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(B2) L'Union européenne doit reconsidérer sa relation avec les Etats-Unis et l'OTAN pour faire émerger une stratégie de défense européenne. C'est ce qu'a défendu Jolyon Howorth, professeur émérite à la Harvard Kennedy School, durant les seconds entretiens européens de la défense à Paris jeudi (16 mai) Face à la création d'une armée européenne, trois obstacles... Les Américains s'inquiètent des conséquences d'une défense européenne pour leur leadership. Les Britanniques jouent l'ambivalence pour ne pas froisser les États-Unis. Les Européens peinent à se mettre d'accord sur la marche à suivre. Trois obstacles qui ont fait « échouer » les deux premières tentatives de forger une armée européenne, la Communauté Européenne de Défense (CED) dans les années 1950 et la première version de la politique de défense (la PESD ou politique européenne de sécurité et de défense) à la fin des années 1990 début 2000, et qui continuent à freiner les nouvelles initiatives. Les Américains, d'accord sur le principe d'une défense européenne Les Américains, souvent critiqués pour le retard que prennent les initiatives européennes en matière de défense, n'étaient pas toujours défavorables à l'idée et ne s'y « opposent pas par principe, au contraire ». Mais une question les taraude, celle des « conséquences pour le leadership de l'Alliance, voire pour son avenir » si une défense européenne crédible devait se former. D'où l'ambivalence des États-Unis sur cette idée que Eisenhower regardait pourtant en 1951 comme un des objectifs de l'Alliance, idée légitimée par les multiples injonctions américaines à augmenter les budgets européens de défense. Cette position confuse s'inscrit dans le débat existentiel qu'est la définition de la prochaine « grand strategyaméricaine », explique Jolyon Howorth. ... mais des inquiétudes subsistent sur leur leadership au sein de l'Alliance Après « quarante ans de leadership incontesté des alliés européens », le courant « liberal hegemon » qui définit la politique des Etats-Unis depuis longtemps se voit contester par les partisans de « l'offshore balancing ». Lesquels prônent un repli américain sur « un nombre fort limité de bases stratégiques » et un « transfert aux Européens de la responsabilité principale de leur propre sécurité ». La question reste ouverte alors que Donald Trump « semble s'y associer », sans toutefois « comprendre un instant le sens profond de ce débat stratégique ». Les Britanniques, réfractaires à toute intégration européenne Les Britanniques ont été, eux, « beaucoup plus réfractaires que les Américains au projet dès le début ». Et ils continueront de « freiner l'avancée des Européens vers une autonomie stratégique », rendant l'axe Paris-Berlin « d'autant plus urgent ». La vision britannique est celle d'une sécurité européenne b'tie sur une « clé de voûte » : l'OTAN. Les Européens étant simplement relégués à un rôle « complémentaire ». C'est pourquoi « Londres a bloqué toute avancée » qui aurait pu mener à une armée européenne tout en réclamant pourtant « à cor et à cri » un « engagement inconditionnel » à la sécurité européenne, selon le professeur, lui-même British. Pourtant fermement soutenue par Winston Churchill dès le début, la défense européenne a vite inquiété outre-Manche, le Royaume-Uni anxieux de « préserver le partenariat avec les États-Unis ». Le pays avait par exemple refusé la CED dès 1953, craignant que « le succès de l'armée européenne n'entraîne le désengagement américain ». Les Européens indécis et divisés Mais au final, les Européens sont leurs propres ennemis. Les divisions nationales sur la manière de construire l'Europe persistent et se retrouvent, « de façon profonde, au sein des familles politiques ». Mais avec le nouveau contexte géostratégique, de plus en plus complexe et multidimensionnel, « l'Union européenne ne peut plus se permettre le luxe de ses divisions internes ». Il faut repenser notre stratégie pour « passer de l'Europe de la défense, à la défense de l'Europe ». Ces divisions cristallisent l'opposition entre « l'intégrationnisme » prôné par Monnet et « l'intergouvernementalisme », selon le modèle gaullien. La politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC) a, depuis Saint-Malo, et la déclaration franco-britannique de 1998, été développée dans le cadre de ce dernier, un modèle « de plus en plus mis en question ». Les dernières évolutions en matière de défense nous placent à nouveau « face à la confrontation de ces deux méthodologies contradictoires ». Trois défis majeurs aujourd'hui Définir une stratégie européenne propre Il faut développer une « grand strategy » à l'européenne martèle Jolyon Howorth. L'un des problèmes fondamentaux de la première version de la PSDC fut son « manque d'ambition » par « crainte de froisser » les Américains. Pourtant, « la seule ambition qui vaille pour l'Union européenne est d'assumer sa propre défense collective ». Et donc d'arrêter de penser qu'il est impossible pour l'Europe de se défendre sans le soutien américain. Et il faut « pouvoir s'adapter à la nouvelle donne planétaire ». « Après Trump, il n'y aura pas de retour à la case départ ». À quel prix « L'armée européenne ne s'achètera pas parmi les soldes de chez Tati ». Les États membres de l'OTAN ont dépensé « 264 milliards de dollars » sur les questions de défense en 2018. Si tous les pays avaient atteint l'objectif fixé par l'OTAN de 2% du PIB, cela aurait majoré la somme de « près de 102 milliards de dollars ». Mais une armée européenne autonome pourrait représenter jusqu'à « 467 milliards de dollars supplémentaires » rappelle l'universitaire, se basant sur une étude récente du International Institute for Security Studies (IISS) qui fait l'hypothèse d'un retrait américain d'Europe. Un engagement conséquent donc. Et avec qui ? Si beaucoup pensent que l'armée européenne sera forgée « à l'extérieur de l'OTAN, sans les Américains, voire contre », Jolyon Howorth n'en est pas persuadé. Une armée européenne ne doit pas être construite contre les Américains, mais « en bonne intelligence avec eux ». Car l'Alliance ne va pas se dissoudre de sitôt. Et elle peut avoir un rôle moteur alors qu'il existe actuellement « quatre-vingt projets de coopération » entre l'OTAN et l'UE, et que les Américains « n'arrêtent pas de nous demander des efforts accrus, de nous encourager à assumer le leadership stratégique dans notre voisinage ». Il faudrait plutôt revenir au scénario initial : une alliance « rééquilibrée » dans laquelle les Européens « prennent graduellement la part du lion » et les Américains jouent « le rôle de facilitateurs ». Pour former une alliance qui ne soit pas « structurée par la dépendance, encore moins par la servitude ». (Coline Traverson st.) https://www.bruxelles2.eu/2019/05/23/entretiens-europeens-de-la-defense-2019-une-grand-strategy-pour-leurope-j-howorth/

By: Andrew Chuter LONDON — Senior British defense procurement officials have found themselves on the wrong end of a verbal battering by the parliamentary Defence Committee. Lawmakers on Tuesday kept up growing opposition to an international competition to build up to three logistics ships instead of favoring a local consortium. Led by Defence Procurement Minister Stuart Andrew, ministry officials were forced to fend of repeated questions from the committee as to why they had opted for an international competition instead of awarding a contract to a consortium made up of Babcock International, BAE Systems, Cammell Laird and Rolls-Royce, known as Team UK. The officials cited the requirement to adhere to European Union procurement rules, known as Article 346, as reasoning for their decision to open up bidding to international shipbuilders. The fleet solid support ships could not be defined as warships and therefore could not be counted under rules allowing warships to be exempt from international bidding requirements, explained MoD officials. But according to trade unions and lawmakers, thousands of jobs, sovereign capability and wider economic benefits are all at risk if the MoD opts for a foreign bid for the vessels, known locally as fleet solid support ships. The deputy chief of the Defence Staff, Richard Knighton, warned the committee that stopping the competition, which could be worth up to £1 billion (U.S. $1.3 billion), would mean serious consequences. “The competition is already running. To throw that away, the risk would be very serious. In fact there is the certainty we would deliver the capability late and there would be a capability gap,” said Knighton, who is responsible for financial and military capability at the MoD. International shipyards Fincantieri, Navantia , Japan Marine United Corp., and Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering were invited in 2018 to bid alongside Team UK for up to three large logistics ships earmarked to provide support for the Royal Navy's new aircraft carrier fleet. In recent weeks the list of interested companies shrunk. Andrew said he could confirm Fincantieri's withdrawal but was unable to comment on reports Daewoo had also pulled the plug on its bid. An MoD spokesperson declined to say whether Daewoo was in or out of the competition. “The MoD does not comment on speculation," the spokesperson said. “Any decision to withdraw from the competition is a matter for each tenderer.” ‘Ludicrous' explanations The ministry's Article 346 explanation infuriated some committee members. Mark Francois, a former defense minister, termed the MoD's position as “patently ludicrous.” “You are treating this like a game. If you declare this ship a warship under the national shipbuilding strategy, you have to award it to a U.K. yard. But you are worried you will be over a barrel in terms of the pricing, so in order to prevent that you insist it's not a warship so you can compete it internationally in order bear down on the price you have to pay,” Francois said. Other members of Parliament said the position was indefensible and pointed to the fact that France and other nations had kept contracts in-house for similar ships. “Some have chosen to class it as a warship and some have chosen not to class it as a warship, and we are trying to pretend we had to [define it as not a warship]. That seems to stretch credulity," Defence Committee Chair Julian Lewis said. MoD officials added that by exposing local shipbuilders to international competition, they were trying to make U.K. industry more competitive, and not just for local orders but in the international market, adding that the industry can't solely rely on domestic work. What are the ships for? The logistic ships are part of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, an organization separate from the Royal Navy that is tasked with supplying warships with ammunition, food, fuel and other stores at sea, including in war zones. The ships are registered as merchant vessels and crewed largely by civilian staff, although they do carry defensive weapons like the Phalanx gun. Under the Conservative government's national shipbuilding strategy launched in 2017, the logistics ships were earmarked for international competition. The author of the original report, John Parker, is conducting a review of the strategy, which is due for publication this year. The budget for the Royal Navy and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary for the coming decade has £60 billion earmarked for building surface ships and nuclear submarines. More than half of that is for renewing the submarine nuclear missile fleet. BAE's shipyard in Glasgow is responsible for the construction of the first three of an expected order of eight Type 26 anti-submarine frigates. A competition is underway between three bidders to build five F-31e general-purpose frigates. Babcock recently closed a small shipyard in Appledore, Devon, after finishing an offshore patrol boat order for the Irish Navy, and there are concerns over the future of the company's large shipyard at Rosyth, now that the assembly of the second Royal Navy aircraft carrier, HMS Prince of Wales, is nearly complete at the Scottish yard. The Rosyth shipyard would be the likely venue to assemble the large logistics ships in the event Team UK succeeds with its bid. The Defence Committee hearing was the latest effort to crank up pressure on the MoD to change its mind over whether international companies can bid on the deal for the logistics ships. Recently, an all-party parliamentary shipbuilding group released a report recommending the government "choose to build new Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships in the UK and thus retain the skills needed for the construction of complex warships.” Bids for two fleet solid support ships, with an option on a third if the MoD can find the money, are due in late July 2019. The winning contractor would agree to a firm fixed-price design and build deal by July 2020. The first ship is due in service by 2026. The new defense secretary, Penny Mourdant, has also stepped into the fray, perhaps decisively. In her first speech as defense secretary last week, she signaled that the MoD is reviewing projects such the logistics ship program. Francois, the former defense minister, claimed Mourdant's announcement effectively awarded the contract to Team UK, although that was denied by MoD officials. “The secretary of state did not say that. She was explicitly asked in the questions after the speech whether she could confirm that fleet solid ships order would go to a British shipyard, and she said, ‘No,' ” the defense procurement minister explained. Britain has previously purchased logistics ships overseas. Four fleet oilers were recently delivered from South Korean shipbuilder Daewoo. The ships arrived months late, and the fixed-price deal cost the shipyard a pile of money remedying faults with the oilers. On that occasion there was no British bid for the work, although a domestic shipyard did secure a deal to equip the oilers with sensitive equipment like sensors and weapons. https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/05/22/is-britain-buying-a-warship-depends-who-you-ask

By: Sebastian Sprenger COLOGNE, Germany – The Belgian defense ministry has awarded a consortium led by France's Naval Group a nearly €2 billion contract to deliver mine-hunting ships and drones to the navies of Belgium and the Netherlands, according to the shipbuilder. The announcement on Wednesday came after the customary review period by the Belgian legislature had passed. The Brussels government announced in March that it planned to select Belgium Naval and Robotics, a joint venture of Naval Group and ECA Group, to produce 12 vessels equipped with around 100 drones for the two countries. Six vessels will go to Belgium, the other six to the Dutch. Finding and disabling sea mines is a key mission for the two neighboring countries. Their navies are configured mainly to defend territorial waters and the nearby English Channel, which allows passage to the North Sea. The offer by Naval Group and ECA Group leans heavily on undersea drones to deal with the treacherous weapons. The ships will be built to launch and recover the ECA Group's “Inspector 125” unmanned boats, which carry various autonomous underwater drones for finding mines and setting them off from a safe distance. The contract is expected to last 10 years, according to a consortium statement. An initial three-year development phase is to be followed by a production stage, putting the first system in the water by 2024. The two companies hope that the high-profile deal will generate additional sales elsewhere in the world. “The Belgian and Dutch navies being a reference in mine warfare within NATO, the choice of our consortium is a major asset for export,” a statement reads. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/05/22/naval-group-led-team-gets-2-billion-mine-hunter-contract-for-belgian-dutch-navies

DARPA's Defense Sciences Office (DSO) will host Discover DSO Day (D3) on June 18, 2019, to facilitate discussion of technical research thrusts outlined in a new office-wide Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) solicitation expected in mid-June. Additionally, D3 will familiarize participants with DSO's mission and streamlined business practices designed to simplify the proposal process and accelerate the timeline from idea approval to research start date. The event will take place in the DARPA Conference Center, Arlington, Virginia, from 8:45 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. EDT, and the audio also will be webcast. Registration is required to attend in person or via webcast. One of six technical offices at DARPA, DSO identifies and pursues high-risk, high-payoff research initiatives across a broad spectrum of science and engineering disciplines and transforms them into game-changing technologies for U.S. national security. “D3 is an opportunity for the broader science and technology community to engage with DSO as we highlight key technical areas we're focusing on in the coming year,” said Valerie Browning, director of DSO. “We encourage potential proposers from small companies, universities, research centers and large companies to join us. We especially encourage those who've never done business with DARPA to come and learn about DSO and let us hear your novel ideas in the areas we're interested in.” Panels of DSO program managers will discuss concepts and ideas they are pursuing in each of the four technical areas listed below. Participants will have the opportunity to ask questions following each panel presentation: Frontiers in Math, Computation & Design: The increasingly complex, technologically sophisticated, fast-paced and dynamic military operational environment imposes fundamental challenges in how we design and plan for future military needs. The DoD implications of these trends drive a need for new math, computation, and design tools that enable trusted decision making at increased speed and with known confidence levels. Topics of interest under this domain include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) mathematical, computational, and design frameworks and tools that provide robust solutions to challenging DoD problems such as planning, optimization, and platform design; (2) fundamental scientific underpinnings and limits of machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI); and (3) alternative computing models, architectures, and substrates for faster, more robust decision making. Limits of Sensing & Sensors: Sensing and measurement of signals ranging from “DC to daylight” are ubiquitous to military systems and missions. Surveillance, navigation, warfighter health monitoring, and target ID/tracking are just a few examples of missions and/or applications that rely on various sensing modalities. Topics of interest under this domain include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) new sensing modalities, (2) fundamental sensing limits, (3) engineered materials that enable novel optics and imaging capabilities, (4) fundamental and practical limits of quantum enabled sensing and metrology, and (5) practical and deployable sensing and sensor designs. Complex Social Systems: Understanding social behavior and the dynamics of complex social networks is critically important for many military operations including stability, deterrence, compellence, counter-terrorism, shaping the environment, training, and mission planning. Additionally, increasingly robust machine capabilities in the form of automation, platforms, and artificial intelligence (AI) will fundamentally change how human teams frame problems, plan, and operate at tempo and manage complexity. Topics of interest under this domain include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) accurate and scientifically validated models of the social dynamics underlying different kinds of conflict; (2) capabilities to improve understanding of causality in complex social systems; (3) artificial intelligence and other tools that enable improved human-machine symbiotic decision-making; and (4) new concepts in war-gaming and simulations to identify and understand options for deterrence and stability operations. Anticipating Surprise: Ultimately, the goal of DSO R&D investments is to ensure that U.S. warfighters have access to the most advanced technologies. Research funded under this thrust area supports scientific and technological discovery that leads to “leap ahead” capabilities for enhanced military readiness across multiple operational domains. Example topics of interest under this domain include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) novel functional and structural materials and manufacturing processes; (2) materials for harsh environments; (3) defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction/Weapons of Mass Terror (WMD/WMT) threats; (4) energetic materials; (5) new propulsion concepts; and (6) novel approaches to energy storage and power generation. For D3 agenda and registration instructions, please visit: https://www.fbo.gov/spg/ODA/DARPA/CMO/DARPA-SN-19-52/listing.html https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2019-05-20a

By Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press OTTAWA — Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is expected to announce Wednesday that the federal government is buying two more Arctic patrol ships on the top of the six it has already ordered from Halifax-based Irving Shipbuilding. However, unlike the first six ships, which are being built for the navy at a total cost of $3.5 billion, a government source said the seventh and eighth will be built for the Canadian Coast Guard. The source, who was not authorized to comment publicly, said the move is intended to address the Canadian Coast Guard's desperate need for new ships. Documents obtained by The Canadian Press earlier this year warned that more than a third of the coast guard's 26 large vessels have exceeded their expected lifespans — and many won't survive until replacements arrive. And that advanced age is already affecting the coast guard's ability to do its job, including reduced search-and-rescue coverage, ferry-service disruptions and cancelled resupply runs to Arctic and coastal communities. The second problem is the threat of layoffs, which Irving has long warned will happen unless the government fills a gap between when the last Arctic patrol ship is finished and construction on the navy's new $60-billion warship fleet, the source said. The government sought to address that gap in November when it ordered the sixth Arctic patrol vessel for the navy from Irving and agreed to pay the shipyard to slow production for a total cost of $800 million. Government officials at the time defended the high cost of that move, saying a third-party assessment commissioned by the government, which has never been made public, indicated it would cost even more to allow a gap to persist. "Ultimately what happens is the workforce gets laid off, you rehire people, it's not the same people so you're retraining, and then you have this learning curve," Patrick Finn, the Defence Department's head of procurement, said in January. "From some of the data we've run, doing what we've done, if we don't do it, we're probably going to pay that much money anyways in inefficiencies and get nothing for it. So the analysis shows that this is really a prudent way forward." Even then, federal bureaucrats and Irving both warned more would need to be done as even with those measures, there was still the threat of an 18- to 24-month gap between construction of the two fleets. Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press https://www.nationalnewswatch.com/2019/05/21/federal-government-to-buy-two-more-arctic-ships-from-irving-to-prevent-layoffs-2/#.XOVcKshKiUm

By THERESA HITCHENS BOSTON: BAE Systems, the third-largest defense contractor in the world, is funding innovative small startups to get innovative technology quickly to its Defense Department customers. Through an initiative called FAST Labs, BAE is both providing seed capital directly to startups and funding a number of accelerators to widen the potential market. The standard tactics include simply buying a smaller company to gain its technology or investing in a startup in order to control the direction of its research. Instead, BAE's FAST Labs is attempting to serve as a middle man connecting startups with DoD customers and BAE's various units. “By giving [the startups] the feasibility money, we can expose them to those harsh requirements that exist in the aerospace and defense world, but we can also in turn do social engineering inside our company,” Jerry Wohletz, the vice president and general management of BAE FAST Labs, told me. The idea is to introduce the startups' designs to BAE's factory and engineering work force, he said, “because we need to get it out of R&D land and get it into those products and services” that BAE knows its defense customers are looking for. FAST Labs is focused on research related to next-generation electronics, intelligent autonomous systems, cyber, electronic warfare, and sensors and processing. Wohletz explained that BAE does in-house research on capabilities that are solely of interest to DoD and the Intelligence Community, but it is reaching out to startups in order to partner on products and services based on commercial market needs. “A lot of aerospace and defense companies have venture capital funds,” Wohletz said. “That's not what we are trying to do. This is not an equity play to drive bottom line performance. We talk here about innovation velocity. We want speed to market.” Therefore, BAE is also putting its money — but more importantly its time — into a number of technology accelerators, such as Techstars in Boston, Capitol Factory in Austin, Texas, and MASSChallenge with hubs in both cities. FAST Labs has a team of scouts whose job is to attend pitches all across the country. “This is not based on ownership. We leave them their freedom,” Francesca Scire-Scappuzzo, who heads the scout team, told me. “We want innovation not just to support our market, we want to support their own innovation” for the commercial market. “Other defense contractors are trying to get involved with venture capital, but they for the most part don't really get it. BAE was in early, and they had the benefit of being linked with us,” Lt. Col. Dave Harden, chief operating officer of AFWERX, the Air Force's innovation hub, told me during the Techstars Air Force Accelerator Demo Day here last Thursday. Indeed, BAE cosponsored the event, and put upfront investment in at least three of 10 start-up companies participating. Neither Wohletz or Scire-Scappuzzo would tell me the size of BAE's budget for startup investment, but Wohletz said “it's getting bigger every year.” Further, the company is using accelerators not just to help itself innovate, Wohletz said, but also to find foreign companies to partner with in bids where the buying country requires offsets, such as India. “It's a completely different way of looking at this than we have done in the past,” he summed up. https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/bae-makes-big-bet-on-small-companies-fast-labs/

We fund innovation through two main mechanisms, the Open Call for Innovation and Themed Competitions. Open Call for Innovation The Open Call exists to offer suppliers the opportunity to submit their ideas to defence and security stakeholders. The Open Call welcomes innovations that address defence and/or security challenges. Please see some examples of work we have funded here. The Open Call is open for proposals all year round, with assessment dates scheduled across the year. More information on assessment dates can be found here. Themed Competitions Themed Competitions exist to offer suppliers the opportunity to submit proposals around specific government areas of interest. Themed competitions may only run for a short time and have set closing dates. DASA has had various themed competitions covering a range of topics. For details on past competitions, please see here. To see examples of projects that have been funded through themed competitions, please see here. Competitions currently open for application Closing Date Competition Title 28 May 2019 Countering drones - finding and neutralising small UAS threats 11 June 2019 Developing the Royal Navy's autonomous underwater capability 18 June 2019 Semi-autonomous reconnaissance vehicles for the Army 26 June 2019 Space to innovate 1 July 2019 Future screening for aviation and borders 9 July 2019 Open Call for Innovation - Cycle 2 Various Help us scope future competitions We also host a number of events; please see here for a list of our upcoming events. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/apply-for-funding

By: Megan Eckstein The Department of the Navy awarded Sikorsky a $1.13-billion contract for 12 CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopters, the Defense Department announced on Friday. The contract to the Lockheed Martin-owned company covers Lots 2 and 3 of the helicopter, which will replace the aging CH-53E Super Stallion. The Navy plans to buy 200 CH-53Ks over the life of the program. This award comes after an overhaul of the helicopter's test program, which had fallen behind due to inefficiencies in the test plan and technical problems in the design of the aircraft. Those problems included an exhaust gas reingestion problem in the helo's three-engine design. A recent Pentagon Selected Acquisition Report noted 126 design deficiencies, Bloomberg has reported, and the Department of the Navy has since worked with Sikorsky to restructure the remaining test program. After cost growth in the Lot 1 contract for the helicopters, the Navy and Marine Corps reduced this contract to 12, compared to a previous plan to buy 14 under Lots 2 and 3. “The aircraft quantity was negotiated for 12 vice 14 aircraft due to cost growth identified during Lot 1 production as well as the cost of incorporating the correction of known technical deficiencies that have resulted from developmental flight test to date,” Navy spokesman Capt. Danny Hernandez told USNI News. “The lower quantity will allow the program to afford the aircraft while preserving planned support efforts within the budget and program schedule.” In a Friday news release, Navy and Marine Corps leadership expressed confidence in the program despite the challenges it has faced over the past year or so. “The Marine Corps is very appreciative of the efforts by the Navy and our industry partners to be able to award the LRIP 2/3 contract,” Lt. Gen. Steven Rudder, the deputy commandant for aviation, said in a news release. “This is a win for the Marine Corps and will secure the heavy-lift capability we need to meet future operational requirements and support the National Defense Strategy. I'm very confident in the success of the CH-53K program and look forward to fielding this critical capability.” “This contract award reflects close cooperation and risk sharing between the Government and industry teams to deliver critical capabilities to the Marine Corps,” James Geurts, assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition, said in the release. “Working with our industry partners, the team ensured that solutions for technical challenges are incorporated into these production aircraft. This reflects the urgency to ensure we deliver capabilities necessary to support the Marine Corps and the Department of Navy's mission, while continuing to drive affordability and accountability into the program.” In a House Armed Services Committee hearing earlier this spring, Daniel Nega, the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for air programs, told lawmakers on the tactical air and land forces subcommittee that the upcoming contract would put the onus on Sikorsky to address remaining design flaws and fix any other problems that come up during the remainder of testing. “The flight envelope's been tested to the corners; Gen. Rudder talked about how we've sort of wrung it out,” he said at the hearing. “There's a relatively low risk that anything major will be found. However, if nuisance issues come along, we are not going to give those nuisance issues to the Marines, and the Navy and Marine Corps team is not going to accept the full risk of that. So the risk concurrency between the development and the production, that overlap is going to be taken care of.” Asked how the contract awarded today would do that, Hernandez told USNI News that “the production contract is structured to ensure a deployable configuration is delivered for fleet use. All known issues are included in the contract, additionally the contract provides provisions for any new issues discovered during flight testing. This will ensure appropriate shared risk between the government and industry.” Sikorsky's Path Forward Despite the ongoing technical challenges with the helicopter design and the delays in the test program – which has set back the planned start of initial operational test and evaluation but does not appear to threaten the planned first deployment of the helicopter in 2023 or 2024 – Sikorsky officials remain confident that the aircraft is on the right path following last year's restructure. “The majority of the technical issues that we've discovered over the 1,400 hours of flight test, nothing too terribly different than we would expect to find on a development program,” Bill Falk, Sikorsky's program director for CH-53K, told USNI News in an interview earlier this month. “The majority of them are already resolved, already proven and demonstrated in aircraft. We do have a set of issues that we still are in the process of resolving and demonstrating, but we've got a plan in place, parts installing in the aircraft and flight test plans to demonstrate that.” Falk said the company has dedicated one of its six test aircraft to tackle the exhaust gas reingestion issue, spending the last four or five months using computer-aided modeling and data from test flights to develop prototype solutions and test them out on the aircraft. “We have enough data that we now understand what solution we need to install on the aircraft, demonstrate and validate, which will become part of the production solution,” Falk said. “So we are at a completely different spot: where there was uncertainty four to five months ago, we have complete confidence now.” The new test plan is also more focused than the original one, tying each flight test to the delivery of a specific capability rather than just flying for flying's sake, Falk told USNI News. The helicopter has already demonstrated that it meets or exceeds all requirements for speed, range, altitude, lift capacity and more. Sikorsky and the Navy/Marine Corps team have also conducted hot weather and brownout condition testing in Arizona, and they have certified the helicopter can be transported via C-5 and C-17 cargo planes. A key upcoming test will be sea trials, where the CH-53K will have to prove it can fly on and off a flight deck and that Marines can maintain it at sea. Falk said the Navy is looking at a window of late February or early March through May of 2020 for sea trials, and that the tests will take place aboard a yet-to-be-decided amphibious assault ship. Initial operational test and evaluation is set to begin in early 2021, which would allow the Marine Corps to declare initial operational capability in time for the first deployment in 2023 or 2024. Though work still remains to be done, Paul Fortunato, director of Marine Corps business development at Sikorsky, and John Rucci, the company's senior experimental test pilot for the CH-53K, said the new helicopter has already proven it is easier to operate and maintain than its predecessor and that its warfighting capability surpasses the requirements for the aircraft. Rucci said pilots have total trust in the fly-by-wire cockpit, which essentially lands the helicopter on its own – meaning the pilots can focus on the mission at hand or evading a threat, or can safely land in a sandstorm or other degraded conditions. And Fortunado said the helo was built with easy maintenance in mind: fewer tools are required, the all-electronic maintenance documents include graphics that maintainers can zoom in on and rotate to help them maintain or repair parts, the logistics footprint is smaller and easier for deployments aboard amphibious ships. The design even includes putting electronic components in “backwards,” meaning the connections are facing outwards and easily accessible when maintainers take off a panel, instead of the wiring being in the back like usual and requiring a Marine to use a mirror to see what is going on behind the component. At Marine Corps Air Station New River in North Carolina, Falk said, Marines are using one of the system demonstration test article (SDTA) helicopters to work out any remaining issues in the maintenance manuals and to start learning more about how to fix and sustain the new helo. “There's Marines crawling around that aircraft, taking it apart, putting it back together again, running the maintenance procedures, and basically using what we developed in order for them to be able to maintain the aircraft,” Falk said. “So the opportunity for us before we start delivering production aircraft, we can learn from that, we can feed all that back, we can improve our maintenance procedures and basically when the aircraft is deployed deliver a much higher-quality, more efficient set of maintenance instructions. Plus, you've got Marines that have already used it, done it, learned.” https://news.usni.org/2019/05/17/navy-awards-sikorsky-1-13b-for-next-12-ch-53k-heavy-lift-helicopters

By PAUL MCLEARY Europe has bristled at a letter sent to the EU from the Pentagon and State Department, which says proposed EU defense programs are unfair to the US defense industry. WASHINGTON: Pentagon and State Department officials have told the European Union they're “deeply concerned” over plans to potentially exclude US defense firms from competing for billions worth of new arms deals, suggesting the US could slap restrictions on buying European defense equipment in retaliation. At issue is the proposed $14 billion European Defence Fund, and a host of procurement programs under the the Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO, the European economic alliance is undertaking. While the May 1 letter from Ellen Lord, Pentagon procurement chief, and Andrea Thompson, State's undersecretary for arms control and international security, expressed general support for the EU initiatives, it made clear the US would like to see significant changes in the draft language before the 28-country bloc votes on them as early as next month. The language in both documents, the US argues, feature intellectual property and export control restrictions that would act as “poison pills” to “effectively preclude participation by any company that uses U.S.-origin technology.” Overall, Lord and Thompson write, the conditions outlined in the EDF and PESCO documents “represent a dramatic reversal of the last three decades of increased integration of the transatlantic defense sector.” If the restrictions are kept in place, the US officials warn, “it is clear that similar reciprocally imposed U.S. restrictions would not be welcomed by our European partners and Allies, and we would not relish having to consider them in the future.” But EU officials defended their efforts this week. Asked about the US letter, an EU spokesperson replied in an email that the EDF and PESCO will “complement and strengthen NATO,” at a time in which the Trump administration has made that a key policy goal, and “enable Europe to shoulder its fair share of the burden and responsibility for global security.” But it's clear the letter has rankled the Europeans. “The EU has an open and competitive defense procurement framework, in fact more so than the US procurement market,” the spokesperson wrote. “In the EU, there is no ‘Buy European Act.' 81 percent of the total value of international defense contracts in Europe go to US firms. The US defense market is three to four times larger than that of the EU, and yet imports from the EU are marginal for the US, while EU imports from the US are significant.” The official said that American companies with subsidiaries in the EU will remain eligible for funding under the EDF subject to security conditions “which are similar – in fact less restrictive – to the ones that EU companies face in the US.” The EU's High Representative Federica Mogherini told reporters Tuesday that PESCO projects aren't meant to be a vehicle to increase transAtlantic ties, and the EU will gladly continue doing business with non-EU defense companies. The program “is not defined to be an instrument for partnership,” she said. “It does not substitute other partnerships, including in the defense industry and research that we have already in place and that are essential for us,” she added. For years, non-NATO countries like Sweden and Finland have drawn closer to NATO and have increased ties with US defense firms while also building their own domestic defense capabilities, though the relationship hasn't always been smooth. While the US government is concerned over US companies being excluded, the PESCO effort has been developed explicitly to bolster the ability of European countries to produce their own weapons systems, cyber capabilities, and surveillance technologies. So-called “third states” — non EU members — may ask to participate in PESCO projects, but all of the member states must vote to allow them in. Lord and Thompson argue that walling-off EU projects from NATO efforts would lead to duplication and waste, while decreasing interoperability between the EU and NATO. It could also “potentially tum the clock back to the sometimes divisive discussions about EU defense initiatives that dominated our exchanges 15 years ago.” In the end, the US letter is just the latest turn in what has been a complex, up and down relationship between the US and Europe under the Trump administration. The president has loudly condemned Washington's closest allies in Europe for not spending enough on their own defense, while threatening to pull out of NATO. At the same time, the US has increased troop levels in Europe and pumped over $11 billion into the European Deterrence Initiative over the past two years, in an effort to upgrade US and allied basing, increase joint exercises, and modernize equipment on the continent to counter the Russian threat. https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/state-dod-letter-warns-european-union-to-open-defense-contracts-or-else/