29 septembre 2024 | International, Naval
Chinese nuclear attack submarine sank during construction, US says
The sinking of China’s first Zhou-class submarine represents a setback for Beijing as it continues to build out the world’s largest navy.
7 mai 2020 | International, Naval
5 things you should know about the US Navy’s new frigate
By: David B. Larter
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy selected Fincantieri's FREMM design for its next-generation frigate, but as with most new platforms it will be a long time before the first ship hits the fleet.
The contract, awarded May 30, is for up to 10 hulls constructed at Fincantieri's Marinette Marine shipyard in Wisconsin. The Navy intends to buy at least 20 frigates.
Here's what we know about what the years ahead will hold:
1) The price tag. According to Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition James Geurts, the first hull will cost $1.281 billion, which includes the design money for both the ship and for the work needed at the shipyard to set up a production line. It also includes all the government-furnished equipment, including things such as Raytheon's AN/SPY-6-derivative radar and Lockheed Martin's Aegis Combat System.
Of that $1.281 billion, $795 million will go to the shipyard.
The next hulls in the buy should cost significantly less. The Navy is aiming for a price tag of $800 million in 2018 dollars, with the threshold at $950 million. But Geurts thinks he can beat both numbers. An independent cost estimate found the follow-on hulls should cost about $781 million if all 20 are built.
“The study shows this ship as selected and the program as designed delivering underneath our objective cost per platform,” Geurts said on a May 30 phone call with reporters.
2) The timeline. Detailed design of the future frigate, known as FFG(X), starts right away, Geurts said, and construction will begin no later than April 2022. The first ship should be delivered in 2026 and should be operational by 2030, with final operational capability declared by 2032, Geurts said.
The contract should be wrapped up — all 10 hulls — by 2035. The intention is to buy 20 hulls, though it's unclear whether Marinette will build all 20 or if the Navy will identify a second source.
3) What could go wrong? The Navy feels like it did a lot to get this ship deal right, which could be argued was important given a not-so-hot track record with programs lately.
Improving the Navy's performance on lead ships, in the wake of the Ford-class debacle, has been a focus of Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jim Inhofe, R-Okla. Among the steps the Navy took to retire risk with FFG(X) was to adapt many of the mature systems being designed for the Flight III destroyer program, including the latest version of the Aegis Combat System and a scaled-down version of the AN/SPY-6 radar destined for Flight III.
“Some of those efforts are still maturing, such as SPY-6, but from my standpoint I'm very comfortable with how that's proceeding,” said Rear Adm. Casey Moton, program executive officer of unmanned and small combatants.
Bringing industry in on the process earlier will also help reduce risk in the lead ship, Moton said. “In general, even before the solicitation went out, the fact that we had industry involved in the conceptual design phase, they were there with us in the requirements; they understood the specifications; we worked with them on cost reduction. Many of the things that tend to trip up lead ships, we took proactive steps to reduce the risk there.”
4) Room to grow. The Navy considered the ability to add new, energy intensive systems on to the ship later in its calculus in selecting FREMM as the FFG(X), according to service officials.
During the competition, Fincantieri highlighted that it could fairly easily grow the electrical capacity of the ship, and that all the major computer and engine gear could be swapped out without cutting a hole in the ship, as is often necessary with current classes in the U.S. Navy's inventory.
Rick Hunt, a retired Navy three-star admiral who is now a senior Fincantieri executive, told reporters that the company's bid was designed to meet the cost specifications while giving the Navy room to upgrade.
“Be flexible in what you do right now, surge to more capacity as soon as we get that [requirement] and be able to grow the ship in lot changes should you need something even greater in the future,” Hunt said.
Vice Adm. Jim Kilby, the Navy's top requirements officer, said growth will be important in Navy designs as the service seeks to move away from combating missiles with other missiles. “Understanding how fast the threat is advancing made the service-life allowance so important for us,” Kilby said May 30. “We didn't want [to] define discretely where we are going in the future, so having some margin to include things like directed energy and other systems, that's why it was so important.
“We have an extensive laser [science and technology] program in the Navy, we have lasers on some of our ships now. We definitely view it as a requirement for the future as we move into a realm where our launchers are reserved for offensive weapons and our point defense systems are these rechargeable magazines that we can sustain for long periods of time.”
5) Lessons learned. The Navy acquisitions boss feels good about the process that produced the FFG(X) award and thinks it can be a model for other programs.
“FFG(X) represents an evolution in the Navy's requirements and acquisition approach, which allowed the acquisition planning, requirements and technical communities along with the shipbuilders to develop requirements for the platform ahead of the release of the detailed design and construction request for proposal," Geurts said.
“By integrating the requirements, acquisition planning and design phases, we were able to reduce the span time by nearly six years as compared to traditional platforms. All this was done with an intense focus on cost, acquisition and technical rigor so we got the best value for the war fighter and the taxpayer. It's the best I've seen in the Navy thus far in integrating all the teams together, and it's a model we're building on for future programs.”
But it's unclear if a similar approach would work on a clean-sheet, new design the same way it worked for FFG(X), which uses already-developed technologies and a parent design.
“Having all the folks in the room early in the process helped move the process along and move it along faster,” said Bryan McGrath, a retired destroyer captain who is now a consultant with The Ferrybridge Group. “The question comes when you consider how applicable duplicating such an effort would be if you were trying to do a clean-sheet design that was incorporating revolutionary technologies, untested technologies, perhaps even undeveloped technologies. That's a different story.”
The FFG(X) will be a considerable step forward for the Navy in terms of capability, but isn't exactly a revolutionary platform that may require a different process to arrive at a solution, McGrath said.
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30 octobre 2019 | International, Naval
3 ways America can fix its vulnerability to cruise missiles
By: Bradley Bowman and Andrew Gabel September's drone and cruise missile attack on a major Saudi energy facility highlights the challenges associated with cruise missile defense. Americans might be tempted to dismiss this attack merely as evidence of a Saudi vulnerability, with little relevance to the U.S. homeland. However, given that an American-built air defense system failed to stop the attack, this would be a mistake. As China and Russia continue to develop and deploy advanced cruise missiles to threaten the United States, urgent action is required. In recent years, the Pentagon has focused on protecting the homeland from ballistic missile attacks by building a ballistic missile defense system consisting of radars and interceptors. This system can provide some protection against a limited ballistic missile attack on the United States, but it is not designed to protect American cities from cruise missile attacks. Unlike ballistic missiles, which arc high into the atmosphere and beyond before striking their target, cruise missiles fly at low altitudes, where ground-based radars struggle to detect them. And to defeat a cruise missile, the Department of Defense must first be able to detect and track it. America's adversaries “currently hold our citizens and national interests at risk,” the commander of Northern Command, Gen. Terrence O'Shaughnessy, testified before the Senate in April. “The homeland is not a sanctuary. For that reason, improving our ability to detect and defeat cruise missile attacks is among my highest priorities.” It is not difficult to understand why. Seeing this long-standing vulnerability, America's great power adversaries have worked to improve their cruise missile capabilities. Today, for example, Russia possesses a submarine-launched cruise missile that Moscow could use to circumvent existing U.S. missile defenses and target key East Coast military bases and population centers. And the cruise missile capabilities of U.S. adversaries are only growing more formidable. In April testimony before the Senate, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy John Rood warned that potential adversaries are developing sophisticated “cruise missile systems with increased speed, range, accuracy and lethality.” For its part, Russia is developing hypersonic cruise missiles. Russian President Vladimir Putin claims one of these cruise missiles could fly as fast as nine times the speed of sound. The Kremlin is also pursuing nuclear-powered cruise missiles with virtually unlimited range. Not to be outdone, China is developing its own hypersonic cruise missiles, supplementing its existing cruise missile stocks. Against both Moscow and Beijing's cruise missile arsenals, America's current defenses are inadequate. So what's to be done? The first step is for the Department of Defense to quickly assign a lead in the Pentagon for homeland cruise missile defense, which would enable key decisions related to the homeland cruise missile defense architecture — including decisions related to sensors and shooters, as well as command and control, battle management, and communications. This would help expedite efforts to integrate ballistic missile defense and cruise missile defense. Second, Congress should support efforts to deploy without delay the space-based sensors necessary to detect, track and ultimately defeat advanced cruise missiles and other missile threats to our homeland. Third, the Department of Defense should proactively look to partner with its impressive array of allies and partners to field — both at home and abroad — advanced cruise missile defense capabilities without delay. Consider the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These allies are already part of a long-standing intelligence sharing arrangement with the United States, known as the “Five Eyes agreement.” As Atlantic Council Senior Fellow William Greenwalt has suggested, systematically expanding this arrangement to institutionalize the shared development of military technology makes sense. Cruise missile defense might be one of several good places to start. Israel represents another obvious partner, as it possesses a proven track record on missile defense innovation, deep real-world experience, an admirable sense of urgency and a long history of cooperation with the U.S. on missile defense. Indeed, Israel and the U.S. have worked together for years to develop the Arrow and David's Sling missile defense systems. If we combine these international partnerships with the innovation prowess of the American private sector — as well as timely, predictable and sufficient funding from Congress — much can be done to address areas of shared vulnerability. That includes cruise missile defenses for both the American homeland and forward-deployed U.S. troops. The September attack on the Saudi energy facility may seem of little concern to most Americans, but that attack should serve as a warning regarding the unique challenges associated with cruise missile defense. If Iran could pull off such an attack, imagine what Moscow and Beijing may be able to do. If our great power adversaries believe a surprise cruise missile attack against the U.S. homeland or American positions abroad might succeed, it increases the chances that Beijing or Moscow would undertake such an attack. The Pentagon assessed in its Missile Defense Review earlier this year that advanced cruise missile threats to the homeland “are on the horizon.” The attack last month in Saudi Arabia suggests that horizon might be closer than Americans think. Bradley Bowman is the senior director for the Center on Military and Political Power with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Andrew Gabel is a research analyst. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/10/29/3-ways-america-can-fix-its-vulnerability-to-cruise-missiles/
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30 octobre 2024 | International, Naval
Lockheed Martin Makes First International SEWIP Sale to Japan
Syracuse, N.Y., October 29, 2024 – Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT) was awarded a $113 million contract by Naval Sea Systems Command for full rate production of Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program...