August 20, 2019 | International, Aerospace, Land
By: Jen Judson
HUNTSVILLE, Alabama — The Missile Defense Agency has a new director, Vice Admiral Jon Hill, who will be tasked to carry out major missile defense endeavors laid out in the Missile Defense Review released in January.
Hill is the son of an Army air defender and became deputy director of the agency in 2016. Prior to that he served as the U.S. Navy's Program Executive Officer for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) beginning in 2014.
The new director will have to guide the agency through a series of major decisions in the coming years —from refining its approach to a global, layered missile defense, to tackling advanced threats like hypersonic missiles, upgrading homeland defense to protect against, ballistic missiles, to designing, developing and initiating a space-based sensor layer, just to name a few.
With his expansive plate full, Hill said he's prepared to ensure the agency has investment in the right places and that efforts move as quickly as they can to outpace current and emerging missile threats.
Defense News sat down with Hill in an exclusive interview at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, to discuss his goals and the challenges ahead.
What are your major priorities as you take up your post as Missile Defense Agency director and what do you believe will be your biggest challenges on the job?
I would say the number one challenge is the poorly defined term of “transfer to the services.” After looking at this problem very closely, considering congressional language, looking at how it's interpreted differently, I really do think that, we, as a country, need to say what is the right thing to do to take care of the war fighter. That should be the number one issue here.
So there's been lots of discussion about the [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System]and the SM-3 [missile] transfer to the services. What does that mean? If it's operations and sustainment, that's done. Put it in the done pile. The Army invests heavily in the operations and sustainment of THAAD. I don't know what more we would want out of them. ... The [Army and Navy] are not running away from the mission. They want to execute the mission, and again, they do operations and sustainment very well.
I often hear that we don't know how to transfer. Look at the Aegis ships today. Navy procures those ships with Ballistic Missile Defense capability. The Navy has come in and said, “Hey, we're going to build a multi-mission radar to include BMD capability in SPY-6.” Man, what's wrong with that? That's fantastic. You look at the SM-6, where the Navy procures, produces that missile. It's a multi-mission missile. We insert sea-based terminal capability.
So it tends to come down to those two systems that are BMD focused — SM-3 and THAAD — and so that's why it gets suspicious when we don't have a fully defined term because all it really results in is fracturing a program during a time where it's most critical to have those programs stable and taking care of the warfighter.
What are some other priorities and challenges you will tackle?
I would say the bigger challenge though is really driven by the threat today and Dr. [Michael] Griffin [under secretary for research and engineering in the Office of the Secretary of Defense] speaks about the Space Development Agency. We're aligned with the strategy, we're aligned with their architecture and their engineering of [a space] constellation because we bring the capability for hypersonic and ballistic tracking. We have support from Congress to do that. The department wants and needs us to go do that.
It's just important to get that deployed as soon as possible. So we have to maintain stable investment. We need to get to a near-term, on-orbit demo as fast as we can, and then we need to build out the constellation in concert with the Space Development Agency. If we do that, we're in a great place.
And in parallel, we need to start looking at our existing systems, which we have been doing. We're making modifications to today's sensors, both terrestrial and in space today on ships, on land, and we're modifying those today to deal with that new, high-end threat. We're also looking at existing weapons. What can they do? Somewhere in that battle space though, there's probably the need for more capability and that's really the next step and where we as a country need to go.
You advocated for a Hawaiian missile defense radar and noted that while the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System, designed to protect the homeland, is a good system, more radars need to be in place. Can you talk more about the advanced threat and the need to enhance missile defense sensing capability?
When you look at a ballistic flight for example, you boost, you have things like V-Bands and separation mechanisms, you've got staging, you've got post-boost vehicles, and you've got the lethal object; that's messy from the standpoint of a radar. So when the radar's staring at all that mess — the word discrimination means, “Hey, I've have got to discriminate all the garbage and make sure I'm pointing at the right thing.” Reduce the amount of radar energy I'm putting on all the garbage, so I've got to very quickly discriminate. So discrimination's important. And as they become more complex, the radar, in a sense of the architecture we have today, is not ready to take on larger numbers coming in and more complexity. Having a large radar on the island allows you to see out far. So the bigger the aperture is, the more fine detail it gets too.
I think we owe it to the Hawaiian people. We owe it to that state. It's part of this country and they deserve to be defended and they want to be defended. We have great congressional support. So at the federal level we're good, at the state level, we're good. We're at the sensitive level now where the local communities are concerned about what it means for the environment and we understand that. So we're working very closely with them. It's an important capability. It fills out the sensor architecture and takes us to the next level in terms of central architecture in that region.
Why do we need a space-based missile defense sensor layer?
We're running out of islands to put radars on and the ships that the Navy has, they are equipped with 360-degree radars, very powerful radars that can discriminate. But ... we need to free up those ships as much as we can and get as much persistent sensor coverage as we possibly can. And space really answers the mail on all those aspects, it frees up those other assets that we can go use for other missions.
An analysis of alternatives has been completed on hypersonic defense. Is there anything you can share about the findings in the AOA and how that is guiding the path forward?
For that space mission you have to look at the sum total of the detection, the control and the engagement. [It is] the sensors, it is the command-and-control, it is the fire control and it is the weapons, whether they're hard kill or non-kinetic. So, it's all of that. It provides the department a broad view: here is the threat space we're dealing with, here's the architecture, here are the pieces of that architecture that do detection, control and engagement. And now Department of Defense, where shall we put our next dollar? Could be that next dollar goes to space. It could be that next dollar goes toward fire control improvements so that you can handle something that's flying this fast, greater than Mach 5. It could be that we're going to put another dollar on improving an existing system or that we need a new engagement system. So that's what it does. It's really a tool. It's not the answer. I've seen a lot of the reports that say, “Oh my God, it's so expensive. We'll never execute it.” The intent is never to go fully execute what's in an AOA. It's the full trade space. Now we've got to go pick from that trade space and so we finished up a [Cost Assessment Program Evaluation] sufficiency review. Not only have we done the work to do the alternatives ... the CAPE has come in and they've costed those out to say, here's what's a reasonable set. The department can make a decision as to what would be best.
Is the SM-3 Block IIA missile test that goes up against an intercontinental ballistic missile threat still scheduled for next year?
It is still scheduled for next year. Now what you should know is that Congress has sent us some messaging that says maybe we don't want to do that, maybe we should more fully explore the battle space for which the missile was designed. ... Congress first told us to go against an ICBM. That's what we're focused in on. And so if the appropriations come through and there's a change, then we have to go back and replan.
Would the delay in the test result in overall program delays?
It wouldn't delay the program. But it makes it difficult for us to say that there is a potential for an underlay. So, if we want to give the combatant commanders a layered defense against ICBMs, it kind of takes that off the table or it delays that for awhile and we'll use the IIAs for their intended battle space and we won't try to expand it.
What's happening with the “strategic pause” on the Redesigned Kill Vehicle for the GMD system?
We're still in a decision space. ... Dr. Griffin is going through the end-game of discussions now within the building. We're in full support and in the end we'll make a decision and we'll press forward with that.
Do you have a timeline for making a decision on the RKV?
We're definitely pressured and what drives that pressure is the fact that we were on a path to deliver the additional 20 [ground-based interceptors]. ... We're building out the missile field. So there is pressure to come to a decision quickly so that we can then get back to work.
October 31, 2023 | International, Naval, C4ISR
A submarine community reorganization is allowing greater focus on submarine sustainment, weapons production and new capabilities like Project Overmatch.
September 24, 2019 | International, Aerospace
Adaptive engine technology faces its first major funding crisis as a 13-year-long, $4 billion investment by the U.S. Defense Department approaches a key milestone. Senate appropriators have threatened to reduce the fiscal 2020 budget for the Adaptive Engine Transition Program (AETP) by nearly one-third. The $270 million cut would be “pretty devastating,” says David Tweedie, general manager of GE's advanced combat engine program. https://aviationweek.com/defense/us-air-force-faces-next-generation-engine-funding-crisis
December 2, 2019 | International, Land
By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — For over a decade, the U.S. Army has used one source — Oshkosh Defense — to build its Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, choosing to sole source to the company beyond its initial five year contract rather than reopen competition. Defense company Navistar is challenging the Army's choice to forgo competition and filed a lawsuit with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in early August. Nov. 26 was to be the day a judge would decide whether the U.S. Army violated the law by continuing to order vehicles from Oshkosh outside of the scope of the contract while avoiding competition. And while a bench trial happened, the judge hearing the case did not make a decision. It is unclear what's next or when a ruling could happen. Navistar decided to sue the Army after it was getting nowhere in its quest to get the Army to produce documents — through a protest filed with the Government Accountability Office — that would show the service's reasoning to continue to order more vehicles from Oshkosh without competition and without proper legal justification. The company contended that the Army did not justify and improperly awarded its most recent sole source FMTV procurement to Oshkosh, and failed to provide proper notice to possible competitors in accordance with federal acquisition regulations and the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), according to an extensive review of court documents by Defense News. In addition, the Army also ignored a stop work order, which automatically went into effect when a GAO protest was filed. Navistar filed two complaints: One that claims the Army violated the law when it continued to buy Oshkosh vehicles outside of the scope of its contract without holding a competition and another that claims the Army illegally continued to work on production of those vehicles despite a required stop work order that must go into affect once a protest is filed with the GAO. Since 2009, the Army has spent over $6 billion on FMTVs from Oshkosh. FMTVs are used for a wide variety of missions to include transporting capabilities that extend from cargo to missile defense radars. Navistar contends the Army had ample time to compete for follow-on FMTV orders, and the pool was deep with companies ready to provide vehicles that met the service's requirement, but the Army never did. A long saga The saga goes much further back than just the 2019 GAO protest and lawsuit. Navistar successfully protested the Army's initial award to Oshkosh back in August 26, 2009. As a result, the Army reviewed its decision, reaffirmed its selection of Oshkosh and awarded it a contract with a performance period of less than five years, set to expire at the end of 2013. The request for proposals ahead of the original contract award estimated 23,341 vehicles to be delivered over a five-year period. Following that, it was Navistar's belief that the Army would reopen the competition to deliver more FMTVs. Through a series of justification and approvals — five of them — the Army continued to extend the contract through August 25, 2019, arguing each time that it did not have the time to conduct a new competition to meet the service's needs. In its latest J&A in September 2016, the Army justified it needed another 1,744 FMTVs at an estimated cost of $575 million for total contract duration of 10 years. The Army argued that it needed to sole source FMTVs to Oshkosh because it didn't have 24 months that it would take to conduct a full competition to meet urgent requirements, while it acknowledged there were other companies to include Navistar that could build FMTVs. The service also justified the sole source award due to its plans to stop procuring the current version of the FMTV as it prepared to take delivery of a new FMTV variant, which was also competitively awarded to Oshkosh in 2018. Navistar chose not to compete for the new variant, according to court documents. The order in 2016 was to fulfill the Army's remaining needs between the end of the current variant and the future variant expected to be delivered in fiscal year 2020. Navistar again protested with the GAO the 2016 sole source award to Oshkosh for more FMTVs and ended up dropping the protest when it settled with the Army to supply some vehicles to Iraq. Without a J&A or any other documents justifying another order of vehicles, the Army, on June 28, 2019, announced what it described as the award of a $320 million contract modification for domestic purposes and for foreign military sales for the countries of Argentina, Djibouti, Iraq, Lebanon and Romania. The order was for an estimated 1,916 vehicles and extended the performance period of the contract out to 2021, 12 years past the original contract award. The announcement, according to Navistar, never disclosed that the Army had actually already ordered roughly 1,000 vehicles in excess of what was justified in the 2016 J&A. Navistar again filed a protest with the GAO over the orders made without a new J&A, but withdrew its protest in favor of filing a lawsuit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims when the GAO refused to require the Army to produce relevant documentation justifying the additional FMTVs. It wasn't until the company filed its complaint in federal court, that it was informed by the Department of Justice that the Army had never stopped work to produce the FMTVs ordered in 2019, Navistar reveals in court documents. Beyond the scope When the Army announced a new sole source procurement for FMTVs to Oshkosh in June, it caught Navistar by surprise because the service hadn't issued a J&A, which had been its practice after the original contract period of performance had ended, and is also required by law, the company argues in the court documents. The June announcement came on the heels of the five J&As that had included an extra 4,875 vehicles and $1.4 billion more to Oshkosh outside of the scope of the original 2009 contract and procured without competition, Navistar notes. Navistar also learned that the Army, months prior to June 28, had already placed tens of millions of dollars in sole source orders for hundreds of FMTVs beyond the scope of the 2016 J&A. Navistar argued a new J&A to cover the 2019 orders was needed because the previous J&As only provided enough authority to solve the Army's claimed immediate needs and were very specific in number and delivery time frame and laid out what trucks were needed by which units and where. The company contended that the original contract and subsequent J&As didn't and shouldn't provide the Army with “a blank check” to continue buying more vehicles without justifying competition. And it argues that the Army, three years beyond 2016, had ample time to prepare to compete for remaining FMTV orders. A contract or a blank check? While the Army's arguments are sealed under a protective order and not available for public review, Oshkosh argued in a response to Navistar's complaint, that the original 2009 contract was a “requirements” contract considered valid through August 25, 2019, for any orders placed. The J&As were essentially just amendments to the original contract. Navistar disagreed and argued that each subsequent J&A should be considered the binding contract and that previous contracts are expired. “CICA does not contain an exception to competition simply because a contract extension involves a requirements contract. To conclude otherwise would gut CICA's requirements," Navistar added. Oshkosh argued that the Army was required to fulfill all of its needs for the FMTV A1P2 through the Oshkosh contract in whatever quantity became necessary until the contract expires. The company also argued that the contract ceiling value had not been exceeded even with the 2019 orders. Oshkosh also argued that Navistar misinterpreted the difference between the ordering period under a contract and the delivery period. The company claims the contract covers the ordering period and not the delivery period, which can extend beyond. Navistar argued that the September 2016 J&A timeline covers the entirety of the contract to include delivery of the vehicles. Oshkosh also contends that the Army alerted all offerors in the original competition that except for monthly and annual limits there is no minimum quantity and no maximum of vehicles that the Army can order. And Oshkosh stated that the number of vehicles laid out in the Army's contract and subsequent J&As were just “estimates” and not a ceiling for orders. Additionally, any maximum ceiling just means a company isn't obligated to honor any orders placed above that level. For Navistar, Oshkosh's interpretation goes against the core of the Competition in Contracting Act. “These J&As do not contain any rationale that would enable the Army to procure an indefinite quantity of Oshkosh vehicles for years into the future - they only provide enough authority to solve the Army's claimed immediate problem of requiring vehicles quickly before a competition can be performed,” Navistar argues. The amendment Deviating from its normal course, the Army retroactively revised or amended the September 2016 J&A in early June instead of issuing a new J&A, scratching out original numbers and costs and replacing them with new numbers and new cost estimates. The amendment was made at the request of the Army's director of policy only after orders earlier in 2019 were discovered to have gone beyond the scope of the 2016 J&A. According to CICA, agencies are not allowed to avoid competition requirements by using the device of a contract modification. The Army did not notify potential offerors of the amendment and claimed, according to Navistar in its response to the court, that the only reason for the amendment was to alert Army leadership of the change. “There is no requirement for the Army to amend a J&A as a method of notifying its own leadership about procurement actions,” Navistar notes. Additionally, Oshkosh argued in its response to Navistar, that the director of policy's request in an email to amend the J&A because orders had fallen out of the scope, was just “the author's view.” Navistar writes, “The Army's attempt to authorize its prior illegal actions along with the Army's official position at the time the amendment was executed (that its sole source actions were “beyond the scope” of its earlier J&As) are damning indicators that the Army failed to justify its 2019 sole source contract action and that it knew its actions were wrong." Army didn't hit pause It's commonly known in defense acquisition that when a GAO protest is filed, work must stop on any contract award at issue until the GAO renders a decision roughly 90 days later. But the Army didn't stop Oshkosh from ordering parts and beginning work to build vehicles wrapped up in the Navistar protest filed July 8. The service doesn't dispute this fact, according to court documents. Navistar was not made aware the Army had continued to execute the disputed sole source orders until it filed its lawsuit at the court. Once alerted by a DOJ attorney that the Army had not stopped working, the company issued a separate complaint addressing the Army's failure to stop working on the contract in accordance with the law. The Navistar complaint states the Army continued to work in secret and did not alert the GAO or Navistar that it was proceeding with the performance of the protested contract. The Army didn't take any action to override the requirement to stop working on roughly 1,365 vehicles covered under the protest. The Army did stop work on 75 vehicles destined for Iraq and Djibouti, but that did not happen for days after the protest was filed with the GAO. The service “inexplicably”, according to Navistar's response to the Army's sealed arguments, believed in “good faith” that the only vehicles in dispute were the 75 vehicles that were bound for Iraq and Djibouti. Navistar states that the administrative record “contains no explanation, documentation or reasoning” as to why the Army failed to stop work. “The Army cannot claim ignorance of its legal obligations (as it appears to be doing) in order to avoid the consequences of its statutory violations,” Navistar argues in its response. The service's argument, according to Navistar's response, focuses on a July 12 phone call it had with Navistar's defense counsel where it claims that the focus of the call was on Iraq and Djibouti requirements, but includes nothing related to it in the administrative record provided to the court. Navistar lays out that the stop work order for the 75 vehicles came at 10:15 a.m. on July 12 before the 10:30 a.m. call with Navistar's counsel. The call was scheduled at the request of the Army's counsel and Navistar's lawyers were advised to come prepared to address the number of FMTV vehicles that it could produce on an expedited basis and the schedule under which it could deliver. According to a declaration submitted to the court, Navistar's lawyers said the Army's counsel offered to try to resolve the protest by giving Navistar contracts to provide vehicles for Iraq and Djibouti. Navistar said it would not agree to a resolution unless the Army agreed to have Navistar provide a more substantial volume of both domestic and foreign military sales vehicles. The Army's lawyers said they couldn't agree with that and indicated they would have to proceed with the protest. And while Iraq and Djibouti were discussed, “the Army could not have reasonably come away from that telephone conference with such a belief,” that the protest only covered those 75 vehicles, according to Navistar's response. To Navistar, it was clear from the beginning that its protest covered all orders in 2019 made beyond the scope of the 2016 J&A. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/11/27/navistars-challenge-against-us-army-over-vehicle-buys-hangs-in-the-balance/