Space Force, partners to craft global supply chain strategy

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  January 11, 2021 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  French Defence Staff chief: France is making moves to guarantee its survival in the face of existential threats

  By: Gen. Francois Lecointre The singularity of the military lies in its raison d'être: to wage war in order to guarantee France survives an existential threat. To this end, the armed forces are alone in having limitless power to use deliberate force and to kill, if that is what the mission requires. This is what distinguishes them from law enforcement agencies who use force strictly in proportion to the risks incurred and who are constrained by the notion of self-defense. This military singularity is based on several fundamental principles. Discipline: The armed forces are the strength of the nation, and it is out of the question that one should be able — for even a second — to suspect them of wishing to become emancipated from legitimate political power. They are therefore strictly and totally subordinated to this political power, the delegatee of national sovereignty. As a counterpart to this subordination, the armed forces must be involved in making the decisions that they will implement under strong ethical requirements and with the knowledge that they may pay with their blood. Moreover, this very strict subordination to political power means they must also be perfectly neutral, both philosophically and politically. Responsiveness and availability: Together these must ensure that any form of surprise — the very essence of war — is averted. Nuclear deterrence is therefore the most successful expression of military singularity, notably because it is based on an operational organization and culture that guarantees its absolute responsiveness. The capacity for independent action: On the battlefield, an army must have every skill at its disposal so that it can conduct its mission, including in a totally disorganized environment. It cannot count on the services of the state and must therefore have on hand the whole range of professions it needs to carry out its mission, including those that might seem quite far removed from the implementation of force. If we relate this autonomy to reactivity, then the question arises of conferring the former in peacetime in order to guarantee the latter when the army needs to engage. Ethics: At the moment they commit the most extreme act possible — taking life — soldiers must be able to find support in high ethical standards and a corpus of values. More broadly, this is what constitutes a military culture, shared by all civilian and military personnel in the armed forces. Based on these principles, military singularity is expressed in many ways. Beyond the rules of status or pay, which first come to mind, it is notably the modes of operation, structuring and organization that singularize our armed forces. This notably involves subsidiarity; the creation of intermediary echelons whose task is to synthesize and summarize data for subordinates; and the capacity of commanders, who hold all the levers for action, to respond as fast as possible to a crisis. Military singularity today has been weakened by a certain number of changes: an organization and operational mode that gives preference to management over command; outsourcing; the adoption of civilian flow logic, including for vital functions; and the lack of reserves in military human resources. These phenomena are obstacles to our full effectiveness. We must consolidate military singularity by modernizing our defense tool into one that is capable of fighting in all fields, with sufficient mass, organization and depth of capabilities to allow it to assume all of its functions both in war and in crisis. This is the aim of the actions we are currently undertaking with the minister of the armed forces. To meet the objective set by the president of the republic — that France should have “a comprehensive, modern, powerful, balanced defense tool, implemented by reactive armed forces looking to the future” — the Military Program Law 2019-2025 must allow us to repair our defense tool before the next military program law modernizes it. We are working to restore the foundations of an organization and a culture compatible with the purpose of armed forces: to guarantee the survival of the nation in the face of an existential threat, in a world marked by uncertainty and a return of tragedy. Gen. Francois Lecointre is the chief of the French Defence Staff. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2021/01/11/french-defence-staff-chief-france-is-making-moves-to-guarantee-its-survival-in-the-face-of-existential-threats/

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  September 4, 2024 | International, C4ISR

  Zyxel Patches Critical OS Command Injection Flaw in Access Points and Routers

  Zyxel releases patches for critical vulnerabilities in routers, including OS command injection flaw CVE-2024-7261.

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  February 10, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  India Prepares For New Fighter Tender

  by Reuben F. Johnson While it is hard to believe, next year will mark almost 15 years since the Indian Air Force (IAF) embarked on a process to procure a new fighter. It will also be eight years since the force selected the Dassault Rafale for its Medium-Multirole Combat Aircraft (M-MRCA) program—a selection that was eventually not carried through to a license-production run as originally planned. The M-MRCA effort was planned for a procurement of 126 fighters by the IAF with an option for 63 additional units. All but 18 of these aircraft were to be license-assembled in India on a Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) production line. In 2012, India eventually selected the Dassault Rafale from a competition that included Russia's Mikoyan MiG-35, the Saab JAS-39E from Sweden, the Eurofighter, and both the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and a developed version of the Lockheed Martin F-16. The latter two are U.S. products. REPLACEMENT CRISIS However, in “winning a competition” such as this, a French industry official told AIN, “you do not really ‘win' anything. What you supposedly win is the right to then sit down and negotiate a contract—and if you cannot come to some agreement, then you get nothing after having spent tens of millions [of dollars] for all the years it takes to bid a major program in a place like India.” By 2015 the two sides had not come to an agreement on localized production, and in 2016 the new government of prime minister Narendra Modi ordered 36 Rafales “off-the-shelf,” the first of which has already been officially handed over to India. Seven of the aircraft should be delivered to the IAF between April and May 2020. This, however, still leaves the force woefully short of the force levels it says are needed to meet New Delhi's national security requirements. There is still no suitable replacement for the older (but modernized) MiG-21 Bison aircraft in service. There is also no solution to address the gap created by the 2018 Indian decision to withdraw from the HAL/Sukhoi joint program with Russia for a Future Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) program. India was to have purchased 127 of this aircraft, which would have been a heavily-modified version of the Sukhoi Su-57. After an IAF inspection of one of the program's prototypes, the force was calling for 43 major changes to the design to correct what it saw as deficiencies with the original configuration. VERSION 2.0 The consequence is that India—after some twists and turns—is on a path to issue another tender for what will be at least 100 of some aircraft to fill the void created by these developments. Originally, the program was to have been a competition for only single-engine airplane designs, which would have limited the competition to the JAS-39 and the F-16. The latter has now been re-christened the “F-21,” due to all of the changes that have been made to the design to accommodate Indian requirements. One of the changes was to add a probe-and-drogue refueling option in addition to the traditional USAF flying boom refueling method. This “single-engine only” competition was then widened to allow all of the twin-engine aircraft that participated in the original M-MRCA tender—with Russia's Sukhoi Su-35 now also thrown into the mix. This has prompted more than one observer to dub the still-officially unannounced re-running of the tender as “M-MRCA ver 2.0.” NEEDED: A SHORTER ACQUISITION CYCLE What makes this impending competition all the more critical for India's future defense posture is that the next-generation of aircraft carriers that will be coming online with the Indian Navy that will require a force of CATOBAR (catapult-assisted take-off barrier-arrested recovery) fighter aircraft. Both the Rafale-M and Boeing's Super Hornet are available for this mission and Saab has a design for a carrier-capable Maritime Gripen variant of the JAS-39E on the shelf that can be realized within a short time frame. What remains to be seen is whether or not a new tender can be carried out without making it a repeat of the arduous seven-year process that the original M-MRCA turned out to be. Suggestions had been made last year that a new tender could be carried out without an extensive set of flight trials to shorten the evaluation and down-select cycles. While there is no agreement on which aircraft type or types fit the requirements of both the IAF and the Indian Navy, there are numerous observers both inside and outside of India who disparage the manner in which the selection of a new fighter type has been carried out. “As it stands now, the methodology for buying a new fighter is an objectively dysfunctional process,” said one Indian aerospace expert. “The problem is that it will never change as long as the OEMs keep rewarding those who propagate that process without demanding that it change.” https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2020-02-06/india-prepares-new-fighter-tender