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May 5, 2023 | International, C4ISR

US Army revising how it develops, deploys advanced networking gear

As the U.S. Army prepares for potential conflicts in the Indo-Pacific or Europe, it is placing increasing emphasis on the division, some 15,000 soldiers.

https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/it-networks/2023/05/05/us-army-revising-how-it-develops-deploys-advanced-networking-gear/

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  • Japan Could Pick And Choose Components From Tempest

    December 2, 2019 | International, Aerospace

    Japan Could Pick And Choose Components From Tempest

    Bradley Perrett Japan says it wants international collaboration in developing its Future Fighter for the 2030s, but it wants to lead the project despite limited experience in fighter development. And it aims at a fighter much larger than any operated by a western European country ; the U.S. is not offering a possible joint project. That seems to leave only the choice of indigenous development, perhaps with help from a foreign technical partner. Nevertheless, participation in the UK's Tempest program may also be feasible. The Tempest project—which includes the Royal Air Force, BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce and MBDA—has a cooperation concept that leaves scope for Japan and other partners to use their own systems, weapons, propulsion and even airframes, says Air Commodore Daniel Storr, head of combat aircraft acquisition at the UK Defense Ministry. The model described by Storr gives Japan the flexibility to choose the size of its own fighter. Though evidently not an objective, this mix-and-match approach also creates an opportunity for Japan to continue to claim development leadership—but also to save money by sharing systems. The policy goal of running its own fighter program, stated in 2018, has looked like a big obstacle to Japan's participation in the Tempest or the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project initiated by France and Germany. But if the Future Fighter shared only some features with Tempest, Japan could reasonably say it was leading its own program. BAE Systems promoted the Tempest program at the DSEI Japan exhibition held in Tokyo fromNov. 18-20. Prospective FCAS prime contractors, such as Airbus, did not show their concept. Storr outlined the flexible model of cooperative development at an exhibition conference, but Japanese speakers at that event did not comment on the prospect of Japan joining Tempest. In a Nov. 1 interview with The Financial Times, newly appointed Defense Minister Taro Kono seemed to play down the possibility of participation in a European program, saying Japan should explore all possibilities but needed to maintain interoperability with U.S. forces. Storr addressed that point, emphasizing that working with the U.S. was a high priority for the UK too. Japan's alternative to international cooperation is developing a fighter by itself with the technical help of a foreign company. Lockheed Martin is supporting the Korea Aerospace Industries KF-X and BAE is helping the Turkish Aerospace Industries TF-X in such an arrangement. By working with Lockheed Martin, Boeing or Northrop Grumman, Tokyo would partially compensate the U.S. for its expenditures in defending Japan. But the U.S. would gain little from technical support fees, and Japan is already committed to buying 147 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightnings as the aircraft to precede the Future Fighters. The defense ministry has asked for the development of the Future Fighter to be launched in the fiscal year beginning April 2020. It is not clear whether that means mobilizing resources to commence full-scale development or taking some lesser step to firm up the commitment to create the aircraft. For the past year, the government's policy has been to launch no later than March 2024. However, Japanese companies, especially fighter builder Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), are pushing for a launch as soon as possible. They want to transfer knowledge to young engineers from the older generation that developed Japan's last fighter, the MHI F-2, which the Future Fighter will replace. The UK does not want to commit to launching full-scale development of the Tempest before 2025, but its date for entry into service in 2035 meets Japan's objective, which is sometime in the 2030s. Meanwhile, the FCAS program is aiming at 2040. Sweden and Italy are cooperating with the UK during the current early stage of Tempest research, while Spain has joined France and Germany for FCAS work. Like Storr, BAE has stressed the advantages of partners taking only as much of the Tempest as they want. “There is a range of different partnership models that can be considered,” says Andy Latham, who is working on the program. “Japan has some great technology that any partner can benefit from. Their avionics industry is pretty effective.” The cooperation concept replaces the standard model, one in which partners spend years negotiating and compromising to define a design that all of them must accept. Instead, according to Storr, they can save time and money by agreeing to disagree—to the extent that each is willing to pay the extra cost of independent development and manufacturing of design elements. The Japanese defense ministry's studies point to a need for a very big fighter with an empty weight well above 20 metric tons (40,000 lb.), larger than the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor. Superior endurance and internal weapon capacity are the key factors behind this choice. No western European country has operated a fighter more than about two-thirds as big, but Storr said a large configuration for the Tempest cannot be ruled out. The mockup exhibited at the 2018 Farnborough International Airshow was bigger than the F-22. Still, the UK and other European partners might want a much smaller fighter; concept designs that have not been shown are not as big as the mockup. But the concept for cooperation would allow for Japan to devise its own airframe while, for example, using the same engine and some weapons, software and avionics as other partners. The architecture of the software is intended to be open, accepting different programs easily. Tempest researchers will consider which systems and capabilities will go into the fighter and which will be incorporated into the ammunition or an accompanying drone, which could be fully reusable or optionally expendable, Storr says. The FCAS program is taking a similar approach. The Tempest will need great capacity for generating electricity, he says, and the weapon bay should be regarded as a payload bay, perhaps for holding additional fuel that would extend endurance on surveillance missions. The Japanese finance ministry is insisting upon private investment in the Future Fighter program, in part to ensure contractors are fully incentivized to prevent failure. Contractors will be able to make money in civil programs from technology developed for the fighter, says the ministry, which is highly influential but does not have a final say. “Judging from past program examples, it is clear that the Future Fighter program would bring a risk of a budget overrun and schedule slippage, but would also benefit the private sector,” the finance ministry said in an October presentation to the Council on Fiscal Policy, an advisory body. “The government and private sector should invest funds and resources to build a failure-proof framework.” Noting that MHI used technology from the F-2 program in its development and manufacturing of the outer wing boxes of the Boeing 787, the ministry says contractors can expect to gain similar opportunities for civil applications of technology from the Future Fighter program—so they should invest in it. https://aviationweek.com/defense/japan-could-pick-and-choose-components-tempest

  • US Risks Losing 5G Standard Setting Battle To China, Experts Say

    May 12, 2020 | International, C4ISR

    US Risks Losing 5G Standard Setting Battle To China, Experts Say

    "We need some coherency around what we're actually doing on the public policy front, and we need some more technical coordination ... so we could at least be at the stage where we're still on the field, versus sitting on the sidelines trying to figure out how to catch up," said Brookings fellow Nicol Turner Lee. By THERESA HITCHENSon May 11, 2020 at 3:46 PM WASHINGTON: The United States needs to take a stronger role in setting international standards for 5G networks or risk losing the international market to China and undercutting US national security. Washington is faltering due to a lack of coherent policy on a wide swathe of foundational issues such as spectrum management for 5G usage, network supply chain security, infrastructure development and data sharing, experts say. As Breaking D readers know, the question of spectrum access is at the heart of DoD's fierce battle to overturn the FCC's approval last month of a plan by Ligado to convert L-band spectrum for satellites to build a terrestrial 5G mobile communications network that DoD and many other US agencies say will jam GPS receivers. “The US-China competition is essentially about who will control the global information technology infrastructure and standards,” said Frank Rose, a senior fellow at Brookings Institution and former assistant secretary of State for arms control, during a Brooking's webinar on Friday. “I think an argument can be made that in the 21st century, whoever controls the information infrastructure will dominate the world.” The webinar, called “Global China: Assessing China's technological reach in the world,” was based on a new series of Brookings' papers on topics ranging from Chinese plans for 5G, its progress in developing artificial intelligence (AI) weapons systems to biotechnology. The panel discussion echoed the concerns raised by a group of powerful Republican senators in an April 14 letter to Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette, Defense Secretary Mark Esper, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Led by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman James Inhofe, the senators worried that the Trump administration's moves to blacklist Chinese 5G behemoth Huawei (about which Sydney has written extensively) are in effect pushing the US into international irrelevance as Washington struggles to set a unique domestic path for network development. Commerce put Huawei on its so-called entity list last May citing national security concerns, and in August expanded its list of related entities subject to restricted US sales. Despite President Donald Trump's wild swings on whether to keep or lift the ban, those restrictions still stand. “Since Huawei's designation on the Department's Entity List in May 2019, U.S. technology leaders have been constrained from full participation in 5G standards-setting bodies because of uncertainty over whether such participation is prohibited by the Commerce Department's export control regulations. We are deeply concerned about the risks to the U.S. global leadership position in 5G wireless technology as a result of this reduced participation, and the economic and national security implications of any diminished U.S. role in 5G,” the senators wrote. Such standards bodies include the influential private-sector Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, the widely-recognized International Standards Organisation (ISO) and the UN's International Telecommunication Union (ITU) that sets global standards for spectrum usage. China's Houlin Zhao currently holds the ITU Secretary-General post, and China has been extremely active in ITU work to establish standards for 5G — an issue that the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission raised in its 2018 report to Congress. To remedy this, the senators called on the White House “to issue regulations as soon as possible confirming that U.S. participation in 5G standards-setting is not restricted by export control regulations.” And according to a May 6 article by Reuters, the Commerce Department is currently figuring out how exactly to do just that. Commerce, however, did not respond to a request for comment by press time. Nicol Turner Lee, a Brookings fellow specializing in Internet governance issues, told the panel while it was Europe that set the standards for 3G communications technologies, the US learned from losing that battle and so “stepped up” to lead the world in developing the technologies and standards for 4G LTE communication. US leadership on 4G in turn allowed it dominate the information revolution that underpins today's “digital sharing economy,” enabling tech giants Google and disruptive firms such as Uber. But the US now risks losing the 5G race to China, she argued, which will be at the heart of the next technological revolution. Mobile 5G cellular networks will provide the high speed and low latency (the time between data being broadcast and received by a user) communications capabilities required by the Internet of Things (IoT) and AI, both technologies hotly pursued by the US the Chinese militaries alike. In her paper, “Navigating the U.S.-China 5G Competition,” Turner Lee explained: “The United States and China are in a race to deploy fifth-generation, or 5G, wireless networks, and the country that dominates will lead in standard-setting, patents, and the global supply chain. While some analysts suggest that the Chinese government appears to be on a sprint to achieve nationwide 5G, U.S. government leaders and the private sector have been slowed by local and federal bureaucracies, restrictive and outdated regulations, and scarcity of available commercial spectrum.” The “current national security concerns of Huawei and ZTE, which are integral to the global supply chain for 5G equipment and software” not only are hindering the ability of US tech firms to play a leading role in international standard setting bodies, she said, but also cramping their ability to cooperate with firms in allied nations — leading to US market isolation. “To date, only five other partners have followed the U.S. lead in banning Huawei equipment in their communications infrastructures: Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand.25 Other U.S. allies, including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the U.K., are moving forward with their deployments with some restrictions,” Turner Lee wrote. Key to China's success in development of 5G networks has been the use of low- and mid-band radio frequency (RF) spectrum, according to experts, that for reasons of domestic regulation the US has been unable to match. Meanwhile, the US has been “spectrum stuck” — unable to move rapidly to figure out how different RF user communities — including military and commercial satellite operators and US military radar systems — can share the limited resources. Low-band spectrum, which includes the 600 megahertz (MHz), 800 MHz, and 900 MHZ bands, can cover longer distances and penetrate through walls of buildings. Mid-band spectrum is in the 2.0 gighertz (GHz) 6 GHz range, works at a higher speed and in some instances provides higher fidelity. Indeed, the mid-band includes portions of the L-band spectrum, in the 1 GHz to 2 GHz range, at the heart of DoD's battle with the Federal Communications Commission over Ligado. L-band signals, used by GPS, are less likely to be degraded by clouds, fog and rain and can pass through heavy foliage. DoD, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Transportation — and a wide range of private sector companies ranging from satellite operators to truckers — are convinced that Ligado's planned network will jam GPS receivers.They are supported by a number of powerful members of Congress, including Inhofe and SASC Ranking Member Sen. Jack Reed, as well as the leadership of the House Armed Services Committee. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith and Ranking Member Mac Thornberry, together with 20 other members representing both political parties, weighed in last Thursday in a letter to the FCC Commissioners questioning the Ligado decision and expressing concern: “Section 1698 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 prevents the commission from approving commercial terrestrial operations in these bands until 90 days after the commission resolves concerns of widespread harmful interference by such operations to covered GPS devices. We are concerned that your approval of any mitigation efforts not rigorously tested and approved by national security technical experts may be inconsistent with the legislative direction to resolve concerns prior to permitting commercial terrestrial operations. We urge the commission to reconsider and impose additional mitigation steps to address the concerns of these users.” HASC intends to hold a classified hearing to focus on the issue, including both DoD and the FCC. However, the Trump administration is divided on the worthiness of Ligado's plan — with the spat pitting Esper and Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao against Pompeo, National Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow, and Attorney General William Barr. Kudlow, Pompeo and Barr, who all are close Trump political allies, have praised the FCC's decision to approve Ligado's network — along with many in the terrestrial wireless industry — as a move towards helping the US gain primary over China in the 5G race. And the need for the US to move out quickly to establish 5G networks figures prominently in Ligado's various FCC filings. In a marathon SASC hearing last Wednesday, DoD CIO Dana Deasy and Research and Engineering head Mike Griffin strongly pushed back against that assessment. Griffin told the SASC that “5G is about capacity, latency, and scale. The Ligado proposal has absolutely nothing to do with latency and scale, and its capacity is on the order of three-and-a-half percent of the total spectrum capacity. Ligado's existence, plus or minus, makes absolutely no difference to the involvement of the US in the so-called 5G race,” he said bluntly. Deasy chimed in to back up Griffin, telling the SASC that “Ligado does not provide a 5G solution.” He explained that “the band in which Ligado operates is not even part of the FCC's 5G FAST Plan, which is the commission's blueprint for advancing US interest in 5G. The non-continuous bands that Ligado could bring the market are both fragmented and impaired.” FCC Chairman Ajit Pai last April approved the FAST Plan — for “Facilitate America's Superiority in 5G Technology — to free up some designated low-band, mid-band, and high-band spectrum now assigned to other uses use by 5G networks, as well as some spectrum currently unlicensed. That effort, however, has been complicated by squabbling among various operator communities. Deasy stressed that DoD “clearly recognizes the huge value of 5G not only for commercial use, but across the US military as well.” And for that reason, he said, DoD not only has a plethora of 5G projects underway, but also has launched a pilot project on how best to share mid-band spectrum being used by DoD radar systems with commercial 5G networks. DoD is partnering on the pilot with the National Spectrum Consortium, he said, which involves government, industry and academia. “The geopolitical battle is standard setting,” Turner Lee summed up during the Brookings' webinar. “We need some coherency around what we're actually doing on the public policy front, and we need some more technical coordination ... so we could at least be at the stage where we're still on the field, versus sitting on the sidelines trying to figure out how to catch up.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/us-risks-losing-5g-standard-setting-battle-to-china-experts-say

  • Contracts for April 13, 2021

    April 14, 2021 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    Contracts for April 13, 2021

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