August 20, 2019 | International, Aerospace, Land
By: Jen Judson
HUNTSVILLE, Alabama — The Missile Defense Agency has a new director, Vice Admiral Jon Hill, who will be tasked to carry out major missile defense endeavors laid out in the Missile Defense Review released in January.
Hill is the son of an Army air defender and became deputy director of the agency in 2016. Prior to that he served as the U.S. Navy's Program Executive Officer for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) beginning in 2014.
The new director will have to guide the agency through a series of major decisions in the coming years —from refining its approach to a global, layered missile defense, to tackling advanced threats like hypersonic missiles, upgrading homeland defense to protect against, ballistic missiles, to designing, developing and initiating a space-based sensor layer, just to name a few.
With his expansive plate full, Hill said he's prepared to ensure the agency has investment in the right places and that efforts move as quickly as they can to outpace current and emerging missile threats.
Defense News sat down with Hill in an exclusive interview at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, to discuss his goals and the challenges ahead.
What are your major priorities as you take up your post as Missile Defense Agency director and what do you believe will be your biggest challenges on the job?
I would say the number one challenge is the poorly defined term of “transfer to the services.” After looking at this problem very closely, considering congressional language, looking at how it's interpreted differently, I really do think that, we, as a country, need to say what is the right thing to do to take care of the war fighter. That should be the number one issue here.
So there's been lots of discussion about the [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System]and the SM-3 [missile] transfer to the services. What does that mean? If it's operations and sustainment, that's done. Put it in the done pile. The Army invests heavily in the operations and sustainment of THAAD. I don't know what more we would want out of them. ... The [Army and Navy] are not running away from the mission. They want to execute the mission, and again, they do operations and sustainment very well.
I often hear that we don't know how to transfer. Look at the Aegis ships today. Navy procures those ships with Ballistic Missile Defense capability. The Navy has come in and said, “Hey, we're going to build a multi-mission radar to include BMD capability in SPY-6.” Man, what's wrong with that? That's fantastic. You look at the SM-6, where the Navy procures, produces that missile. It's a multi-mission missile. We insert sea-based terminal capability.
So it tends to come down to those two systems that are BMD focused — SM-3 and THAAD — and so that's why it gets suspicious when we don't have a fully defined term because all it really results in is fracturing a program during a time where it's most critical to have those programs stable and taking care of the warfighter.
What are some other priorities and challenges you will tackle?
I would say the bigger challenge though is really driven by the threat today and Dr. [Michael] Griffin [under secretary for research and engineering in the Office of the Secretary of Defense] speaks about the Space Development Agency. We're aligned with the strategy, we're aligned with their architecture and their engineering of [a space] constellation because we bring the capability for hypersonic and ballistic tracking. We have support from Congress to do that. The department wants and needs us to go do that.
It's just important to get that deployed as soon as possible. So we have to maintain stable investment. We need to get to a near-term, on-orbit demo as fast as we can, and then we need to build out the constellation in concert with the Space Development Agency. If we do that, we're in a great place.
And in parallel, we need to start looking at our existing systems, which we have been doing. We're making modifications to today's sensors, both terrestrial and in space today on ships, on land, and we're modifying those today to deal with that new, high-end threat. We're also looking at existing weapons. What can they do? Somewhere in that battle space though, there's probably the need for more capability and that's really the next step and where we as a country need to go.
You advocated for a Hawaiian missile defense radar and noted that while the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System, designed to protect the homeland, is a good system, more radars need to be in place. Can you talk more about the advanced threat and the need to enhance missile defense sensing capability?
When you look at a ballistic flight for example, you boost, you have things like V-Bands and separation mechanisms, you've got staging, you've got post-boost vehicles, and you've got the lethal object; that's messy from the standpoint of a radar. So when the radar's staring at all that mess — the word discrimination means, “Hey, I've have got to discriminate all the garbage and make sure I'm pointing at the right thing.” Reduce the amount of radar energy I'm putting on all the garbage, so I've got to very quickly discriminate. So discrimination's important. And as they become more complex, the radar, in a sense of the architecture we have today, is not ready to take on larger numbers coming in and more complexity. Having a large radar on the island allows you to see out far. So the bigger the aperture is, the more fine detail it gets too.
I think we owe it to the Hawaiian people. We owe it to that state. It's part of this country and they deserve to be defended and they want to be defended. We have great congressional support. So at the federal level we're good, at the state level, we're good. We're at the sensitive level now where the local communities are concerned about what it means for the environment and we understand that. So we're working very closely with them. It's an important capability. It fills out the sensor architecture and takes us to the next level in terms of central architecture in that region.
Why do we need a space-based missile defense sensor layer?
We're running out of islands to put radars on and the ships that the Navy has, they are equipped with 360-degree radars, very powerful radars that can discriminate. But ... we need to free up those ships as much as we can and get as much persistent sensor coverage as we possibly can. And space really answers the mail on all those aspects, it frees up those other assets that we can go use for other missions.
An analysis of alternatives has been completed on hypersonic defense. Is there anything you can share about the findings in the AOA and how that is guiding the path forward?
For that space mission you have to look at the sum total of the detection, the control and the engagement. [It is] the sensors, it is the command-and-control, it is the fire control and it is the weapons, whether they're hard kill or non-kinetic. So, it's all of that. It provides the department a broad view: here is the threat space we're dealing with, here's the architecture, here are the pieces of that architecture that do detection, control and engagement. And now Department of Defense, where shall we put our next dollar? Could be that next dollar goes to space. It could be that next dollar goes toward fire control improvements so that you can handle something that's flying this fast, greater than Mach 5. It could be that we're going to put another dollar on improving an existing system or that we need a new engagement system. So that's what it does. It's really a tool. It's not the answer. I've seen a lot of the reports that say, “Oh my God, it's so expensive. We'll never execute it.” The intent is never to go fully execute what's in an AOA. It's the full trade space. Now we've got to go pick from that trade space and so we finished up a [Cost Assessment Program Evaluation] sufficiency review. Not only have we done the work to do the alternatives ... the CAPE has come in and they've costed those out to say, here's what's a reasonable set. The department can make a decision as to what would be best.
Is the SM-3 Block IIA missile test that goes up against an intercontinental ballistic missile threat still scheduled for next year?
It is still scheduled for next year. Now what you should know is that Congress has sent us some messaging that says maybe we don't want to do that, maybe we should more fully explore the battle space for which the missile was designed. ... Congress first told us to go against an ICBM. That's what we're focused in on. And so if the appropriations come through and there's a change, then we have to go back and replan.
Would the delay in the test result in overall program delays?
It wouldn't delay the program. But it makes it difficult for us to say that there is a potential for an underlay. So, if we want to give the combatant commanders a layered defense against ICBMs, it kind of takes that off the table or it delays that for awhile and we'll use the IIAs for their intended battle space and we won't try to expand it.
What's happening with the “strategic pause” on the Redesigned Kill Vehicle for the GMD system?
We're still in a decision space. ... Dr. Griffin is going through the end-game of discussions now within the building. We're in full support and in the end we'll make a decision and we'll press forward with that.
Do you have a timeline for making a decision on the RKV?
We're definitely pressured and what drives that pressure is the fact that we were on a path to deliver the additional 20 [ground-based interceptors]. ... We're building out the missile field. So there is pressure to come to a decision quickly so that we can then get back to work.
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Tony Osborne Jen DiMascio May 28, 2020 The decision by the U.S. government to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty signed two decades ago is creating ripples of discontent within the U.S. and in Europe. Washington announced on May 22 that it would end its obligations to the arms control treaty in six months, saying that it was “no longer in the United States' best interest to remain a party to this Treaty when Russia does not uphold its commitments,” in a statement put out by the Defense Department. The Open Skies Treaty permits its 34 signatories to conduct observation flights over each other's territory. Aircraft with four types of sensors—-optical panoramic and framing cameras, real-time video cameras, infrared line-scanners and sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar—may make observations anywhere over a country's national territory. Treaty rules say that the flight may only be restricted for reasons of flight safety, not for reasons of national security. NATO and European nations may share U.S. concerns about inconsistent flight restrictions imposed by Moscow but see a U.S. departure from the agreement, in place since 1992, as regrettable. According to the U.S. and NATO, Russia has imposed restrictions on the treaty, in particular those flying near Kaliningrad, Russia's enclave on the Baltic Sea, and near the country's border with Georgia. The Pentagon also says Moscow blocked the overflight of a major military exercise in September 2019, “preventing the exact transparency the treaty is meant to provide.” In an op-ed in The New York Times, Tim Morrison, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a former member of this administration's National Security Council, added that Russia has been using its overflights to collect “military relevant intelligence on the other parties, like the means to target critical infrastructure.” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, during the May 22 meeting of alliance members, called on the Russian government to return to compliance as soon as possible, noting that the U.S. could reconsider its position if Russia complied. European Open Skies Treaty member states—including Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden—said they would continue to implement the treaty, saying it has a “clear added value” for conventional arms control architecture and cooperative security. Russia rejects the claims of flight restrictions and contends that the U.S. had limited Russia's own Open Skies flights over Hawaii and the Aleutian Islands. Senior Russian officials, including Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, denounced Washington's decision. Medvedev said the U.S. had taken another step down the “path of dismantling the international security architecture that took decades to lay down.” Moscow believes Washington's decision could also affect other arms control treaties, with negotiations on the next New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty potentially at risk. In Washington, the leaders of the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees (both Democrats) have written a letter to Defense Secretary Mark Esper and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo contending that withdrawal from the treaty is illegal. They say it violates the fiscal 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires Esper and Pompeo to notify Congress 120 days before the intent to withdrawal is presented. “This notification must be based on your joint conclusion that withdrawal is in the best interests of the United States and that other states parties to the treaty have been consulted. To date, this requirement has not been fulfilled,” wrote Reps. Adam Smith (Wash.), the Armed Services chairman, and Eliot Engel (N.Y.), the Foreign Affairs chairman. President Donald Trump and his administration have support from Repub-licans who lead the Senate for their decision to exit the treaty. Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.), who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserts that the U.S. should withdraw if Russia is not complying with the agreement. “It will be critical for the Trump administration to continue working with our allies and partners, especially those in Eastern Europe, to ensure they have access to the intelligence they need to protect their security. That includes facilitating access to high-quality imagery.” The U.S. had planned to upgrade the two Boeing OC-135 aircraft delivered to the Air Force in 1996. Late last year, the U.S. issued a request for information saying it was considering awarding two contracts—one for the purchase of two commercial aircraft and another to modify the airframe and provide logistics support. But the Pentagon did not include funding for OC-135 upgrades in its fiscal 2020 budget request. And in March, Esper told Congress he was not prepared to authorize funding for those upgrades until a path forward is clear. Several signatories to the treaty have dedicated aircraft for the mission; others share or lease platforms from other nations for the task. Germany is the latest country to dedicate an aircraft for the mission, using an Airbus A319 converted by Lufthansa Technik. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/budget-policy-operations/how-us-open-skies-exit-could-undermine-arms-control