to fight anywhere far away. The US, by contrast, routinely intervenes overseas and has dismantled many of its Cold War bases around the world. Air transport is a limited commodity anyway, and war plans assume most heavy equipment will either arrive by sea or be pre-positioned in warehouses on allied territory. But the Army really wants to have the option to send at least some armored vehicles by air in a crisis.
If the Army won't give ground on either protection or transportability, then it faces a different dilemma: They need to either give industry more time to invent something revolutionary, or accept a merely evolutionary improvement.
“We're going to reset the requirements, we're going to reset the acquisition strategy and timeline,” Gen. McConville said about OMFV on Tuesday. But, when he discussed Army modernization overall, he repeatedly emphasized that “we need transformational change, not incremental improvements.
“Transformational change is how we get overmatch and how we get dominance in the future,” the Chief of Staff said. “We aren't looking for longer cords for our phones or faster horses for our cavalry.”
https://breakingdefense.com/2020/01/bradley-replacement-did-army-ask-for-unobtainium
14 avril 2021 | International, Naval
The SEA SERPENT delivers an agile, highly penetrative, combined anti-ship and land attack capability at ranges significantly in excess of 200 km.
24 septembre 2021 | International, Aérospatial
L'Inde a officialisé, ce vendredi 24 septembre, l'acquisition de 56 Airbus C295 pour remplacer la flotte AVRO de l'Indian Air Force (IAF). Selon les termes de l'accord, 16 appareils assemblés en Espagne seront dans un premier temps livrés au gouvernement indien et les 40 autres seront construits et assemblés en Inde par Tata Advanced Systems. Il s'agit du premier programme aérospatial « Make in India » dans le secteur privé, impliquant le développement complet d'un écosystème industriel, précise Airbus. Les 16 premiers appareils seront livrés dans les quatre ans suivant la mise en œuvre du contrat. Tous les C295 de l'IAF seront livrés en configuration de transport et équipés d'une suite de guerre électronique fabriquée en Inde. « Le C295 a une nouvelle fois prouvé qu'il était le leader du segment et, avec l'arrivée de l'Inde en tant que nouvel opérateur, ce type d'appareil élargira encore son empreinte, non seulement sur les aspects opérationnels, mais aussi sur son propre développement industriel et technologique », a déclaré Michael Schoellhorn, CEO d'Airbus Defence and Space. Les Echos Investir du 24 septembre
24 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
Jen DiMascio Michael Bruno Lee Hudson Tony Osborne November 20, 2020 One of Joe Biden's last speeches as U.S. vice president focused on nuclear security, touting passage of the New Start Treaty with Russia in 2010 and subsequent reductions in the U.S. stockpile of warheads. Four years later, nuclear modernization and arms control will be among the first major tests he faces when he assumes the presidency in January. Under President Donald Trump, the Pentagon made notable strides in speeding up its cumbersome acquisition system, enabling the military to take better advantage of commercial technologies. The Defense Department also established what it calls “irreversible momentum” toward new space capabilities. But it will fall to the Biden administration to shepherd many experiments in new technologies into actual programs. It will be Biden's task to sell Congress on the idea of Joint All-Domain Command and Control. The new Democratic president could be dealing with a Senate controlled by Republicans, and he faces allies that see the U.S. as a less reliable partner than it was four years ago. He also will have to balance the modernization and readiness of the force within a budget that probably peaked in 2020. Shortly after he is inaugurated, Biden will face the Feb. 5 expiration of the New Start arms control treaty with Russia. His options are to extend the treaty for up to five years, for a shorter time frame or not at all. The Trump administration has been reluctant to agree to a full extension, given Russia's aggressive modernization of nuclear systems not covered by the treaty. Biden's advisors are likely to opt for extending the treaty to allow for more time for negotiations, predicts Matthew Kroenig, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Republicans, meanwhile, are likely to be more focused on the threat of advanced weaponry in Russia and China, in particular the growth of strategic nuclear arsenals. Retiring Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), ranking member on the House Armed Services Committee, says he is “particularly concerned about where the Chinese are headed with the size and capability of their nuclear program.” He adds: “Like a lot of things related to the Chinese, we have probably been too complacent.” Such tensions, and a Congress split along partisan lines, could help maintain support for nuclear modernization programs such as development of the next-generation ICBM, the Northrop Grumman Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), a program some analysts have thought a Biden administration might consider slowing or canceling. “Any serious push to retire the ICBM force and do away with the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program would not be supported by the Senate,” Cowen analysts say. A Biden administration likely means more of the same for the U.S. industrial base, for better or worse. The U.S. defense budget is expected to remain flat, putting pressure on the Pentagon to find ways to get more bang for its buck and better technologies against peer rivals—at the expense of traditional force structure. “Technology investment is likely to be most important, including network integration, hypersonics, artificial intelligence, long-range strike and missile defense,” Bernstein analyst Doug Harned and his team say. “We expect a lot of activity around integration, but exactly what this means is still ill-defined. Force structure may well come under more pressure. This means lower numbers of troops, aircraft, vehicles, ships, etc.” Downward pressure on force structure would be bad for Lockheed Martin, given its high exposure with the F-35, as well as for General Dynamics' warships and ground vehicles, says the Bernstein team. Northrop Grumman appears well-positioned long-term, based on its lean toward new technologies, but there are some risks around the GBSD. Raytheon Technologies and Lockheed have the highest Middle East exposure among the primes, and military sales there may have some added risk. “Democrats in both the House and Senate want restrictions on [Foreign Military Sales] in the wake of reports that the United Arab Emirates will be allowed to purchase 50 Lockheed Martin F-35s,” the Cowen Washington Research Group observed Nov. 4. “We do not believe a [Republican] Senate will support restrictions. If the sale is going to happen, it will need to be jammed through . . . before Biden takes office.” Like the Obama administration, the Trump team provided growing support for new space technologies. “I believe space will continue to be very, very important,” says Ellen Lord, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment. “I just had a briefing on a lot of [National Reconnaissance Office] projects we work on. And I'll tell you, it is absolutely eye-watering the capability that is being launched here in the next couple of months. . . . I think we have irreversible momentum.” During the Trump administration's final weeks in office, Lord is working to create a trusted capital marketplace, strengthen the defense industrial base and work with Capitol Hill on new ways of purchasing software. The Defense Department is working closely with the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment to block adversaries such as China or Russia from purchasing companies that are critical to U.S. national technology initiatives, she told the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics' Ascend conference on Nov. 18. Another focus for Lord's team is rare earth minerals and microelectronics. The bulk of rare earth mineral processing occurs in China, and most microelectronics are manufactured outside the U.S. Chris Brose, who served as policy director for the late Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), is advocating more radical change to scale up defense innovation, a priority of U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr. “The question for the new administration is going to be: ‘How do you support that vision, and how do you kind of reshape the Air Force, reshape the Space Force and really realign the [national] defense program?'” asks Brose, who is now chief strategy officer for the defense industry startup Anduril. Brose believes that to compete more effectively against advanced military challenges, the Pentagon must rethink how it harnesses new technologies, from the requirements process all the way through the acquisition process. Today's military, he notes, is organized to purchase a platform it has seen in a presentation or read in a white paper. The goal should not be to spend a long time defining requirements and then pay a single vendor to build things such as small satellites, software-defined programs or unmanned systems. One of the Air Force's top modernization priorities is the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). The challenge with an effort such as the ABMS is that the requirements and concepts of operation are unclear, Brose says, and ABMS demonstrations study different problems each year, making progress tough to discern. Though the Trump administration has experienced extensive turnover among its civilian leadership, it made considerable progress in restoring aircraft fleet readiness. In 2018, then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis—the first of five men in the military's top civilian job in four years—mandated that all tactical aircraft fleets needed to be 80% ready for missions. The Navy drew on techniques from the commercial airline industry to meet that goal within about one year for its Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fleet. The service has since applied the same techniques to improve the readiness of Boeing EA-18G Growlers, and it is beginning to expand the process to its Northrop Grumman E-2D Hawkeyes, with an eye toward the rest of its tactical aircraft, Rear Adm. Shane Gahagan, the Navy's program executive officer for tactical aviation, said at Aviation Week's Military Aviation Logistics and Maintenance Symposium on Nov. 17. While Biden's team will seek to build on that progress, his administration likely will take a markedly less confrontational approach with U.S. allies than Trump, who believes the U.S. has borne too much of the burden to defend Europe. As the Pentagon announced the withdrawal of 12,000 U.S. troops from Germany earlier this year, repositioning them around Europe, Trump placed the blame squarely on Germany, describing the nation as “delinquent” in failing to pay its fair share. NATO members breathed a collective sigh of relief after Biden's election, believing it will pave the way for a relaunch of transatlantic defense relations. But Biden is likely to maintain pressure on European countries to keep defense spending up in light of Russian and Chinese threats and to align with NATO's call for members to spend 2% of their GDP on defense. “Trump seized on the 2% and banged the table. . . . It is broadly true he got the Europeans to take seriously the demand that more should be spent on defense,” says Jonathan Eyal, an associate director at the London-based Royal United Services Institute. The cost of Trump's approach, however, has been “very heavy,” he says, leading to a virtual collapse in the relationship between the U.S. and Germany. Less certain is how a Biden administration will deal with countries that appear to be undermining NATO values. Turkey's oil and gas exploration in waters disputed by neighbor and fellow NATO member Greece have prompted regional tension, not to mention Ankara's actions in Libya, Syria and, more recently, its support of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (AW&ST Oct. 12-25, p. 62). Turkey's decision to recently test its S-400 ground-based air defense system purchased from Russia also remains a source of irritation for Washington. The purchase of the S-400 prompted Washington to kick Turkey out of the F-35 program, but Trump opted not to invoke the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act against the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan despite pressure in the Senate. “One can assume that the Biden administration would take the tougher line on Turkey,” Eyal says. “Erdogan is now part of the problem rather than part of the solution.” https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/budget-policy-operations/what-expect-bidens-pentagon