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  December 18, 2019 | International, Aerospace

  Study: Counter-Drone Systems Proliferate, Challenges Endure

  Graham Warwick Counter-drone systems continue to proliferate on the market, but technical and operational challenges in countering small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have not yet been fully surmounted, says a new report by the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, New York. The second edition of the Center's Counter-Drone Systems report lists 537 systems marketed by 227 companies in 38 countries, up from 235 in the first edition published in February 2018. This is despite removing 24 products from the database that no longer appear to be available. Citing a March 2019 solicitation by the Pentagon's Defense Innovation Unit which said “it has proven difficult to identify and mitigate threats using currently fielded technologies,” the report says “dozens of background interviews with military and law enforcement personnel have validated this assertion.” The challenges extend beyond the issue of effectiveness “and include complex questions around safety, practicality, policy and legality,” says the report's author, Arthur Holland Michel, founder and co-director of the Center. When it comes to detection effectiveness, radar may struggle to pick up small UAS flying close to the ground, while cameras might confuse a drone with a bird or aircraft and be degraded by poor weather, low visibility and strong sunlight. Electromagnetic interference may degrade the detection performance of radio-frequency sensors, with many potential sources of interference in urban areas. Radar, some RF systems and electro-optical/ infrared (EO/IR) sensors require line of sight to the drone, which can be problematic in urban areas. Acoustic sensors and RF detection systems rely on a library of sounds and signals emitted by known drones, but given the rapid rate at which drones are emerging on the market “even libraries that are updated often will never cover 100% of the drones that might be operating,” the report says. A major detection issue is the level of false negatives and false positives, the report said, noting that results of FAA testing of counter-drone systems showed distinguishing true positives from false positives in cluttered environments required a high level of manpower. Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate drone use is another issue. Remote identification technology and the FAA's pending Remote ID rulemaking, “may go a long way to addressing this issue once implemented, but it will not be a total fix,” the report says. There is a short time window available in which to respond to a drone threat and potential dangers posed to bystanders by some counter-drone interdiction techniques. Long-range systems such as lasers and high-power microwaves “could pose a serious threat to aircraft operated above the targeted drone.” In terms of interdiction effectiveness, the report points to results of a 2017 counter-UAS event staged by the U.S. Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Organization that showed the drones were resilient against damage. “More recent C-AUS exercises indicate this problem remains an enduring one,” it says. Jammers have no effect against drones operating autonomously without an active RF link; many signal jammers have an effective range of only a few hundred meters; spoofing systems may not be universally effective; and all kinetic systems may struggle against drones moving fast or in unpredictable patterns. Drone technology, meanwhile, is not standing still, the report says, noting research underway on UAS that can operate in GPS-denied environments, negating jamming, and are capable of actively defeating jamming or spoofing attacks. Consumer drones may soon be controllable via mobile LTE networks rather than an RF link, the report says. LTE drones could be operated at essentially unlimited range and “would be difficult or dangerous to interdict with jamming systems without interfering with ubiquitous cellular communications,” it says. The proliferation of counter-UAS systems will inevitably accelerate the development of technology to render them less effective, the report concludes, by programming drones to maneuver in patterns that make them hard to detect by automatic target algorithms. The report also highlights the challenges posed by drone swarms. “A swarm doesn't have to be dynamic or truly autonomous to achieve these effects: 10 individual drone operators flying 10 drones in unison may just be as difficult to defend against as a true autonomous swarm of 10 aircraft,” it says. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/study-counter-drone-systems-proliferate-challenges-endure

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  April 21, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Pentagon Predicts Three-Month Major Program Delay

  Lee Hudson The Pentagon predicts there will be a three-month slowdown for major defense acquisition programs because of the novel coronavirus pandemic. Aerospace, shipbuilding and small launch are the most vulnerable sectors in the wake of COVID-19, Pentagon acquisition executive Ellen Lord told reporters April 20. Out of the 10,509 major prime contractors, 106 have shuttered their doors, and 68 have closed and reopened. Of 11,413 vendor-based companies, 427 are shut down, with 147 having closed and reopened, she said. Lord's team has not identified specific programs but anticipates there will be schedule delays, she said. One of the measures the military is taking to support the defense industrial base is boosting progress payment rates to contractors, raising them for large businesses from 80% to 90% and for small businesses from 90% to 95%. “Based on submitted invoices, we expect payments at the higher progress payments to start this week, helping provide $3 billion in increased cash flow to industry,” Lord said. “I commend Lockheed Martin and Boeing for both publicly committing to ensure this cash flow goes quickly down the supply chain to small businesses who need it most.” The DOD is hoping other large defense contractors will make similar public announcements. The Pentagon's small business program office hosted a webinar with more than 1,000 companies to address their unique concerns, she said. Over the last few weeks, Lord's team has focused on supply chain “illumination” tools and found “international dependencies.” Specifically, the defense industrial base is being hit hard by supplier closures in Mexico and India. Lord spoke with the U.S. ambassador to Mexico on April 17 and on April 20 was sending a letter to the Mexican foreign minister asking for help in reopening international suppliers. The Pentagon also is hoping for additional aid from the American people via the second Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act. Lord would not pinpoint a particular amount, but the money sought is incremental funding for inefficiencies related to contracting, Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III, the defense industrial base and medical resources. In the inaugural CARES Act, DOD received $1 billion for DPA Title III, $750 million for medical resources and $250 million for the defense industrial base. The DPA Title III medical resources priorities are N95 masks, ventilators, active pharmaceutical ingredients, testing kits, suppliers and reagents, vaccines and delivery systems. The defense sector focus areas for DPA Title III include machine tools and industrial controls, aircraft supply chain illumination, chem bio, directed energy, radar, munitions, missiles, space, shipbuilding, soldier systems and ground systems. To date, the Defense Logistics Agency has provided more than 1.8 million N95 respirator masks, 3.2 million nonmedical and surgical masks, 54.8 million exam gloves, 8,000 ventilators and 275,000 isolation and surgical gowns to the military services, combatant commands, and several federal agencies, Lord said. “We have ordered face coverings for the workforce, 3 million active duty, guard, reserve and government civilians with deliveries starting this week,” she said. “We expect 135,000 by the end of April and 580,000 by the end of May.” For the first time ever, U.S. Transportation Command (Transcom) was able to use the Defense Threat Reduction Agency-developed transport isolation system to move three COVID-19 positive patients from Afghanistan to Germany. The system was developed in 2014 during the Ebola crisis. “The joint staff, Transcom, and the Air Force continue to work to ensure that we can safely transport COVID-19 patients from overseas locations to the United States,” Lord said. “We just issued a memo that directs contracting officers to support a U.S. Forces Afghanistan memo to redeploy at-risk contractor employees due to insufficient medical capability in-country.” The Pentagon anticipates this will affect fewer than 1,000 personnel. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/budget-policy-operations/pentagon-predicts-three-month-major-program-delay

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  August 21, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval

  The Navy's Fighter Shortage Is Finally, Slowly Improving

  By Kyle Mizokami The U.S. Navy's horrible fighter availability rate is gradually improving thanks to increased funding for fighter maintenance. At one point in 2017, just one in three F/A-18 Super Hornet fighters was available, a number that's increased to nearly half of all fighters. The problem is in large part due to past budget shortfalls and delayed introduction of the F-35 fighter jet. The U.S. Navy has 546 F/A-18E and F/A-18F Super Hornet fighters, larger, beefier, slightly stealthier versions of the original F/A-18 Hornet. Aircraft readiness rates, or the percentage of aircraft ready for deployment, should typically be north of seventy five percent, depending on type of aircraft, the complexity of the aircraft systems, and the age of the fleet. In 2017, the Navy's Super Hornet fleet hovered around 30 percent readiness, a shockingly low number the service blamed on minimal maintenance budgets and non-stop operations. The Navy struggled to place flight-capable aircraft with squadrons deploying on aircraft carriers. On the outside things looked fairly normal, as carriers went to sea with flight decks filled with Super Hornets. Behind the scenes however non-deployed squadrons suffered, acting as spare parts donors for deployment-bound ships. This cascading effect had negative implications for stateside squadrons and pilot training. According to DefenseNews, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer cited increased maintenance budgets over the past two years as a major part of the turnaround, allowing the service to fund repairs and spare parts. The service also streamlined maintenance processes, avoiding duplication and increasing efficiency. The maintenance crisis was caused by several problems. The high demand for strike fighters, particularly for combat operations against the Islamic State, increased the amount of wear and tear on the Super Hornet fleet. Super Hornets also act as aerial refueling tankers, increasing flight hours and wear and tear on the platform. Meanwhile the Navy struggled to operate within the budget mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act that trimmed federal spending. Making matters worse, so-called "continuing resolutions" passed during times of budget bickering to keep government going were an inefficient means of spending money and played havoc with the Pentagon's budget. Another problem that indirectly cause the crisis: a delay in the introduction of the U.S. Navy's version of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35C. The F-35C, meant to replace older F/A-18C Hornet fighters, is now at least three years behind schedule. As the chart above illustrates, the Navy originally expected the F-35C to be initial operations capable—when the first Navy squadron is at least partially combat-capable—in late 2015. That date has gradually slipped to late 2018 or early 2019. On the outside things looked fairly normal, as carriers went to sea with flight decks filled with Super Hornets. Behind the scenes however non-deployed squadrons suffered, acting as spare parts donors for deployment-bound ships. This cascading effect had negative implications for stateside squadrons and pilot training. According to DefenseNews, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer cited increased maintenance budgets over the past two years as a major part of the turnaround, allowing the service to fund repairs and spare parts. The service also streamlined maintenance processes, avoiding duplication and increasing efficiency. The maintenance crisis was caused by several problems. The high demand for strike fighters, particularly for combat operations against the Islamic State, increased the amount of wear and tear on the Super Hornet fleet. Super Hornets also act as aerial refueling tankers, increasing flight hours and wear and tear on the platform. Meanwhile the Navy struggled to operate within the budget mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act that trimmed federal spending. Making matters worse, so-called "continuing resolutions" passed during times of budget bickering to keep government going were an inefficient means of spending money and played havoc with the Pentagon's budget. Another problem that indirectly cause the crisis: a delay in the introduction of the U.S. Navy's version of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35C. The F-35C, meant to replace older F/A-18C Hornet fighters, is now at least three years behind schedule. As the chart above illustrates, the Navy originally expected the F-35C to be initial operations capable—when the first Navy squadron is at least partially combat-capable—in late 2015. That date has gradually slipped to late 2018 or early 2019. As a result of this delay, the Navy was forced to extend the lives of five squadrons of older -C model Hornets while it waited for the F-35C. That work added to the burden of Navy maintenance units already working to keep Super Hornets flying. In addition to the Navy's maintenance work, Boeing is set to take 40 to 50 Super Hornets a year and upgrade them to the new Block III configuration. DefenseNews says this will also bring the jets in the worst shape back to flying condition. In the long term F-35C production should ease the burden on the Super Hornet community, as the fifth generation fighter will eventually equip half of the strike fighter squadrons deployed on U.S. Navy carriers. The executive branch's 2019 defense budget also plans for an additional 110 Super Hornets over five years. Finally, the Navy plans to acquire a small fleet of MQ-25 Stingray unmanned aerial refueling aircraft to take over tanking duties from the overworked strike fighters. Full article: https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a22778556/us-navy-fighter-shortage-progress