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May 13, 2022 | International, Land

Thales remporte une commande de l’OTAN pour fournir des viseurs de casque Scorpion à la Garde nationale aérienne américaine

Thales a reçu une commande pour équiper les pilotes de F-16 de la Garde nationale aérienne américaine (Air National Guard) avec des écrans montés sur casque (HMD) Scorpion, dans le cadre d'un accord qui mettra ce système à la disposition des forces de l'OTAN. Le contrat fournira à l'Air National Guard des kits de rétrofit Scorpion pour remplacer l'actuel système de repérage monté sur casque (JHMCS) pour sa flotte d'avions F-16 block 40 et 50. Scorpion doit devenir la solution HMD commune à l'ensemble de la flotte de F-16 block 30, 40 et 50 de l'Air National Guard et de l'U.S. Air Force Reserve. « Le passage de l'ensemble de la flotte de F-16 à Scorpion témoigne de la capacité, de la qualité et du faible coût du cycle de vie que Scorpion offre aux combattants et à la Garde aérienne », a déclaré Mike Sheehan, président-directeur général de Thales Defense & Security. « La conscience situationnelle supérieure de Scorpion, avec un seul écran qui fournit une symbologie couleur et permet l'utilisation de lunettes de vision nocturne non modifiées, est inégalée sur le marché des HMD. De plus, nous pouvons fournir la même mise à niveau à tout client volant un avion équipé du JHMCS ».

Le Journal de l'Aviation du 13 mai

On the same subject

  • Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties

    June 9, 2020 | International, Aerospace

    Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties

    By: Sarah Bidgood Russia recently published a new document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Its release marks the first time that Russia's official policy on deterrence has been made publicly available. As others have observed, this document is an example of declaratory policy aimed primarily at a foreign audience — and should be read with this orientation in mind. Still, it contains information that helps readers better understand how Russia thinks about nuclear weapons, and this certainly makes it worth a close examination. Some of the more useful insights this document offers pertain to Russia's threat assessments and what it sees as likely pathways to nuclear use. A number of these threats line up with American declaratory policy as reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These overlaps are noteworthy, since the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been able to work together to mitigate mutual threats even when their bilateral relationship is in crisis. As such, they can point toward ways to get arms control back on track at a time when it is in deep trouble. One such area of overlap appears in section 19C, which covers the conditions that could allow for nuclear use. This list includes an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions." The similarities between this language and that which appears in the 2018 NPR are considerable. That document identifies “attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian populations and infrastructure and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” as a significant non-nuclear strategic attacks that could warrant the use of nuclear weapons. These parallels suggest that an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear command, control and communications systems could be of interest to both Washington and Moscow. A treaty along these lines would help to shore up crisis stability while rebuilding trust and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. It could also become a multilateral approach involving the five nuclear weapon states, which have been meeting regularly to discuss risk reduction and other topics. This would represent one of the few concrete outcomes of these discussions, which have been met with cautious enthusiasm but have so far failed to bear much fruit. Another example of mutual U.S.-Russia threats appears in section 12E of the Russian document. Here, the “uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture” are described as risks that nuclear deterrence is meant to neutralize. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons seems to remain a focus of U.S. nuclear policy, too, and the 2018 NPR commits to strengthening institutions that support “verifiable, durable progress on non-proliferation.” This ongoing shared interest is an argument for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, especially as it relates to strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. There is a long history of engagement between the two largest nuclear weapon states on nonproliferation, even at times of major discord in their relationship. Successful outcomes of this cooperation include the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty itself, which the United States and the Soviet Union concluded 50 years ago to stop additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite decades of joint work toward this shared goal, the rift between Washington and Moscow has now brought most bilateral efforts in this area to a halt. As some in Iran, Turkey and Germany contemplate the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it's time for the U.S. and Russia to shore up the credibility of the regime they built. Other sections of Russia's document offer additional glimpses into Moscow's perceived threats, although not all find ready analogs in U.S. declaratory policy. Many relate instead to the possibility that an adversary will carry out a conventional attack on Russia. Sections 12 and 14, for instance, reference the risks posed by adversary deployments of medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons. They also mention the deployment of missile defense systems in space; military buildups by would-be adversaries of general-purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in territories neighboring Russia; and the placement of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapons states, among others. There is little here that would surprise most Russia-watchers, but if the U.S. is serious about pursuing “next generation” arms control, it is useful to have a list of potential topics for discussion that go beyond ballistic missile defense. This list might also prove helpful in negotiating asymmetric treaties or in identifying confidence-building measures that cross domains. Overall, this short document does provide greater clarity with respect to Russia's deterrence strategy, but it is ambiguous on many points as well. Olga Oliker, the International Crisis Group's program director for Europe and Central Asia, noted, for instance, it does not settle the debate over whether Russia has an “escalate-to-deescalate” policy, and it is (unsurprisingly) vague about the precise circumstances under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons. Still, despite leaving some questions unanswered, the document offers a valuable window into Russia's strengths and vulnerabilities as they appear from Moscow. While likely not the intended signal this document was meant to send, it nevertheless points to possible opportunities for engagement when other good alternatives are hard to see. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/08/russias-new-nuclear-policy-could-be-a-path-to-arms-control-treaties/

  • The Navy will test pushing new software to ships at sea

    March 20, 2020 | International, Naval, C4ISR

    The Navy will test pushing new software to ships at sea

    By: Mike Gruss The Navy plans to test next year whether it can push new software — not just patches but new algorithms and battle-management aids — to its fleet without the assistance of in-person installation teams. Navy officials plan to send the first upgrades to the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln's C4I systems for a test in early 2021, officials said during a March 3 media roundtable at the West 2020 trade show in San Diego. Today, Navy teams frequently deliver security patches to ships, but that process does not allow for new capabilities. The reason is because service officials fear that one change to the ship's software could have unintended consequences, creating a cascading effect and inadvertently breaking other parts of the system. But in recent years, Navy officials have embraced the idea of digital twins, which are cloud-based replicas of the software running on a ship's systems. This setup allows Navy engineers to experiment with how new code will react with the existing system. It also helps software developers work on the same baseline and avoid redundancies. Ultimately, the setup offers Navy officials a higher degree of confidence that the software they're uploading will work without any surprises. The Navy completed its first digital twin, the Lincoln, in fall 2019 and has started building a digital twin of the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt. Eventually Navy leaders expect to complete a digital twin of all the service's ships. However, only those in the fleet that have already been upgraded to a certain version of the Navy's tactical afloat network, known as the Consolidate Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services program, or CANES, would be eligible for the over-the-air updates. “In the Information Warfare community, software is a weapon,” Rear Adm. Kathleen M. Creighton, the Navy's cybersecurity division director in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare, told C4ISRNET in a March 17 statement. “If we were to ask a warfighter if it would be valuable to conceptualize, order and receive additional kinetic capability at sea, of course the answer would be yes. The same is true of software. “In an ever-dynamic warfighting environment, the ability to improve, add to, or build new capabilities quickly has extraordinary value. We believe our sailors on the front line are the best positioned to tell us what they need to win. That is what we are trying to accomplish. Put the warfighter's perspective at the center of the software we deliver and do it iteratively at speed.” In this case, think of a capability update for a ship much like downloading a new app on a smartphone. Today, some ships in the fleet can receive security updates for applications they've already downloaded, but they cannot download new applications. Navy officials expect that to change. The new capability would arrive as an automatic, over-the-air update or come pierside, but would not require an installation team as is the case today. “Anytime there's a new capability or a new change, we're just going to do it the same way that you get that done on your smartphone,” said Delores Washburn, chief engineer at the Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific, which is leading the change. “What we will be able to [do] now is do a rapid update to the ships.” Navy engineers hope to be able to push the updates as quickly as war fighters need them. “We're going to try to go slowly here because, again, we're having to tackle simultaneously cultural, technical and operational problems,” said Robert Parker, the deputy program executive officer for command, control, communications, computers and intelligence. The Navy plans to test this new arrangement by installing a set of software, performing an update and then fairly quickly pushing that update to the ship. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/it-networks/2020/03/19/the-navy-will-test-pushing-new-software-to-ships-at-sea/

  • Air Force transforms existing program office into its new software development hub

    September 18, 2018 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR

    Air Force transforms existing program office into its new software development hub

    By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force's program executive office for battle management has been redesignated PEO Digital, but it's more than a name change, the service's top acquisition executive told Defense News. Instead, it's about taking one of the Air Force's most diverse acquisition portfolios — covering everything from JSTARS ground-surveillance planes to certain communications gear — and transforming it into the headquarters of agile software development as the service moves forward with evermore sophisticated information technology programs, said Will Roper, assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, technology and logistics. In at least the beginning, it will look much like the service's program office for buying services. “It won't do all of the software development for the Air Force. There's no way it could,” Roper said in a Sept. 7 interview. But the hope is that it will be able to manage agile software development for some of the Air Force's most tricky programs, while at the same time providing expertise and software development tools to the rest of the program offices. “As programs shift to agile development, where they're pushing code out every month, where they are working directly with the user, where they are measuring their output using metrics that tell them whether it's good code or bad code, PEO Digital will provide Air Force standards for doing it and a playbook for making it work,” Roper said. FUll article: https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/air-force-association/2018/09/17/air-force-transforms-existing-program-office-into-its-new-software-development-hub

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