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MIRABEL, QC, le 15 août 2013 /CNW Telbec/ - L-3 MAS, avec son partenaire Avianor Inc., a annoncé aujourd'hui que le gouvernement canadien lui avait accordé le contrat pluriannuel subséquent visant à poursuivre le soutien en service (SES) complet de la flotte d'Airbus CC-150 Polaris du ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN). Ce nouveau contrat pluriannuel de SES du CC-150 représente une valeur potentielle de 683 millions de dollars et établit L-3 MAS comme entrepreneur de soutien au CC-150 du gouvernement jusqu'en 2018, entente à laquelle pourraient s'ajouter deux périodes de cinq années d'option. L-3 MAS avait obtenu le contrat intérimaire de SES du CC-150 en juin 2012. Les t'ches relevant de ce contrat seront exécutées à la base d'opérations du client à Trenton, Ontario, ainsi qu'aux installations de L-3 MAS et Avianor à Mirabel, Québec. « Nous comprenons l'importance stratégique des missions de la flotte de CC-150 et nous sommes honorés que le gouvernement canadien nous ait sélectionnés une fois de plus pour ce programme », a déclaré Jacques Comtois, vice-président et directeur général de L-3 MAS. « Depuis l'attribution du contrat intérimaire en juin dernier, l'équipe de L-3 MAS s'est consacrée à fournir à cette flotte stratégique du MDN un soutien stable et le meilleur rapport qualité-prix possible. Ce succès démontre toute l'importance que L-3 MAS accorde à ses clients, à la qualité de son travail et à ses relations d'affaires à long terme en tant que principal fournisseur canadien de SES pour des aéronefs militaires. » « Avianor est extrêmement heureuse de pouvoir continuer à participer au soutien de la flotte canadienne de CC-150 et de démontrer ses capacités exceptionnelles en maintenance, réparation et révision (MRO) commerciales », a ajouté Sylvain Savard, président et copropriétaire d'Avianor Inc. « Notre expérience avec les Airbus, notre agilité et notre structure tarifaire très concurrentielle nous permettront d'assurer une disponibilité opérationnelle maximale et d'offrir le meilleur rapport qualité/prix au gouvernement canadien. » La flotte de CC-150 Polaris est exploitée par le gouvernement pour des fonctions de haute importance comme le transport VIP et le ravitaillement en vol stratégique, ainsi que pour le transport de passagers et de marchandise et pour le transport médical. En tant qu'entrepreneur principal, L-3 MAS assurera la gestion globale du programme et du matériel, les services de soutien technique ainsi que l'entretien quotidien des appareils de la base des Forces canadiennes (BFC) Trenton. De son côté, Avianor prendra en charge les travaux d'entretien majeurs de la flotte ainsi que les services de réparation et révision des composants depuis ses installations à Mirabel. https://www.newswire.ca/fr/news-releases/l-3-mas-choisie-une-fois-de-plus-pour-assurer-le-soutien-en-service-de-la-flotte-dairbus-cc-150-du-mdn-512805701.html

Par Stéphane Parent | francais@rcinet.ca Le gouvernement canadien de Justin Trudeau prévoit investir 3 milliards au cours de la prochaine décennie pour maintenir en service ses avions de chasse CF-18 jusqu'à l'achat de nouveaux chasseurs. La facture ne tient pas compte cependant de la mise à niveau des systèmes électroniques de ces avions qui n'ont pas été modernisés depuis 2008. Nos CF-18 auront 50 ans en 2032, l'année où le gouvernement prévoit les retirer. Leur technologie de combat accusera alors un retard de 15 ans si elle n'est pas modernisée. Croyant qu'elle allait pouvoir les remplacer en 2020, la Défense nationale canadienne n'a pas préparé de plan pour mettre à jour leur capacité de combat. Le vérificateur général du Canada, Michael Ferguson, a critiqué le gouvernement libéral, le mois dernier, en soulignant que les montants prévus pour le maintien opérationnel de la flotte ne comprenaient en fait aucune mise à niveau réelle des systèmes de combat des avions, qui n'ont pas été revus depuis 2008. Des avions capables de voler, mais pourront-ils réellement nous défendre? Des représentants de la Défense ont affirmé à un comité de la Chambre des communes, lundi après-midi, qu'ils s'attendaient à avoir une idée d'ici le mois de mai du type de mises à niveau nécessaires. Des améliorations qui, selon des analystes, coûteront des centaines de millions, voire des milliards de dollars. Selon les données de la défense nationale du printemps dernier, 22 % des postes de techniciens dans les escadrons de CF-18 à Bagotville au Québec et à Cold Lake en Alberta étaient vacants ou occupés par des techniciens peu qualifiés. Un autre défi qui attend l'armée canadienne sera de trouver une façon de remédier à la pénurie de techniciens expérimentés pour réparer et entretenir les vieux avions. Elle cherche à sous-traiter certaines t'ches de maintenance des avions de combat vieillissants CF-18. Des responsables de la Défense estiment qu'ils sauront le printemps prochain quels capteurs, armes et autres mises à niveau seront nécessaires pour que les avions de combat CF-18 vieillissants du pays puissent encore effectuer des missions de combat jusqu'à leur remplacement. De moins en moins d'avions et de plus en plus d'argent Pas moins de 19 chasseurs F-18 se sont écrasés depuis l'acquisition de cette flotte de 138 appareils par l'Aviation royale canadienne au tout début des années 1980 au prix de 5 milliards de dollars. Dix pilotes ont perdu la vie dans ces écrasements. Seuls 76 des 138 CF-18 achetés dans les années 80 sont toujours en service. Craignant de ne plus être en mesure de maintenir le nombre de chasseurs qui doivent être prêts à décoller en tout temps comme l'exige son alliance militaire avec les États-Unis au sein du NORAD, le Canada a décidé l'an dernier d'acheter 18 avions de chasse usagés CF-18 de l'aviation militaire australienne. En septembre, les États-Unis ont finalement donné le feu vert à l'achat par le Canada des CF-18 australiens usagés. L'approbation des Américains était nécessaire parce que ces avions ont été construits aux États-Unis avec la technologie américaine. Si toutes les négociations et approbations se déroulent comme prévu, les avions commenceraient à arriver au Canada en 2019. De nouveaux avions attendus depuis près de 10 ans d'ici 7 ans et plus Les CF-18 mis en service dans les années 1980 devaient être retirés d'ici 2020, mais leur remplacement s'est transformé en une longue saga. Il y a six ans, le gouvernement conservateur de Stephen Harper a abandonné dans la controverse son projet d'acheter des avions de chasse américains F-35 sans appel d'offres pour remplacer cette flotte vieillissante. Le gouvernement Trudeau, qui avait par la suite décidé d'acheter 18 avions Super Hornet à Boeing également sans appel d'offres, a annulé cet achat en 2017 dans la foulée du conflit commercial entre Boeing et Bombardier. Il a donc fini par se tourner vers l'Australie pour acheter des avions de chasse provisoires et a lancé un appel d'offres pour acheter 88 avions de chasse permanents. On s'attend maintenant à ce qu'il faille de cinq à sept ans pour réunir un nombre suffisant de pilotes et de techniciens à temps pour commencer à faire la transition des CF-18 vers de nouveaux avions ultramodernes. La livraison du premier avion est prévue en 2025, et celle du dernier en 2031. http://www.rcinet.ca/fr/2018/12/04/modernisation-vieux-cf-18-canada-verificateurs-avion-chasse-australien/

Lee Berthiaume / The Canadian Press OTTAWA — New court documents show public servants discussing the risk to taxpayers as successive federal governments have turned to sole-source contracts to buy desperately needed equipment for the Canadian Forces and others. The documents were filed on behalf of suspended Vice-Admiral Mark Norman, who is charged with breach of trust in connection with one such contract. They land amid frustrations with Canada's military procurement system — including because of political mismanagement — that have led to the need for quick fixes. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's government has chosen to sign several sole-source contracts to bolster the coast guard's aging icebreaking fleet and the country's fighter-jet force, buying time to find permanent replacements. Sole-sourcing does make sense in many cases, said defence analyst David Perry of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, particularly where there is an emergency or it's clear that only one company can meet the government's needs. "But if you're sole-sourcing to fill a capability gap, that's the result of mismanaging a procurement to the point where you are out of options and have no alternative," Perry said. "That's not really a good reason to be sole-sourcing." The Tories under Stephen Harper once intended to buy a fleet of F-35 fighter jets on an untendered contract, but aborted that plan in 2012 once the full price became known. Then the Trudeau government planned to spend about $6 billion on 18 sole-sourced "interim" Super Hornets from Boeing because it said Canada needed more fighter jets to support its aging CF-18s until replacements could be purchased through a competition. The Super Hornets deal eventually fell apart because of a trade dispute with Boeing. So the government is buying 25 second-hand Australian fighter jets, also without a competition. Canada isn't expected to get new fighter jets until at least 2025. The Liberals also recently bought three second-hand icebreakers from Quebec-based Davie Shipbuilding for the coast guard, whose existing fleet is on average 35 years old — with no immediate plan to replace it on the horizon. Suspended as the military's second-in-command in January 2017, Norman was charged in March 2018 with one count of breach of trust for allegedly leaking cabinet secrets to Davie over a different contract. He has denied any wrongdoing and vowed to fight the charge. The case against Norman centres on a sole-sourced deal negotiated between Davie and the previous Conservative government in 2015, in which the Quebec shipyard proposed converting a civilian cargo ship into a temporary support vessel for the navy. The $700-million contract with Davie was not finalized before that year's federal election. Although the newly elected Liberals at first wanted to delay it for a closer review, they signed off on the deal a short time later. Before Liberal ministers agreed to buy the converted ship, bureaucrats from the Privy Council Office, the government's top department, wrote a secret briefing note in November 2015 that discussed the problems with not holding a competition. "The risk inherent with a sole-source contract is that much of the leverage in the contract negotiation resides with the company," the bureaucrats wrote, even as they noted that the Conservatives had exempted the deal from the usual oversight for such projects. Despite these concerns, the officials recommended the government approve the deal. Partly because they had assessed that "risk mitigation measures" were in place, but mostly because the navy urgently needed a support ship for faraway operations. The court documents, none of which have been filed as exhibits or tested in court, include RCMP interviews with civil servants that suggest politicians' desire for votes in Quebec also played a role in the decisions about the ship. But the navy's need for the vessel was real. The navy at the time had just retired its 50-year-old support ships and while replacements are being built in Vancouver through the government's national shipbuilding plan, numerous delays and problems mean they won't be ready until the 2020s. The navy had originally expected to get new support ships in 2012. The briefing note said a competition could have been held to find another, perhaps cheaper, solution, but "a competitive process would take longer to deliver a solution — likely 10-14 months for a contract award, and then more time for the service to be ready." RCMP interviews with several senior civil servants raise similar concerns about awarding a contract to Davie without a competition while also alluding to the sense of urgency in getting new support ships. The Defence Department's head of procurement, Patrick Finn, told the Mounties that other companies were clamouring to compete to supply a temporary support ship in late 2014, and that "the information existed to say that this could be done competitively." But Finn noted that Davie had already found a ship that it could convert for the navy, which "at that point had no replenishment ships." Melissa Burke, an analyst with the Privy Council Office who attended various cabinet meetings about Davie's proposal in 2015, told the RCMP that federal procurement officials were unhappy because "they felt the taxpayers were getting a raw deal." https://www.timescolonist.com/sole-sourced-contracts-can-be-raw-deal-top-officials-said-in-navy-ship-case-1.23516431

LEE BERTHIAUME OTTAWA THE CANADIAN PRESS PUBLISHED DECEMBER 3, 2018UPDATED DECEMBER 3, 2018 The Canadian military is looking to contract out some maintenance work on the country's aging CF-18 fighter jets as well as training to help address a shortage of experienced technicians. Defence officials revealed the plan during a Commons committee meeting on Monday, in which they also defended the time needed to pick a new jet for the air force and faced calls to reveal how much it will cost to upgrade the CF-18s' combat systems. The technician shortage was first revealed in an explosive auditor general's report last month in which the watchdog took aim at the Liberals' plan to buy second-hand Australian jets by warning the air force needed more technicians and pilots – not planes. A number of measures are being introduced to address both shortfalls, air force commander Lt.-Gen. Al Meinzinger told the committee, including the contracting out of more involved maintenance that usually takes place away from the front lines as well as some tech training. The initiatives will free up about 200 experienced aircraft technicians so they can work directly on planes in the field and keep them flying, Meinzinger said, adding in an interview after the meeting that the move would not affect combat readiness. Initiatives are also being introduced to better support military families, which Meinzinger identified as a key contributing factor in why many pilots and technicians are leaving, while the air force is looking at a new training model to produce more pilots. Even with these measures, Meinzinger said he expected it to take between five and seven years to have a full complement of pilots and technicians in time to start transitioning from the CF-18s to new state-of-the-art replacements. “We're putting our shoulder to the wheel,” Meinzinger told The Canadian Press. “This is a top priority. But it's going to take some time, obviously.” Defence officials faced pointed questions from members of Parliament on both sides of the table during Monday's committee meeting about the length of time it is expected to take for those new replacements to be selected and delivered. A request for proposals will be released in the spring, with bids due in early 2020. Another full year has been set aside to evaluate those bids and another for negotiations with the winner. Delivery of the first aircraft is expected in 2025 and the last in 2031. The Defence Department's head of procurement, Patrick Finn, underscored the complexity of the $19-billion project, which has been plagued by delays and political mismanagement for more than a decade as Canada has sought to choose a new fighter. Those complexities include the usual challenges evaluating and negotiating the capabilities of each of the four aircraft that are expected to compete, Finn said, as well as the industrial benefits to Canada and intellectual-property rights. At the same time, he added, the process for actually purchasing each of the planes is different given, for example, that Canada is a member of the F-35 stealth fighter project while the U.S. government would need to officially sign off on buying Super Hornets. In fact, Finn said the government has only limited flexibility in its schedule given that most manufacturers can only start delivering aircraft three years after an order is made – though he remained confident that the timeline would be met. The length of time was nonetheless a clear concern to some committee members. Officials were also grilled over the cost of upgrading the CF-18s' sensors, weapons and defensive measures after the auditor general found $3-billion in planned investments over the next decade was only to keep them flying and did not include their combat systems. The Defence Department's top bureaucrat, deputy minister Jody Thomas, told the committee that an analysis is underway, which includes consulting with the U.S. and other allies, and that a plan is expected in the spring. But opposition members challenged Thomas when she suggested that the department would not be able to provide cost estimates to the committee before being presented to the government, saying even if it is a matter of security, they are entitled to the information. “A unilateral declaration by a deputy or anybody that a parliamentary committee cannot have information is unacceptable,” NDP MP David Christopherson said. “There needs to be one more step to pursue that so that question, which is entirely legitimate in my opinion, can be answered in a way that respects the security and defence issues but also upholds the right of Parliament to demand any information they so choose.” https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-plan-for-combat-upgrades-to-aging-cf-18s-expected-in-may-defence

Murray Brewster · CBC News The Liberal government has budgeted up to $20 million in this fiscal year to rejoin NATO's Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) program, reversing a Conservative-era budget cut in the name of alliance utility and solidarity. Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan and other senior officials recently appeared before a House of Commons committee to talk about the country's return to the long-standing alliance programme, which sees more than a dozen nations cost-share the operation of E3-A surveillance planes. New documents, released to CBC News under access to information law, show Canada has agreed to a partial return to the program through operations and support. It's a compromise decision that leaves the country's aerospace companies partly out in the cold — and one expert is questioning whether the reasons which led the former government to drop out of the program still exist. One of the major complaints voiced about the program behind closed doors in Stephen Harper's government had to do with NATO's reluctance to deploy the sophisticated surveillance aircraft on missions to Afghanistan and Iraq. The aircraft eventually were used for those missions, but not without considerable debate and what some Canadian officials saw as foot-dragging on NATO's part. 'A tough sell' Defence expert Dave Perry said that, going forward, the Liberals will have to justify this particular reinvestment more carefully. "If they don't actually use them in an operational context when it matters, then it's going to be a tough sell," he told CBC News. National Defence defends the decision to jump back into the program, saying in an email that "several things have changed, causing Canada to re-evaluate the relevancy" of its participation. A major factor is the introduction of the Liberal government's new defence policy, which emphasizes the need for better surveillance and reconnaissance. Canada had been part of the AWACS program for decades. When the Conservatives pulled the plug they cast the decision in economic terms, saying it had "little direct benefit." The planes were deployed in Europe and occasionally on other operations. The debate within the Harper government was over the logic of paying for a defence system that doesn't contribute directly to the defence of North America. "Accordingly, it is debatable whether it is appropriate for Canada to carry nearly 10 per cent of the programme, given that it is one of the two NATO members on the North American side of the Atlantic Ocean, and, as such, would benefit considerably less from AWACS than the 26 members on the European side," reads a March 22, 2016 internal government briefing note. NATO AWACS aircraft currently fly surveillance missions in support of reassurance measures in eastern Europe ordered after Russia's annexation of Crimea. The program is also providing "tailored assurance measures" for Turkey because of the crisis in Syria and is watching out for terrorist movement in the Mediterranean Sea. "I think time will tell, and it will depend on whether these aircraft are actually used," said Perry, an analyst at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. "If they're not used, then it will be a struggle to justify Canadian participation, however good it is for wider burden-sharing within the alliance and support to allies." Business opportunities The internal briefing note shows the decision to quit in 2011 cost Canadian defence contractors the right to bid on hundreds of millions of dollars in work related to the modernization of observation planes, known for their distinctive radar domes. Rejoining the plan will allow Canadian companies a finite set of bidding opportunities, a National Defence spokeswoman said. "Canada did not regain access to AWACS-related industrial benefits for modernization and upgrade when it re-engaged with the program," said Jessica Lamirande in an email. "However, Canadian industry has regained eligibility to compete for contracts related to the operations and maintenance of the AWACS." The briefing shows Canada is, in some respects, being treated like a new member of the plan, which means Ottawa pays for operations and support of the aircraft "while the fleet modernization will continue to be the responsibility of the programme's current 16 members, who will retain all of the industrial benefits associated with the programme." Prior to the Liberal government's decision to return to the program, officials held out the hope that rejoining might "restore Canada's ability to bid on such contracts." Conservative defence critic James Bezan described the government's approach as a "half-measure" and said rejoining AWACS became necessary after the Ukrainian crisis. "They're not spending as much as we were and we're not getting the full benefits of industrial contracts," he said, noting the Commons defence committee pointed out that Canada was not getting everything it could out of NATO contract opportunities. "The Liberals are always late to the table and that's what we're seeing here." https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/awac-nato-surveillance-ukraine-1.4931098

by Ken Pole As the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) gears up for the late 2019 arrival of the first of 16 new Airbus CC-295 fixed-wing search and rescue (FWSAR) aircraft, a Senate committee said the government should consider the deployment of even more search and rescue (SAR) aircraft. “This would be a multi-year, mega-government dollar capital procurement project,” the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans acknowledged in an exhaustive new report, When Every Minute Counts: Maritime Search and Rescue. “Repositioning current aeronautical SAR assets is not feasible . . . at this time because the fleet is fully utilized.” The November 2018 report is based on more than two years of study and hearings, which wrapped up in October. While most witnesses were heard in Ottawa — including senior RCAF, Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) and Transport Canada officials, as well as representatives of several industries — the committee also travelled to bases across the country as well as visiting officials and SAR facilities in England, Ireland, Norway and Denmark. RCAF fixed- and rotary-wing assets are a key element in covering nearly 18 million square kilometres of land and sea. In 2017, the Joint Rescue Coordination Centres in Victoria, Trenton and Halifax responded to 10,003 SAR calls, 62 per cent of them maritime. The committee predicts that the number of calls in the Arctic will increase as global warming results in a longer ice-free navigation period. Accordingly, the report recommends that the CCG establish additional primary search and rescue stations in the Canadian Arctic, where no SAR aircraft are currently based. It also calls on the Department of National Defence (DND) to authorize a pilot project which would see private civilian helicopters provide coverage in the North as well as in Newfoundland and Labrador, where the committee says “a disproportionately high number” of SAR incidents occur. In addition to the possible privatization of some missions (CHC Helicopter and Cougar Helicopters Inc. appeared before the committee), the committee also said the CCG should be an independent agency. “The Canadian Coast Guard . . . is hampered by its position within Fisheries and Oceans Canada, which leaves it at the mercy of the department for funding and prevents it from receiving long-term sustainable capital funding.” SAR reaction times were also an issue for the committee. It was told that the CCG's official time is 30 minutes from when a helicopter or ship is tasked until it departs, but that it usually takes less than 15 minutes in the case of a surface vessel, because they are probably on the water already. In comparison, the RCAF has a reaction time of 30 minutes during a typical eight-hour working day five days a week, and two hours at all other times. “Like the CCG vessels, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) crews are often airborne sooner than the targeted reaction time, around 20 minutes during working hours and one hour outside of working hours,” the committee notes. “However, there was considerable discussion regarding what witnesses called the CAF's ‘two-tier reaction time.' It was stressed that the two-hour reaction time guaranteed outside of working hours had . . . resulted in missions becoming recovery-oriented instead of rescue-oriented. In their view, the CAF should have a reaction time of 30 minutes, 24/7/365, like the CCG.” DND witnesses told the committee the concern had been addressed “to the extent possible” and it was the responsibility of SAR commanders in the three regions to align the 30-minute reaction time to coincide with the observed periods of greatest maritime SAR activity. “Overall, the committee was told that shifting the regular weekly schedules without increasing the total number of hours worked has improved readiness.” It also was told it was impossible for the RCAF to maintain 30-minute readiness at all times because “pilots and SAR aircrew members have a limit on how long they can engage in flying operations.” Sustaining a 30-minute target would require crews to remain poised on flight lines. “The two-hour reaction time allows the pilots and aircrews to be ‘fresh' and able to deliver a SAR response for up to 14, 16, 18 hours, which allows them to then go longer, further distances. Moreover, the increased level of readiness would require more aircraft, add more maintenance and necessitate infrastructure upgrades.” The committee says that despite improvements, Canada's SAR reaction time is “not at par” with other countries. “Aeronautical SAR assets operated in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark respond within 15 minutes during the day and between 30 and 45 minutes at night.” The committee says that given current shortfalls in the RCAF's pilot, flight engineer and SAR Technician cadres, it isn't possible to impose similar reaction times on RCAF crews. But it says it hopes the RCAF will reconsider its reaction time targets once personnel shortages are addressed. https://www.skiesmag.com/news/senate-committee-outlines-recommendations-for-canadian-sar

Airbus reports it is on track to provide Canadian industry with the required level of high-value work associated with the fixed-wing search and rescue (FWSAR) aircraft replacement in-service support (ISS) program. In its first FWSAR Value Proposition ISS annual report to the Government of Canada, submitted earlier this year and covering 2017, the company declared that more than 80 per cent of the ISS work was already being performed by Canadian industry in Canada. That data has now been validated and accepted by Canada. The activity, led by Airbus and its Canadian ISS integration partner AirPro – a joint venture with PAL Aerospace – is rapidly generating work and employment at partners such as CAE and Accenture. AirPro itself has already recruited nearly 20 highly qualified full-time staff to work on FWSAR ISS, and is adding resources in fields such as aeronautical engineering, architecture, construction, information technology and project management. More than 125,000 Canadian labour hours of work were performed by five companies in 2017 and the figure will grow more rapidly as many other companies begin their supply roles further into the program. The AirPro activity in particular will markedly increase as the Airbus CC-295 aircraft enters service and day-to-day ISS activities such as maintenance begin. Simon Jacques, president of Airbus Defence and Space in Canada, said: “We are proud of having made such a successful start to the development and transfer of capability to Canada with all the associated high value work that it brings. Ensuring an active role for AirPro in this set-up phase will ensure that it has a solid preparation for its ISS role in the operational phase. And this new expertise has the potential to be reused in other Canadian programs.” Canada's Industrial and Technological Benefits (ITB) Policy applies to the FWSAR contract and ensures that the total value of the contract is leveraged resulting in high-value jobs in the Canadian economy. The FWSAR program is supporting some $2.5 billion in Industrial and Technological Benefits to Canada, through high-value, long-term partnerships with Canadian industry. “The work done in Canada as part of the fixed-wing search and rescue project demonstrates the tangible benefits of our Industrial and Technological Benefits Policy for Canadian industry,” said the Honourable Navdeep Bains, minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development. “This project will provide the Canadian Armed Forces with the equipment and services they need to keep Canada safe, and the Industrial and Technological Benefits Policy ensures Canadians have access to middle-class jobs, growing our economy along the way.” https://www.skiesmag.com/press-releases/airbus-reports-strong-progress-in-generating-fwsar-work-in-canada

Les conclusions du rapport du vérificateur général soulignant une pénurie de pilotes militaires au Canada résonnent particulièrement au Manitoba, où la formation initiale des pilotes des Forces armées canadiennes est donnée et supervisée. Un texte de Pierre Verrière Il est difficile de parler de l'Aviation royale canadienne sans évoquer le Manitoba. Pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les pilotes de tout le Commonwealth venaient y suivre leur formation avant d'être déployés en Europe. Depuis 1992, la troisième École de pilotage des Forces canadiennes située à Portage-la-Prairie, à une heure de Winnipeg, assure la formation de base des pilotes canadiens. Enfin, c'est à Winnipeg qu'est situé le quartier général de la 2e Division aérienne du Canada, responsable de l'instruction des pilotes. Or, ce sont justement ces pilotes qui font gravement défaut, selon le vérificateur général du Canada. Ce dernier met notamment l'accent sur les pilotes de chasse. Selon le vérificateur, il en manque plus du tiers pour satisfaire aux exigences opérationnelles. Parmi les raisons évoquées, on compte le rythme auquel les pilotes quittent l'aviation, qui est plus rapide que celui auquel elle peut en former de nouveaux. Entre avril 2016 et mars 2018, l'Aviation royale canadienne a ainsi perdu 40 pilotes de chasse qualifiés et en a formé seulement 30 nouveaux. Ce problème n'est cependant pas nouveau ni étranger pour les responsables de la formation des pilotes. Article complet: https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/1139188/penurie-pilotes-forces-armees-canadiennes-manitoba

Murray Brewster · CBC News The last couple of weeks may go down in the Trudeau government's public record as the point when the desires of deliverology met the drawbacks of defence procurement. Remember 'deliverology'? That lofty concept — measuring a government's progress in delivering on its promises — was the vogue in policy circles at the beginning of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's administration. While it's sometimes derided as an empty concept, deliverology must have seemed tailor-made for a new government inheriting a troubled defence procurement system. The Canadian International Trade Tribunal's decision Tuesday to step into the brawl over which multinational consortium will design and support the construction of the navy's new frigates is another lesson in how (apologies to Robert Burns) the best laid plans of mice and men go awry. The tribunal's decision to order Ottawa to put the frigate project on hold pending the completion of their probe into a complaint by a failed bidder comes at a politically awkward time for the Liberals. One week ago, Auditor General Michael Ferguson delivered an ugly report on the Liberals' handling of fighter jet procurement — specifically, the plan to buy interim warplanes to cover the gap until the current CF-18 fleet can be replaced with new aircraft. Self-inflicted wounds A cynic's reflex (given the checkered history of defence purchasing over the last decade) might be to consider these two events as just another day at the office for the troubled government procurement system. That might not be entirely fair. Still, experts were saying Wednesday that the government is suffering from numerous self-inflicted political and administrative wounds on this file. With a federal election on the horizon, and in a climate of growing geopolitical instability, the question of what the government has actually managed to deliver on military procurement is an important one to ask, said Rob Huebert, an analyst in strategic studies at the University of Calgary. While the system, as the Trudeau Liberals and previous governments have constructed it, seems to be the perfect model of the "evidence based" policy making promised by the champions of deliverology, it's also not built for speed. Some would suggest the deliverology model was followed to the letter in the design competition now tied up before the trade tribunal and in Federal Court. What seemed like endless consultations with the bidders took two years. The government made up to 88 amendments to the tender. And in the end, the preferred bid was challenged by a competitor that claims not all of the navy's criteria were met. Alion Science and Technology Corp. and its subsidiary, Alion Canada, argue the warship Lockheed Martin Canada and BAE System Inc. want to sell to Ottawa cannot meet the speed requirements set by the tender without a substantial overhaul. It does not, the company claims, meet the government's demand for a proven, largely off-the-shelf design. Michael Armstrong, who teaches at Brock University and holds a doctorate in management science, said the government could have avoided the challenges and accompanying slowdowns had it been more precise in its language. "They could have been more clear and firm when they use the words 'proven design'," he said. "Did they literally mean we won't buy ships unless they're floating in the water? Or did they mean that British one that doesn't quite exist yet is close enough? "If they would have been more firm and said, 'We want a ship that actually exists,' that might have simplified things at this stage." Huebert described the auditor general's report on the purchase of interim fighters as an all-out assault on evidence-based policy making. "It is just so damning," he said. A break with reality The Conservatives have accused the Liberals of avoiding the purchase of the F-35 stealth jet through manufacturing a crisis by claiming the air force doesn't have enough fighters to meet its international commitments. The auditor found that the military could not meet the government's new policy commitment and even ignored advice that one of its proposed solutions — buying brand-new Super Hornets to fill the capability gap —would actually make their problems worse, not better. That statement, said Huebert, suggested a jaw-dropping break with reality on the government's part. "They [the Liberals] were just making things up," he said. It might have been too optimistic to expect the Liberals to fix the system, said Armstrong, given the short four years between elections. But Huebert said Ottawa can't carry on with business as usual — that the government now must deliver on procurement, instead of doubling down on rhetoric. The problem, he said, is that governments haven't really paid a price in the past for botched military procurement projects. There was "no political pain for the agony of the Sea King replacement, as an example," he said, referring to the two-decade long process to retire the air force's maritime helicopters. "The thing that makes me so concerned, even outraged, is that we are heading into a so much more dangerous international environment," said Huebert, citing last weekend's clash between Russia and Ukraine over the Kerch Strait and ongoing tension with Beijing in the South China Sea. "When things get nasty, we have to be ready." https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/why-can-t-ottawa-get-military-procurement-right-1.4924800