4 février 2021 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
Ben Kassel and Bruce Kaplan
While many Pentagon initiatives face a change of course under new Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, its digital engineering strategy deserves a push forward.
The strategy, issued in 2018 by then-Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin, aimed to help military services harness modern sustainment methods like additive manufacturing, digital twin and augmented reality. For the Department of Defense, enterprisewide implementation of these techniques would lower costs, increase weapon systems' mission-capable rates and afford flexibility in fleet modernization.
But digital engineering requires digital, 3D data — and the DoD doesn't have enough.
Modern sustainment practices hinge on the availability of what's known as the model-based definition, 3D models and digitized descriptive information for a system or component. Using computer-aided design programs, engineers can manipulate the data to enable practices like condition-based maintenance, eliminating weapon systems' unnecessary downtime. Digital data can facilitate seamless transit from original equipment manufacturers, or OEM, to procurers and sustainers in the field and at maintenance depots worldwide.
However, the technical data for most weapons systems remains elusive to the services and their program management offices, or PMO, or the datasets are available only in 2D documentation, such as blueprints.
Meanwhile, readiness suffers. Of 46 weapons systems reviewed by the Government Accountability Office, only three achieved annual mission-capable targets at least five times between 2011 and 2019. More than half (24) failed to meet their goal even once, according to GAO's November 2020 report.
The KC-13OJ Super Hercules air refueler and the MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor were among the programs to miss their target all nine years. GAO cited inaccessible technical data as a contributing factor for both programs. Of the Super Hercules, the report says: “The Navy and Marine Corps were unable to obtain the technical data of the aircraft ... the lack of the technical data compromises [their] ability to analyze and resolve sustainment issues.” Similar concerns were raised about the P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine aircraft, saying “technical data needed for maintenance has not been readily available to the Navy.” Dozens of systems, including the F-35 fighter jet, face similar obstacles.
Notably, the GAO report referred not to 3D, model-based data but rather legacy incarnations: blueprints and documents that may have been converted “digitally” into PDFs. This is a far cry from the machine-readable formats required to use digital engineering technologies across the enterprise.
The GAO cited the production of 170 “structural repair manuals” as a means of narrowing the Osprey's technical data gaps. The labor-intensive replication of physical documents — the PMO projected five years to deliver all of them — is a piecemeal solution, at best. Troublingly, modern sustainment methods seem beyond the reasonable expectation of not just PMOs but even forward-looking organizations like the GAO.
To foster its DoD-wide implementation, the digital engineering strategy needs reinforcement, which could take the following forms:
Operationalizing the DoD strategy requires work in other areas as well, particularly in removing intra- and inter-organizational stovepipes, and securing the data's transmission and storage. But the first step toward a model-based sustainment enterprise is ensuring the availability of modern technical data. This need will only grow more crucial.
Today's sustainment practices too closely resemble those of 30 years ago, not what they should be 30 years from now. We're already playing catch up. It's time to view sustainment with 3D glasses.
Ben Kassel is a senior consultant at LMI. He previously worked with the U.S. government on defining and exchanging technical data used for naval architecture, marine and mechanical engineering, and manufacturing. Bruce Kaplan is a fellow at LMI. He previously served as technical director of logistics for research and development at the Defense Logistics Agency.
21 juin 2021 | International, Aérospatial
As part of our Aerospace & Defense Community Forum, Aviation Week Network spoke with leaders across the Aerospace & Defense industry about their companies, the state of the industry currently and where it is headed in the future. See what they had to say.
4 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial
"I have great hopes that this administration, with its bold unilateral actions on so many fronts, would take unilateral action with this regime on UAVs," says Keith Webster, former DoD head of defense cooperation. By THERESA HITCHENSon June 03, 2020 at 12:48 PM WASHINGTON: The Trump administration should unilaterally declare that it will no longer subject drone sales to export control restrictions under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), says a new Mitchell Institute study. And Congress should use the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to redefine unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as aircraft, which not only remove them from MTCR restrictions but also would ease US domestic export controls, asserts the paper, “”Modernizing UAV Export Policy for Effective Coalition Forces,”. “The US Congress should craft language in the 2021 NDAA that defines UAVs as aircraft, not cruise missiles, but as aircraft, and subject to the same export considerations as any other military aircraft,” said Heather Penny, senior resident fellow at Mitchell and the paper's author, during a webinar today. “We believe that this language, a statute, would be sufficient to be able to remove UAVs from being subject to the MTCR guidelines.” The 35-nation MTCR agreement requires a “strong presumption of denial” for sales of so-called Category 1 drones — those that can carry a 500 kilogram payload more than 300 kilometers. The Category 1 definition is considered as the minimum capability a missile needs to carry a nuclear warhead. Smaller unmanned aerial vehicles also are covered under MTCR's Category 2 rules, but those export restrictions are less stringent. Even the treaty-hating Trump administration sees the MTCR — a political agreement rather than a treaty — as a key tool in preventing the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles. This is despite its long-standing efforts to ease drone sales to allies, including through revamping US domestic law to allow “Direct Commercial Sales” by companies, rather than requiring all sales to go through the formal Foreign Military Sales process that requires approval by DoD, the State Department and Congress. Indeed, over the past year the administration tried — and failed — to convince its MTCR partners to revamp the rules to allow drones flying less than 800 kilometers per hour to slip out from under the Category 1 rules, said Penny. Washington is now expected to try again at the annual MTCR signatories meeting, she said, instead suggesting a 600 kph speed limit as the line of demarcation between the two categories of export restrictions. (The meetings are usually held in the fall, although there has yet to be an announcement of the 2020 dates.) But, Penny argued, even if this new effort comes to fruition, it would fail to fix the underlying problem of allowing allies to buy high-end US combat drones — and preventing them from fully integrating with US operations. Secondly, she asserted, complying with MTCR rules “distort the market” in favor of Chinese sales, she said, since China is not a member of the MTCR and has few formal restrictions on arms exports. “Continuing to adhere to and apply MTCR guidelines to UAVs facilitates Chinese strategic interests,” Penny said. “It's working against US interests.” Keith Webster, former DoD head of defense cooperation, agreed — calling efforts to revise the MTCR as a “Band-Aid” that would soon loose viability because of the rapid pace of technology improvement. “I wish we would act unilaterally,” he told the Mitchell Institute webinar. “We have the ability to act unilaterally. And I would like to see us do so very soon. I have great hopes that this administration, with its bold unilateral actions on so many fronts, would take unilateral action with this regime on UAVs.” That doesn't mean, Webster hastened to add, pulling out of MTCR itself. “Stay in the MTCR,” he said. “It served its purpose.” The experts acknowledged that a unilateral US move to exempt UAVs from MTCR could spur other nations to do the same for their own weapons systems that could exacerbate nuclear proliferation. Penny stressed that it was key for the US to renew its commitment to nonproliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles, and support MTCR's rules for those systems. Saying that “we need to be honest with ourselves about the implications” while seeking “creative solutions” to the UAV issue, Webster seemed to suggest that ultimately the US may decide the MTCR itself isn't worth the trade off. “There are challenges with compliance within the regime with at least one member,” he warned. As Breaking D readers know, US military leaders and Congress have sounded the alarm on the proliferation of cruise missiles by Russia (an MTCR member) and China that can more easily slip through US ballistic missile defense systems. This is especially true for hypersonic missiles, which have speeds above Mach 5 and while visible on radar are extremely hard to target. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/06/us-should-pull-drones-from-missile-control-regime-mitchell-institute/
10 mai 2023 | International, Naval
The unit aims to leverage reservists' contacts in the business and tech worlds to quickly solve modernization problems.