Taiwan moves closer to acquiring 160 Turkish-made Jackal drones

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  January 21, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  U.S. Military Given Authority To Defend Against Climate Change

  Lee Hudson The U.S. Congress is providing the military with direct responses to the threat of climate change. The passage of defense policy legislation provides the military with new tools to address the effects of the warming globe on strategic security interests, installations and readiness. Congress addresses climate change in defense legislation Climate change negatively affects military training That climate change is a threat to national security has been acknowledged by the military for nearly 30 years. In 1990, the U.S. Naval War College issued a report on “Global Climate Change Implications for the United States.” But in recent years, the issue has become politically charged, with the Republican-controlled House of Representatives voting in 2016 on an amendment to block Pentagon action on climate change. Now legislative support for addressing the security effects of a warming planet is growing. The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) characterized climate change as a direct threat to national security. Two years later, lawmakers are uniting around potential solutions. Last month, President Donald Trump signed into law the 2020 NDAA, which includes 10 provisions related to climate security. The bill made it through the Democrat-controlled House and the Senate, past Armed Services Committee Chairman Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.), who wrote a book in 2012 calling global warming The Greatest Hoax. The 2020 NDAA mandates creation of a Climate Security Advisory Council within the intelligence community to ensure analysis is informed by the best possible science. Intelligence experts must incorporate the foresight scientists have in projecting stress on various regions to predict potential crises. Establishing a Climate and Security Council is a positive step, John Conger, director of the Center for Climate and Security, tells Aviation Week. “If you know there is going to be a water shortage in some portion of the world, that would inform, for example, the assessment of whether that region is going to go unstable,” Conger says. Another provision in the bill related to climate-security strategic interests for the U.S. revolves around the Arctic. Section 1752 of the 2020 NDAA directs the Pentagon to consider sites for a strategic port in the Arctic and submit a report to Congress no later than June 2020. The document should include a cost estimate for construction and sustained operations at the site. For years, experts have rallied for the U.S. to have a more permanent presence in the Arctic as melting ice caps begin to open sea lanes to vessels from Russia and other nations. As the Arctic continues to warm, extreme weather has hit hard at existing bases in the continental U.S. In 2018, Hurricane Michael decimated Tyndall AFB in Florida. Tyndall was home to the Air Force's fleet of Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptors. The Air Force is still coping with the aftermath. While Tyndall is undergoing repairs, F-22s assigned to the 43rd and 95th Fighter Sqdns. have moved to other installations. The jets assigned to the 43rd relocated to Eglin AFB in Florida, while the 95th's aircraft are being spread out across F-22 units at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii, and Joint Base Langley-Eustis in Virginia. The military is not just concerned about its coastal bases. A few months after Hurricane Michael floodwaters reached 7ft. (2.1 m), damaging Offutt AFB in Nebraska and causing personnel to move aircraft and munitions to higher ground. The flooding damaged one-third of the Midwestern base, home to the headquarters of the nation's nuclear arsenal, U.S. Strategic Command (Stratcom) and the 55th Wing. The 55th Wing is Air Combat Command's largest wing, with an annual budget of more than $477 million, 45 aircraft, 31 squadrons and 7,000 employees. In total, the damage at Tyndall and Offutt will cost the American taxpayer an estimated $5 billion to rebuild. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein and former Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson had to beg Congress for $5 billion in emergency funding to begin rebuilding the installations damaged by natural disasters. Section 328 of the 2020 NDAA creates a dedicated budget line item for adaptation to and mitigation of extreme weather on military networks, installations, facilities and other assets. These include loss or obstructed access to training ranges. The bill defines extreme weather as recurrent flooding, drought, desertification, wildfires and thawing permafrost. In 2019, the Air Force submitted to Congress a “Top 10” list of installations at risk of extreme damage from chaging weather. Six of the bases are in Florida—Eglin, Hurlburt Field, Patrick AFB, Homestead Air Reserve Base, MacDill AFB and Tyndall. The base taking the top spot is Vandenberg AFB in California, home to the Space Force's Space Operations Command. The remaining installations at risk are Dover AFB in Delaware and Langley-Eustis in Virginia. “As developed, the above list reflects installations susceptible to the consequences of severe weather events: coastal and inland flooding, wildfires, and/or drought; not necessarily 50-100-year climatic changes,” the submission states. “This list does not look at any specific critical mission implications (i.e., even if the base is subject to flooding because a portion is within a 100-year flood plain, a mission-critical facility may not be impacted because of its location on the base or it is on high ground; e.g. the Stratcom Headquarters Building on Offutt AFB).” The Army assessed six climate vulnerabilities on its military bases in the U.S. The service is most concerned about desertification, or land degradation caused by dry conditions, affecting its installations especially at Yuma Proving Ground and Fort Huachuca in Arizona, Fort Irwin and Camp Roberts in California, Fort Bliss in Texas, White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, Hawthorne Army Depot in Nevada, Tooele Army Depot in Utah and Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado. “The analysis is based on climate science only and is not influenced by strategic or mission considerations,” the Army report says. The majority of the measures to defend the military against climate change to date are reactionary, but Section 2801a of the 2020 NDAA is more preventative, directing the Pentagon to incorporate military installation resilience into master plans; it authorizes funding for climate resilience projects. These installation master plans will specifically assess vulnerabilities to the bases and surrounding communities, identify missions affected by those susceptibilities and propose projects to address those weaknesses. “Until you start incorporating these risks into your master planning process, you aren't going to fully appreciate what you have to do at a particular location,” Conger says. “You can't just throw money at a problem not knowing what you're supposed to do.” The Navy paid attention to climate change early on because the service has the most coastal bases and infrastructures in its inventory. Separate from climate change, a few years ago Congress directed the Navy to study the infrastructure requirements of its shipyards. That assessment found that the dry docks at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Virginia were not high enough to deal with sea level rise, Conger says. The 2020 NDAA authorizes $49 million for a project at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to increase the height of the floodwalls around its dry docks. The shipyard's primary mission is the overhaul, repair and modernization of Los Angeles-class fast-attack nuclear-powered submarines. Climate change is also affecting the U.S. military's readiness levels because of an increasing number of Black Flag days, when the temperature rises to 90F or higher, and training is suspended. This affects units being able to complete a training syllabus on time, Conger says. “It's not like we've never done workarounds in training, but these are things where the training experts in all of the services will have to look at trends and figure out how to adjust what they have to do,” he says. “It is not something they're immune from; it's something they're going to have to accommodate and deal with.” https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/us-military-given-authority-defend-against-climate-change

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  December 13, 2023 | International, Aerospace

  Millennium to apply Victus Nox lessons to missile warning satellites

  The company in November passed a key design review for the Missile Track Custody program, which aims to develop a constellation of satellites in MEO.

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  January 14, 2019 | International, Land, C4ISR

  What to look for in the upcoming Missile Defense Review

  By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — The Pentagon's Missile Defense Review is in the final stages of pre-release, sources tell Defense News, after more than a year of release delays. The review, a congressionally mandated document looking at the status of America's missile defense capabilities, could be unveiled as soon as the next week, although it has yet to be briefed to Congress, sources say. And while there appears to be significant momentum to actually releasing the document soon, the release has seemed imminent in the past, only to be pulled back at the last minute. The document has been the focus of intense speculation from both the missile defense and nonproliferation communities, with a wide expectation that the document will call for investments in new missile defense technologies and, potentially, a notable change in America's missile defense posture toward Russia and China. For years, America has maintained that missile defense systems capable of defeating major strategic systems are being designed and deployed not at another great power, but only at rogue actors — chiefly Iran and North Korea — who might seek to strike at the U.S. or its allies. The National Security Strategy — the overall security guidance released by the Trump administration in late 2017 — underlines this thinking, stating that “the United States is deploying a layered missile defense system focused on North Korea and Iran to defend our homeland against missile attacks. This system will include the ability to defeat missile threats prior to launch. Enhanced missile defense is not intended to undermine strategic stability or disrupt longstanding strategic relationships with Russia or China.” But analysts, such as Thomas Karako of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, have argued that in an era of great power competition, as illustrated in the National Defense Strategy, it's foolish to lack a plan for defending American assets and allies against China and Russia. “For so many decades we've been standing there like Samson, pushing apart Russia and China on the one hand and missile defenses on the other, saying they're not related,” Karako said. “So in some ways, that implicit connection [from previous reviews] could become much more explicit and pursued more aggressively, and really it should be.” Citing a need to defend against Russian and Chinese weapons is simply stating a need to defend against a major challenger. But China particularly seems to grow as a concern year over year for the U.S. government; it's notable that acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan's message to his staff upon taking over the top job at the Pentagon was to focus on “China, China, China.” Members of the nonproliferation community, such as Laura Grego of the Union of Concerned Scientists, argue that the technology needed to ensure America can defeat a major nation's use of strategic weapons is so expensive and technically challenging that getting to that point will divert funding from better projects. That spending decision would also encourage potential adversaries to invest more, not less, in nuclear weapons to counter America's perceived missile defense improvements, the argument goes. “Even absent a specific policy to take on Russia and China more explicitly, planned missile defense plans continue to be made in patterns that Russia and particularly China will not be able to ignore,” she said. “Trying to counter China and Russia's strategic deterrent with missile defense is of course a fool's errand and gets us further from reducing nuclear weapons, not closer. I hope that wiser heads prevail.” It is important to differentiate between regional missile defense systems being placed to defend allies against Russia or China, and the bigger homeland defense mission, said Kingston Reif of the Arms Control Association. For example, based on congressional guidance, it is expected the review will include ideas for countering hypersonic weapons, a threat currently originating from only Russia and China. “If the review goes so far as to broaden the role of missile defense to defend the U.S. homeland against Russian and Chinese missile attack[s], that would mark a major and radical change in U.S. policy,” Reif said. “The United States, Russia and China aren't taking into account the concerns the others have about their offensive and defensive developments sufficiently seriously to avoid increased risks of instability.” Technical capabilities While the great power competition may be a key driver, it is unlikely to be the only new aspect of the report. Karako hopes to see a layout for how missile defense capabilities fit into America's overall deterrence strategy, noting: “All capabilities are finite. So how is it that finite active missile defenses can contribute to deterring a Russia or China?" “Everyone knows if they want to, they could overwhelm a given defense. But it really comes down to how do certain capabilities deter aggression, opportunism, limited strikes, all these kind of things,” he said. “So I'll be looking for the articulation of how it contributes to overall deterrence for ourselves and our allies.” He's also keeping an eye out for how the document defines “integrated” missile defense systems, and whether planners can avoid stovepiping capabilities. Reif, for his part, is looking to see if there are increases in the Ground-Based Interceptor force in Alaska and California, or the creation of an East Coast missile defense site. Technologically, the report is expected to push for so-called left-of-launch technologies — capabilities that can take out a potential missile threat before it even leaves the launcher. “If you can see it early, you can kill it early,” Gen. John Hyten, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, said in August. “Driving that equation to the left has huge operational advantages because to actually shoot down a missile that somebody launched that comes back down on their head, do you think they are going to shoot another one? I don't think so. They are not going to shoot another one because it's just going to come right back down on their head, and so they stop shooting. Isn't that the whole point?” It's also expected the MDR will call for investment in laser systems, with Michael Griffin, the Pentagon's research and engineering head, saying in November that “you're going to see in upcoming budgets for missile defense a renewed emphasis on laser scaling across several” technology areas. In addition, expect talk of a space-based layer for missile defense, although that may be primarily focused on sensors rather than intercept capabilities — at least for now. Asked about space-based interceptors, Reif said: “Like a zombie that can't be killed, the idea keeps coming back. Pursuing space-based interceptors would be unaffordable, technically dubious and highly destabilizing.” The document, as ordered by Congress, must include milestone targets for developing new capabilities. It requires statements of five- and 10-year programmatic goals for developing capabilities, “as well as desired end states and milestones for integration and interoperability with allies, and a statement on the role of international cooperation,” per congressional guidance. Getting the MDR published has proven to be a nearly Sisyphean task for the Trump administration. Pentagon officials originally said the document would be released in late 2017 — then February, then mid-May and then late in the summer. In September, John Rood, who as undersecretary of defense for policy is the point man for the MDR, indicated the report could come out in a matter of weeks. And in October, Shanahan, then the deputy secretary of defense, said the document had been done “for some time.” There is also widespread speculation in the missile defense community that the review has been delayed, at least in part because of the warmed relations between the Trump administration and North Korea. Notably, the mid-May time frame for release, which was floated by Shanahan in April, lined up President Donald Trump's planned meeting in Singapore with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. While that meeting was canceled and then eventually happened in June, there was a sense the Pentagon did not want to do anything that could jeopardize those talks, such as releasing a report discussing how the U.S. could counter North Korean capabilities. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/01/11/what-to-look-for-in-the-upcoming-missile-defense-review